the Lodge resolution. That the legal mind shares this view is not so clear. Let us state it in general terms. On the ground of self-defense a state may forbid its neighbor to sell lands of strategic value to the private subject of a third Power, there being no act, but mere suspicion to warrant the fear that the third Power will make sinister use of its subjects' property. What becomes of the sovereign right of the neighbor to dispose of its lands, for commercial development? If the principle of self-defense is unduly stretched, will it not break down and become ridiculous? Is an attitude of constant suspicion consistent with international good-will? These are doubts which fairly arise from the Lodge resolution.

Annals of the American Academy. 54: 84-91. July, 1914

Effects of the Panama Canal on Our Relations with Latin America. John Holladay Latané

The original Monroe Doctrine announced our purpose to protect all the independent Latin-American states against political interference by European Powers. We have now gone a step further and established formal protectorates by treaty over Cuba and Panama guaranteeing them not only against outside interference, but against internal disorders, and a similar protectorate over Nicaragua has been proposed. On July 19, 1913, a treaty signed with Nicaragua by Mr. Bryan was submitted to the Senate. It embodied almost word for word the Platt amendment, which defined our relations with Cuba. Nicaragua agreed not to declare war without the consent of the United States; not to sign treaties giving foreign powers a foothold on her soil; not to contract any foreign debt which could not be met by the ordinary revenues of the country; and to recognize the right of the United States to intervene for the purpose of protecting the independence of Nicaragua.

There were other equally important features of the treaty which will be considered in a moment. But the Senate refused to ratify it. The committee on foreign relations reported it unfavorably by a vote of eight to four. The press reports indicate, however, that this treaty project has not yet been finally

abandoned, but that ratification will be again urged upon the Senate as soon as more pressing matters are disposed of.

President Roosevelt's Dominican policy added an important corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. He held in brief that where it was necessary to place a bankrupt American republic in the hands of receivers, the United States must undertake to act as receiver and take over the administration of its finances; that to allow a European Power to take possession of the custom houses to collect the duties, the only effective method of paying the foreign debt, would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. He boldly adopted this policy and finally forced a reluctant Senate to acquiesce. In spite of the criticism that this policy encountered, the Taft administration adopted it and proposed to extend it to Honduras and Nicaragua. In January, 1911, a treaty placing the finances of Honduras under the supervision of the United States was signed by Mr. Knox, and in June a similar treaty was signed with Nicaragua. These treaties provided for the refunding of the foreign debt in each case through loans made by American bankers and secured by the customs duties, the collector in each case to be approved by the President of the United States, and to make an annual report to the department of state. These treaties were not ratified by the Senate.

Secretary Knox then tried another solution of the question. February 26, 1913, a new treaty with Nicaragua was submitted to the Senate. By the terms of this treaty Nicaragua agreed to give the United States an exclusive right of way for a canal through her territory and a naval base in Fonseca Bay in return for a payment of $3,000,000. The Senate failed to act on this treaty, as the close of the Taft administration was at hand. In July Mr. Bryan submitted to the Senate a third treaty with Nicaragua containing the provisions of the second Knox treaty and in addition the provisions of the Platt amendment, as already stated above. This arrangement has so far failed to receive the approval of the Senate. It is to be noted that the second Knox treaty and the Bryan treaty did not propose financial administration by the United States, but the Bryan treaty bound Nicaragua not to create a public debt which could not be met by the ordinary revenues of the island.

President Wilson's attitude toward foreign concessions is a

matter of importance and carries our Latin-American policy a step further. As he expressed it, it is this:

You hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States. They are not granted concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an invitation, not a privilege, and the states that are obliged because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs--a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable.

What these states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination which has been inevitable to foreign enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate.

These remarks probably had reference to the oil concession which Pearson and Son of London had arranged with the president of Colombia. This concession covered practically all of the oil interests in Colombia, and carried with it the right to include harbors and canals in the country. As oil is coming into use as a naval fuel the occupation of the Colombian oil fields and harbors by a foreign corporation presented a serious question. However, before the meeting of the Colombian Congress in November, 1913, which was to confirm the concession, Lord Cowdray, the president of Pearson and Son, withdrew the contract, alleging as his reason the opposition of the United States.

The next policy which we shall consider is that of acquiring control of all possible canal routes so that no competing canal may at any time in the future be dug by other powers. The manner in which we acquired the Panama Canal Zone produced a very bad effect throughout Latin America. Following Roosevelt's assertion of the big-stick policy and of the duty of the United States to play policeman in the western hemisphere, his seizure of the Canal Zone-to adopt his own view of the transaction-aroused serious apprehension and made the countries of Latin America believe that the United States had converted the Monroe Doctrine from a protective policy to a policy of selfish aggression. His hasty recognition of the Panama Republic tended to strengthen belief in the reports that he had instigated the revolution. Colombia felt outraged and aggrieved,

and this feeling was not alleviated by Mr. Roosevelt's speech to the students of the University of California in which he boasted that he had taken the Canal Zone, and that if he had not acted as he did the matter would still be under discussion.

In January, 1909, shortly before the close of the Roosevelt administration, Secretary Root had undertaken to reestablish friendly relations with Colombia by means of a tripartite treaty between the United States, Panama and Colombia. The proposed agreement provided for the recognition of the Republic of Panama by Colombia and for the transference to Colombia as Panama's share of the public debt of the first ten instalments of the annual rental of $250,000 which the United States had agreed to pay to Panama for the lease of the Canal Zone. The treaty was ratified by the United States and by Panama, but not by Colombia. The Taft administration made repeated efforts to placate Colombia, which resulted in the formulation of a rather remarkable proposition by Secretary Knox shortly before the close of the Taft administration. His proposals were that if Colombia would ratify the Root treaty just referred to the United States would be willing to pay Colombia $10,000,000 for an exclusive right of way for a canal by the Atrato route and for the perpetual lease of the Islands of St. Andrews and Old Providence. These proposals were rejected by Colombia. The American minister, Mr. Du Bois, acting on his own responsibility, asked informally whether $25,000,000 without options of any kind would satisfy Colombia. The answer was that Colombia would accept nothing but the arbitration of the whole Panama question. Mr. Knox in reporting the matter to the President said that Colombia seemed determined to treat with the incoming Democratic administration.

In his message to the Colombian congress, September, 1913, President Restrepo referred to the conciliatory attitude of President Wilson, and added: "The probability that the service of the Isthmian Canal will soon be available, the advantage of cultivating frankly cordial relations with the United States, the clear and progressive development of our nationality, and the peculiar needs of our maritime departments, are making every day more close our rapprochement with the great Republic of the North."

It would probably be wise policy as well as an act of justice on our part to agree upon some compromise with Colombia.

While ordinarily a political act like the recognition of a new state is not a proper subject for arbitration, there are certain features of the Panama case which posibly afford legal ground for Colombia's demand for pecuniary damages. I refer to President Roosevelt's interpretation of the treaty of 1846. That treaty was a contract between the United States and Colombia, and yet President Roosevelt construed it as an obligation assumed by the United States for the benefit of the world at large, and under this interpretation he refused to allow Colombia to land troops in Panama for the purpose of putting down the insurrection. If Colombia should continue to insist on arbitration, basing her claims on President Roosevelt's forced construction of the treaty, it is difficult to see how the United States could refuse to submit the question to arbitration.

The Nicaraguan treaty, signed by Mr. Bryan but not ratified by the Senate, provided that the United States should have an exclusive right of way over the Nicaraguan canal route. It was stated at the time that this treaty was negotiated that Germany was considering the possibility of getting the right of way for a canal through Nicaragua, but such a suggestion seems extremely improbable.

Another important policy is the acquisition of naval stations in the Pacific and in the Caribbean. The Bryan treaty with Nicaragua, as we have already seen, provided for a ninety-nineyear lease of a naval base in Fonseca Bay and also for the lease of the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean. The Knox proposals to Colombia provided for coaling stations on the islands of St. Andrews and Old Providence in the Caribbean.

The last policy to which I shall refer is President Wilson's requirement that the governments of Latin-American states shall be constitutional in form and based on the consent of the governed, or, to state it negatively, the doctrine of non-recognition. This is of course the policy that the administration has adopted in the case of Mexico. In his Swarthmore speech President Wilson said: "I would like to believe that all this hemisphere is devoted to the same sacred purpose and that nowhere can any government endure which is stained by blood or supported by anything but the consent of the governed." The refusal to recognize a revolutionary government is not as novel a policy