upon condition that France or England would give some guarantee connected with the islands of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. Having received information, from sources that I could rely on, that propositions from the government of Madrid had actually been made for a loan of six millions of pounds sterling, and that agents had been sent to Paris and London for the purpose of consummating the loan and negotiating with the two governments on the subject of the guarantee, I deemed it my duty to take an early opportunity of having an informal conversation with Lord Palmerston, and accordingly, last week, asked an interview for that purpose, the result of which I now com municate. I stated to Lord Palmerston that the object of my visit was to converse with him, unofficially and confidentially, upon the subject of this Spanish loan, and that I hoped, if he felt any delicacy on the subject, he would frankly say so. His lordship at once said that there was not the slightest objection to the course I proposed, and that he would hear with pleasure anything I might be disposed to communicate. I opened the subject by stating that I presumed he had seen the publications with which the French and English papers had been filled, on the subject of this loan. That I had good reason for believing that propositions had been made, both to France and Great Britain, for the purpose of some guarantee connected with the island of Cuba and Porto Rico. That, in the absence of instructions from my government, and ignorant of what his Majesty's government had done, or might be disposed to do, in relation to the matter, I felt it to be my duty to take the earliest opportunity of placing his lordship in possession of what I knew to be the views of my government, on the subject of these islands, and of reminding him of the course it had heretofore felt itself justified in taking in relation to the subject. I proceeded to give a brief explanation of the geographical relation of these islands to the United States, and the consequences that would be likely to follow their separation from the dominion of Spain. That the possession of Cuba by a great maritime power would be little else than the establishment of a fortress at the mouth of the Mississippi, commanding both the Gulf of Mexico and Florida, and, consequently, the whole trade of the western States, besides deeply affecting the interests and tranquillity of the southern portion of the Union. That, under such circumstances, it was not to be expected (if the subject was even now for the first time agitated) that the United States could remain indifferent to the destiny of Cuba, or its separation from Spain. I remarked, however, that the question was not a new one, and referred to the course of our government, heretofore, on the subject. I reminded his lordship of the declaration made by our minister to the French government, in the year 1826, "that the United States could not see with indifference Porto Rico and Cuba pass from Spain into the possession of any other power." That France, at that time, so far from complaining of this course, as a breach of neutral duty or interference with the concerns of other nations, acquiesced in it. I referred, also, to the proceedings which took place in Mexico, in 1825-6, between the agent of Great Britain and the minister of the United States, in which he identified himself in the communications received and made on the appearance of a French fleet in those seas. That these views of our government were made known, at the time, to the Russian government, and, by it, to all the courts of Europe. Under such circumstances, I felt justified in saying frankly to his lordship that it was impossible that the United States could acquiesce in the transfer of Cuba from the dominion of Spain to any of the great maritime powers of Europe; that of the right of the United States to interfere in relation to these islands I presumed there could be little doubt; that whilst the general rule of international law which forbids the interference of one State in the affairs of another was freely admitted, there were yet exceptions to the rule, in relation to the laws of defence and self-preservation, which all nations acknowledged, and that the present was precisely such a case; that in this view, and with a sincere desire to guard against possible difficulties, I deemed it proper to say what I had, and hoped his lordship would receive it in the spirit in which it was offered. Lord Palmerston in reply said very little. He assured me that he understood and appreciated the motives which had produced the interview. He said that the government of Spain was no doubt desirous to terminate their civil wars, and he seemed to think that it could only be done by a large loan of money; that efforts had been made for that purpose in the manner supposed, but on what terms the loan had been proposed, or whether they had been successful or not, he did not say, nor did I think it proper to inquire. His lordship admitted that propositions had been made to Great Britain on the subject of the loan, (the nature of which he did not state,) but he said that they had been declined by his Majesty's government. He remarked, however, at the same time, that the consent of Parliament was necessary to the fulfilment of any pledge of the character supposed, and that, under the present state of things, there would be very little probability of any such consent being given. ' This remark was made in a way that left me at liberty to draw my own conclusions as to what the government here might have been disposed to do, if the consent of Parliament could have been obtained. It is proper, also, that I should state, that having expressed in the course of conversation my impression that the course and policy of France could not, I thought, be mistaken, and that I had reason to believe that she would not for a moment listen to the application which had been made to her on the subject, Lord Palmerston remarked that considerations of that nature could not be permitted to influence the conduct of Great Britain; that in deciding all such questions, his Majesty's government could not listen to the opinions and views of any foreign government, but must decide for itself. This remark was made by his lordship in good temper, but its tendency was too obvious to be mistaken. I replied to it, by stating that my remark, to which his was an answer, was entirely incidental, and merely intended to show that the opinions of France in relation to Cuba had undergone no change since the year 1825-6, but were in accord with those of the United States. To this Lord Palmerston said nothing. As there seemed to be no desire on the part of his lordship to continue the conversation, and having accomplished what I had intended, I forbore to press the subject, and the interview closed. It is proper, however, to state, that the language and manner of Lord Palmerston were in the highest degree conciliatory, though evidently more marked than usual. You will see that I took care to guard against misconstruction or commitment of our government, by expressly stating at the outset that I was neither instructed or authorized to say anything on the subject, but was acting solely on my own responsibility. I need not say that I shall feel gratified if the course which I have taken shall meet the approbation of the President. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOHN FORSYTH, Esq., SIR: Secretary of State, Washington. A. STEVENSON. John H. Eaton to the Secretary of State. [Extract.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, MADRID, August 10, 1837. Many rumors have spread concerning a commercial treaty between England and Spain, a lien obtained upon Cuba, &c., &c. Nothing of this sort can now be done but with the assent of the Cortes. The elections are in progress, and the two Chambers of Spain, for the first time, will assemble in November. Should any treaty be made, before these assembled bodies it will come up for consideration and approval. The English minister at this court, Mr. Villiers, is a frank, urbane, and qualified man for his position. With his business I, of course, can have nothing to do; but in conversation, merely, I have taken occasion to express a hope that his government would not attempt to obtain the possession of Cuba; and not for the reason that the United States desired or wished it as an appendage of their territory, but because I felt satisfied that it would occasion war between the two countries. His reply was, "England does not desire its possession." In a former letter, I suggested the propriety of our government making some official communication upon this important subject through our minister at London, whereby the British government might be estopped to say, in the future, that in acquiring Cuba she had not anticipated any objections from us. Very respectfully, JNO. FORSYTH, Esq., &c., Sc. Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Vail. [Extract] JNO, H. EATON, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, The United States have long looked with no slight degree of solicitude to the political condition of the island of Cuba. Its proximity to our shores, the extent of its commerce with us, and the similarity of its domestic institutions with those prevailing in portions of our own country, combine to forbid that we should look with indifference upon any occurrences connected with the fate of that island. The Spanish government has often been apprized of the wishes of the United States that no other than Spanish domination should be exercised over it, and scarcely need be told that our policy in that respect has undergone no change. For fear, however, that the subject should be lost sight of in the frequent changes or modifications of the Spanish cabinet, it is important that you do not allow any person who may be called to a share in the councils of the Spanish government to be ignorant or forgetful of our views: these continue what they have always been, and such as you will find them fully stated in the correspondence and archives of the legation. There are, however, considerations which, in addition, will claim your attention; it is surmised, and by many believed, that Great Britain has designs upon the island. If such be the case, pretexts will not be wanting for measures calculated to open the way to the realization of such designs. Spanish liabilities are to a great extent held by British subjects, and their government have, it is believed, claims upon that of Spain. As a guarantee for both, the resources of Cuba afford a tempting prize, towards which British views have several times been directed. Let such a guarantee be once given, and its realization or enforcement might lead to a military occupation at some point of the island. Again, Spain and England are by treaty bound to certain proceedings for the suppression of the African slave trade, and a mixed commission sits at Havana to enforce sundry stipulations in the treaty. The practical operation of the system is known to be nearly nugatory; for, whether with or without the connivance or knowledge of the British commissioners, the fact that the slave trade is carried on in Cuba to a great extent, in violation of the Anglo-Spanish alliance to prevent it, is notorious and undisguised. England may think herself to have, under the treaty, a right to call upon Spain for a faithful and efficient performance of the obligations contracted under it; and in case of an avowal by Spain of her inability to comply, it might be apprehended that England would enforce compliance by means which would eventually affect the territorial rights of her ally to the island of Cuba, or undertake to perform her obligations under the treaty on receiving guarantees or equivalents calculated to lead to an increase of her influence and power in that quarter. Whether attempted to be brought about by one or the other of the means alluded to, or by any other process, the United States can never permit it. The Spanish government is to bear in mind this fixed resolution on our part, and be given to understand that it is taken upon long and mature deliberation, and at all costs, to govern the conduct of the United States. You will understand the tact and delicacy which are to regulate the communications you may have to make to the Spanish government on this subject: they are not to be volunteered, nor made in writing, unless in case of necessity, but in informal and confidential conversations with the members of the government you are to endeavor fully to acquaint them with our views. Should you have reason to suspect any design on the part of Spain to transfer voluntarily her title to the island, whether of ownership or possession, and whether permanent or temporary, to Great Britain or any other power, you will distinctly state that the United States will prevent it at all hazards, as they will any foreign military occupation for any pretext whatsoever. And you are authorized to assure the Spanish government, that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it. It is believed that the means of preventing such an attempt, or of disconcerting all designs. that may lead to it, lie within the reach of the Spanish government: the readiest which occur to us is to deprive England of all real motive, and even of the remotest pretence, for interference on her part in the affairs of Cuba, by a scrupulous performance of all the obligations Spain may have contracted towards her, either of a pecuniary character, or as connected with the existing agreements between the two: nations in relation to the slave trade. No proper opportunity of which you can avail yourself, without incurring the risk of being thought officious, should be allowed to escape you, to let the Spanish government be fully informed of the views we entertain with regard to the island, as set forth in these instructions, and in the others on file in the legation. And you will hold yourself in readiness, should the occasion arise formally to protest, in the name of your government, against any act, whether of Spain herself or of any other power, likely to lead to a transfer of her territorial right to the island of Cuba, or to the military occupation of it by the forces of any other nation. Mr. Webster to Mr. Irving. [Extract.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, January 17, 1843. I have the honor to transmit a copy of a private and confidential letter addressed by this department, on the 14th instant, to Mr. Robert B. Campbell, consul of the United States at Havana. It was drawn forth by information recently communicated to the department from a source so reputable that it could not fail to awaken some concern. The archives of your legation will show you that the subject of supposed designs upon the island of Cuba by the British government is by no means new, and you will also find that the apprehension of such a project has not been unattended to by the Spanish government. It was, accordingly, in view of what had already passed, and what had recently transpired, calculated to excite anxiety on the part of this government, in regard to its relations with what is to us the most interesting portion of the Spanish empire, that it was thought expedient to give your predecessor special directions about it, which you will see in the instructions to him from this department, dated on the 15th July, 1840, and numbered 2. To these instructions you are now particularly referred, as well as to a confidential despatch from Mr. Vail (numbered 10,) of the 15th January, 1841, detailing what passed in a conference with M. De Ferrers, at that time |