Appeal from the District Court of Haskell County. Hon. Malcolm N. Rosser, trial Judge. Affirmed 1. An information charging murder, verified by the County Attorney, he having no personal knowledge of the facts therein stated, is not in derogation of the defendants constitutional guaranty, that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation; where the prosecution was in fact predicated upon the evidence taken upon the preliminary examination and the action of the examining magistrate in holding the defendant for trial in the district court. 2. In the absence of a statute requiring verification, the County Attorney, acting on his official oath, may present an information charging murder, where the defendant having had a preliminary examination before an examining magistrate, was held to the District Court for trial for the felony charged. 3. Where the instructions given by the court on a trial for murder contain a correct and comprehensive statement of the law of self defense, applicable to the facts in the case, it is not error to refuse requested instructions substantially the same, differing only in form. (Syllabus by the Court.) Brown & Lawrence, Attorneys for plaintiff in error Statement of Facts. Plaintiff in error was charged by information filed in the District Court of Haskell County with the crime of manslaughter. Said information in substance charged that on the 27th day of December, 1908, he feloniously and with the premeditated design to effect the death of one Pete Folsom, did stab, thrust, cut at upon and into the neck of him the said Pete Folsom, with a certain knife then and there and thereby inflicting one mortal wound from which he then and there did die. Upon the trial the jury returned their verdict finding him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and assessing his punishment at imprisonment for a term of four years. Judgment and sentence in accordance with the verdict was entered on June 18th, 1909. An appeal was taken by filing November 4th, 1909, with the clerk of this court, a petition in error with case-made attached. OPINION of the COURT by DOYLE, J. Various errors are assigned in the petition for a reversal of the judgment, but only three are argued in the brief: The first is that: "The court erred in refusing to permit defendant to introduce evidence to show that the County Attorney who verified the information, had no personal knowledge of the alleged crime." Upon his arraingment the defendant filed a motion to set aside and quash the information. "For the reason that neither of the informations are sworn to by a person who knows the facts therein stated to be true, or by a person who has any personal knowledge of any of the facts of this cause." The defendant thereupon called Joseph W. Foster, the County Attorney who verified the informations, as witness proposing to prove by him that he had no personal knowledge of the alleged crime. The court of its own motion refused to permit the witness to answer any question pertaining to his knowledge of the crime, and the defendant excepted. There is no merit whatever in this assignment. The case-made not only contains the proceedings had upon the trial, but also the testimony taken in support of the complaint filed before the County Judge upon the preliminary examination. The constitutional requirement of probable cause; supported by oath or affirmation, to authorize the detention of the accused was fully met by the evidence taken upon the preliminary examination without objection on the part of the defendant and by his having been held to the District Court for trial by examining magistrate. In the case of Henson vs. State, 5 Okla. Cr.- 9 Okla. Law Journal, 349, this court said: "The verification is no part of an information charging a felony, and is therefore not an indispensible requisite.' The object of such verification is not as in misdemeanors for a showing of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, to authorize the arrest of the accused, and it is not for the purpose of evidence, which is to be weighed and passed upon, but only as we believe to secure good faith and as a matter of good form in pleading. See also In re Talley 4 Okla. Cr. 398, 112 Pac. 36. The remaining assignments relate to instructions requested and refused, and to instructions given. We have examined with care the instructions given and refused. Those given embrace a full and correct exposition of the law bearing upon the facts of the case, and we find no legal objection to the instructions excepted to. The instructions requested and refused relate to the law of self defense. No useful purpose could be served by a repetition of the same thing in different language, and it was clearly not error for the court to refuse requested instructions which were substantially similar to those given. The record shows that the evidence in the case was received without objection. The facts admitted or conclusively established seems to us to exclude every reasonable doubt as to the justice of the judgment. In conclusion we simply add that a careful examination of the record discloses that the defendant had a fair and impartial trial in the manner prescribed by law. Wherefore the judgment of the District Court of Haskell county is affirmed. Furman, Presiding Judge. Armstrong, Judge concur. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Plaintiff in Error, vs. W. N. MABEN, Defendant in Error. (Rendered April 18th, 1911.) No. A-790. Appeal from District Court of Pottawatomie County. Hon. S. H. Russell, trial Judge. Affirmed 1. When a grand jury is in session investigating charges against persons for violation of the laws of this State, special counsel are not entitled to appear before the grand jury for the purpose performing any of the duties of the Attorney-General of the State or of the proper county attorney of the county in which the grand jury is assembled. 2. When an attorney, other than the proper County Attorney or under some circumstances the AttorneyGeneral of the State, appears before a grand jury for the purpose of giving advice or performing any other duties devolving upon the county attorney or attorneyGeneral of the State, indictments found by such grand jury which were considered when such attorney was present, on proper motion should be set aside. 3. Sec. 24 of Art. 3, Ch. 69, Session Laws of 1907-8, does not confer upon counsel for the governor appointed under said Act authority to exercise the powers of the County Attorney in cases other than those involving violations of the prohibitory law. (Syllabus by the Court.) Chas. J. West, Att'y Gen., for plaintiff in error. A. C. Cruce, Pruit & Rutherford, and McAdams and Pendleton, Attorneys for defendant in error OPINION of the Court by ARMSTRONG, Judge. This is an appeal by the State from a judgment rendered by the District Court of Pottawatomie County on the 31st day of January, 1910, setting aside an indictment for bribery against the defendant in error upon the ground that Hon. Fred S. Caldwell, Counsel for the Governor, an attorney who was neither the Attorney General of the State nor the County Attorney of Pottawatomie County, was present in the grand jury room when the grand jury was in session considering the charges against the defendant in error. The findings of the trial court on this point are as follows: "The court finds that Fred S. Caldwell, Counsel to the Governor, was present in the grand jury room during the April, 1909, term of said court; that the grand jury was then in session and considering matters including charges against the defendant; and the court further finds that the said Fred S. Caldwell, Counsel to the Governor, was not authorized to appear before said grand jury.' This question of the authority of the Counsel for the Governor to appear and prosecute that class of public offenses designated as felonies, and conduct examinations before grand juries, involving this class of offenses, has not been raised in this court heretofore. The act creating this office and prescribing the duties thereof is what is commonly known as the prohibitory enforcement act. Section 24 of Article 3, Chapter 69, of said Act is as follows: "The governor shall have power to appoint an attorney who shall have been a resident in this state for at least two years and shall have been a lawyer licensed by some court of record for at least five years, who shall be known as counsel for the governor. He shall, under the direction of the governor, assist in enforcing the provisions of this Act, and the other laws of the state, and shall perform such other duties as the governor may, from time to time, require. He shall have all the powers of county attorneys in their respective counties. He shall hold office during the pleasure of the governor, |