things must produce upon a people so situated, we know that its approach has already had a powerful effect upon them, and that the question, what they are to do upon contingencies daily pressing upon them and ripening into reality, has for the last twelve months constantly excited their attention and stimulated them to action. Were the population of the island of one blood and color, there could be no doubt or hesitation with regard to the course which they would pursue, as dictated by their interests and their rights: the invasion of Spain by France would be the signal for their declaration of independence. That even in their present state it will be imposed upon them as a necessity, is not unlikely; but among all their reflecting men it is admitted as a maxim fundamental to all deliberation upon their future condition, that they are not competent to a system of permanent self-dependence; they must rely for the support of protection upon some force from without; and in the event of the overthrow of the Spanish constitution, that support can no longer be expected from Spain-their only alternative of dependence must be upon Great Britain or upon the United States. Hitherto the wishes of this government have been that the connexion between Cuba and Spain should continue as it has existed for several years; these wishes are known to the principal inhabitants of the island, and instructions, copies of which are now furnished you, were some months since transmitted to Mr. Forsyth, authorizing him in a suitable manner to communicate them to the Spanish government. These wishes still continue, so far as they can be indulged with a rational foresight of events beyond our control, but for which it is our duty to be prepared. If a government is to be imposed by foreign violence upon the Spanish nation, and the liberties which they have asserted by their constitution are to be crushed, it is neither to be expected nor desired that the people of Cuba, far from the reach of the oppressors of Spain, should submit to be governed by them. Should the cause of Spain herself issue more propitiously than from its present prospects can be anticipated, it is obvious that the trial through which she must pass at home, and the final loss of all her dominions on the American continents, will leave her unable to extend to the island of Cuba that protection necessary for its internal security and its outward defence.

Great Britain has formally withdrawn from the councils of the European alliance in regard to Spain; she disapproves the war which they have sanctioned, and which is undertaken by France, and she avows her determination to defend Portugal against the application of the principles upon which the invasion of Spain raises its only pretence of right. To the war as it commences, she has declared her intention of remaining neutral; but the spirit of the British nation is so strongly and with so much unanimity pronounced against France, their interests are so deeply involved in the issue, their national resentments and jealousies will be so forcibly stimulated by the progress of the war, whatever it may be, that, unless the conflict should be as short and the issue as decisive as that of which Italy was recently the scene, it is scarcely possible that the neutrality of Great Britain should be long maintained. The prospect is that she will be soon engaged on the side of Spain; but in making common cause with her, it is not to be supposed that she will yield her assistance upon principles altogether disinterested and

gratuitous. As the price of her alliance, the two remaining islands of Spain in the West Indies present objects no longer of much possible value or benefit to Spain, but of such importance to Great Britain that it is impossible to suppose her indifferent to the acquisition of them.

The motives of Great Britain for desiring the possession of Cuba are so obvious, especially since the independence of Mexico and the annexation of the Floridas to our Union; the internal condition of the island since the recent Spanish revolution, and the possibility of its continued dependence upon Spain, have been so precarious, the want of protection there, the power of affording it possessed by Great Britain, and the necessities of Spain to secure, by some equivalent, the support of Great Britain for herself, have formed a remarkable concurrence of predispositions to the transfer of Cuba, and during the last two years rumors have been multiplied that it was already consummated. We have been confidentially told, by indirect communication from the French government, that more than two years since Great Britain was negotiating with Spain for the cession of Cuba, and so eager in the pursuit as to have offered Gibraltar, and more, for it in exchange. There is reason to believe that, in this respect, the French government was misinformed; but neither is entire reliance to be placed on the declaration lately made by the present British Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the French government, and which, with precautions indicating distrust, has been also confidentially communicated to us, viz: that Great Britain would hold it disgraceful to avail herself of the distressed situation of Spain to obtain possession of any portion of her American colonies. The object of this declaration, and of the communication of it here, undoubtedly was to induce the belief that Great Britain entertained no purpose of obtaining the possession of Cuba; but these assurances were given with reference to a state of peace then still existing, and which it was the intention and hope of Great Britain to preserve. The condition of all the parties to them has since changed; and however indisposed the British government might be ungenerously to avail themselves of the distress of Spain to extort from her any remnant of her former possessions, they did not forbear to take advantage of it by order of reprisals given to two successive squadrons despatched to the West Indies, and stationed in the immediate proximity to the island of Cuba. By measures thus vigorous and peremptory, they obtained from Spain an immediate revocation of the blockade which her generals had proclaimed on the coast of Terra Firma, and pledges of reparation for all the captures of British vessels made under cover of that military fiction. They obtained, also, an acknowledgment of many long-standing claims of British subjects upon the Spanish government, and promises of payment of them as a part of the national debt. The whole amount of them, however, as well as that of the reparation and indemnity promised for the capture of British property under the blockades of General Morales and by the Porto Rico privateers, yet exists, in the form of claims, and the whole mass of them now is acknowleged claim, for the satisfaction of which pledges have been given to be redeemed hereafter, and for which the island of Cuba may be the only indemnity in the power of Spain to grant, as it will undoubtedly be to Great Britain the most satisfactory indemnity which she could receive.

The war between France and Spain changes so totally the circumstances under which the declaration above mentioned of Mr. Canning was made, that it may, at its very outset, produce events, under which the possession of Cuba may be obtained by Great Britain, without even raising a reproach of intended deception against the British government for making it. An alliance between Great Britain and Spain may be one of the first fruits of this war. A guaranty of the island to Spain may be among the stipulations of that alliance; and, in the event either of a threatened attack upon the island by France, or of attempts on the part of the islanders to assume their independence, a resort to the temporary occupation of the Havana by British forces may be among the probable expedients through which it may be obtained, by concert, between Great Britain and Spain herself. It is not necessary to point out the numerous contingencies by which the transition from a temporary and fiduciary occupation to a permanent and proprietary possession may be effected.

The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of this Union. This opinion is so generally entertained, that even the groundless rumors that it was about to be accomplished, which have spread abroad, and are still teeming, may be traced to the deep and almost universal feeling of aversion to it, and to the alarm which the mere probability of its occurrence has stimulated. The question both of our right and of our power to prevent it, if necessary by force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils, and the administration is called upon, in the performance of its duties to the nation, at least to use all the means within its competency to guard against and forefend it.

It will be among the primary objects requiring your most earnest and unremitting attention, to ascertain and report to us every movement of negotiation between Spain and Great Britain upon this subject. We cannot, indeed, prescribe any special instructions in relation to it. We scarcely know where you will find the government of Spain upon your arrival in the country, nor can we foresee, with certainty, by whom it will be administered. Your credentials are addressed to Ferdinand, the King of Spain, under the constitution. You may find him under the guardianship of a Cortes, in the custody of an army of faith, or under the protection of the invaders of his country. So long as the constitutional government may continue to be administered in his name, your official intercourse will be with his ministers, and to them you will repeat, what Mr. Forsyth has been instructed to say, that the wishes of your government are that Cuba and Porto Rico may continue in connexion with independent and constitutional Spain. You will add that no countenance has been given by us to any projected plan of separation from Spain, which may have been formed in the island. This assurance becomes proper, as by a late despatch received from Mr. Forsyth, he intimates that the Spanish government have been informed that a revolution in Cuba was secretly preparing, fomented by communications between a society of Free Masons there and another of the same fraternity in Philadelphia. Of this we have no other knowledge; and the societies of Free Masons in this country are so little in the practice of using agency of a political nature on any occasion, that we think it most

probable the information of the Spanish government, in that respect, is unfounded. It is true that the Free Masons at the Havana have taken part of late in the politics of Cuba, and, so far as it is known to us, it has been an earnest and active part in favor of the countinuance of their connexion with Spain. While disclaiming all disposition on our part either to obtain possession of Cuba or of Porto Rico ourselves, you will declare that the American government had no knowledge of the lawless expedition undertaken against the latter of those islands last summer.

Mr. J. J. Appleton to Mr. Adams.

[Extract.]

CADIZ, August 6, 1823.

If no buyers for the new loan offer without security, the interest may be secured upon the revenue of the island of Cuba, which exceeds the ordinary expenditures of the island by about $1,500,000; more than sufficient for the principal which remains to be disposed of. A member of the Cortes, high in the confidence of the government, and who has been constantly employed in the commission of "ways and means," came to see me yesterday with the formal object of inquiring whether a loan could be negotiated in the United States, mortgaged upon the proceeds of the customs of the Havana. He said that he was afraid that England, pursuing her policy to thwart all the financial operations of Spain, and to curtail thus her means of resistance, would prevent a negotiation of the "inscriptions;" and that Spain would thus become a victim of the reliance placed upon England. He was, therefore, anxious that Spain should look beyond England, and had thought that the United States, knowing best how to value the island of Cuba, would be most likely to engage in a speculation resting upon its revenues. He therefore desired me to tell him frankly whether the government of the United States would favor such a loan, if attempted. I answered that I could not tell what would be the success of an offer of this kind to the United States; that there were some shapes in which it would meet with great and perhaps insurmountable objections; that there were others where the difficulties would be less; that it appeared to me, however, to be a subject of so much importance to Spain at this moment, that I should be astonished if she did not take the necessary steps to ascertain distinctly what she could expect in reference to it. He asked me then what steps could be taken. I answered that I saw no other way but by sending to the United States a person possessing the entire confidence of this government, calculated to gain that of mine, and furnished with ample powers. He observed that he had thought of the same expedient, and that he thought the government was disposed to send a minister to the United States. Let one of your vessels of war, added he, come into this port, and I will insure his appointment; for he would then have the means of getting to his destination. I replied that I would let Mr. Nelson know what he had told me, that he might, if he found it practicable, send, under any pretext,

one of our vessels here; but that I feared it would be difficult to arrange the opportunity he desired, and should be sorry if the government waited for it, as in affairs of the importance of those in question despatch was everything. The gentleman with whom I had this conversation, though not friendly to England, has always felt the importance of securing her good will, if not her assistance, and has, in consequence, been one of the organs through which the Cortes have, if I may so say, conversed with the English minister and unaccredited but confidential agents of Mr. Canning at this court.

His coming to me, under such circumstances, has impressed me with the idea that there was but little hope of engaging England to enter in the speculation which he proposes to the United States. That she has been sounded on this or some analogous point, I have but little doubt; that she has been found cold and distant, in consequence of her engagements to other powers, and her little confidence in the stability of the government from which the overtures proceeded, is also not improbable. What, however, you may rely upon as certain is, that up to this day there has been nothing done involving the fate of the island of Cuba.

Mr. J. J. Appleton to Mr. Adams.

[Extract.]

CADIZ, July 10, 1823.

SIR: The contents of the letter of which I herewith enclose a duplicate, are substantially confirmed by all that has come to my knowledge since it was written. I shall say nothing of the official declaration of England; they are documents which must long since have reached you. I have it, however, in my power to say, upon the best authority, that the sentiments she now professes in relation to acquisition of territory at the expense of Spain have not always been entertained by her. Mr. Quadra, now deputy of the Cortes, had, when minister of UltraMarine in the year 1820, distant overtures made to him for a cession of the eastern side of Cuba to England. These overtures were treated with great coldness, and it is supposed have not been repeated. This fact has been communicated to me in confidence by Mr. Gener, a deputy from the Havana, who, being a European by birth, has had more access to the secrets of the cabinet than his companions, and has lately received a distinguished proof of the respect in which he is held in being called to preside over the Cortes during an epoch of particular difficulty. This gentleman has, moreover, assured me that these overtures were the only ones that had ever come to his knowledge, though, before leaving Madrid, he had made it a subject of particular inquiry. The depu ties of Cuba have, within a few days, written a letter to the provincial deputations, in which, after acquainting them with the events which have lately occurred here, express a hope that, if some of the worthy patriots who have sacrificed everything to support the liberties and independence of the Peninsula should be obliged to cross the Atlantic,