as the Vice-President of the United States is of the Federal Senate. Otherwise he is an insignificant personage, though sometimes a member of some of the executive boards.

The names and duties of the other officers vary from State to State. The most frequent are a secretary of state (in all States), a treasurer (in all), an attorney-general, a comptroller, an auditor, a superintendent of public instruction. In some States we find a State engineer, a surveyor, a superintendent of prisons, etc. It has already been observed that many States have also various bureaus and boards of commissioners. Most of these officials are in nearly all States elected by the people at the general State election. Sometimes, however, they, or some of them, are either chosen by the legislature, or, more rarely, appointed by the governor, whose nomination usually requires the confirmation of the Senate. Their salaries, which of course vary with the importance of the office and the parsimony of the State, seldom exceed $5,000 per annum and are usually smaller. So, too, the length of the term of office varies. It is often the same as that of the governor and with few exceptions does not exceed four years. Holding independently of the governor, and responsible neither to him nor to the legislature, but to the people, the State officials do not take generally his orders, and need not regard his advice. Each has his own department to administer, and as there is little or nothing political in the work, a general agreement in policy, such as must exist between the Federal President and his ministers, is not required. Policy rests with the legislature, whose statutes, prescribing minutely the action to be taken by the officials, leave little room for executive discretion.

Of the subordinate civil service of a State there is little to be said. It is not large, for the sphere of administrative action which remains to the State between the Federal government on the one side, and the county, city, and township governments on the other, is not wide. It is ill-paid, for the State legislatures are parsimonious. It is seldom well manned, for able men have no inducement to enter it and the so-called "spoils system," which has been hitherto applied to State no less than to Federal offices, makes places the reward for politi

cal work, i.e., electioneering and wire-pulling. Efforts are now being made in some States to introduce reforms similar to those begun in the Federal administration, whereby certain walks of the civil service shall be kept out of politics, at least so far as to secure competent men against dismissal on party grounds. Such reforms would in no case apply to the higher officials chosen by the people, for they are always elected for short terms and on party lines.

Every State except Oregon provides for the impeachment of executive officers for grave offenses. In all save two the State House of Representatives is the impeaching body; and in all but Nebraska the State Senate sits as the tribunal, a twothirds majority being generally required for a conviction. Impeachments are rare in practice.

There is also in many States a power of removing officials, sometimes by the vote of the legislature, sometimes by the governor on the address of both Houses, or by the governor alone, or with the concurrence of the Senate. Such removals must of course be made in respect of some offense, or for some other sufficient cause, not from caprice or party motives; and when the case does not seem to justify immediate removal, the governor is sometimes empowered to suspend the officer, pending an investigation of his conduct.

CHAPTER VII

THE STATE JUDICIARY

The judiciary in every State includes three sets of courts: -A supreme court or court of appeal; superior courts of records; local courts; but the particular names and relations of these several tribunals and the arrangements for criminal business vary greatly from State to State. As respects the dis tinction which Englishmen used to deem fundamental, that of courts of common law and courts of equity, there has been great diversity of practice. Most of the original thirteen colonies once possessed separate courts of chancery, and these were maintained for many years after the separation from England, and were imitated in a few of the earlier among the newer States, such as Michigan, Arkansas, Missouri. In some of the old States, however, the hostility to equity jurisdiction, which marked the popular party in England in the seventeenth century, had transmitted itself to America. Chancery courts were regarded with suspicion, because thought to be less bound by fixed rules, and therefore more liable to be abused by an ambitious or capricious judiciary. Massachusetts, for instance, would permit no such court, though she was eventually obliged to invest her ordinary judges with equitable powers, and to engraft a system of equity on her common law, while still keeping the two systems distinct. Pennsylvania held out still longer, but she also now administers equity, as indeed every civilized State must do in substance, dispensing it, however, through the same judges as those who apply the common law, and having more or less worked it into the texture of the older system. Special chancery courts were abolished in New York, where they had flourished and enriched American jurisprudence by many admirable judgments, by the democratizing Constitution of 1846; and they now exist only in a few of the States, chiefly older Eastern or Southern States, which, in judicial matters, have shown themselves more conservative than their sisters in

the West. In four States only (California, Idaho, New York and North Carolina) has there been a complete fusion of law and equity, although there are several others which have provided that the legislature shall abolish the distinction between the two kinds of procedure. Many States provide for the establishment of tribunals of arbitration and conciliation.

The jurisdiction of the State courts, both civil and criminal, is absolutely unlimited, i.e., there is no appeal from them to the Federal courts, except in certain cases specified by the Federal Constitution, being cases in which some point of Federal law arises. Certain classes of cases are, of course, reserved for the Federal courts, and in some the State courts enjoy a concurrent jurisdiction. All crimes, except such as are punishable under some Federal statute, are justifiable by a State court, and in most States there exist much wider facilities for setting aside the verdict of a jury finding a prisoner guilty, by raising all sorts of points of law, than are permitted by the law and practice of European countries.

Each State recognizes the judgments of the courts of a sister State, gives credit to its public acts and records, and delivers up to its justice any fugitive from its jurisdiction charged with a crime. Of course, the courts of one State are not bound either by law or usage to follow the reported decisions of those of another State. They use such decisions merely for their own enlightenment, and as some evidence of the common law, just as they use the English law reports. Most of the States have within the last half century made sweeping changes, not only in their judicial system, but in the form of their law. They have revised and codified their statutes, a carefully corrected edition whereof is issued every few years. They have in many instances adopted codes of procedure, and in some cases have even enacted codes embodying the substance of the common law, and fusing it with the statutes. Such codes, however, have been condemned by the judgment of the abler and more learned part of the profession, as tending to confuse the law and make it more uncertain and less scientific. But with the masses of the people the proposal is popular, for it holds out a prospect of a system whose simplicity will enable

the layman to understand the law, and render justice cheaper and more speedy. A really good code might have these happy effects. But it may be doubted whether the codifying States have taken the steps requisite to secure the goodness of the codes they enact. And codification increases the variations of the law between different States, and these variations may impede business and disturb the ordinary relations of life.

Important as are the functions of the American Judiciary, the powers of a judge are limited by the State Constitutions in a manner surprising to Europeans. Usually he is not allowed to charge the jury on questions of fact, but only to state the law. He is sometimes required to put his charge in writing. His power of committing for contempt of court is often restricted. Express rules forbid him to sit in causes wherein he can have any family or pecuniary interest.

I come now to three points, which are not only important in themselves, but instructive as illustrating the currents of opinion which have influenced the peoples of the States. These

are:

The method of appointing the judges.

Their tenure of office.

Their salaries.

In colonial days the superior judges were appointed by the governors, except in Rhode Island and Connecticut, where the legislature elected them. In the period between 1812 and 1860, when the tide of democracy was running strong, the function was in several of the older States taken from the governor or the legislature to be given to the people voting at the polls, and the same became the practice among the new States as they were successively admitted to the Union. At present we find that in more than two thirds of the States the judges are elected by the people. These include nearly all the Western and Southern States, besides New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio.

Originally, the superior judges were, in most States, like those of England since the Revolution of 1688, appointed for life, and held office during good behavior, i.e., were removable only when condemned on an impeachment, or when an address