announced our intention to observe neutrality between the two nations and he laid down the proposition that the Doctrine did not require the United States, in a consistent pursuit of it, to protect any government in this hemisphere, either by a defensive alliance against the attacking European Power or by interfering to prevent such punishment as it might inflict, provided only that in the end the conquering power did not force its own government upon the conquered people, or compel a permanent transfer to it of their territory, or resort to any other unjustly oppressive measures against them. And Mr. Roosevelt in his communications to Congress has again and again asserted that maintenance of the Doctrine does not require our Government to object to armed measures on the part of European governments to collect their debts and the debts of their nationals against governments in this continent that are in default of their just obligations, provided only that they do not attempt to satisfy those obligations by taking over to themselves ownership and possession of the territory of the debtor governments, or by other oppressive measures. It may be conceded that Mr. Olney used language that was unfortunate in describing the effect of the Monroe Doctrine upon the position of the United States in this hemisphere. It is not remarkable that it has been construed to be the claim of suzerainty over the territory of the two American continents. Our fiat is not law to control the domestic concerns or indeed the internal policies, or the foreign policies of the Latin-American republics, or of other American governments, nor do we exercise substantial sovereignty over them. We are concerned that their governments shall not be interfered with by European governments; we are concerned that this hemisphere shall not be a field for land aggrandizement and the chase for increased political power by European governments, such as we have witnessed in Africa and in China and Manchuria, and we believe that such a condition would be inimical to our safety and interests. More than this, where a controversy between an European government and a Latin-American republic is of such a character that it is likely to lead to war, we feel that our earnest desire to escape the possible result against which the Monroe Doctrine is aimed, is sufficient to justify our mediating between the European Power and the Latin-American republic, and bringing about by negotiation, if possible, a peaceable settlement of the difference. This

is what Mr. Roosevelt did in Venezuela and in Santo Domingo. It was not that the use of force or threatened force to collect their debts by the European Powers constituted a violation of the Monroe Doctrine that induced Mr. Roosevelt to act, but only a general desire to promote peace and also a wish to avoid circumstances in which an invasion of the Monroe Doctrine might easily follow.

"A National Asset"

It is said—and this is what frightened peace advocates from the Monroe Doctrine-that it rests on force, and ultimately on the strength of our army and our navy. That is true, if its enforcement is resisted. Its ultimate sanction and vindication are in our ability to maintain it; but our constant upholding and assertion of the Doctrine have enabled us, with the conflicting interests of European Powers and the support of some and the acquiescence of others, to give effect to that Doctrine for now nearly a century, and that without the firing of a single shot. This has given the Doctrine a traditional weight that assertion of a new policy by the United States never could have. It is a national asset, and, indeed, an asset of the highest value for those who would promote the peace of the world. The mere fact that the further successful maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine in the improbable event that any European Power shall deliberately · violate it will require the exercise of force upon our part, is certainly not a reason for the most sincere advocate of peace to insist upon sacrificing its beneficent influence and prestige as an instrument of peace to prevent European intermeddling in this hemisphere which a century of successful insistence without actual use of force has given it.

Much as the Doctrine may be criticized by the Continental press of Europe, it is an institution of one hundred years' standing, it is something that its age is bound to make Europe respect. It was advanced at a time when we were but a small nation with little power, and it has acquired additional force and prestige as our nation has grown to the size and strength and international influence that it now has.

Were we to abandon the Doctrine and thus in effect notify the European governments that so far as our remonstrance or interposition was concerned, they might take possession of Santo

Domingo, of Haiti, or of any of the Central American republics, or of any South American republics that might be disturbed by revolution, and that might give them some international excuse for intervention, it would be but a very short time before we would be forced into controversies that would be much more dangerous to the peace of this hemisphere than our continued assertion of the Doctrine properly understood and limited.

Should We Invite Their Cooperation?

But it is said that we ought to invite in these so-called A. B. C. powers of South America to assist us in upholding the Doctrine and also in doing what the Doctrine, as well as neighborhood interests, may lead us to do with nearby countries around the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, and that we ought to establish some sort of relationship with these great powers as members of a kind of hegemony to decide upon Latin-American questions and participate in intervention to help along the smaller countries, and thus put such powers on an equality with us in our American policy and give assurance of our disinterestedness. If we could do this, I would be glad to have it done, because it would relieve us of part of a burden and would give greater weight to the declaration of the policy. I would be glad to have an effort tactfully made to this end and I don't want to discourage it; but I fear we should find that these powers would be loath to assume responsibility or burden in the matter of the welfare of a government like one of the Central American republics, or Haiti or Santo Domingo so remote from them and so near to us. We attempted in case of disturbance in the Central American governments once or twice to interest Mexico, when Mexico had a responsible government and was very near at hand, but President Diaz was loath to take any part with the United States in such an arrangement, and we found that whatever had to be done had to be done largely on the responsibility of the United States.

If action in respect of any republic of South America were necessary under the Monroe Doctrine, the joining of the A. B. C. powers with the United States might involve suspicion and jealousy on the part of other South American republics not quite so prosperous or so stable as the A. B. C. powers. Thus, instead of helping the situation, the participation of part of the South

• American governments might only complicate it. I know something about the character of those countries myself, not from personal observation, but from a study of the character of Spanish descended civilizations and societies, and I venture to say that sensitive as they all may be in respect to suspected encroachments of the United States, they are even more sensitive as between themselves and their respective ambitions. During my Administration, Mr. Knox, the Secretary of State, tendered the good offices of the United States as between South American governments who were bitter against each other over boundaries and other disputes, and successfully brought them to a peaceful solution, but in those controversies it was quite apparent that whatever then might be the general feeling against the United States, their suspicions of each other, when their interests were at variance, were quite as intense. Indeed it is not too much to say that the fear in the hearts of the less powerful peoples of South America of a South American hegemony is more real than any genuine fear they may have of the actual suzerainty of our Government. My belief, therefore, is that unless we could organize a union of all the countries of two continents, which would be so clumsy as to be entirely impracticable, the influence of the United States can probably be exerted in support of the Monroe Doctrine more effectively and much less invidiously alone than by an attempt to unite certain of the South American Powers in an effort to preserve its successful maintenance. I hope my fear in this respect will prove to be unfounded and that the plan suggested may be successful.

Craftsman. 25: 311-4. January, 1914

Vitality of the Monroe Doctrine. W. Carman Roberts

This doctrine which for ninety years has been a cardinal principle of our foreign policy has not merely held its own during this period, but has proved its vitality by gradually extending its scope under succeeding administrations. Thus under President Cleveland it was interpreted to mean that any European Power owning land in the Western Hemisphere must arbitrate its boundary disputes with its neighbors. President Roosevelt went further than his predecessors in accepting for Uncle Sam

under the Monroe Doctrine the rôle of benevolent policeman, "the big brother with a stick," who, as Professor Hiram Bingham of Yale puts it, "would keep intruders from annoying the little fellows, and who would also see to it that the little fellow did not annoy the neighbors." Under President Taft the Lodge resolution, passed by the Senate but not signed by the President, undertook to carry Monroeism still further by denying the right of American republics to sell harbor rights to foreign corporations.

But the most remarkable development of the Monroe Doctrine is that formulated by President Wilson within very recent weeks and involving the proposition that the United States will not countenance the establishment of any foreign financial control over the weaker Latin-American countries of a sort that would in effect control their government. Speaking at Mobile recently the President said: "States that are obliged to grant concessions are in this condition-that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs, a condition always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. What these states are going to see is an emancipation from this subordination which has been inevitable to foreign enterprises. The United States must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity." This was prefaced by an emphatic statement that never again would the United States acquire a foot of territory by conquest. An almost immediate sequel to this warning to the foreign concessionaires was the abandonment by a powerful British syndicate of gigantic oil project in Colombia and Ecuador. These projects, if consummated, would have put certain ports in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal practically under British control-a situation in direct conflict with the Monroe Doctrine as elaborated in the Lodge resolution. Moreover, since oil is likely to supersede coal as naval fuel, an oil port is virtually the equivalent of a coaling station.

Thus, despite repeated assertions that it is dead or obsolete, the Monroe Doctrine not only remains a controlling factor in our foreign relations, but is proving its vitality by constant growth in meaning and scope. Moreover, it is and always has been a popular doctrine with the American people. Even the weaker of the Latin-American nations are now beginning to