Cuba is almost within sight of the coast of Florida, situated between that State and the peninsula of Yucatan, and possessing the deep, capacious and impregnably fortified harbor of the Havana. If this island were under the dominion of Great Britain, she could command both the inlets to the Gulf of Mexico. She would thus be enabled, in time of war, effectively to blockade the mouth of the Mississippi, and to deprive all the western States of this Union, as well as those within the gulf, teeming as they are with an industrious and enterprising population, of a foreign market for their immense productions. But this is not the worst: she could also destroy the commerce by sea between our ports on the gulf and our Atlantic ports, a commerce of nearly as great a value as the whole of our foreign trade. Is there any reason to believe that Great Britain desires to acquire the island of Cuba? We know that it has been her uniform policy, throughout her past history, to seize upon every valuable commercial point throughout the world, whenever circumstances have placed this in her power. And what point so valuable as the island of Cuba?

The United States are the chief commercial rival of Great Britain; our tonnage at the present moment is nearly equal to hers, and it will be greater, within a brief period, if nothing should occur to arrest our progress. Of what vast importance would it, then, be to her to obtain the possession of an island from which she could at any time destroy a very large portion both of our foreign and coasting trade? Besides, she well knows that if Cuba were in our possession, her West India islands would be rendered comparatively valueless. From the extent and fertility of this island, and from the energy and industry of our people, we should soon be able to supply the markets of the world with tropical productions, at a cheaper rate than these could be raised in any of her possessions.

But let me present another view of the subject. If Cuba were annexed to the United States, we should not only be relieved from the apprehensions which we can never cease to feel for our own safety and the security of our commerce, whilst it shall remain in its present condition, but human foresight cannot anticipate the beneficial consequences which would result to every portion of our Union.

This can never become a local question. With suitable fortifications at the Tortugas, and in possession of the strongly fortified harbor of Havana as a naval station on the opposite coast of Cuba, we could command the outlet of the Gulf of Mexico, between the peninsula of Florida and that island. This would afford ample security both to the foreign and coasting trade of the western and southern States, which seek a market for their surplus productions through the ports on the gulf.

2. Under the government of the United States, Cuba would become the richest and most fertile island, of the same extent, throughout the world. According to McGregor's Commercial Regulations and his Commercial Statistics, "in 1830, of the 468,523 caballerias of thirtytwo English acres of land, which compose the whole territory, 38,276 were under sugar, coffee, tobacco, garden and fruit cultivation, and 9,734 in grazing grounds and in unfelled woods, belonging to sugar

and coffee estates." It thus appears that in 1830 less than one-twelfth of the whole island was under cultivation. The same author says: "We have no accounts of the present extent of cultivation in Cuba; but by comparing the value of exportable produce of 1830 with that of 1842, and by various estimates, we consider it probable that the lands under sugar, coffee, tobacco and gardens, may fairly be estimated at 54,000 caballeras, or 1,728,000 acres." According to this estimate, between one-eighth and one-ninth, only, of the whole island, was under cultivation in 1842. The author proceeds: "If we compare this extent with the remaining vast area of the fertile soils of Cuba which are still uncultivated, and the produce which the whole island at present yields, it can scarcely be an exaggeration to say that Europe might draw as much coffee and sugar from Cuba alone as the quantity already consumed." Mr. McGregor states the aggregate population of Cuba in the year 1841 to have been only 1,007,624; but from the data which have just been presented, it may fairly be inferred that the island is capable of sustaining in comfort a population of ten millions of inhabitants. Were Cuba a portion of the United States, it would be difficult to estimate the amount of breadstuffs, rice, cotton, and other agricultural as well as manufacturing and mechanical productions; of lumber, of the produce of our fisheries, and of other articles which would find a market in that island, in exchange for their coffee, sugar, tobacco, and other productions. This would go on increasing with the increase of its population and the development of its resources, and all portions of the Union would be benefited by the

trade.

Desirable, however, as the possession of this island may be to the United States, we would not acquire it except by the free will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by justice and honor, would be too dearly purchased. While such is the determination of the President, it is supposed that the present relations between Cuba and Spain might incline the Spanish government to cede the island to the United States, upon the payment of a fair and full consideration. We have received information from various sources, both official and unofficial, that among the creoles of Cuba there has long existed a deep-rooted hostility to Spanish dominion. The revolutions which are rapidly succeeding each other throughout the world, have inspired the Cubans with an ardent and irrepressible desire to achieve their independence. Indeed, we are informed by the consul of the United States at the Havana, that "there appears every probability that the island will soon be in a state of civil war." He also states that "efforts are now being made to raise money for that purpose in the United States, and there will be attempts to induce a few of the volunteer regiments now in Mexico to obtain their discharge and join in the revolution."

I need scarcely inform you that the government of the United States has had no agency whatever in exciting the spirit of disaffection among the Cubans. Very far from it. A short time after we received this information from our consul, I addressed a despatch to him, of which I transmit you a copy, dated on the 9th instant, from which you will perceive that I have warned him to keep a watchful guard both upon his words and actions, so as to avoid even the least suspicion that he had

encouraged the Cubans to rise in insurrection against the Spanish government. I stated also that the relations between Spain and the United States had long been of the most friendly character, and both honor and duty required that we should take no part in the struggle which he seemed to think was impending. I informed him that it would certainly become the duty of this government to use all proper means to prevent any of our volunteer regiments now in Mexico from violating the neutrality of the country by joining in the proposed civil war of the Cubans against Spain. Since the date of my despatch to him, this duty has been performed. The Secretary of War, by command of the President, on the day following, (June 10,) addressed an order to our commanding general in Mexico, and also to the officer having charge of the embarcation of our troops at Vera Cruz, (of which I transmit you a copy,) directing each of them to use all proper measures to counteract any such plan if one should be on foot, and instructing them "to give orders that the transports on which the troops may embark proceed directly to the United States, and in no event to touch at any place in Cuba." The consul, in his despatch to me, also stated that, if the revolution is attempted and succeeds, immediate application would be made to the United States for annexation; but he did not seem to think that it would be successful, and probably would not be undertaken without the aid of American troops. To this portion of the despatch I replied-knowing the ardent desire of the Cubans to be annexed to our Union-that I thought it would not be "difficult to predict that an unsuccessful rising would delay, if it should not defeat, the annexation of the island to the United States," and I assured him that the aid of our volunteer troops could not be obtained.

Thus you will perceive with what scrupulous fidelity we have performed the duties of neutrality and friendship towards Spain. It is our anxious hope that a rising may not be attempted in Cuba; but if this should unfortunately occur, the government of the United States will have performed their whole duty towards a friendly power.

Should the government of Spain feel disposed to part with the island of Cuba, the question, what should we offer for it? would then arise. In deciding this question, it will be important to ascertain, 1st. What net revenue it yields at the present moment to the royal treasury, after deducting all the expenditure incurred on its account; and, 2d. What net revenue would it yield to the government of the United States in its present condition?

The first inquiry I have no means of answering with accuracy. McCulloch, in his Gazetteer, states "that the whole revenues of the island, at an average of the five years ending with 1837, amounted to $8,945,581 per year;" and it is stated in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine for October, 1845, that the revenue for the year 1844 amounted to $10,490,252 871⁄2. Since 1844 we have no information on the subject in the department, upon which reliance can be placed. Mr. Calderou informs me that the Spanish treasury at Madrid have never received from Cuba in any one year a sum exceeding $2,000,000. In answer to an inquiry, how the remainder of the revenue was expended, he stated that it was appropri ated to defray the expense of its colonial government, and to pay and

support the troops and maintain the vessels of war necessary for its defence and security.

It will occur to you that if Spain should cede Cuba to the United States, she would at once relieve herself from a great part, if not the whole of this civil, military and naval expenditure. In this view of the subject, it would seem that the sum of $50,000,000 would be an ample pecuniary indemnity to Spain for the loss of the island.

2d. What net revenue would it yield to the government of the United States at the present moment?

In estimating the amount of this revenue, we must mainly rely upon two sources duties on imports, and the proceeds of the public lands. Of the average revenue of $8,945,581 for the five years ending with 1837, McCulloch states that "the maritime duties formed 61 per cent.; the internal taxes 22 per cent.; the ecclesiastical deductions 14 per cent.; the personal deductions 24 per cent.; the miscellaneous revenues 2 per cent.; and the casual revenues 10 per cent." Now it is manifest that if Cuba were in the possession of the United States, the people would be relieved from the greater part if not the whole of these contributions, with the exception of the maritime duties. Bc sides, a considerable proportion of these maritime duties are levi upon exports which the constitution of the United States would forbid. But the important inquiry on this branch of the subject is, what amount of duties could we collect in the island? and this must depend upon the amount of the imports.

This we can ascertain for many years up, till 1844 inclusive, from the tables published annually by the Intendente of the island. The following tabular statement, extracted from Hunt's Magazine, is doubt less correct:

Admitting that these imports have increased to $26,000,000 s. ‘e 1844, and estimating the average rate of our duties under the existi tariff at 25 per cent., which the Secretary of the Treasury informs n.. is correct within a small fraction, the revenue from imports would amount to $6,500,000; but, from this sum must be deducted that portion of it which arises from productions of the United States imported into Cuba. The total value of these during the year ending the 30th June, 1846, according to the books of our custom-house, was $4,713966. Estimating for their increased value at the custom-houses in Cuba, in consequence of freight and other charges, it would approxi mate the truth to state that one-fifth of the imports into Cuba consists of American productions. Then, in order to show what revenue we would derive from imports into Cuba, we must deduct one-fifth from $6,500,000, and the balance remaining, $5,200,000, would be the

amount.

It may be remarked, however, that our acquisition of the island

would doubtless considerably increase the annual military and naval expenditures of the United States. But these calculations all refer to Cuba in its present condition. Were it a possession of the United States, its population and industry, and consequently its exports, would rapidly increase, and produce proportionally increased imports. Indeed, it is highly probable that during the very first year the duties would amount to a sum not less than $6,000,000.

In regard to the quantity of public lands still remaining in Cuba the department does not possess accurate information. From all that we have learned, it is believed that the crown of Spain has already granted by far the greater portion of the whole territory of the island to individuals. We need not, therefore, calculate upon deriving much revenue from this source. Upon the whole, the President would not hesitate to stipulate for the payment of -, in convenient instalments, for a cession of the island of Cuba, if it could not be procured for a less

sum.

The apprehensions which existed for many years after the origin of this government, that the extension of our federal system would endanger the Union, seem to have passed away. Experience has proved that this system of confederated republics, under which the federal government has charge of interests common to the whole, whilst local governments watch over the concerns of the respective States, is capable of almost indefinite extension, with increasing strength. This, however, is always subject to the qualification that the mass of the population must be of our own race, or must have been educated in the school of civil and religious liberty. With this qualification, the more we increase the number of confederated States, the greater will be the strength and security of the Union, because the more dependent for their mutual interests will the several parts be upon the whole, and the whole upon the several parts. It is true that of the 418,291 white inhabitants which Cuba contained in 1841, a very large proportion is of the Spanish race: still, many of our citizens have settled on the island, and some of them are large holders of property. Under our government it would speedily be Americanized, as Louisiana has been. Within the boundaries of such a federal system alone can a trade exempt from duties and absolutely free be enjoyed. With the possession of Cuba we should have throughout the Union a free trade on a more extended scale than any which the world has ever witnessed, arousing an energy and activity of competition which would result in a most rapid improvement in all that contributes to the welfare and happiness of the human race. What State would forego the advantages of this vast free trade with all her sisters, and place herself in lonely isolation? But the acquisition of Cuba would greatly strengthen our bond of union. Its possession would secure to all the States within the valley of the Mississippi and Gulf of Mexico free access to the ocean; but this security could only be preserved whilst the ship-building and navigating States of the Atlantic shall furnish a navy sufficient to keep open the outlets from the gulf to the ocean. Cuba, justly appreciating the advantages of annexation, is now ready to rush into our arms. Once admitted, she would be entirely dependent for her prosperity, and even existence, upon her connexion with the Union, whilst the rapidly increasing trade between