armed intervention in Mexico for the purpose of overthrowing the domestic republican government under Juarez and establishing on its ruins the foreign imperial government under Maximilian, nor in any of the official correspondence relating to the subject, mentioned the "Monroe Doctrine," although his action came within the letter as well as the spirit of the message of 1823. President Polk, on the other hand, in pronouncing against the acquisition of new "dominion" in North America by a European Power, although he was well within the limits of the "Monroe Doctrine" as it is now understood, invoked a passage that fell far short of sustaining his position. It would be easy to cite many similar examples.

The Monroe Doctrine, as a limitation upon the extension of European Power and influence on the American continents, is now generally recognized as a principle of American policy. To its explicit acceptance by Great Britain and Germany there may be added the declaration which was spread by unanimous consent upon the minutes of the Hague Conference, and which was permitted to be annexed to the signature of the American delegates to the convention for the peaceful adjustment of international disputes, that nothing therein contained should be so construed as to require the United States "to depart from its traditional policy of not entering upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or internal administration of any foreign state," or to relinquish "its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."

Chautauquan. 22:549-56. February, 1896.

Monroe Doctrine and Some of Its Applications. James Albert Woodburn

The times since 1823 at which claims have been put forth for the application of this doctrine have been numerous. The Panama Congress in 1825-6; repeated discussions concerning Cuba ; the case of Yucatan in 1848; the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 1850, and the Nicaraguan Canal; the French intervention in Mexico, 1861-5, and numerous minor instances since our Civil War-in connection with all these the Monroe Doctrine has been brought

into discussion. Our space does not permit us to discuss here more than one of these, and we choose the only one in which, as it seems to us, the Monroe Doctrine has ever been fairly applicable the case of Mexico, 1861-5.

On October 31, 1861, a convention was held in London between England, France and Spain, avowedly to consider how these nations might secure redress and security for their citizens in Mexico. Some of these citizens held Mexican bonds which that government, it was said, was not willing, or not able, to pay. Complaint was also made that life and property were not safe in Mexico. The convention provided for such occupation of Mexico and "such other operations" as should be necessary or suitable to secure these objects.

Payment of debts might be secured under the then existing government of Mexico, but to secure the other object, i. e., the permanent security of life and liberty, these new allied powers deemed that a new government for Mexico was necessary. This meant a war of conquest upon that country, though it was asserted that the Mexicans themselves might determine of what form their new government should be. The United States was invited to become a party to this treaty-that is, after the terms of the treaty had been arranged and its execution begun. Secretary Seward endeavored to remove the occasion for this interference by offering our aid to Mexico to help her pay her debt. Mexico consented to the arrangement; but when Mr. Seward gave information of such proposals to the allied Powers, the propositions for a peaceful settlement were rejected as unsatisfactory. One apology for their proposed intervention could now no longer be urged by the allies. But they could no longer be satisfied by the payment of the debts due them. Their bald proposition now was that they would make war on Mexico in order to change her form of government upon the pretext that foreign residents were not safe in that country.

The motives behind the movement are best seen from the letter of the French emperor ordering the French commander to march upon the capital of Mexico: "to redress grievances; to establish bounds to the extension of the United States further south, to prevent her from becoming the sole dispenser of the products of the New World.". The allies were moving for power

and commercial influence, though the French emperor disclaimed any design of forcing a government upon Mexico. But there are those unreasonable enough to remember that the avowals made to the world are not always those which reveal the real influences behind the scenes in cabinet councils. The sequel proves the suspicion.

On April 9, 1862, at another conference between these three Powers (at Orizaba) England and Spain objected that France had gone beyond the terms of the first convention in giving military aid in Mexico to the party favoring an imperial government, and these two Powers therefore withdrew from further cooperation. Says Mr. Dana:

But France, whose pecuniary claims upon Mexico were much smaller than those of the other powers, and more questionable, left to itself in Mexico, proceeded, by military aid to the Imperialist party, to establish that party in possession of the capital, and, under the protection of the French forces, an Assembly of Notables was called, without even a pretense of a general vote of the Mexican people. This assembly undertook to establish an imperial form of government, and to offer the throne to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria.

The French emperor acknowledged this government and entered into a treaty to give it support and security by military aid. Now, where, during all this time, was the Monroe Doctrine? Here was a plain case. Here was a clear, undisputed European "interposition for the purpose of controlling the destiny" of an American state. If the Monroe Doctrine were not to be asserted in such a flagrant intervention in the affairs of an American state it is not to be doubted that it could never again have been consistently referred to as a principle, or precedent, in our foreign relations. As a policy the Monroe Doctrine would have fallen into a state of "innocuous desuetude." It is important to note how the precedent of Monroe and Adams was followed by Lincoln, Seward, and Grant.

On April 4, 1864, the House of Representatives passed a resolution by unanimous vote, denouncing the French intervention. Mr. Seward, our secretary of state for foreign affairs, set forth our position that we regarded France as a belligerent in Mexico. We acknowledged the right of one nation to make war upon another for international objects, and that one Belligerent might secure military possession of the soil of the other, if she could. And, as between these belligerents, we did not enter into the

merits of the controversy.

French government says:

Mr. Seward, in his dispatch to the

But France appears to us to be lending her great influence to destroy the domestic republican government of Mexico, and to establish there an imperial system under the sovereignty of a European prince. This is the real cause of our national discontent, that the French army which is now in Mexico is invading a domestic republican government there, for the avowed purpose of suppressing it and establishing upon its ruins a foreign monarchical government, whose presence there, so long as it should endure, could not but be regarded by the people of the United States as injurious and menacing to their own chosen and endeared republican institutions. We have constantly maintained, and still feel bound to maintain that the people in every state on the American continent have a right to secure for themselves a republican government if they choose, and that interference by foreign states to prevent the enjoyment of such institutions deliberately established is wrongful, and in its effects antagonistical to the free and popular form of government existing in the United States.

This is a very fair re-expression of the Monroe Doctrine. Certainly the circumstances justified this reassertion. This was at the close of the Civil War, four years after intervention began -four eventful years during which our hands were pretty well tied against foreign controversy. What was said we have seen from Seward; what was done let the silent soldier tell. Grant in his memoirs says:

England, France, and Spain, under the pretext of protecting their citizens, seized upon Mexico as a foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. I, myself, regarded this as a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged, and supposed, as a matter of course, that the United States would treat it as such where their hands were free to strike. I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lincoln and the secretary of war, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles on our hands. All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the armed intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the throne of Mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way.

After the surrender of Lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling the French from Mexico. These troops got off before they could be stopped and went to Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributed them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream. This soon led to the request from France that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of

theirs. Finally Bazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French government. From that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us.

This theoretical and practical reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine bore tangible results, and it indicated a policy which is unanimously approved by the American people.

Since the intervention in Mexico there have been several minor incidents which have given rise to a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine. Repeatedly, in the public discussions, the doctrine of Monroe has been misinterpreted and misapplied. Nicaragua treats Great Britain with international discourtesy by the expulsion of a consul, or in other ways inflicts injuries. Great Britain demands satisfaction and a money indemnity and, upon Nicaragua's refusal to pay, proceeds, by the occupation of a Nicaraguan port, to collect forcibly the sum demanded. It was asserted by some that, in pursuance of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States ought to interfere in behalf of Nicaragua. Had we used the Monroe Doctrine as the apology for interference in such a quarrel, it would have been equivalent to asserting that the great precedent of Seward and Adams had committed us to the folly of interfering in all the quarrels of other American states with European Powers and of protecting those states from the just consequences of their insolence and misdeeds. The Monroe Doctrine is not to be belittled in such a way.

The Monroe Doctrine did not commit us to the policy of interfering to protect our American neighbors against a forcible territorial aggression by a European Power. No student of history will venture to say that it did. Whether we shall interfere in such a case and make another's quarrel our own is a matter to be determined by public policy and national interests. The precedent of Monroe need not be quoted, or relied upon, to justify us. Mr. Calhoun, in opposing President Polk's application of the doctrine in the case of Yucatan, in 1848, denied that the doctrine had reference to transfers of sovereignty in territory by coercion or agreement. In 1856 Senator Cass made the same denial. To-day Secretary Olney holds that the doctrine applies in a case of territorial transfer by coercion, but not in a case of transfer by agreement; while Senator Lodge and others would still further enlarge the doctrine by making it apply to cases both of coercion and agreement. But when Calhoun announced the