pany in point of fact and such firm? A mutual telephone company is composed of many members and when it makes application to the appellant for long distance service for each of its members, said mutual company to pay for such service, facility and convenience, we think the Commission has the authority to require such connection to be made ani for such service to be performed at all times, the appellant, however, to have just and fair compensation for the service to be performed and the facilities or conveniences furnished.

The order of the Commission, however, required the installation of all necessary equipment for the connection of the office of the appellee telephone company with the long distance office of the appellant telephone company and that said appellee should bear the cost of such apparatus installed in its office and the appellant to pay for the installation of the necessary apparatus in its office for the connection between the two offices. This order must be modified to the extent that the appellee telephone company be required to pay all the expenses of the installing of said equipment, whether in the office of the appellee or the appellant telephone company, but in all other respects where the order of the Commission is in accordance with this opinion it must be affirmed. See also, Corporation Commission vs. Southern Ry. Co., 69 S. E. (N. C.) 621.

The control of telephone companies has been the source of litigation in other jurisdictions. See Central Union Telegraph Company vs. Falley, 118 Ind. 194. 10 Am. St. 114. 25 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 481; Billings Mutual Telephone Co. vs. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co.. 115 Fed. 207: Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Kelly, 160 Fed. 316, 87 C. C. A. 268, 15 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1210.

2. It is insisted that the order of the Commission constitutes the taking of the property of the appellant without just compensation and without due process of law and denies it the equal protection of the laws and is in contravention of the Constitution of Oklahoma and of the United States. The order of the Commission is in part as follows:

"The Commission finds from the evidence that to connect the exchange of complainant with that of the defendant would require some additional equipment for that purpose, and would incur some expense. The complainant it appears is willing to bear this expense necessary for the furnishing of reasonable equipment for the service desired. The complainant further concedes that all reasonable rules of the defendant in the transaction of its business should be complied with and that the defendant should receive from the subscribers of the complainant the same amount of consideration for the transmission of long distance messages that it receive from the subscribers of its own exchange at Pond Creek.

The Commission finds from the evidence that physical connection between the exchange of complainant and defendant can be made without impairing the service of the defendant's local exchange or long distance lines; that the circuit may be installed, one terminus being in the exchange of the defendant, and the other terminus in the exchange. of complainant, with proper equipment supplied in both exchanges.

The Commission finds from the evidence that the supervision of the traffic can best be handled at the defendant's exchange, and that such rules and methods for handing such traffic as now prescribed by the defendant are not unreasonable.

It is, therefore, ordered that the defendant, the Pioneer Telephone and Telegraph Company, install in the exchange of complainant and its own exchange in the town of Pond Creek such special apparatus as may be necessary for the operation and interchange of service, and construct between the said exchange a line to connect said apparatus, and immediately upon completion of same shall receive and transmit long distance messages for the subscribers of the complainant and those having connection with the exchange of the complainant over the lines of the defendant to any point reached by the defendant's toll lines or connections. That said equipment shall be installed on or before the 15th day of September, 1909, and that the complainant shall pay the actual cost of the material and the installation of this connection for all apparatus used in complainant's exchange and the defendant shall supply and install at its own expense all apparatus necessary to make the proper connection in its own exchange, and the complainant shall pay for the installation and wire between the exchanges.

After this connection shall have been made, any gross, inadequate, or wilful refusal to serve the patrons of those calling for long distance connections through the exchange of the complainant will be considered by the Commission a violation of this order, and all rules and regulations imposed by the defendant upon the complainant shall be subject to the approval of the Commission before the complainant will be bound thereby, being understood that the present operating rules of the defendant are considered reasonable and binding, and the above has reference only to changes made in the regular system now in force."

The Commission, under the provisions of sections 2. 5 and 18. of article 9 of the Constitution of Oklahoma, is authorized to make such order as heretofore indicated by us, provided it is reasonable and just. The rules and charges of the appellant theretofore in force are continued by this order. Certainly the appellant cannot be heard to complain when the rules and charges applied by it to the public generally are made by the Commission to also apply to appellee. The appellee must pay all these charges for its different members, just as a firm must pay the charges for its different members. As to whether the different members of the firm make a contribution into the partnership fund by way of reimbursement, or whether the members of the mutual company make a contribution into the general fund by way of reimbursement, with that the appeilant has no concern. The fact that the appellee company is composed of many citizens who formed a co-operative or mutual plan by which they maintain their lines to and from their residences or places of business to a common point and there have an agent or operator representing them and cause connections to be made with appellant's long distance line for the convenience of said members of this company, but not for hire or profit, is no just ground for complaint on the part of appellant. However, the appellee company must pay a just and fair charge for all service, and compensate for all facilities and conveniences. The appellant company being a domestic corporation, every

provision of sections 2, 5 and 18 of article 9 of the Constitution becomes a part and a condition of its charter. Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 22 Okla. 48, 97 Pac. 590; Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf R. Co. vs. State et al., recently decided by this court, but not yet officially reported; Hammond Packing Co. vs. Arkansas, 81 Ark. 519, 100 S. W. 1190, 211 U. S. 322; Osan Lumber Co. vs. Biddie, 87 Ark. 587, 113 S. W. 795; Leep vs. Ry. Co., 58 Ark. 407, 25 S. W. 83, 23 L. R. A. (O. S.) 264, 41 Am. St. 109: Union Saw Mil Co. vs. Pelsenthal, 85 Ark. 346, 108 S. W. 217; Arkansas Store Co. vs. State, 125 S. W. 1001; New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. vs. Williams, 92 N. E. (N. Y.) 404.

In Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Co. vs. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 89, 49 S. E. 39, 10 Va. Law. Reg. 770, it is said:

"The principle upon which the state assumes authority to control and regulate the affairs of railroads and other public service corporations rests largely upon the doctrine of agency. Such corporations are founded by the legislature for public purposes, and are clothed with authority, subject to state regulation and control, to exercise important governmental functions. By their charters they are granted privileges which may not be exercised by private persons, whether individuals or corporations, but always with the reservation, express or implied, that such privileges are subject to reasonable governmental control. Cal. vs. Pac. R. R. Co., 127 U. S. 40, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073, 32 L. Ed. 150. This right of control is part of the police power of the state.

As was said by this court in the City of Petersburg vs. Petersburg Aqueduct Co., 102 Va. 654, 47 S. E. 846: 'Bearing in mind the distinction between public and private corporations in the matter of public control-that the former are regarded as instrumentalities of the state, and liable to visitation and regulation, while the charters of the latter are contracts within the meaning of the contract clauses of the state and federal constitutions, the obligation of which, in the sense of those clauses, cannot be impaired. nevertheless the police power of the state is a governmental

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function, the exercise of which neither the legislature nor any subordinate agency thereof upon which part of its authority may have been conferred can alienate or surrender. by grant, contract or other delegation. Richmond, etc. Co. vs. Richmond, 26 Gratt, 83; S. C. 96 U. S. 521, 24 L. Ed. 734; Boston Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 2.4 L. Ed. 989; Stone vs. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079; Butchers' Union Slaughter House, etc. Co. vs. Crescent City Live Stock Landing, etc. Co., 111 U. S. 745, 4 Sup. Ct. 452, 28 L. Ed. 585; Powell vs. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 Sup. Ct. 992, 32 L. Ed. 253. * * lt follows, as a necessary consequence from the foregoing statement of the law. that there is an implied reservation of the police power of the state in every public charter granted by the legislature.'

Governmental powers are conferred upon the state primarily by the people, in trust for the benefit of all of its citizens; and whether exercised by the government directly through its own officials or indirectly through the agency of corporations chartered by the state, must be exercised impartially, and without discrimination, for the benefit of all the people. This is the basic principle upon which our government is founded, and the philosophy of the constitutional provision securing to every one the 'equal protection of the law.'

'A franchise is a right, privilege, or power of public concern, which ought not to be exercised by private individuals at their will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly or by public agents acting under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose in the public interest.' Cal. vs. Pac. R. R. Co., Supra.

Railroads are public highways, and in this age of advanced civilization are as essential to the life of the state as ordinary roads and streets are to the existence of rural and urban communities. The very existence of public corporations, as well as their power to exact fares and freights, is derived from the state; and it cannot be de