was subject to a motion to compel the trustee to make his petition more definite and certain, and to state specifically what moneys or property the bankrupt had in his possession or control that he had not surrendered.

2

Compelling Surrendering of Assets-Evidence.

The transcript of the testimony of the bankrupt at his examination before the referee, is admissible on the hearing of the trustees petition to compel the surrender of assets claimed to be in the bankrupt's hands, after the bankrupt had testified that his testimony so given was true. In re Greer, 189 Fed. 511. Arkansas (W. D.) Dist, Court, Aug. 2d, 1911.

1

Bankruptcy-Opposition to Discharge-Costs.—

The authority of the court to tax costs when allowed by law against the unsuccessful party, or the successful party for cause, or in part against each of the parties, in proceedings in bankruptcy, did not authorize the taxation of costs of a successful opposition to a bankrupt's discharge against a bankrupt's estate.

2

Successful Opposition-Costs.

When a bankrupt was entirely without funds and unable to pay costs of a successful opposition to his discharge, the court should not tax such costs against him. In re Kyte, 189 Fed. 531.

A trustee in bankruptcy has no right to set aside contracts made by the bankrupt with money fraudulently obtained, by which an insurance company, in consideration of a cash premium, undertook to pay him annuities beginning at a designated future time, where the company acted in good faith without notice of the source of the funds, since it acquired rights and advantages under the transaction of which it could not be deprived.

33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439, 184 Fed. 1

AUTOMOBILES.

Points Decided Sustaining Actions.

Judicial Notice.-Courts will take judicial notice that automobiles by reason of their construction will frighten horses. 78 S. Car. 249, 58 S. E. 766. Dangerous.-Courts will take judicial notice that automobiles are dangerous when run at great rate of speed whether in city or country roads and that accidents may happen to persons driving animals that may become unmanageable by reason of fright.

147 Cal. 523

Danger from Want of Skill.-That autoinobiles are more dangerous than street cars or steam railway cars-the latter having fixed tracks, while the automobile may be unskillfully shifted from side to side and strike pedestrians or other objects on either side of its course.

134 Ky. 563, 121 S. W. 471 Courts will also take judicial notice of the fact that an automobile will readily yield to the steering wheel in the hands of a competent driver. 182 Fed. 58

Automobile races, or contests of speed in cities or highways are unlawful and a nuisance per se. 186 N. Y 139 (reversing 109 N. Y. 821 where permission had been granted to hold the race.)

The automobile is a machine confined to no part of the street. It seems too obvious for further remark that the legislature has the same right to protect other users of the highways against these dangers as it has to guard them against the unrestricted movements of a trolley Therefore the provisions of a statute which limit the rate of speed, which require the display of signals and the use of efficient brakes, are all appropriate to preserve safety in the use of the road.

car.

Unwen vs. The State, N. J. L. 529, 64 Atl. 163

POINTS SUSTAINING DEFENSES.

On the other hand courts have decided that an automobile is not inherently a dangerous instrumentality. 145 Wis. 49

That automobiles are not to be placed in the category of ferocious animals, dynamite or other dangerous agencies, and that the owner is not liable to the same extent as the proprietors of such agencies. 75 N. H. 111.

That the operation of an automobile in the highway is not in itself an act of negligence. 165 Ind. Sup. 465

And further that an owner, is not liable to one "who has been injured by the car when driven by another person merely because the owner has made it possible for such person to operate the car upon the highway. 47 Wash. 663; 42 Wis. 49.

The owner of an automobile is not liable for damage done to person or property injured or damaged where without negligence on his part he left his auto standing in the street and the car set in motion by mischievous persons. 84 N. Y. Supp. 292 The reason of the rule is found in the principle of proximate cause' as the act of malicious persons, and not the automobile as the proximate cause of the damage. 131 App. Div. N. Y. 200

Properly conducted the automobile has an equal right with other vehicles in the streets of a city or country highway. The dedication of roads and streets does not restrict any particular mode of travel, and the roads were established for the benefit of the public, which must admit of new methods when general benefit requires it. 34 Mich. 217; 91 N. E. 172; 107 Md. 420; 65 N. Y. Supp. 651.

For a more extended view of the right of action and defense on this important subject, See the new work of Mr. Berkley Davids, published by the Edward Thompson Company, and reviewed in this Journal, in the last August Number, page 65.

CURRENT DECISIONS OF

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

OKLAHOMA.

THE ATCHINSON, T. & S. FE RY. CO., Appellant,

VS

No. 1424.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA and J. F. McFADDEN, Ap

pellees.

(Rendered Dec. 5, 1911.)

APPEAL FROM THE CORPORATION

COMMISSION.

1. Section 3 of an act of the legislature, approved May 29, 1908, entitled, "An act providing for the punishment of any corporation, person or firm for contempt, for violation of any order or requirement of the Corporation Commission," (Sess. Laws, 1097-8, p. 228), allows an appeal to the Supreme Court by any person, firm or corporation adjudged guilty of contempt by the Corporation Commission for the violation of its orders.

2. Said statute was not repealed by act of the legislature, entitled, "An act creating a Criminal Court of Appeals and defining the jurisdiction of said court," (Sess. Laws, 1907-8, p. 291), nor by act of March 2, 1909, entitled, "An act perpetuating the Court of Criminal Appeals, etc.," (Sess. Laws, 1909, p. 170).

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Cottingham & Bledsoe, Attorneys for Appellant.

Chas. West, Atty. Gen., Chas. L. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., and C. J. Davenport, of Counsel, Attorneys for Appelless.

Opinion of the court by HAYES, J. This is an appeal from an order of the Corporation Commission, adjudging appellant guilty of contempt and fining it for violation of one of the orders of the Commission. In considering the questions raised on the merits of the appeal, the question of this court's jurisdiction suggested itself to the court; and, by request of the court, counsel for both parties have filed briefs herein upon the question of jurisdiction. Coun

sel for both appellant and appellees agree in the view that the court has power to hear and consider this cause; and, after consideration of their briefs, we have reached a like conclusion; but, since the question has been suggested and deemed by the court of sufficient importance to consider it separately, before considering the case upon its merits, we have decided to express our decision in writing for future guidance.

The ground upon which doubt as to the jurisdiction of this court first arose was that this is a criminal proceeding; and that the act perpetuating the Criminal Court of Appeals and conferring jurisdiction upon it in certain causes repealed the statute authorizing appeals from orders of the Corporation Commission fining persons or corporations for contempt for the violation of any orders of the Commission. There cannot be any doubt that Section 3 of the act of the first legislature, approved May 29, 1908, entitled, "An Act providing for the punishment of any corporation, person or firm for contempt for the violation of any order or requirement of the Corporation Commission of this state, etc." (Sess. Laws, 1907-8, p. 228), allows an appeal from judgements of the Commission adjudging any person or corporation guilty of contempt for violation of its orders, and confers upon this court jurisdiction to hear and determine same. It has been suggested that such right and jurisdiction existed without said act and were conferred by that part of Section 2. Article 7. of the Constitution, reading as follows:

"The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be co-extensive with the state, and shall extend to all civil cases at law and in equity, and to all criminal cases until a Criminal Court of Appeals, with exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, shall be established by law."

It has been suggested by this provision of the Constitution, appellate jurisdiction is conferred upon the Supreme Court, and the right of appeal thereto is granted to litigants in all cases, civil or criminal, until exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is vested in a court of Criminal