as some of the opponents of the Wilson administration would have us believe, but as this question has a special place in this volume I shall not venture to discuss it further.

The building of the canal has thus led to new developments of the Monroe Doctrine, developments not applicable to firmly established states like Argentina, Brazil, and Chili, but limited to what we Americans erroneously regard as typical LatinAmerican states, that is, the states within the zone of the Caribbean. The new applications of the simple principle announced by President Monroe in 1823 have aroused the apprehensions of certain Latin-American writers, and their denunciations of what they are pleased to call this pseudo-Monroeism have not failed to win the sympathetic support of a more or less limited number of writers in this country. Some of these writers appear to cherish a personal grievance against this cardinal principle of American diplomacy and one writer in particular has vehemently denounced it as an obsolete shibboleth. It is in vain that the critics point out the difference between the doctrine of 1823 and the doctrine of 1914 or the difference between the international situation then and now. If the original policy had not expanded with the lapse of time or taken on new phases with the development of new situations, it would long since have ceased to be of any value to us, for the exact situation that called forth the original declaration in 1823 can never again arise. The Monroe Doctrine is merely a name that Americans have given for ninety years to our Latin-American policy, which in the necessity of things has undergone changes and will continue to undergo them, and it is no more likely that the public will repudiate the name than that the State Department will repudiate the policy.

Señor Calderón, in the Atlantic Monthly for March, 1914, takes issue with Professor Bingham's recent attack on the Monroe Doctrine on several points. He says:

It is not true, as Professor Bingham maintains, that amongst the republics which form the A B C alliance, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, powerful and solidly organized states, one finds any jealous opposition to the neo-Saxon power-such as would explain, according to Professor Bingham's theory, the alliance of these ambitious peoples. On the contrary, among these nations, out of range of North American action, the liveliest sympathy with the politics of the United States is discernible. It is rather in the "zone of influence" of the United States, between the northern frontier of Mexico and Panama, in the Antilles, in Colombia and Venezuela, that hatred against the United States has become a popular passion.

His final conclusion as to the future of the Monroe Doctrine we may safely accept: "The wisest statesmen have no thought of divorcing this doctrine from the future history of America, even though they criticize its excesses most severely."

North American Review. 199: 833-40. June, 1914

Monroe Doctrine Fundamentals. Theodore S. Woolsey

The Monroe Doctrine in its ninety years of life has been so overlaid with comment and so modified and enlarged in development that we are apt to lose sight of its real and fundamental character. By studying its essential nature, by appreciating upon what it is founded and how it is limited, perhaps we may form a juster sense of its usefulness, its meaning, its legality. But before all and throughout all we must keep in mind that it is a policy, not a law, municipal or international. The distinctions between policy and law are wide and vital; here are certain of them.

A nation's policy is unilateral. Though affecting other states, it is formed without their consent: it may therefore be changed without reference to their wishes. Germany has adopted a naval programme, that is, a policy of building up an important navy, without consulting Great Britain. The United States determined to dig a Panama Canal itself, without getting the consent of other commercial powers except that of England, which had been given a veto of such action by treaty.

A nation's policy is changeable as self-interest dictates. Thus France, a few years ago, nagged England wherever their interests met, by a policy of pin-pricks; then, after her Russian ally proved a broken reed, changed attitude and welcomed England to the Triple Entente-all within a decade.

Policy imposes no continuous obligation upon a state. We here in America are quite accustomed to have the action of one Administration disavowed by the next. Our financial attitude toward China under President Taft and again under President Wilson is an instance.

Policy is based upon considerations which are selfish rather than altruistic. This is because the state, like any other incorporate body, has a fiduciary duty toward its subjects which

forbids the sacrifice of their interests for the sake of another state.

In all these aspects policy and law differ. A rule of international law comes into being in the last analysis by the common consent of nations. It cannot be created, though it may be suggested, by a single power. Great Britain's maritime strength backed by her administrative and judicial attitude, somewhat more than a century ago, asserted a right to impress seamen out of neutral vessels on the high seas-i. e. to enforce a municipal statute outside of British jurisdiction. Unwarranted by the consent of other states, this practice, though persisted in for years, never became law and finally lapsed. A law is universal, not unilateral; it is fixed, not changeable unless changed by the consent of those who framed it; it is binding upon a state even if damaging to that state's interests; it is neither selfish nor altruistic because, once having become operative, no question of self or of interest enters into it. Bearing in mind these distinctions, it remains to show that the Monroe Doctrine has always remained what it was at its inception, a policy. The proof is twofold. First no international agreement can be found which converts it from policy into law. Secondly, there has not come about such acquiescence in it as to change its nature. The first statement is a matter of record and is perfectly clear. The second may be doubted. As examples of an opinion contrary to the above an article in the North American Review for 1903, by Mr. Scruggs, may be quoted, also the reference in Cleveland's Venezuelan Message.

Mr. Scruggs argues thus. "Not one of the European Powers has ever entered formal protest against it; on the contrary, all have acquiesced in it and thus tacitly assented to it. It is therefore a valid part of the public law of this continent, and until abandoned by us or until formally challenged by Europe or until modified or abrogated by public treaty, it will continue to be recognized as part of the International Code of the Christian world."

And Mr. Cleveland said in reply to Lord Salisbury's objection: "It may not have been admitted in so many words to the Code of International Law, but since in international councils every nation is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine is something we may justly claim, it has

its place in the Code of International Law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned." The first writer refutes himself, for in the same breath he calls the Doctrine law, yet says we can abandon it; the second expresses himself too vaguely for specific refutation. It is enough to say in reply that the right of the United States to surrender and escape from the Monroe Doctrine or to alter it at will is admitted by every one. If it were a law it could not be escaped from without the assent of those accepting and framing it. To say that it can become a law by mere acquiescence and then be abrogated or modified by the ex parte act of one state, is to have a loose and mistaken idea of the nature of the law of nations. Hence when a writer asserts that the Monroe Doctrine is an "obsolete shibboleth" he simply means that it is a policy which has outgrown its usefulness, and, not being law, can be and should be given up, which is a perfectly legitimate argument.

There are now three fundamental principles which characterize the policy of President Monroe as it was and as it is. For the sake of coherence and completeness they are stated together here and then examined separately.

I. The Monroe Doctrine was a statement of policy, originated and maintained by reason of self-interest, not of altruism.

II. It was justifiable by reason of the right of self-defense (which is a recognized principle of International Law).

III. It called no new rights into being, therefore whenever it oversteps the principle of self-defense reasonably interpreted, the right disappears and the policy is questionable because it then violates the rights of others.

I. The Monroe Doctrine dictated by self-interest. The circumstances which called the Monroe Doctrine into being are too familiar to need repetition. But the underlying motive in it may not be so clear. This had nothing to do with fear of enhancement of Spanish power in Europe which was incidentally struck at, because in the same message the United States was made to disclaim all European ambitions. "Our policy in regard to Europe which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers."

Nor was it designed primarily to aid the Latin-American

states in winning their independence or to preserve that independence if already won. If, however, Spain should recover her American possessions by the help of her European backers (apostles of absolutism), she would become a menace to the United States upon this continent.

"With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power," said Mr. Monroe, "we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European Power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security."

And later in the message came this other reference to the South-American states: "If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other parties will pursue the same course."

The policy then was one of neutrality, of "leaving the parties to themselves" so far as Spain was concerned, which would not have been the case had the United States desired primarily to help them.

But when intervention was threatened by certain great Powers in behalf of Spain, then indeed was there evidence of "an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." This idea was amplified thus: "It is impossible that the allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either [American] continent without endangering our peace and happiness." And again: "We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to