APPENDIX EXHIBIT NO. 17 JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN SELECTED COURT CASES INVOLVING DENIAL OF REQUESTS FOR AMERICAN PASSPORTS INDEX I. CASES INVOLVING PASSPORT APPLICATIONS A. Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States: 2. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 (1958). B. Decided by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals: C. Decided by the United States District Courts: 1. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D. D. C. 1952). 6. Worthy v. Dulles, Civil No. 916-58, D. D. C., Oct. 2, 1958... Page 401 409 437 449 451 456 457 460 464 466 468 498 503 510 511 512 515 520 II. CASES INVOLVING PASSPORTS AND THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP A. Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States: 1. Urtetiqui v. D' Arbel, 34 U. S. (9 Peters) 692 (1835). B. Decided by United States Circuit Courts of Appeals: 2. Ng Kwock Gee v. Dulles, 221 F. 2d 942 (9th Cir. 1955). C. Decided by United States District Courts: 1. Aiko Matsuo v. Dulles, 133 F. Supp. 711 (S. D. Cal. 1955)___ 521 530 602 556 558 560 562 566 569 573 574 577 584 588 3. Wong Dick Wing v. Dulles, 140 F. Supp. 261 (S. D. N. Y. 590 4. Soo Hoo Doo Wing v. Dulles, 147 F. Supp. 862 (D. Conn. 591 5. Wong Yoke Sing v. Dulles, 151 F. Supp. 459 (E. D. N. Y. 593 6. Lee Wing Get v. Dulles, 154 F. Supp. 577 (E. D. N. Y. 1957)__ 598 I-A CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES BROWDER v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 287. Argued January 16, 1941-Decided February 17, 1941. 1. A citizen of the United States who willfully and knowingly uses a United States passport which was secured by a false statement, is guilty of an offense under § 2 of the Passport Title of the Act of June 15, 1917, when the use was for the purpose of establishing his identity and citizenship and consequent right to reënter this country from abroad. P. 337. 2. The term "willful" often denotes an intentional, as distinguished from an accidental, act. P. 342. 113 F.2d 97, affirmed. CERTIORARI, 311 U. S. 631, to review the affirmance of a sentence on two counts of an indictment. Mr. Carl S. Stern, with whom Carol King was on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. John T. Cahill, with whom Solicitor General Biddle, Assistant Attorney General Berge, and Messrs. Herbert Wechsler, Raoul Berger, and Robert L. Werner were on the brief, for the United States. MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether the use by an American citizen of a passport obtained by false statements to facilitate reëntry into the United States is a "use" within § 2 of the Passport Title of the Act of June 15, 1917,' '40 Stat. 217, 227, Title IX: "SEC. 2. Whoever shall willfully and knowingly make any false statement in an application for passport with intent to induce or secure the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United States, either for his own use or the use of another, contrary to the and, if so, whether petitioner was properly convicted of a "willful" use. We brought the case here because of its importance in the administration of the passport laws. Section 2 provides that whoever shall either make a false statement in an application for a passport or "shall willfully and knowingly use . . . any passport the issue of which was secured in any way by reason of any false statement, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both." The indictment in two counts charged that petitioner, having secured a passport by a false statement, willfully and knowingly used it on April 30, 1937, and again on February 15, 1938, each time by presenting it to an immigration inspector to gain entry into the United States. The proof showed that petitioner, a native-born American citizen, had in 1921, 1927 and 1931 obtained passports under different assumed names by means of false statements. In 1934 petitioner applied for a passport in his own name. The application blank contained the clause: "My last passport was obtained from and is submitted herewith for cancellation." Despite the three passports previously issued to him, petitioner wrote "none" in the blank space, then signed the application and swore to the truth of its contents. The Government issued him a passport, which was later extended upon a renewal application until September 1, 1938. Returning from Europe in April, 1937, and again in February, laws regulating the issuance of passports or the rules prescribed pursuant to such laws, or whoever shall willfully and knowingly use or attempt to use, or furnish to another for use, any passport the issue of which was secured in any way by reason of any false statement, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.” By the Act of March 28, 1940, the maximum term of imprisonment under this section was increased to ten years. 54 Stat. 80. 1938, petitioner showed his passport to an inspector to identify himself and establish his citizenship and consequent right to reënter the United States. The jury convicted him on both counts for willfully using a passport secured by a false statement, and the District Court sentenced him to two years' imprisonment and a fine of $1,000 on each count, the terms to run consecutively. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. At the time of the indictment, the statute of limitations had run on the obtaining of the passport by a false statement (18 U. S. C. § 582). Petitioner contends that the indictment is for the "use" "of a passport as truthful proof of his Kansas birth." Since the "use" to prove an admitted fact-his American citizenship—was innocent, it is urged, no statutory prohibition was violated. The indictment, indictment, however, charges that petitioner "used . . . a passport . . the issue of which he secured by reason of a false statement . . . in the application therefor." The language of the indictment conforms to the definition of the offense in the statute, as the use of "any passport the issue of which was secured in any way by reason of any false statement." The balanced form of § 2, quoted above at note 1, shows that the Congress viewed with concern and punished with equal severity the securing of passports by false statements and their use. The crimes denounced are not the securing or the use but either of such actions made criminal only by the false statements in the procurement of the passport. If the misrepresentation is withdrawn nothing culpable remains in the use. A condemned use of a passport secured by the fraud seems obviously within the act. A more difficult issue emerges from petitioner's assertion that the use proven here is not the kind of use covered by the statute. He finds the prohibitions di '113 F. 2d 97. 29174 0-38-pt. 2--23 rected against "dishonest uses of the safe-conduct of the United States in foreign relations." Such use must be "willful and knowing," an expression said to bear the connotation of evil or dishonest. Attention is called to alleged passport frauds of about the time of the passage of the passport sections and to the recommendation of the Attorney General that Congress pass legislation against the fraudulent use of passports. These are brought forward as indicative of the purpose of Congress to punish fraudulent uses or those uses abroad which would involve misuse of the privilege, under international law, of traveling through foreign countries. It is quite true that passports are used chiefly in foreign travel. There is no limitation, however, to that field and surely the close connection between foreign travel and reëntry to this country is obvious. The plain meaning of the words of the act covers this use. No single argument has more weight in statutory interpretation than this. Nothing in the legislative history is brought to our attention which indicates any other purpose in Congress than that expressed by the words of the act. The final form of the enactment did not vary in this particular portion from the bill originally introduced. The Government does not urge that every use of a fraudulent passport is violative of the act but only those "uses in connection with travel which are a part of the ordinary incentives for obtaining passports.' Certainly the use to prove citizenship on reëntry to the country is within the ordinary incentives." It is en 543. Report of the Attorney General (1916), p. 17. United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534, 'H. R. 291, 65th Cong. Since 1929, the State Department has carried substantially the following suggestion in its "Notice to Bearers of Passports": "22. An American citizen leaving the United States for a country where pass |