Authority for the action.

The limits of the blockade.

129. The Establishment of a Blockade

One of the most effective instruments of war is the closure of the enemy's ports by blockade, and the power to establish a blockade is incidental to the general war powers. It is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution and presumably may be exercised by Congress or the President or by both in conjunction. On April 22, 1898, President McKinley issued the following proclamation:

Whereas by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and approved April 20, 1898, and communicated to the Government of Spain, it was demanded that said Government at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and the President of the United States was directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolution into effect; and

Whereas in carrying into effect said resolution the President of the United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including all ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba:

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, in order to enforce the said resolution, do hereby declare and proclaim that the United States of America have instituted and will maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba, aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the law of nations applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to prevent the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessel approaching any of the said ports or attempting to leave the same without notice or knowledge of the establishment of such blockade will be duly warned by the commander of the blockading forces, who will indorse on her register the fact and the

date of such warning, where such indorsement was made; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against her and her cargo as prize as may be deemed advisable.

Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the establishment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this 22d day of April, A.D., 1898, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

(Seal.)

By the President:

JOHN SHERMAN,

Secretary of State.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

130. The Direction of the War *

The following extracts from an article in the World's Work describe the wonderful fashion in which war may be directed in all parts of the world from a single room at the White House:

The Cuban War developed in the White House the novel in- The equipment stitution known as the Telegraph and Cipher Bureau. President of the McKinley conceived the idea of this telegraph and telephone office War Room. for his personal use at the outbreak of the war. It is called the "War Room" because it formed the common channel through which was received and dispatched all the most important information about the opposing armies. The Bureau is an apartment the size of an ordinary drawing-room, containing the most improved modern apparatus for communicating quickly by telephone, telegraph or ocean cable with every accessible portion of the globe. The President, although Commander-in-Chief of the Army and of the Navy, was formerly unable to know exactly the progress of events at the seat of war. Battles were fought, campaigns planned

How the President kept

informed.

Communi

cations with the front.

and carried into execution, and even surrenders were arranged without direct communication with the Chief Executive at every move; but President McKinley was enabled to direct from his office in the White House the operations of the army and navy in Cuba and Porto Rico.

The "War Room" brought valuable and prompt information of the great strategic game played upon the waters of the Atlantic. While the press and the public were kept for weeks in suspense about the movements of Admiral Cervera's fleet and the intentions of its commander, the President, through secret agents in Europe, was possessed of accurate information disclosing the plans of the Spanish Government before its war vessels left the home port. The movements of the hostile squadron were marked day by day upon a great map on the wall, and in the secrecy of the "War Room" the President knew that the fleet was in the harbor of Santiago before the public was informed.

As the invading army advanced into Cuba, telegraph lines were constructed and the President was kept in touch with his commanders in the field. So perfect were the arrangements that he was able to communicate from Washington in less than twenty minutes with the officers on the firing line at Santiago. There were days when the President, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy sat for hours at the elbows of the telegraphers, directing in person the military operations thousands of miles distant. On the day which brought the occupation of Santiago the President stood before great maps on which were marked in contrasting colors the exact position of every detachment of the American and Spanish forces. When a flag of truce appeared at any of the enemy's outposts the anxious commander-in-chief was apprised of the fact within a few minutes. Had the slender metallic strand between the President and the powder-begrimed fighters in the trenches been a telephone instead of a telegraph line, he might almost have heard the thunder of the guns and listened to the cheers of the American soldiers as the red and yellow flags dropped from the ramparts.

This account of the steps taken by Lincoln and Stanton in preparation for the fateful battle of Gettysburg illustrates the manner in which the President and Secretary of War may coöperate in directing the military forces:

Stanton

on the

coming

battle.

It was night in Washington. The President wore a gloomy face Lincoln and as he entered the War Department by the urgent request of Secre- counsel tary Stanton. Neither spoke for a while. Mr. Lincoln at last said: "Stanton, you want to speak to me; you have something to communicate; let us calmly counsel with each other: I am ready to listen." The Secretary replied: "Yes, I do want to say something to you. I want to tell you the trouble that oppresses me at this time; I'll not mince words, for I feel you want to know the worst." "I do," said Mr. Lincoln; "speak out then, I'll be listener." Mr. Stanton in brief language told him that he dreaded the issue of the coming battle, with Lee's conscious ability and the animating spirit of his army, on the one side, and Hooker, the beaten general, commanding men who still remembered their defeat in Virginia on the other side. "In short," said Mr. Stanton, "I have not confidence in General Hooker, though his personal courage I do not question." "I don't disagree with you,” said the President, but you recollect the old saying, 'While crossing a stream it is too late to swap horses.' Stanton, have you any other general to suggest?" He replied: "I have thought of General Sedgwick, but you know he will not accept. I have thought of others and arrived at the same conclusion. The best of them are not without detractors. There is one that I would suggest, General Meade, with whose record and ability I could find no fault; and as a Pennsylvanian he has patriotism enough to draw out all the latent energies of his nature. . . ." "Stanton, there is no time to be lost. You must have conceived a plan. If you can satisfy my judgment that this expedient will prove a master stroke, and lead to success, I will co-operate with you, and give it my approval." Secretary Stanton then detailed his plans. The orders and papers, all written out, were taken up seriatim and discussed, and the papers executed.

The plans carried into execution.

A locomotive engine was in readiness, fired up; orders were placed in the hands of a tried officer of the regular army, who had precise instructions how to proceed. The first was to go forward to the headquarters of General Meade who was ordered by a paper delivered to him to take command of the army; the second was to deliver to General Hooker orders which informed him that he was superseded by General Meade; and all conditions were fully arranged to give simultaneous intelligence to the corps and division commanders in the field, of the President's order for the change, so that immediate intelligence to all subordinate officers might be given to the soldiers under their command. These orders were announced and acquiesced in, and a new spirit wakened among the rank and file of the army. All the world knows the story of Gettysburg.

The lengths to which the President as Commander-in-Chief and his immediate subordinates at Washington may go in prescribing the exact movements of the army and navy in the war on land and sea must, of course, always be determined by circumstances. This order issued in connection with the Spanish-American war serves to illustrate the process of direction only in a very general way.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, May 30, 1898. (Sent in cipher, May 31, 1898, 2.30 A.M.)

Instructions Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla.:

to General

Shafter to

proceed to Cuba (1898).

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it on to the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there; and cover the Navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or with the aid of the Navy capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago Harbor. You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprize, and the Government relies upon