and dust." Wholesale or commission houses come within this ordinance.

Mr. George A. Harris, is conducting a commercial legal business in the city of Shawnee, and officing with the Hon. S. A. Sheldon. Mr. Harris is at present devoting most of his attention to collections from business Houses and claims from other attorneys, collectable at Shawnee and adjacent points. He is a young man of integrity and business aptitude. All matters intrusted to him receives prompt and faithful attention.

Efforts to Correct Evils by Means not Well Studied.

At the last session of the Missouri legislature several well meaning organizations sought to pass more stringent laws relative to divorces. These bills failed to pass. Since then the same influences have forced the appintment of a "Divorce Proctor," who is to examine into all divorce cases and at his discrtion to himself appear for the defendant and contest the suit.

This plan is copied from the state of Illinois and so far no ascertained evil resulting from the plan has been brought to the surface, however in the state from which Missouri has copied, already comes cries of abuses by by those in control of the reform measure, and a committee' report is made cautioning the trial judges to be on the lookout from "imposition in divorce cases by procter or special investigator.' What a field for grafting by an unscruplous proctor, especially with certain classes of the rich! To be proctor in some large cities would throw presidential aspiration salaries in the shade from income standpoint.

Parker W. Cress., Esq., of Perry, is prominently mentioned as the probable successor of Hon. John Embry, United States Attorney for the Western District. Mr. Cress has the almost unanimous endorsement of the Bench and Bar of the District.

Upon receiving his degree at the Kansas University, he located in Perry in the practice of his profession, where for many years he has enjoyed a large and lucrative law practice and has well earned his acknowledged place among the leading lawyers of State. He is

a born lawyer with a character conspicuous for probity, capacity and ability that with opportunity commands success. It is the sincere wish and hope of his many friends that success will attend his aspirations for this honorable position.

In Hewitt v. City of Seattle, 113 P. 1084, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington held the city liable for an automobile accident, although the operator of the auto was one of the city officials.

HUMOR.

Wasted Effort.-Village constable (to villager who has been knocked down by passing motorclist) :“You did not see the number, but could you swear to the man?" Villager: "I did; but I don't think he cuss heard me.”

A prisoner was before a jury accused of stealing a lot of money. The judge had assigned to defend him a mere boy just admitted to practice. When the time for argument in his defense came he pulled back the young lawyer and said, "I'll made der argument." He stepped to the jury and said: "Gents o' d jury, I asks yer, if I had got away with all that swag, do yer spose I'd put up with dis sniviling, bungaloing fool of a boy lawyer? Now gents ye take that in. That's all gents." And on the spot

the foreman polled the jury. Verdict not guilty.

An old offender was recently introduced to a new County justice as "John Timmins, alias Jones, alias Smith." "I'll try the two women first," said the justice. "Bring in Alice Jones."

Law Enforcement. What are they moving that church for."

"Well. stranger, I'm the mayor of these diggin's, an' I'm fer law enforcement. We've got an ordinance what says no saloon shall be nearer than three hundred feet from a church. I give 'em three days to move the church." Students Helper

THE

OKLAHOMA

LAW JOURNAL

EDITED AND PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY

D. H. FERNANDES, GUTHRIE, Oklahoma.

VOL. 10.

March, 1912.

No. 9

CONSTRUCTION OF PROBATE STATUTE. Article by Hon. Theo. D. B. Frear, Ex-County Judge of Craig County.

There seems to be some confusion in the minds of some of the courts and a few of the members of the Bar as to the proper construction to be given to this section of our statutes, and some of the views held and expressed seem, to me, so contrary to the fundamental principles and maxims of law that it seems it might be well to briefly discuss it. The section reads "The marriage of a minor ward terminates the guardianship; and the guardian of an insane or other person may be discharged by the judge of the county court when it appears to him, on the application of the ward or otherwise, that the guardianship is no longer necessary."

It has been held, by some courts, that this section permits the county judge to declare a guardianship of minor terminated at any time, regardless of the fact that the minor has lands and personal property that must be conserved by some one. Such a view is certainly obnoxious to all the laws ever enacted in this country from the earliest days to this time. Certainly the legislature of 1893 could not have had such an idea when they enacted the Probate Code of Oklahoma. They took exceeding care to safeguard the interests of minors in that code, and does seem very unreasonable that they should, in one section of a law nullify and set aside all the other provisions of that same act by

permitting the guardianship of a minor, possessed of property, to be terminated before death, marriage, or attainment of majority.

This question, especially on the east side of Oklahoma, is particularly important. All Indian and Freedmen minors are possessed of lands that must be attended to by some one. Who, except a legally appointed and qualified guardian, can care for the proprety of such a minor?

Our statutes provide that, "no person, whether a parent or otherwise, has any power as guardian of property, except by appointment as hereinafter provided." In another section it is provided that, "the parent as such, has no control over the property of the child." Now in the face of those express statutes is it reasonable to suppose that the legislature intended that the words "other person" in section 5523 should refer to minors?

It is obviously true that if an insane or incompetent person becomes competent that he should be restored to his right to control and manage his own property, but the law has prescribed the age at which children become adults and capable of attending to their own affairs. We all know that a law must be construed according to its "spirit and reason" and that the courts have the right to declare that a case which falls within the letter of the law is not governed by the statute if it is not within the spirit and reason of the statutes and the plain intention of the legislature.

In a leading case, Rector of Holy Trinity Church vs. The United States, 143 U. S. 457, the court says—“It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute, and yet not within the statute, because not within the spirit nor within the intention of its makers * This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include the act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation or of the absurd which follow from

giving such broad meaning to words, make it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act."

Now what was, and is, the spirit and reason of our laws in reference to minor children? It is clearly apparent and self evident on even a very superficial examination, that the sole object is to protect and conserve the property of minors. Our laws have thrown almost innumerable barriers and safeguards around the child's property, in order to preserve it, and yet if this one single clause, in the section under discussion, were to be so construed that a judge could terminate the guardianship of minor children, possessed of both real and personal property, before it reached majority or married, it would destroy all the protection afforded the infant by all the body of our laws.

Another well settled maxim of law is that--"every statute is to be construed with reference to its intended scope and the purpose of the legislature in enacting it; and where language is ambiguous, or admits of more than one meaning, it is to be taken in such sense as will conform to the scope of the act and carry out the purpose of the statute." In United States vs. Saunders, 22 Wall 492, it is said "if it is the evident and plain purpose of the act to effect only a particular class of persons, the genreality of the language used will not have the effect of including a single individual not belonging to that class, though the mere words might include him." Is it not clear, judging from the entire act, that the legislature only intended that the words "other person" in this section should apply to insane or incompetent persons?

There is another reason why, in this section, the words "other person" should not be held to apply to minors, and that is a statute should always be so construed as to give effect to all laws on the subject; and receive such construction as will harmonize with the pre-existing body of the law. It is undisputed that an antagnoism between the particular section to be construed and the previous laws, whether statutory or unwritten, is to be avoided, unless it