vations, and rely on your candour and liberality for their insertion.

J. I. condemns the opinion of those who maintain the unlawfulness of prosecutions for infidelityt as a "popular mistake." I hope to prove that it is no mistake at all; and, I am persuaded, be it what it may, that it will become increasingly popular.

J. I. affirms that "this is not an ecclesiastical, but a civil or political question." Persecutors have always found it very convenient to treat as political crimes those actions which have been deemed offences against the protected religion. This conduct of theirs has resulted from the conviction, that a contrary mode of proceeding would lead people to suspect that the religion thus defended, was unable to support itself by fair argument: thus prophets and apostles have suffered as malefactors-see Amos vii. 10-13. Acts xvii. 6, 7. But Christianity disdains the use of such a weapon, though it has been employed with so much cruelty against herself.

J. I. asserts, that blasphemy "is of the same class of crimes, and is so considered by the common and statute laws of the kingdom, as perjury and profane swearing" and he argues, that, if the magistrate is to punish perjury and profane swearing, much more ought he to punish blasphemers. My mental vision may be dim, but I must confess that I cannot clearly discern this supposed analogy. It appears to me that perjury and profane swearing, or blasphemy, are not "of the same class of crimes." The first is an offence against man, as a breach of the ninth commandment; the others are direct offences against God: the former ought to be punished, because it regards the politi

+ What J. I. has written, does not refer to infidel opinions, but acts of blasphemy. EDITORS.

cal" well-being of the community," and is usually connected with serious injury to the individual who is affected by it; the latter must be left to Him who has said, "Vengeance is mine, I will repay."

According to J. I.'s reasoning, atheists and infidels, who "cannot feel the obligation of an oath," and therefore cannot be trusted, are not fit to be members of civil society. But what is to be done with them? Shall we banish them from the country, lest, if they stay, they should commit perjury, and ruin their neighbours? or, shall we wait till we see how they behave themselves, and defer punishment till the crime is committed? It is not difficult to determine what decision common-sense will come to on such a point. If all were to be expatri ated who" cannot feel the obligation of an oath," we should be frightened at the desolation of the land, and strangers, passing through it, might suppose that some direful famine, or pestilence, had raged amongst us. But J. I. does not seem to be aware that he is arguing from the tendencies of actions; he wishes us to be convinced that, because the principles of infidels tend to falsehood and perjury, they are to be punished. But, let J. I. beware, and let Protestant Dissenters beware, and let all Englishmen beware, of the doctrine of tendencies; it is a most ensnaring and dangerous doctrine. If men are to be punished, not for overt actions, but for the tendencies of their actions, then farewell freedom-our boasted liberty is gone!

My opponent argues from the less to the greater. He says, "Shall libel be a crime to be punished by the judges, and shall the name of Jehovah be contumeliously reproached, Christian magistrate manifest no reand his providence denied, and the gard for his honour, nor respect for

his government?" I answer, Yes; let him show his regard for the honour of God, by refraining from the use of unhallowed weapons in the defence of his cause, and by ceasing to visit offences against religion with temporal penalties. He who libels his neighbour may go to jail for it; he who libels God, will, unless he repent, suffer everlasting imprisonment in the dungeon of hell has the civil magistrate any thing to do with this?

On this subject, there are two im. portant questions to be considered; first, what is the design of civil government? Secondly, has Christianity made any alteration therein ? As to the first, we shall generally agree. Civil government is a wise and beneficial institution, intended for the preservation of life, liberty, and property. It regards man as a social being, recognizes his rights, protects him from injury. But, with religion it has nothing to do. The magistrate is not to inquire, whether his subjects are of this, or of that religion, or of any religion at all; here he has no right of interference. So long as they maintain peace and good order, and refrain from injuring one another, they are to be regarded as good subjects, whatever be their religious opinions, or even though they have no religious opinions.

If this statement be correct, and I apprehend that no Protestant Dissenter will object to it, the question before us is not a "civil or political question;" it is purely religious, and must be treated accordingly. I anticipate an objection, derived from the peculiarities of the Mosaic economy. But are my opponents will ing to go all the lengths of their own argument? Are they content that blasphemers should be punished with death, according to the Jewish law?

The second question is, has

Christianity made any alteration in civil government? Has it invested the magistrate with powers which he did not before possess?

a

Notwithstanding J. 1.'s endeavour to persuade us to regard this as "civil, or political, question," he must be aware that it is not so regarded by the law of England. Blackstone says, that blasphemy is "punishable by fine and imprisonment, for Christianity is part of the laws of England."

Now, I think, it may be easily shewn, that Christianity does not interfere, in the least, with civil government. It leaves it as it finds it, with this exception, that the mild and gentle influence of the gospel, by softening the rugged heart of man, has led to the amelioration of human laws, and destroyed much of the cruelty which formerly accompanied the exercise of power. But, waving this, and understanding that Christianity is " part of the laws of England," we come immediately to the inquiry, "What injunctions does Christianity itself give, relative to its propagation and defence?" For if Christianity be the law of the land, that law must be agreeable to Christianity.

"What saith the scripture?" Let the advocates of prosecutions for infidelity, bring forth their" strong reasons," and summon all their biblical knowledge to the contest. Let them produce the passage in which the Lord Jesus Christ, and his apostles, have directed us to defend a spiritual religion by carnal weapons, to substitute a sword of steel for the sword of the Spirit, and to immure an adversary in a gloomy dungeon, rather than to endeavour, by a process of conclusive reasoning, to "shut him up unto the faith?" But it is needless to pursue the argument further; I will only refer to Luke ix. 49-56; John xviii. 36; 2 Tim. ii, 24-26.

A truly Christian government will be guided by Christian principles, and will use no other mode of defence of those principles than Christianity itself warrants. Most cordially do I agree with our immortal Milton, that "to uphold religion otherwise than to defend the religious from outward violence, is no service to Christ, or his kingdom, but rather a disparagement, and degrades it from a divine and spiritual kingdom to a kingdom of this world, which he denies it to be, because it needs not force to confirm it." See his "Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes." Works, Vol. I. p. 552, folio edition.

J. I. maintains, that, in "discountenancing and suppressing impiety and irreligion," there is a "legitimate exercise" of the magistrate's authority; that is, as a magistrate, he is bound to suppress impiety. The Roman Emperors thought so, and, therefore, persecuted the Christians, who, in their view, were impious atheists. We have been accustomed to consider those Christians as martyrs; according to J. I.'s reasoning, they were criminals. Our Missionaries, too, if this argument be valid, must not complain of bonds, imprisonment, or death, for ridiculing the heathen gods. Indeed, the consequences of J. 1.'s theory will lead him much further than he seems to be aware. I have attempted to point out some of his mistakes, and, by so doing, to counteract the injurious tendency of his system.

Southwark, Nov. 18, 1824.

J. M. C.

subject of morals, it may be neces sary, that the crime, which I have contended is cognizable by the civil magistrate, should be yet more plainly defined. In the book of Leviticus, chap. xxiv. verse 16, it is said, "And the Israelitish woman's son blasphemed the name of the Lord, and cursed:" that is, as may be seen in verse 15, (O! the awful depravity of man!) "cursed his God!" which is twice in verse 16, called "blaspheming the name of the Lord!" In accordance with this description, I defined blasphemy, in my last paper, as being committed by those persons "who had denied the being, and had spoken in terms of impious irreverence of God;"— or, "who had published such blasphemies." Our great lexicographer calls a blasphemer, "a wretch that speaks of God in impious and irreverent terms;" and defines blasphemy to be "an offering of some indignity unto God himself." BLACKSTONE, in his Commentaries, describes blasphemy against the Almighty as being committed "by denying his being or providence; or, by contumelious reproaches of our Saviour Christ:"-as, also," by profane scoffing at the holy scripture, or exposing it to contempt and ridicule." To this statement, that profound lawyer, and constitutional writer, adds: "These are offences punishable at common law by fine and imprisonment, or other infamous punishment; for Christianity is part of the laws of England."

For the purpose of proving, that the laws of England, in respect to blasphemy, are opposed to the laws of Christianity; and that I have acted the part of a "persecutor,"

Civil Magistrate,

AN INDEFENSIBLE POSITION.

In order that a proper judgment might be formed on this important

perfectly compatible, is the object of J. M. C. in the paper to which this is a reply.

As to the charge of persecution, I hope to be able to prove, that it rests

on no evidence; and, therefore, I expect to obtain from every ipartial reader a verdict of acquittal! But, had I undertaken, as J. M. C. has done, to prove, that the legal prosecution of blasphemers is opposed to the laws of God, and to the spirit of Christianity, I should feel that the rebuke once given to a king of Judah, who had made common cause with the enemies of God, applied to my conduct:-" Shouldest thou help the ungodly, and love them that hate the Lord?" 2 Chron. xix. 2.

There are several things in the letter of J. M. C. which, being little more than mere assertions, without evidence for their support, that I shall leave to the impartial decision of the reader: viz. That "blasphemy is not of the same class of crimes, and is not so considered by the common and statute laws of the kingdom, as perjury or profane swearing;"-that blasphemy is not

an

overt action ;" i. e. not an open, public, apparent crime;-that "the magistrate should shew his regard for the honour of God, by refraining from the use of unhallowed weapons in the defence of his cause, and by ceasing to visit offences against religion with temporal penalties;"-and, that blasphemy "is not a civil or political question."

In confirmation of the last of these positions, that the question, as to blasphemy, "is not a civil or political question," J. M. C. remarks concerning those who are subject to the magistrate's authority; "So ong as they maintain peace and good order, and refrain from injuring one another, they are to be considered as good subjects, whatever be their religious opinions, or even though they have no religious opinions."

I feel no objection to adopt this statement, and am free to acknowledge, that, if I cannot shew, by

sufficient evidence, that uttering blasphemy in language, or publishing it in books, is subversive of "peace and good order," and that it is "injurious to the well being of the community;" that my position is untenable, and I shall abandon the argument. I am fully of opinion, with Blackstone, that "all crimes ought to be estimated merely according to the mischiefs which they produce in civil society and, of consequence, private vices, or breach of mere absolute duties, which man is bound to perform, considered only as an individual, are not, cannot be, the object of any municipal law; any farther than as, by their evil example, or other pernicious effects, they may prejudice the community, and thereby become a species of public crimes?" He then gives instances of the difference between " private vices," as drunkenness and lying, and the same sins, when attended with "public inconvenience;" and thus concludes: "The only difference is, that both public and pri vate vices are subject to the vengeance of eternal justice; and public vices are besides liable to the temporal punishments of human tribunals."

Now the simple question is, "Whether blasphemy, uttered, or published, be not prejudicial to the community; an evil example, producing pernicious effects: and, therefore, a public crime? Surely J. M. C. will not deny, that, if a man be legally convicted of having publicly cursed his God," he has committed an open and apparent crime? nor, that it is equally with "the breach of the ninth commandment, an offence against man, as well as a direct oflence against God!" Are there no other ways, I inquire, in which the com. * Chapter on Public Wrongs, Vol. IV. Pages 41-42.