admits of no doubt or secondary meaning, it is simply to be obeyed, without more; [for the intention, controlling though it be, can be resorted to only to find what the Legislature intended to do, not what it has done."] If it admits of more than one construction, the true meaning is to be songht, [first of all, in the statute itself as applied to the subject matter to which it relates"]-not on the wide sea of surmise and speculation," but "from such conjectures as are drawn from the words alone, or something contained in them" (a); that is, from the context viewed by such light as its history may throw upon it, and construed with the help of certain general principles, and under the influence of certain presumptions as to what the Legislature does or does not generally intend.

Leavitt v. Blatchford, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 9.

80 Tyman v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634; Virginia, etc. R. R. Co. v. Lyon Co., 6 Nev. 68.

81 Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 178.

82 Cearfoss v. State, 42 Md. 403. (a) Puff. L. N. C. 5, c. 12, s. 2, note by Barbeyrac.

CHAPTER IV.

PRESUMPTIONS ARISING FROM SUBJECT MATTER AND OBJECT OF ENACTMENTS, AS TO LANGUAGE USED.

§ 73. Words Construed with Reference to Subject Matter and Object. 74. Technical Meaning.

§ 86.

$87.

Restriction of General Words to Subject Matter, etc.
"Persons," and other General Words.

$104.

105.

§ 107.

108.

§ 110.

"Done" including "Omitted."

Qui Facit per Alium, etc.

Liberal Construction of Remedial Acts.

What are Remedial Acts.

Extension beyond Letter. General Intent.

§ 112. Extension to New Things.

$73. Words Construed with Reference to Subject Matter and Object. The words of a statute are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view (a). Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained (b). [That is, in the construction of a statute, as in that of other instruments, words are to be understood, not according to their mere ordinary general meanings but according to their ordi

(a) Sup., § 27.

(b) Per Cur. in R. v. Hall, 1 B.

& C. 136; Grot. de B. & P. b. 2, s. 16; Puff. L. N. b. 5, c. 12, s. 3.

nary meaning as applied to the subject matter with regard to which they are used, unless indeed there be something requiring them to be read in a sense which is not their ordinary sense in the English language as so applied.' "It is a general and very sound rule, applicable to the construction of every statute, that it is to be taken in reference to its subject matter." And equally the construction ought to be with reference to the object to be accomplished by the act, and to keep in view the conditions existing.] This is evident enough in the simple case of a word which has two totally different meanings. The Act of Ed. III., for instance, which forbade ecclesiastics to purchase "provisions" at Rome, would be construed as referring to those papal grants of benefices in England which were called by that name, and not to food; when it was seen that the object of the Act was not to prevent ecclesiastics from living in Rome but to repress papal usurpations (c). ["The same words might mean a very different thing when put in to impose a tax, from what they would mean when exempting from a tax."] The "vagabond" of the Vagrant Act, is not the mere wanderer of strict etymology (d). No one is likely to confound the "piracy" of the high seas with the" piracy of copyright; or to give, in one branch of the law, the meaning which would belong, in another, to a host of familiar words, such as "accept," "assure," "issue," "settlement." In the Succession Duty Act, which provides that the instalments of duty payable by a successor shall cease at his death, except when he is "competent to dispose by will of a continuing interest in the property," the competency intended is obviously not mental sanity or freedom from personal incapacity, but the possession of an estate of inheritance which

1 Lion Ins. Ass'n v. Tucker, L. R. 12 Q. B. D. 186.

2 Sedgw. p. 359. And see to same effect: Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 198; Op. of Justices, 7 Mass. 523; State v. Mayor of Paterson, 35 N. J. L. 197; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152; Ruggles v. Washington Co., 3 Mo. 496; and illustrations infra. See also, Bish., Writt. Laws, § 95a, 98a, 111, and cases cited.

is capable of disposition by will (a). The Gas Works Consolidation Act, did not, by calling the debt due for gas, "rent," authorize a distress for the debt under the Bankrupt Act, which regulates the power of distress of a landlord "or other person to whom 'rent' is due " by the bankrupt (). The Mutiny Acts which exempt soldiers from the payment of tolls over" bridges," would not carry the exemption to a steam ferry boat, because it is called a floating bridge (c). The enactment which prohibited parish officials from being concerned in contracts for supplying goods, materials or provisions," for the use of the workhouse," meant "for the use of the persons in the workhouse," and therefore did not apply to a contract for the supply of materials for the repair ot the building. (d) [A moving train of cars is not a "structure" such as contemplated by an act making railway companies liable for injuries on the highway by structures legally placed by them upon it."

$74. Technical Meaning.-[An obvious result of this rule. is, that,] where technical words are used in reference to a technical subject, they are primarily interpreted in the sense in which they are understood in the science, art, or business in which they have acquired it (e). [Thus, upon subjects relating to courts and legal proceedings, the Legislature may

(a) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51, s. 21 ; Attorney-General v. Hallett, 2 H. & N. 368, 27, L. J. 89. See also R. v. Owen, 15 Q. B. 476. As to a judgment being "final,' 22 Ridsdale v. Clifton, 2 P. D. 276, 46 L. J. 27. [See $ 74, note 9.]

(b) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 34; Exp. Hill, 6 Ch. D 63, 46 L. J. 116. As to "tol's" in railway acts, see the cases collected in the judgment of Field, J., in Brown v. G. W. R. Co., 9 Q. B. D. 750. That water "rates paid by consumers of water supplied through municipal water-works are not taxes, see Jones v. Water Comm'rs of Detroit. 34 Mich. 273. And see Smith v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. St. 38; Girard, etc., Co. v. Philadelphia, 88 Id. 393, 394.

(c) Ward v. Gray, 6 B. & S. 345.

(d) 55 Geo. 3, c. 137, s. 6; Barber v. Waite, 1 A. & E. 514; Comp. 4 & 5 Wm. 4, c. 76. s. 77.

"Lee v. Barkhampsted, 46 Conn. 213. But under a statute giving mechanics' liens to mining claims, a mine or pit sunk was deemed a "structure:" Helm v. Chapman, 66 Cal. 291.

(e) Grot. b. 2, c. 16, s. 3; Vattel, b. 2, s. 276; Evans v. Stevens, 4 T. R. 462, per Lord Kenyon; Morrall v. Sutton, 1 Phil. 533; Doe v. Jesson, 2 Bligh, 2; Doe v. Harvey, 4 B. & C. 610; Abbot v. Middleton, 7 H. L. 68. 28 L. J. Ch. 110; The Pacific, 33 L. J. P M. & A. 120; see per James, L. J., in Boucicault v. Chatterton, 5 Ch. D. 275. [Clark v. Utica, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 451, and see ante, §§ 2, 3, and infra.]

be presumed to speak technically, unless, from the statute itself, a different use of the language may be apparent.' Hence where at act] gave the effect of judgments to rules of Court, for the payment of money, and a later one (the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, s. 60) authorized creditors who obtained judgment to recover the amount by the new process, which it introduced, of foreign attachment, it was held that this remedy did not apply to rules of Court, the object of the former Act appearing to be merely to give to rules the then existing remedies of judgments, and of the latter, to confine the new remedy to judgments in the strict acceptation of the term (a). [And where an act directed that the coroner should serve process in cases in which the sheriff was a party, it was held that he must be technically a party, and that his merely being interested in a suit was not sufficient. So, where an act declared that a judgment entered in certain proceedings should be final, it was declared that the word should be taken in its technical sense and as precluding an appeal. Again, proceedings in insolvency were held not to be an action within the meaning of that word in a statute saving from the effect of the passage or repeal of an act actions pending at the time." Nor does the term proceeding in the provision of a code, that "no action or proceeding commenced" before its adoption shall be affected by it, include a judgment, the latter, being an entire act, and incapable, in any proper sense, of being said to be commenced before a certain day." Nor is an election covered by a similar clause as to "proceedings." " Nor, again, is a petition for partition an action within the meaning of a statute giving costs, to the prevailing party in all actions." A writ of levari facias sur mortgage is civil process within the meaning of the Pennsylvania stay-laws ;"

'Merchants' B'k v. Cook, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 405.

(a) Re Frankland, L. R. 8 Q. B. 18; Best v. Pembroke, L. R. 8 Q. B. 363.

& Merchants' B'k V. Cook, See, for similar con

supra.

N. C. (N. Y.) 422.

Snell v. Bridgewater, etc., Co., 24 Pick. (Mass.) 296.

10 Belfast v. Folger, 71 Me. 403.
11 Daily v. Burke, 28 Ala. 328.
12 Gordon v. State, 4 Kan. 489.
13 Counce v. Persons Unknown,

struction of "party " under act 76 Me. 548; Comp. post, § 77.

compelling production of books, etc.: Adriance v. Sanders, 11 Abb.

14 Coxe v. Martin, 44 Pa. St. 322.