than four mouths before any general election of officers provided for by said act, the legislative authority of such cities shall have power to call a special election for the election of the elective officers under the charter, and where the charter is adopted less than four months before the next general municipal election of officers, said election of officers under the charter shall be at such general election. (Syllabus by the Court.) Flynn, Chambers & Low, Everest, Smith & Campbell and Warren K. Snyder, Attorneys for Plaintiffs in Error. Jas. S. Twyford and Stuart, Cruce & Gilbert and Geo. A. Matlock and J. W. Johnson, Attorneys for Defendants in error. R. MARLOW, et al., Plaintiffs in Error, VS. No. 940 SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4, Murry County, et al., Defendants in Error. Error from District Court of Murry County. R. McMillin, trial Judge. Reversed and Remanded. 1. Certificates required by statute to be made by officers in the discharge of their official duty, as a rule, may be introduced in evidence, when material to any issue. 2. Certificates made by the county treasurer and the county clerk purporting to state what is shown by the records in their custody when not authorized by statute, are not competent evidence. 3. ལྟ་ A petition in due form properly verified alleging that the officials of a school district are about to issue bonds in the sum of $10,000.00 in excess of the debt limit as prescribed by section 26, article 10 of the constitution and a temporary injunction having been issued thereor, no answer having been filed to said petition, but an unverified motion to dissolve being presented without any competent evidence being introduced to support it, and an order being made dissolving said temporary injunction, Held, error. 4. A resident tax-payer, although he shows no special private interest, may invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity to prevent the issuance of bonds contrary to the limitations of article 10, Sec. 26 of the constitution. (Syllabus by the Court.) H. W. Broadbent and W. E. Latimer, on brief for plaintiffs in error Haste & Casteel, for defendants in error. REVIEWS. AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ANNOTATED CASES. Volume 19. Published by Edward Thompson Company, Price $5. per vol. New York. A few weeks since, an eminent Oklahoma lawyer, while conversing with us on the subject of reports, reached back to the shelves and pulled out volume 17 of the American and English Ann. Cases, and said: "I am glad that you estimate these volumes so high. They have no equal. Look at the first case here, St. L. Iron Mountain vs. Raines. Its annotations cover every thing that can arise." Yes, therein is to be found the unrivaled merit of these reports. In this volume 19 we will call the attention as he did, to Mesmer vs. Bell and Coggeshall Company, beginning with the third page! The opinion while correct and sound, secms merely a meteoric scintillation as compared with a complete and searching treatise on the doctrines of astronomy, to which the sight of the scintillation gave rise. Such is the exhaustive annotation and treatment given this case. Take the next, McElroy vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. The notes here also become a treatise on the questions involved. In fact the old phrase: "a storehouse of knowledge," has lost its force when applied to the merits of these reports. Another lawyer speaking of these reports, said: "Aside from our local series of reports. I want no other than these Annotated Cases. The reporter system and even the reports of all the States if I was able to buy them take too much room and would be thousands of repeated cases in the library.” Such is the universal opinion of the American and English Annotated Cases. In this volume 19 in addition to the incalculable value of the volume as a whole, the blue cumulative index to the notes adds greatly to the work. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Late Important Opinions. SCHLEMMER VS. BUFFALO, ROCHESTER & PITTSBURG RY. CO. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania. Practice-Reversal on Federal Question: I. Where on writ of error the case is reversed on the Federal question and remanded to the highest state court for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this court, the state court should, in its remittitur require the further proceedings by the lower court to be in conformity with the opinion of this court, as the matter involved is a Federal right within the protection of this court. If, however, the trial court on the second trial of a case reversed by this court on the Federal question does give to the statute involved the construction and effect given by this court, the judgment will not be reversed because the remittitur from the highest court to which the mandate of this court was sent, did not specifically direct that further proceedings be had in conformity with the opinion of this court. Difference in Assumption of Risk and Contributory Negligence: 2. The Safety Appliance Acts of March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531; April 1, 1896, c. 87, 29 Stat. 85; March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943, took away from the carrier the defense of assumption of risk by the employe but did not affect the defense of contributory negligence. There is a practical and clear distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence. By the former, the employe assumes the risk of ordinary dangers of occupation and those dangers that are plainly observable; the latter is the omission of the employe to use those precautions for his own safety which ordinary prudence requires. 3. Under the Safety Appliance Acts, an employe does not by reason of his knowledge of the fact, take upon himself the risk of injury from a car unequipped as required by the acts-but he is not absolved from duty to use ordinary care for his own protection merely because the carrier has failed to comply with the law; and, in the absence of legislation taking it away, the defense of contributory negligence is open. On the record in this case there appears to have been contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff's intestate, apart from the question or assumption of risk, and the state court denied plaintiff no Federal right under the Safety Appliance Acts in dismissing the complaint on the ground of contributory negligence. 4. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILWAY COMPANY VS. UNITED STATES. Certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 1. Under the Safety Appliance Acts of March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531, April 1, 1896, c. 87, 29 Stat. 85, and March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943, there is imposed an absolute duty on the carrier and the penalty cannot be escaped by exercise of reasonable care. 2. This court in St. Louis, I. M. & S. Railway Co, vs. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, considered and determined the scope and effect of the Safety Appliance Acts and the degree of care required by the carrier, and the question is not open to further discussion, as this court should not disturb a construction which has been widely accepted and acted upon by the courts. 3. For this court to give a construction to an act of Congress contrary to one previously given would cause uncertainty if not mischief in the administration of law in Federal courts, and, having placed an interpretation on the Safety Appliance Acts, this court will adhere thereto until Congress by amendment changes the rule announced in St. Louis, I. M. & S. Railway Co. vs. Taylor, supra. An action for penalties under the Safety Appliance Acts is a civil, and not a criminal one, and the enforcement of such penalties is not governéd by considerations controlling prosecution of criminal offenses. 5. Congress has unquestioned power to declare an offense and to exclude the elements of knowledge and due diligence from the inquiry as to its commission. J. WISE US. MILLS. The act that a question under the Constitution is involved in an order requiring production of books and papers, does not establish that a constitutional |