Federal Constitution, or by any of its amendments. It is not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United States. Minor vs. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162. It may not be refused on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship of the United States. In other words, the privilege to vote in a state is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be exercised as the state may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals, in violation of the Federal Constitution. The state might provide that persons of foreign birth could vote without being naturalized, and, as stated by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162,22 L.Ed. 627, such persons were allowed to vote in several of the etates upon having declared their intentions to become citizens of the United States. Some states permit women to vote; others refuse them that previlege. A state, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, might provide by its own constitution and laws that none but native-born citizens should be permitted to vote, as the Federal Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one, and the conditions under which that right is to be exercised are matters for the states alone to perscribe. subject to the conditions of the Federal Constitution, already stated; although it may be observed that the right to vote for a member of Congress is not derived exclusively from the state law. See Fed. Const. art. 1, sec. 2; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 65 L. Ed. 85,21 Supt. Ct. Rep. 17. But the elector must be one entitled to vote under the state statute. Id. See also Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 587, 5-1, 57 L. ed. 1005, 1007, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 783. In this case no question arises as to the right to vote for electors of President and Vice President, and no decision is made thereon. The question whether the conditions prescribed by the state might be regarded by others as reasonable or unreasonable is not a Federal one. We do not wish to be understood, however, as intimating that the condition in this statute is unreasonable or in any way improper.

We are unable to see any violation of the Federal Constitution in the provision of the state statute for the declaration of the intent of a person coming into the state before he can claim the right to be registered as a voter. The statute, so far as it provides conditions precedent to the exercise of the elective franchise within the state, by persons coming therein to reside, is neither an unlawful discrimination against any one in the situation of the plaintiff in error nor does it deny to him the equal protection of the law, nor is it repugnant to any fundamental or inalienable rights of citizens of the United States, nor a violation of any implied guaranties of the Federal Constitution. The right of a state to legislate upon the subjective franchise as to it may seem good, subject to the conditions already stated, being as we believe, unassailable, we think it plain that the statute in question violates no right protected by the Federal Constitution.

The reasons that may have impelled the state legislature to enact the statute in question were matters entirely for its consideration, and this court has no concern with them.

By this amendment, which was sugested by concurrent resolution of the legislature of the State of Oklahoma and proposed by an initiative petition on the part of the qual ified electors of said state, and afterwards adopted by a majority of the electors "voting at an election held throughout the state," and thereby declared by the legislature, recommending, and at least 15 per cent. of the qualified electors joining in said petiton and a majority of those voting at said election, approving the same, that said limitations on the right of suffrage were reasonable and not violative of the federal or state constitution. As was said in the Mississippi case, this amendment does not on its face discriminate between the races.

Limitations on the right of suffrage existed in the states on January 1st, 1866 as follows: Conn. (1837) art. 8, as adopted in 1835, an elector to be qualified must "sustain a good moral character.”

Del. (1831) art. 5, electors with certain exceptions, must have for two years next before the election paid county tax, which shall have been assessed for over six months prior to said election.

Mass. (1780) art. 3, as supplenented by art. 20 as adopted in 1857, electors with a few exceptions, must have paid by himself, his parent, master, or guardian, any state or county tax, which shall have been assessed upon him, in any town or district of this commonwealth and in addition thereto, must be able to read the constitution in the English language, and write his name.

The State was erected and admitted into the Union under this constitution, which was passed on by the President of the United States, and his proclamation of admission issued thereon with such a declared reservation on the part of sovereignty. It is specifically provided in said section that the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it is limited by the proviso only to the extent that such alteration or revision shall not conflict with the constitution of the United States. It has time and again been held that if the constitution of a state contains any modifications of the provisions of the Enabling Act whereby the state has been formerly admitted, that the modification contained in the constitution controls. Romine v. State, et al., 7 Wash. 215, 34 P. 924; Edwards v. Lesener, 142 Mo. 310 Williams v. Hurt, 110 Fed. 166; Rice v. State of Montana, 204 U. S. 289. It is therefore not essential in this case to determine whether a provision in the Enabling Act accepted by an irrevocable ordinance on the part of the state, preliminary to admission, could have a continuing, binding force upon the state after its erection and admission into the Union upon an equality with the other states so as to control the government in its sovereign capacity in the exercise of a purely governmental power.

As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Pope v. Williams, supra, the reasons that may have impelled the people to adopt this amendment were mat

ters entirely for their consideration, and this court has no concern with them.

This amendment has never been put in operation since its adoption, and how could it be 'shown that their (its) actual administration was evil until the same is put in operation? (Williams v. Mississippi, supra.)

Every election officer is sworn not only to observe but also to obey the law, which includes this amendment. And the presumption is that they will fairly carry the law into effect. Should the election officers knowingly and wilfully exclude negroes from voting who are qualified to vote under section 4a, of article 3, sufficiently in number, had all been counted for the next highest candidate, to have changed the result of the election, said election would be void. (Martin v. McGarr), Oct. Number Okla. Law Journal, pages 133-146.

.

The parties hereto in the argument have treated the question as properly raised under this proceeding. Without passing on whether the proper remedy has been invoked, for the purpose of this case, we have assummed that such relief may be obtained by injunction.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Dunn, C. J., Hayes and Turner, JJ. concur.

Kane, J. concurs in the conclusion reached, but dissents from that part of the reasoning as to the Enabling Act.

CAPITAL LOCATION DECISION.

THOMAS P. SMITH, et al., Secretary of State,
Plaintiffs in Frror.

V8.

No. 1931

C. N. HASKELL, et al.,Defendants in Error.

(Rendered Nov. 15th, 1910.)

Error from District Court of Logan County. Hon. A. H. Huston, Trial Judge.

Affirmed

1. Oklahoma Enabling Act (June 16, 1906,) in part provides: "The capital of said State shall temporarily be at the city of Guthrie, in the present Territory of Oklahoma, and shall not be changed therefrom previous to A. D. 1913." The terms and conditions of said act were adopted by ordinance irrevocable by the delegates elected pursuant thereto in constitutional convention assembled. Held, in a suit to restrain state officers from, in effect, removing the capital from Guthrie prior to that time pursuant to the provisions of an initiated bill proclaimed by the governor to have been adopted by the electors of the state at the polls, that said provision so adopted had the force and effect of law and is binding on the State unless repealed by said initiated bill.

2. Since Congress has no power to admit a state into the Union except on an equal footing with the origina! states, in accordance with the rights, powers and duties defined by he constitution, the admission of Oklahoma fixed her status and that of her people as that acquired by the other states of the Federal Union under the constitution, anything in the Enabling Act to the contrary notwithstanding; and conferred on such State the exclusive power to enact and repeal its own laws, provided the same enacted be not repugnant to the constitution of the state or that of the United States.