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gard to the wishes of his wife. The rule of law stated by the referee is sound, as in this state the homestead exempted purpose to resume their occupancy of the land, which they had ceased to reside upon. A vague intent is insufficient. But their residence on the town property is a certainty, and under the circumstances is believed to be entirely sufficient to render it exempt as a homestead under the law, and effectually place it beyond the reach of creditors, and it is property acquired by the wife, she, it is insisted, did not abandon or intend to abandon the land as a homestead. If the farm should be held exempt, this family had two homesteads at the same time, but this the law does not permit. The limitation is to one homestead of a certain area for the family, irrespectve of ownership as between husband and wife. In the opinion of this court, the acquisition and use of the second homestead under the circumstances of this case must be regarded as sufficient to complete the abandonment of the first.

The conclusion is that neither the bankrupt nor his wife is entitled to the exemption claimed in this case. The order of the referee will be reversed and set aside, the exemption denied, and the land ordered sold as a part of the estate for the benefit of creditors.

Guthrie, Oklahoma,

January 2, 1912.

JOHN H. COTTERAL,
District Judge.

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT SUSTAINED

Aluminum Company of America vs. Ramsey, affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, December 11th, 1911.

The points decided by the Federal Court in affirming 89 Ark. 522, are the following:

1. A State statute may increase the liability or alter or amend the law regulating domestic corporations pursuant to the police power vested in the State, but that this cannot be exercised to the same extent in the regulation of foreign corporations.

2. Whether or not a classification between corporations, partnerships and individuals involves the equal protection clause of the constitution, a classification of corporations operating railroads and individuals does not offend that provision.

3. One in a class cannot question the classification because he believes that others are not properly classified, if he who questions the statute is properly classified. Opinion of the United States Supreme Court delivered by Justice McKenna, and in full is as follows:

The defendant in error brought this action against the plaintiff in error in the Saline Circuit Court of the State of Arkansas to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been received by him while in the employment of the company, which maintained a railroad to its mines, on account of the negligence of a fellow servant.

The action was based upon a statute of the State called by the parties "The Fellow Servant Law." (Acts 1907, Act 69, p. 162.) The statute makes railroad corporations operating within the State and every company, whether incorporated in the State and every company,

engaged in the mining of damages for injuries or

whether incorporated or not, coal, "liable to respond in death sustained "by agents, employes, or, "resulting from the careless omission of duty or negligence of such employer," or "any other agent, servant or employe of the said employer, "in the same manner as though the carelessness, omission of duty or negligence was that or the employer. The company assailed the constitutionality of the statute by the request for the following instruction, which was refused by the trial court: "You are instructed that the act of the legislature, approved March 8th, 1907, known as, The Fellow Servant Law, in providing it shall apply to all corporations but shall not apply to individuals, persons or partnerships, except those engaged in the operation of a railroad or coal mine. denies to this defendant the equal protection of the law, and is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. "There was a verdict for the plaintiff, defendant in error here upon which judgment was duly entered by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 89 Arkansas, 522. The Supreme Court sustained the action of the trial court in refusing the instruction on the authority of Ozan Lumber Co. v. Biddie, which had been previouly decided, and which is reported in 87 Arkansas, 587. This action of the court is assigned as error, and is the Federal question relied on.

A motion is made to dismiss, and, alternately, to affirm, respectively, on the ground that there is no Federal question in the state court's construction of the statute and, decisions of this court. In support of the motion to dismiss it is contended that the state court decided that the act assailed is an amendment to the charter of the corporation under the reserved right to amend, alter or repeal the charter, and of this the corporation cannot complain, the exercise of such right being a condition of its existence.

In Ozan Lumber Co. v. Biddie, supra, the court decided that "The Fellow Servant Law, was an amendment

to the charters of corporations, made under the right reserved in the constitution of the State to repeal, alter or amend such charters. The Ozan Lumber Company, however, was a domestic corporation, and whether the principle on the decision would be applicable to foreign. corporations, as plaintiff in error in the case at bar is, being a Pennsylvania corporation, depends on many considerations, and involes questions not local; so we pass to the consideration of the merits.

On the merits the case is in a very narrow compass and does not demand much discussion, though plaintiff in error earnestly press the contention that the statute is discriminatory in that it applies to all corporations, but does not apply to individuals or partnerships. Whether that exact distinction, that is, the distinction merely between corporations and partnershps and individuals, is competent for a legislature to make, under its power of classifying objects, we are not called upon to decide the distinction made by the statute is broader. The distinction among others, it makes is between railroads operating in the State and indviduals, and such distinction has been maintained by this court as not offending the Constitution of the United States. Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co., 175 U. S. 348; Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline 199 U. S. 593. See also Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 504, and El Paso etc. Ry Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87.

What grievance plaintiff in error might have if it were not operating a railroad we are not called upon to consider, because it is limited in its complaint to the effect of the statute on it and cannot appropriate the grievance that corporations engaged in mining, but not operating railroads, may have on account of the distinction between them and individuals.

It is true that the Supreme Court of the State, following Ozan Lumber Co. v. Biddle, supra, decided the law was a regulation of corporations, and applied it to the plaintiff in error because it was a corporation, not distinguishing it as one operating a railroad; it, however,

may be so distinguished under the statute. That is, it constitutes a class of corporations operating railroads, and under the cases we have cited the classification is valid, there being equality within the class. In other words, not only the plaintiff in error, but all other corporations operating railroads are covered by the statute.

We think, therefore, that the statute of Arkansas is not repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, and the judgment is affirmed.

W. I. BARNES, Plaintiff in Error

VS.

No. 1581

AMERICAN SODA FOUNTAIN CO., Defendant in Error.

(Filed Feb. 6. 1912.)

Reversed

1. In order to recover, in an action begun since state hood, on notes given by a minor in the Indian Territory in 1904, but who at the time suit was begun had arrived at full age, made some promise, or had in some way ratified his contract, and such promise or ratification to be binding on him, must according to section 3384. Ch. 68 Mansf. Dig. Ark., have been in writing.

2. In such case sec. 3384, Ch. 68, which was in force in the Indian Territory at the time the contract was made fixed the rights and liabilities of the parties.

3. Sections 1 and 2 of the Schedule of the State Constitution continued said section of the Arkansas law in force for the purpose of determining the rights of the parties to this action.

4. In this case it was unnecessary for defendant to p'ed and prove the statutes of Arkansas, the provisions of the Schedule of the Constitution of the State of Constitution of the State required the court to take judicial notice of the same.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

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