The reasons

for the discredit.

of office.

council were so diminished by the charter of 1885 as to destroy its importance. The prohibition of interference with the letting of contracts, the employment of labor and the other details of administration, was intended as much for the relief of honest members of the city council as for protection against dishonest ones. It is only through this withdrawal of executive functions that membership in the city council is possible for busy men. The reasons for the disrepute into which the city council has fallen and for the consequent disinclination of competent and representative citizens to serve in it, are to be found in the conduct of that body and its members.

The council The city council as a body gives no serious consideration to its has an induties. In 1907 twenty-eight of the forty-two joint standing comterest only in the spoils mittees had no papers referred to them, and held no meetings. In the common council of the year four hundred and seventy orders were introduced and referred to the mayor without discussion or vote. Its work on the annual appropriations bill consists generally of attempting to raise the mayor's estimates to the maximum amount allowed by law, with a preference for those departments where the patronage is largest. Loan bills are log-rolled through with more regard for the demands of interested constituents and the possibility of jobs than for the needs of the city as a whole. The annual borrowing capacity of the city within the debt limit is treated as affording so much more money to be spent; and every occasion is seized to petition the legislature for leave to borrow additional millions outside the debt limit. This phrase, the "debt limit," has lost its meaning, and each additional authorization to borrow in excess of it is regarded as a "gift" of money by the state to be spent as soon as the act can be accepted. Notwithstanding the small amount of legitimate business transacted, weekly meetings of both branches are held throughout the year, except in summer, and a small army of high-salaried clerks, stenographers, messengers and assistants is maintained. At least $50,000 a year is wasted upon superfluous employees, generally politicians, retained to aid the city council in the non-discharge of its duties.

Many members spend their time in violating the charter by Illegal practices. besieging the heads of departments to employ men, raise salaries, give out contracts, and order goods for the benefit of their political supporters and constituents. If persistent entreaties are insufficient to cause the heads of departments to swerve from their duty, recourse is often had to scurrilous attacks on the floor of the city council which are printed in the daily papers and perpetuated in the official publications of the city. These illegal efforts are often directed to the pecuniary benefit of the members themselves. In the belief that they could not contract directly with the city, the practice has arisen of making contracts and selling goods under assumed names, or as silent partners with contractors or material

men.

double

Few large cities in the country have a double legislative body. The In 1908 eleven cities in this state had a single legislative body; chamber and the mayors of all these cities informed the commission that system. there was no disposition to return to the double chamber system. During the present year two more cities have come under the single chamber system. The chief objections to the double chamber are the multiplicity of elective officers, the diffusion of responsibility, and the fact that the members of one of the branches. must be elected by wards and do not represent the city as a whole. Moreover, there is no true analogy between the legislative department of a city government and our state and national legislatures. In fact, the word "legislative," when applied to a city council, is a misnomer It is a convenient expression to distinguish that body from the executive, but it does not represent in any accurate sense the functions of a city council. These relate mainly to the appropriation of money for local purposes, and involve very few questions of the kind passed on by a true legislative body. The reason for having two branches of a state legislature does not, therefore, apply to a city council. The relations between a mayor and city council are analogous to those which exist in private corporations between the president and the board of directors.

The sole advantage to be found in the double chamber system

The advantage of two chambers.

The mayor as a check on the council.

Reduce the

number of councilors.

is that the mistakes of one body may be corrected by the other. Not infrequently in the history of our city government an unwise exercise of the borrowing power by one branch has been negatived by the other; but much more frequently improvident loans desired by one branch have been added to the similar loans favored by the other, incorporated in a single bill, and passed. In fact, this has become the common way in which the loan bills are made up. On the whole, the disadvantages of a second chamber appear to the commission to far outweigh its advantages.

If there be but one elective council, there should be a check upon its action more effective than the qualified veto power now possessed by the mayor. Such a check can be secured by enlarging the power of the mayor over appropriations, loans, franchises and ordinances. The commission recommends that the mayor be given a concurrent voice in all matters passed on by the city council. This means either an absolute veto or the right of initiative on his part. The commission recommends a combination of the two plans. The annual appropriation bill or budget should originate with the mayor in legal theory as it does now in practice, while all other acts and votes of the city council should be subject to his approval. Appropriations from revenue and taxes should be submitted by the mayor to the city council which should have the power to eliminate or decrease items but not to increase or add items. A similar provision, but varying in details, is found in the charters of New York, Baltimore and Cleveland and is recommended by the National Municipal League for general adoption by cities of the country. All other acts, votes, orders, and resolutions of the city council should require the affirmative approval of the mayor.

If the city council is to be elected at large, the commission regards it as essential that its membership should be small. The history of municipal government in this country has demonstrated that the elective offices should be few in number. By reducing the number of candidates and thereby simplifying the ballot, good nominations and intelligent discussion of candidates will be pos

sible. This is not now the case. The commission recommends a city council of nine members, elected at large, three each year after the first, for a term of three years.

commission.

A permanent body with powers and duties similar to those of the A finance present finance commission is a vital necessity. Without it the people have no impartial means of accurate information as to the manner in which the mayor, the city council, and the heads of departments are conducting the business of the city. The ignorance of the voters upon these subjects has been a great hindrance to good government in this city. Adequate means of enlightenment through investigation and publicity cannot be secured through the efforts of volunteers; though these may be of great value. An official board of information, acting diligently, fairly, and continuously, is required. The commission, therefore, recommends the appointment by the governor of a board consisting of five members, with authority to draw against the city treasury a sum not exceeding $25,000 per annum for the expenses which it may incur in the performance of its duties.

These duties should be to investigate such departments, methods, and practices as may from time to time be thought to require investigation, to hold public hearings if necessary, and to report from time to time either to the city government or to the legislature. The commission should have the same powers with respect to the summoning of witnesses and the production of papers as were given to the finance commission by chapter 362 of the Acts of 1908. Experts should be retained to investigate the more complicated questions of administration.

Duties

of the com

mission.

of reforms.

The legislative measures which the commission regards as A summary essential to enable the people of Boston to redeem their government may be summarized as follows:

1. A simplified ballot, with as few names thereon as possible.

2. The abolition of party nominations.

3. A city council consisting of a single small body elected at large.

There are too few direct taxpayers.

The government is too complex.

4. The concentration of executive power and responsibility

in the mayor.

5. The administration of the departments by trained experts, or persons with special qualifications for the office.

6. Full publicity secured through a permanent finance commission.

205. A Plea for the Rehabilitation of the City Council

The experience of American cities with corrupt and irresponsible boards of aldermen and councils has led to a drastic reduction in the general powers of the municipal legislature. This development has not been without protest, however, and in the last New York constitutional convention, Mr. Jenks made a plea for the rehabilitation of the city council:

The difficulties in the government of cities are not far to seek. I tell nothing new. I may be unconsciously plagiarizing. They are these: First. There are so few direct taxpayers. You may take almost anything from a man indirectly, little from a man directly. The man who pays the rent does not understand that the tax levy bears upon him. The man who pays the direct tax into the receiving office is he who protests. The other is indifferent; he is the workingman, the rent payer, who sees no tax bill and forgets that any burden is upon him. It is chiefly on account of the fewness of the direct taxpayers that the difficulties in the government of cities exist.

Another difficulty is that the affairs of the city are not understood by the intelligent citizens who live in them. We have a complex system of city government; we have boards and bureaus; we have commissions and routine of delicate charter provisions and manipulations. No man, unless he becomes a student of his own municipality, burning the midnight oil, can understand the system and program of government. Take these two things, then, the intricate method of administering government in cities, the fewness of the people compared with the population who pay direct taxes, and you have the chief bars to good clean government.