interests

several

states.

would marshal themselves in opposition to each other on various The points. Other combinations, resulting from a difference of local varying position and policy, must have created additional difficulties. of the As every state may be divided into different districts and its citizens into different classes, which give birth to contending interests and local jealousies; so the different parts of the United States are distinguished from each other, by a variety of circumstances, which produce a like effect on a larger scale. And although this variety of interests, for reasons sufficiently explained in a former paper, may have a salutary influence on the administration of the government, when formed; yet every one must be sensible of the contrary influence which must have been experienced in the task of forming it.

from per

avoidable.

Would it be wonderful, if under the pressure of all these diffi- Deviations culties, the convention should have been forced into some devia- fect theory tions from that artificial structure and regular symmetry, which rendered unan abstract view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a constitution planned in his closet, or in his imagination? The real wonder is that so many difficulties should have been surmounted; and surmounted with an unanimity almost as unprecedented, as it must have been unexpected. It is impossible for any man of candour to reflect on this circumstance, without partaking of the astonishment. It is impossible, for the man of pious reflection, not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty Hand, which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the revolution.

18. Hamilton's Plea for a Strong and Stable Government

In Hamilton's view, the conduct of the legislatures of the several states during the period of confederation had demonstrated the inability of the people to rule themselves without powerful checks, and, in an argument for a life term for United States senators, he summed up his political philosophy.

All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well-born, the other the mass of the

The people are turbulent and changeful.

The President and Senate

! as checks on democracy.

people. The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and, however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give, therefore, to the first class a distinct, permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second, and, as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good government. Can a democratic Assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent and uncontrollable disposition requires checks.

The Senate of New York, although chosen for four years, we have found to be inefficient. Will, on the Virginian plan, a continuance of seven years do it? It is admitted that you cannot have a good Executive upon a democratic plan. See the excellency of the British Executive. He is placed above temptation. He can have no distinct interests from the public welfare. Nothing short of such an executive can be efficient. The weak side of a republican government is the danger of foreign influence. This is unavoidable, unless it is so constructed as to bring forward its first characters in its support. I am, therefore, for a general government, yet would wish to go the full length of republican principles. Let one body of the Legislature be constituted during good behavior or life. Let one Executive be appointed who dares execute his powers. It may be asked: Is this a republican system? It is strictly so, as long as they remain elective. And let me observe, that an Executive is less dangerous to the liberties of the people when in office during life, than for seven years. It may be said, this constitutes an elective monarchy. Pray, what is a monarchy? May not the governors of the respective States be considered in that light? But, by making the Executive subject to impeachment, the term monarchy cannot apply. These elective monarchs have produced tumults in Rome, and are equally dangerous to peace in Poland; but this cannot apply to the mode

in which I would propose the election. Let electors be appointed in each of the States to elect the Legislature, to consist of two branches; and I would give them the unlimited power of passing all laws, without exception. The Assembly to be elected for three years, by the people in districts. The Senate to be elected by electors to be chosen for that purpose by the people, and to remain in office during life. The Executive to have the power of negativing all laws; to make war or peace, with their advice, but to have the sole direction of all military operations, and to send ambassadors, and appoint all military officers; and to pardon all offenders, treason excepted, unless by advice of the Senate. On his death or removal, the President of the Senate to officiate, with the same powers, until another is elected. Supreme judicial officers to be appointed by the Executive and the Senate.

laws to be controlled

federal government.

The Legislature to appoint courts in each State, so as to make State the State governments unnecessary to it. All State laws which contravene the general laws to be absolutely void. An officer to by the be appointed in each State, to have a negative on all State laws. All the militia, and the appointment of officers, to be under the national government. I confess that this plan and that from Virginia are very remote from the idea of the people. Perhaps the Jersey plan is nearest their expectation. But the people are gradually ripening in their opinions of government; they begin to be tired of an excess of democracy; and what even is the Virginia plan, but "pork still, with a little change of sauce."

19. The Philosophy of the American Constitutional System according to Madison

between

However much some of the members of the convention sympa- The Conthized with the extreme views of Hamilton, it was the consensus stitution a of opinion that a golden mean should be sought between direct compromise popular rule and the more aristocratic system which he pro- democracy posed. The framers of the Constitution, therefore, sought to avoid and "an excess of democracy on one hand and an excess of aristoc- aristocracy. racy on the other," and the logic of their system is thus admirably stated by Madison.

E

The evils arising from overbearing majority

rule.

Definition of a faction.

The

origin of diverse opinions.

Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor, have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

As long as the reason of man continues fallible and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection exists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the pos

session of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

distribution

The most common and durable source of factions has been The the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who unequal hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed dis- of property tinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those a source of party who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed divisions. interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government.

arise in

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his How ininterest will certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, justice may corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay, with greater reason, legislation. a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? and what are the different classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges: and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction, must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes; and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The appor