for it would result only in a return thereto by the judges of the court below that they have considered the application of the peti tioner, and in the exercise of the judicial discretion conferred on them by law, have rejected it. Under all our cases such a return would be conclusive and it would lead to no profitable result to allow the writ. It is therefore denied." Raudenbusch's Petition, 21 W. N. C. (Pa.) 432. Comp. § 431. SEE § 169, p. 233, note (b.)—In Pennsylvania it was held that the refu sal by a foreigner, who had arrived and become domiciled there, to receive and provide for his wife who followed him thither, was a virtual turning her out of doors, and gave the courts of that state jurisdiction, under its laws, to decree her alimony. Our statute," says Gibson, C. J., "is a municipal regulation for the protection of the community as well as the wife . . . It is proper, therefore, that [the husband,] and not the community, bear the burthen of her support:" McDermott's App., 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 251, 256. - p. 235, note 114.-In the absence of expressions to the contrary, acts made causes of divorce by statute, are exclusively acts arising within the state: McDermott's App., supra; Bishop v. Bishop, 30 Pa. St. 412. And where such statute permits divorces for certain causes arising "in any other state," this refers only to states of the Union, not foreign countries: Bishop v. Bishop, supra. Nor can a decree of divorce, pronounced by the court of such state, under such a statute, have any extra-territorial effect upon a non-resident respondent who was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court by lawful service and notice: Love v. Love, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 453. A statute, however, declaring, that, upon due proof at the return of the subpoena, "that the same shall have been served personally on the said party [respondent], wherever found,” etc., the cause may be brought to a hearing and a decree made, cannot be so construed as to give a state court extra-territorial power to bring within its jurisdiction the person of a citizen and resident of another state by a personal service upon him outside of the state of said court: Ralston's App., 93 Pa. St. 133. On the other hand, the refusal of a wife to accompany her husband to a foreign country is not, in itself, a wilful and malicious desertion within the meaning of a statute allowing absolute divorce for such cause: Bishop v. Bishop, supra. - p. 236, note (c).—A Pennsylvania statute which made it a misdemeanor for the cashier of "any bank" to engage in any other business, was held to refer only to cashiers of banks created under and by the virtue of the laws of that state, and not to cashiers of national banks: Allen v. Carter, (Pa.) 11 Centr. Rep. 673. (See the briefs in that case for collection of authorities.) - § 173, p. 238, note 120. See, in this connection, also: Mott v. Pa. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St., 9, 27, et seq., to the effect that one Legislature may not alienate the right of taxation so as to bind future Legisla tures. SEE § 196, p. 265, note 80.--Add, to same effect, Goodall v. People, (Ill.) 12 West. Rep. 824, and see State v. Duval Co., (Fla.) 3 So. Rep. 193, that an amendment purporting to set out all that the act, as amended, is designed to contain, repeals all of the original act that it omits. § 216, p. 288, note 18.-On the principle that general legislation upon any subject must give way to later inconsistent special legislation upon the same, it was held, in St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, (Vt.) 4 N. Engl. Rep. 509, that the charter of an incorporated village, authorizing it to "regulate" its victualing houses, repealed by implication, as to it, the general law on that subject. § 247, p. 328, note (a).—The provision of 22 & 23 Car. 2, requiring in "all actions of trespass, assault and battery and other personal actions," where the verdict is under 40 shillings ($5.331), the certificate of the judge to give plaintiff full costs to be made "at the trial of the cause," permits it to be made at any time between verdict and final judgment: Simonds v. Barton, 76 Pa. St. 434; nor does the provision extend to any actions, save trespass quare clausum fregit and for assault and battery: Ibid.; and where the question of the entry of judgment is to be settled by the same judges who tried the cause, semble, that the formal certificate is not required, but costs may be allowed or withheld according to the facts resting in the personal knowledge of the judges: Knabb v. Kaufman, 1 Woodw. (Pa.) 325 - 347, p. 481, note 127.-The term "costs ordinarily includes officers' fees, as well as the party's own charge for witnesses: Delong v. R. R. Co., 1 Woodw. (Pa.) 195. § 350, p. 485, note (a).-As to whether natural gas is "freight," and the conducting of it through pipes "transportation of freight,” see Carothers v. Philad'a Co., (Pa.) 11 Centr. Rep. 48. (See this case also as to the effect of the use of the word "trade" in the preamble on its construction in the body of the act.) Comp. § 353. § 521, p. 734, note 125.-In 1874, the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act for the incorporation and regulation of cities, the operation of which upon existing cities was, by one of its sections, confined to such as might choose to adopt it. These were empowered by the act to assess the cost of grading, etc., streets upon the properties fronting thereon, authorized to file liens for the amount against them, and to proceed to collect the same by scire facias, etc. A lien was filed under the act by the city of Reading in 1886. In 1887, the Supreme Court, in Scranton Sch. Distr. App., 113 Pa. St. 176, having declared option legislation as to cities special and unconstitutional, a new municipal law was enacted intended to comply with the principles of general legislation announced by the courts. One of its sections provided that "all taxes levied or assessments made in any of said cities . . . within five years next preceding the date of the approval of this act, are hereby made valid and said cities are hereby authorized and empowered to collect the same." An application to strike off the lien referred to was granted by the court of Common Pleas, on the ground that the General Assembly cannot by an enabling act indirectly make that constitutional which directly is prohibited as unconstitutional. Such legislation is just as obnoxious as the original Act." And the decision was sustained per cur. in the Supreme Court, in Reading v. Savage, decided April 30, 1888. INDEX. [The reference is to sections.] Abandoned and captured property act, 96. ABATEMENT, construction of act providing against, of actions, &c., on rule adopted from analogy with statute relating to, 327. See APPEAL, QUASH. Abduction, 64, 131, 133, 337. Abolition, see TAX. Abortion, what is procuring, 337. Absconding debtors, 436. Absence of defendant no excuse for non-service of summons, 10. editor, effect of, on liability for libel, 135 n. Absent persons, who included, 12. Absentees' estates, effect of act authorizing court to appoint trustees of, 120. Absoluta sententia expositore non eget, 4, 507. ABSURDITY, presumption against, 264, 267. to be avoided, 258 n. in constitutions, 509, 524. literal meaning leading to, rejected, 295. not to defeat act, 4. literal construction followed, though productive of, 11, 23. Abuse of power, presumption against construction permitting, 146, 150. Accept, 73. construction to avoid, 439. Acceptance, power of, involved in grant of power of gift, 427. Accessories, 375, 417. Accidental omissions, 317. See OMISSIONS. According to his discretion, 147, Account, 155 n. Accounts, 54 n. Accounts, jurisdiction in, 151. ACCUSED, right of, to demand nature and cause of accusation, 520. public trial, 524. See WITNESS. Acknowledged to have been paid, 345. ACKNOWLEDGMENT, necessity of seal to, 10. power to take, not inclusive of power to take of married woman by justice of the peace inter- acts relating to, 271, 284 n., 293, 294. conveyance by married woman without, 358 n. See ATTESTATION, INTERPRETER, LIMITATIONS, MARRIED |