Furthermore, Germany is getting around the Monroe Doctrine, and is actually making a peaceful conquest of South America which will injure us just as much as if we had allowed her to make a military conquest of the southern republics. She is winning South American friendship. She has planted colonies, one of which, in southern Brazil, has 350,000 people in it, as large a population as that of Vermont and nearly as large as that of Montana. Germany is taking pains to educate her young business men in the Spanish language, and to send them out equipped to capture Spanish-American trade. We have a saying that "Trade follows the flag." Germany has magnificent steamers, flying the German flag, giving fortnightly service to every important port in South America-ports where the American flag is practically never seen. She has her banks and business houses which have branches in the interior cities. By their means she is able to keep track of American commerce, to know what we are doing, and at what rates. Laughing in her sleeve at the Monroe Doctrine as an antiquated policy, which only makes it easier for her to do a safe business, Germany is engaged in the peaceful conquest of Spanish America.

To be sure, we are not standing still, and we are fighting for the same trade that she is, but our soldiers are handicapped by the presence of the very doctrine that was intended to strengthen our position in the new world. Is this worth while?

At all events let us face clearly and frankly the fact that the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine is going to cost the United States an immense amount of trouble, money, and men.

Carried out to its logical conclusion, it means a policy of suzerainty and interference which will earn us the increasing hatred of our neighbors, the dissatisfaction of Europe, the loss of commercial opportunities, and the forfeiture of time and attention which would much better be given to settling our own difficult internal problems. The continuance of adherence to the Monroe Doctrine offers opportunities to scheming statesmen to distract public opinion from the necessity of concentrated attention at home by arousing mingled feelings of jingoism and self-importance in attempting to correct the errors of our neighbors.

If we persist in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, we shall find that its legitimate, rational, and logical growth will lead us

to an increasing number of large expenditures, where American treasure and American blood will be sacrificed in efforts to remove the mote from our neighbor's eye while overlooking the beam in our own.

The character of the people who inhabit the tropical American republics is such, the percentage of Indian blood is so great, the little understood difficulties of life in those countries are so far-reaching, and the psychological tendencies of the people so different from our own, that opportunities will continually arise which will convince us that they require our intervention if we continue to hold to the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine.

It is for us to face the question fairly and to determine whether it is worth while to continue any longer on a road which leads to such great expenditures and which means the loss of international friendships.

That international good will is a desideratum it needs no words of mine to prove to anyone. Looked at from every point of view, selfishly and unselfishly, ethically, morally, commercially, and diplomatically, we desire to live at peace with our neighbors and to promote international friendship. Can this be done by continuing our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine?

Journal of Race Development. 4: 324-33. January, 1914

Monroe Doctrine. George F. Tucker

We should not forget that at the time of President Monroe's declaration this country had a population of only a few millions, and that her interests were inconsiderable in comparison with those of today, that the Spanish-American countries were emerging from colonial conditions that made the transition to independence and democracy difficult and problematical; that trade between civilized countries was not extensive and was largely limited to merchandise peculiar to an age when wants were few and luxuries little known; that transportation was not yet effected by the agencies which man has since called from latency; that knowledge the world over was the possession of the few, and that such a thing as the education of the masses was hardly contemplated; that racial affinities and prejudices were marked and prevalent-a fact due to the aloofness of nations, caused in

a large measure by slow and imperfect means of communication; that there were few, perhaps no, societies and associations organized to promote the cause of peace and to agitate for settlement of wars and disputes by compromise or arbitration, and that no one dreamed—not even the visionary and enthusiast—of the discoveries and inventions that were to modify the methods of trade and business, augment the wealth of the world, raise the standards of living, bring long separated peoples into closer relations and make possible cooperative efforts to promote amity and good-will among nations.

Is it not a fact that the Monroe Doctrine might possibly be applied today to the detriment of the southern republics in whose interest it may be invoked, and possibly to the discredit of the United States? It is fair to assume that there are only two nations that are likely in any event to oppose or violate this Doctrine or inhibition-Great Britain and Germany. In the past ninety years Great Britain has advanced from the rule of the few to that of the many, so that the subjects of the King enjoy about all the privileges of citizens of our country; she has covered the seas with her shipping, and has developed a colonial system the most remarkable and efficient in the history of the world; she has guarded and guards her subjects in every corner of the globe, and, wherever her flag flies, the lives and property of aliens are accorded the same protection as those of her own. Now is it not probable that; if Great Britain should interfere in the affairs of a Latin-American country, she would establish a system calculated to promote the interests of that country, and not at all inimical to those of the United States? And what system? Not that of the old Great Britain governed by gentlemen, but that of the Great Britain of today governed by the people.

Ninety years ago Germany was a collection of states without cohesion and with a not redundant population. Now regard the aspect of governmental unification, and consider her great advance not only in education and all the activities that go with learning, but in manufacturing and trade and commerce. The growth in population has been marvelous, and the label "Made in Germany," testifies everywhere to commercial expansion and prosperity, but her territory is hardly sufficient to maintain her constantly increasing numbers, and she naturally seeks other lo

calities for those who are handicapped at home by the struggle for existence. Now if Germany should take over a Latin-American country, would its people be subjugated and deprived of their liberties, or would they affiliate with the conquerors and profit by the appropriation? And how would our own institutions be affected? Would there be ground for apprehension that such an appropriation would be a menace to our democratic government? The speaker does not answer these questions, but he adverts to the fact that there are several million German-Americans; that they have been famed for their indifference to political intrigue, and have been and are equally famed for their diligence, their frugality, their thrift, and their loyalty to their adopted land. So far as is known, they have never attempted to destroy the American republic, but on the other hand have been among the foremost to contribute to its prosperity.

But how about coaling stations and the transference to American shores of the European military system? This suggests other questions. Have not the great Powers of Europe all they can attend to in colonial enterprise and expansion, especially since their taking over of the available portions of Africa, under spheres of influence? Would not the maintenance of military strong-holds and coaling stations in Central and South America be an element of weakness rather than of strength? Commanding a large portion of the trade of these southern republics are not Great Britain and Germany, for example, better off than they would be if they were compelled by expensive military and naval measures to guard a commerce which prospers and increases under the protection of the countries with whom it is carried on?

The chief solicitude, perhaps, of the alarmists relates to the Panama Canal. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty has been supplanted by the Hay-Pauncefote convention. Under the direction, and at the expense of this country, the Canal is nearly completed. It is to be neutralized. The United States may maintain such military police as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder; belligerent vessels are restricted in method and activity, and the provisions of the treaty are to apply to waters adjacent to the Canal, within three marine miles of either end. And what is this solicitude? Is it not that the littoral is in peril, that is the shores adjacent to the Canal, particularly on the Atlantic

side; that some strong European Power may appropriate a part of this littoral, and that the position of the United States may be thus rendered insecure and the Monroe Doctrine made ineffective? Great Britain may be eliminated from consideration, for there is no reason to believe that, after settling the protracted controversy over Isthmian transit, she is going to pursue a course which may weaken the alliance she has entered into to further her own trade. With the English speaking peoples in accord, is there ground for apprehending interference with the littoral, or the establishment of coaling-stations in any parts thereof, or in any of the islands of the Caribbean Sea? Is not the logical conclusion that the successful operation of this great waterway will prove such a benefit to the commercial nations of the globe, that no one of them will be disposed to pursue a policy calculated to give umbrage to the others?

A matter which merits attention is the enforcement of money claims. The Latin-American republics have been frequent borrowers of European money-changers, and frequently also the disinclination or refusal to settle has led to threats of coercion. In one notable instance-a little over a decade ago-war was actually resorted to and the American people, misled by the yellow newspapers, were distracted by the bugaboo of an invaded Monroe Doctrine. The case was that of Venezuela. It is not contended that the government of Venezuela repudiated its obligations; in fact, that government only objected to the amount of the claims, and proposed that they be passed upon by a board of Venezuelans, while the creditor nations urged their reference to a mixed commission. The method adopted the sinking of Venezuelan war vessels and the bombardment of Venezuelan portsis believed to be one of the first attempts in history to enforce commercial demands by virtual acts of war. It is to be noted, however, that both Great Britain and Germany disavowed to the American government in advance any intention to acquire territory, the German ambassador assuring the State Department, "We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory." The intention to acquire territory was disavowed, but were not the attitude and measures of Great Britain and Germany in a sense an interference in the affairs of Venezuela, and were the interests of South and Cen