this provision has been suggested except the discrimination which by it is plainly indicated.

"This being so, what is the effect of the Fifteenth Amendment? It is declared by the Supreme Court to have the effect of obliterating from the statutes so much of their provisions as creates the forbidden discrimination. Neal vs. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370."

And after citing and quoting from authorities, the opinion proceeds:

"It is therefore apparent that, in enforcing the discriminating provisions of the state statute, the registers were doing and intended to do an act forbidden by the supreme law of the land and for doing which the state statutes afforded them no protection."

The further questions which this case may involve do not seem to be properly raised upon the demurrer. From the views expressed, it follows that the demurrer must be overruled as to each count.

The first question presented for determination upon the demurrer to the indictment in case 544 is whether section 20 of the Code on which it is based applies to the right of suffrage. If it is not so applicable, the indictment cannot be sustained. In the opinion of the court, a consideration of this question is sufficient to control the ruling upon the demurrer.

The portion of section 20 on which the indictment proceeds declares a punishment against every person for wilfully subjecting, under color of a state law, etc., any inhabitant of a state, territory, or district to the deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured or protected by the Federal Constitution and laws. This section is practically the same as section 5510 of the Revised. Statutes, and should therefore be taken as having the came meaning. Section 5510 appears to have come from cections 16 and 17 of the Act of May 31, 1870. Section 15 of that act provided that "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in

every state and territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoye by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding," and that unequal taxes or charges shall not be imposed or enforced by any state upon immigrants thereto from different countries, any state law in conflict with this provision being declraed null and void. Section 17 provided a punishment against every person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, should subject any inhabitant of any state or territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by section 16, or to different pains or penalties on account of alienage, color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of citizens. It will be observed that the right of suffrage was not included in the rights enumerated in the foregoing sections of the Act of 1870. Was section 5510, in forbidding the subjection of an inhabitant of any state, territory, or district, to deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution and laws, intended to effect a change of legislative purpose and protect the right of suffrage?

The mere condensation, abridgment, or re-arrangement of statutes in a revision will not justify a different construction than was before authorized. A substantial change of language is necessary. It is settled if a statute when

it has been revised is plain in terms, its language will control its construction. But if there is doubt as to its meaning, if it is susceptible of different constructions, it is then proper to consider the statutes which have been revised in order to resolve the uncertainty. United States vs. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508. The controversy here shows that it is permissible and requisite in ascertaining the meaning of section 5510 to consult the Act of 1870.

From an examination of that act it is believed to

sufficiently appear that section 5510 was intended to provide redress by means of more brief expression for the deprivation of the same rights as those specified in section 16 of the Act of 1870, since section 16 appears to be comprehensive of the civil rights protected by the Federal Constitution and laws.

The fact that section 5510 also accords its protection to inhabitants only is important, as appears from a reference to other sections of the Act of 1870. Section 18 of the act should not be overlooked, whereby sections 16 and 17 were to be enforced as provided in the Act of April 9, 1866, (14 Stat. 27). which was re-enacted. Section of this earlier act declared citizens to have certain civil rights. But the relation of sections 16 and 17 of the later act to civil rights of "persons" and "inhabitants" was not affected. Other sections of the Act of 1870 pertaining to the right of suffrage confined their protection to citizens and were so brought into the Revised Statutes. See Title XXVI; Ch. 7, Title LXX. By continuing the use of the wor "citizen" in the other sections of the Revised Statutes respecting suffrage and of the word "inhabitant" in section 5510 an intention is manifest to exclude the right of suffrage from the protection of the latter section.

From the foregoing considerations. it may well be concluded that in the adoption of section 5510 and, in turn, of section 20 of the Code, the rights in contemplation were those only of a civil nature secured to inhabitants by the Federal Constitution and laws.

This view of the meaning of the statute on which this indictment is predicated renders unnecessary a determination of the questions as to its sufficiency in other respects. The demurrer will be sustained to each count.

May 22, 1911.

JOHN H. COTTERAL,
District Judge.

REVIEWS.

A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW

OF EVIDENCE.

Volume 1.

By Hon. Charles F. Chamberlayne, American Editor of 'Best's Principles of the Law of Evidence,' and of 'Taylor on Evidence,' etc.

Published by Matthew Bender & Company,

Albany, New York.

The work before us is the first volume of a proposed series of four large volumes, and the whole offered the Profession for twenty-eight dollars.

In this review notice we will confine ourselves to the work now in being, volume first. it consists of a largo octavo, well printed and bound, containing 1089 pages of reading matter, beside 130 of preface, table of contents and introduction. The body of the volume is divided into ten chapters: The first, essential and proper definitions. The second, 'Facts.' The third, Law and Facts.' The fourth and fifth, 'Court and Jury.' Sixth, 'Principles of Administration.' which is inclusive of the seventh chapter. Eight 'Knowledge judicial.' Nineth, 'Knowledge common.' And tenth. Knowledge special.' We enumerate these chapter divisions to show at the outset that the design of the book is original and does not follow the beaten path. While as said by one of our exchanges "that to the 'making of books' on evidence 'there is no end," this work is the production of a Specialist on this most important branch of the law, and a specialist not simply in the ordinary term confined to the little circle specialized, but the work of a master in the whole field of the law. He has been in the 'thickest of the fight' and knows and understands the suitablness of weapons; being thoroughly conversant with the whole becomes most competent to specialize. Mr. Chamberlayne has stood for years as an authority before the le

gal profession, both for clear insight into substantive as well as procedural law; together with his labor as editor and annotator of one of the most profound works on the Principles of the Law of Evidence, accords him the right to speak with authority, not vis a fronte, but vis a tergo, out of the abundance within." The depth of his researches making him competent to suggest, modify and classify the rules that obtain in the details of this complicated but most essential branch of the law. His work while practical, is searching into the theoretic principles upon which the practical art rests. In these ten chapters as a foundation the author has placed the Bench Bar under lasting obligations as contributor to a vast amount of light on many dark places which have hung over the subject as the somber mist of centuries. In addition to clarification the author cites all valuable authorities, English, Canadian and American. With the completion of the second volume the author will close it with a copious index which will include the index to this first volume. This excellent book is complete as to the ground it covers and well worth $7. to every lawyer.

IIOPKINS' UNITED STATES

JUDICIAL CODE.

By James L. Hopkins, of the St. Louis Bar.
Published by Callaghan & Company,
Price $2.50.

Chicago, Illinois.

This is a neat and well bound volume, appearing at the most opportune moment; as since March 3, 1911, every lawyer has been anxious for access to a reliable authority as to how much of the Federal procedure had been changed by the last Congress at its close, and by it termed the "Judicial Code Act." This Act actually abolished an establish court, known and recognized as far back as the Government itself, the Federal Circuit Court, and merged all its jurisdiction into the District Court. Such radical changes made it imperative that