Later developments would seem to be in harmony with the principle thus laid down by President Cleveland, that the United States had the right itself to intervene actively in Central and South American affairs. We took control of Porto Rico and the Philippines and laid certain limitations on Cuba. President Roosevelt declared our responsibility to European nations for the conduct of Latin-America. In San Domingo we took over the custom houses and are acting as receiver for European nations. Our course with respect to Nicaragua and Panama would seem to carry out the same principle. President Wilson's course in refusing to recognize Huerta and his Mobile speech are claimed by some to be still further extensions of our policy.

The events of the last few years, especially in Mexico and Panama have revived the discussion of the Monroe Doctrine and it is urged by many that it is outworn and should be abandoned. It is gradually being borne in upon us that our course has not gained for us such friendly relations with our southern neighbors as is desirable for our best interests. It is worthy of remark that two distinct bodies have thought it worth while to devote entire conferences to the study of our relations with these southern republics and incidentally of the Monroe Doctrine. The Clark University Conference, held late in 1913, was devoted to LatinAmerica, the papers and discussions having since been published in book form under the editorship of George H. Blakeslee. Most of them are also to be found in the Journal of Race Development for January, 1914. The eighth annual conference of the American Society of International Law was concerned largely with a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, which has since been published in the Proceedings of this Society for 1914. The July, 1914, number of the Annals of the American Academy is devoted also to a study of our international relations, and includes much material of value on the Monroe Doctrine. These three collections have been quoted from liberally in the following pages.

The compiler of this volume has experienced more than ordinary difficulty in classifying the material both in the bibliography and the reprints because of the lack of any clear line of demarcation between the solutions suggested by the advocates and opponents of the Doctrine. For this reason the student will find in the General Discussion and in the section of the Bibliography headed General References, much material that will

supplement the arguments to be found in the Affirmative and Negative Discussions. As so much material has been published on the subject, references to general histories and encyclopaedias have not been included. It also seemed advisable to exclude a number of valuable books on Central and South America which would be useful to the student wishing to obtain a wider knowledge of these continents and their people and governments. Among them may be named Calderon's "Latin America," Bryce's "South America: Observations and Impressions," W. R. Shepherd's "Latin America," and Hiram Bingham's "Across South America."

February 27, 1915.

E. M. PHELPS.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Harper's Magazine. 109: 857-69. November, 1904

Non-Intervention and the Monroe Doctrine. John Bassett Moore

Among the rules of conduct prescribed for the United States by the statesmen who formulated its foreign policy, none was conceived to be more fundamental or more distinctively American than that which forbade intervention in the political affairs of other nations. The right of the government to intervene for the protection of its citizens in foreign lands and on the high seas never was doubted; nor was such action withheld in proper cases. But, warned by the spectacle of the great European struggles that had marked the attempts of nations to control one another's political destiny, the statesmen of America, believing that they had a different mission to perform, planted themselves upon the principle of the equality of nations as expounded by Grotius and other masters of international law. This principle was expressed with peculiar felicity and force by Vattel, who declared that nations inherited from nature "the same obligations and rights," that power or weakness could not in this respect produce any difference, and that a "small republic" was "no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom." The same thought was tersely phrased by Chief-Justice Marshall, in his celebrated affirmation: "No principle is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights." And as the Declaration of Independence proclaimed life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to be "unalienable rights" of individual men, so the founders of the American republic ascribed the same rights to men in their aggregate political capacity as independent nations.

While the principle of non-intervention formed an integral part of the political philosophy of American statesmen, its practical importance was profoundly impressed upon them by the narrowness of their escape from being drawn, by the alliance with France, into the vortex of the European conflicts that grew

out of the French revolution. Even before American independence was acknowledged by Great Britain, American statesmen scented the dangers that lurked in a possible implication in European broils. "You are afraid," said Richard Oswald to John Adams, "of being made the tool of the powers of Europe." "Indeed I am," said Adams. "What powers?" inquired Oswald. "All of them,” replied Adams; "it is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually manoeuvring with us to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power.

But I think

that it ought to be our rule not to meddle." In 1793 the revolutionary government of France, apparently doubting the applicability of the existing alliance with the United States to the situation in Europe, submitted a proposal for "a national agreement, in which two great peoples shall suspend their commercial and political interests and establish a mutual understanding to defend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be embraced." This proposal the American government declined; and its response found practical embodiment in its acts. The reasons for the policy of non-intervention and neutrality, to which the administration of the time so sedulously adhered, were eloquently summed up by Washington in that immortal political legacy, his Farewell Address. "The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations," said Washington, "is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop." The same thought was conveyed by Jefferson, in his first inaugural address, in the apothegm, "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

In connection with the principle of non-intervention, a prominent place must be given to the Monroe Doctrine, the object of which was to render intervention unnecessary by precluding the occasions for it. On September 26, 1815, the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia signed at Paris a personal league commonly called the Holy Alliance, the design of which was declared to be the administration of government, in matters both internal and external, according to the precepts of justice, charity, and peace. To this end the allied monarchs, "looking upon themselves as delegated by Providence" to rule over their respective countries, engaged to "lend one another, on every

occasion and in every place, assistance, aid, and support." In the course of time, as revolt against the arrangements of the Congress of Vienna spread and grew more pronounced, the alliance came more and more to assume the form of a league for the protection of the principle of legitimacy-the principle of the divine right of kings as opposed to the rights of the people— against the encroachments of liberal ideas. Congresses were held at Aix-la-Chappelle, Troppau, and Laybach, for the purpose of maturing a programme to that end. The league was joined by the King of France; but England, whose Prince Regent had originally given it his informal adhesion, began to grow hostile.

Her own government, with its free and parliamentary institutions, was founded on a revolution; and the allies, in the circular issued at Troppau, had associated "revolt and crime," and had declared that the European Powers “had an undoubted right to take a hostile attitude in regard to those states in which the overthrow of the government might operate as an example." In a circular issued at Laybach they denounced "as equally null, and disallowed by the public law of Europe, any pretended reform. effected by revolt and open force." In October, 1822, they held a congress at Verona for the purpose of concerting measures against the revolutionary government in Spain; and in yet another circular announced their determination "to repel the maxim of rebellion, in whatever place and under whatever form it might show itself." Their ultimate object was more explicitly stated in a secret treaty in which they engaged mutually "to put an end to the system of representative governments" in Europe, and to adopt measures to destroy "the liberty of the press." Popular movements were forcibly suppressed in Piedmont and Naples; and in April, 1823, France, acting for the allies, invaded Spain for the purpose of restoring the absolute monarch Ferdinand VII. Before the close of the summer such progress had been made in this direction that notice was given to the British government of the intention of the allies to call a congress with a view to the termination of the revolutionary governments in Spanish America.

At this time Lord Castlereagh, who had always been favorably disposed towards the alliance, had been succeeded in the conduct of the foreign affairs of England by George Canning, who reflected the popular sentiment as to the policy of the allied powers.