honest men everywhere to the dangers which must attend every invasion of those rights, no matter how specious the reasons given for that invasion may be. All who believe in our form of government and hope for its perpetuity have a vital interest in this great wrong and should make common cause against it. The injunction in question should be challenged in the courts, as was the one issued by Judge Jenkins against the Northern Pacific employees and the officers of the railroad brotherhoods, and it should not be allowed to rest until the last court of resort has been reached. The right of free speech is not yet dead. The courts are growing constantly bolder in their invasions of the domain supposed to have been set apart for the legislative departments of our Government, and not another session of Congress should be allowed to pass without the enactment of such legislation as will forever restrict them to their proper sphere of action.

[Editorial from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers' Journal for September, 1896, p. 789.]

* * * We do not understand that "curbing" means taking away any rightful authority, in the light of the present age of moral and intellectual thought, which understands so much better where the right of one factor of our social organization ends and the other begins than was conceived in the past. The ninth blue law of the New Haven colony says: "The judges shall determine controversies without a jury;" but out of abuse of this authority has come "curbing" of authority. The most exalted opinion of a citizen cloaked with judicial authority, with life tenure as the means of purification of character and unselfish purpose to follow lines of absolute justice without bias, has been shaken to the very foundation by decisions that convey to the minds of all that the judges rendering the decision were not impervious to favoritism, bias, and passion that moved them out of the correct line of the judicial functions into that of personal spleen and demagoguery; and the restrictions wanted by those who would preserve order and give to every factor of society equality under the law, which guarantees that they shall not be deprived of liberty without trial by jury, is to restrict the possibility of snap judgments, which are the products of passion, spleen, and favoritism, backed by authority, that should be restricted until this abuse of authority finds a cure.

* * *

*

The misuse of judicial authority of Judge Jenkins and others demonstrated the necessity for some legislation restricting the scope of their authority. ** That it is necessary for some action in this direction there is no question, nor can there be any question that laboring men should use every influence they possess to assist in securing suitable legislation to maintain liberty and preserve the dignity of the court, which on several occasions has been dwarfed and warped into a powerful means of fostering personal ends and selfish purposes.

* * *

These are the expressions of the laboring classes themselves, and, having personally talked with thousands of them and heard their individual opinions on this question, I am safe in saying that the papers here quoted are not an exaggeration. If it is thought these criticisms are too severe, I would invite a comparison of them with the expressions made by some of our great public men on this subject, including judges, attorneys-general, Congressmen, United States Senators, and the governors of several of our States; and when it is considered that in one case the expressions come from the men who have suffered, and in the other they come from those who are not so directly interested, I believe the expressions of the employees will be considered comparatively moderate.

Chief Justice McCabe, of the supreme court of Indiana, in writing on the subject of injunctions in the Chicago Times-Herald of September 19, 1897, said:

* * * Yes; I am inclined to believe that the use of the power interferes with the constitutional right of trial by jury, and in so far as it does this it endangers the highest and most sacred safeguard of the people.

* * *

Judge John Gibbons, of the circuit court of Illinois, in the same paper, said:

* * * I desire to say that in my opinion there is a danger to-day threatening the very existence of the Republic as gigantic as that which precipitated the rebellion and well-nigh wrought the ruin of our Union. Now it comes, as ever, in the

* * *

In

seductive guise of the law and under the solemn authority of the court. their efforts to regulate or restrain strikes by injunction they are sowing dragons' teeth and blazing the path of revolution.

* * *

Judge M. F. Tuley, of the appellate court of Illinois, in the same paper gave expression to these words:

* * * Such use of the right of injunction by the courts is judicial tyranny, which endangers not only the right of trial by jury, but all the rights and liberties of the citizens. * * * If Congress has the power it should promptly put an end to 'government by injunction" by defining and limiting the power of the Federal courts in the use of the writ.

66

* * *

During the coal miners' strike in 1897, on the question of injunctions, Governor Sadler, of Nevada, expressed himself as follows:

* * * The tendency at present is to have committees make the laws, and to have the courts enforce them by injunction, both of which methods, in my opinion, are subversive of good government and the liberties of the people. ** (Railroad Trainmen's Journal for September, 1897, p. 833.)

* *

On the same question Governor Jones, of Arkansas, said:

* * * Freedom of speech and of the press is inviolable in this Government, and we should not tolerate for a moment any encroachment upon this sacred right. Judge Jackson's order is revolutionary, and if upheld by the Federal Supreme Court and submitted to by the people will overturn our system of government and destroy our liberties. It is not only illegal and unadvisable, but is such an act as calls for his impeachment and removal from his office. (Railroad Trainmen's Journal for September, 1897, p. 833.)

Governor Pingree, of Michigan, expressed himself in these words: * * * I consider government by injunction, unless stopped, the beginning of the end of liberty. Tyranny on the bench is as objectionable as tyranny on the throne. It is even more dangerous, because judges claim immunity from criticism, and foolish people acquiesce in their claims. To enjoin people from assembling peaceably to discuss their wrongs is a violation of first principles. road Trainmen's Journal for September, 1897, p. 832.)

* * *

(RailThe House Committee on the Judiciary of the Fifty-third Congress, which was directed to make an investigation of the Jenkins injunction and report to the House what action should be taken by the House or Congress, reported as follows:

The power to punish for contempt is limited by the laws of most of the States, and we can see no reason why a like limitation should not be placed upon the powers of Federal judges. Your committee therefore recommends the adoption of the following resolution:

Resolved, That the action of Judge James G. Jenkins in issuing said order of December 19, 1893, being an order and writ of injunction, at the instance of the receivers of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, directed against the employees of said railroad company, and in effect forbidding the employees of said Northern Pacific Railroad Company from quitting its service under the limitations therein stated, and in issuing a similar order of December 22, 1893, in effect forbidding the officers of labor organizations with which said employees were affiliated from exercising the lawful functions of their office and position, was an oppressive exercise of the process of his court, an abuse of judicial power, and a wrongful restraint upon said employees and the officers of said labor organizations; that said orders have no sanction in legal precedent, were an invasion of the rights of American citizens, and contrary to the genius and freedom of American institutions, and therefore deserving of the condemnation of the Representatives of the American people. (House Report 1049, Fifty-third Congress, second session.)

I have quoted these resolutions and editorials to show the committee the way the employees view the recent actions of our courts; but, Mr. Chairman, the railroad employees of this country did not pass these resolutions and not endeavor to put them into effect. For the last five or six years they have kept a man here at this capital urging upon the

members of Congress to pass some kind of a law that would limit and define the power of courts in issuing injunctions. In addition to this, the lodges and individual members have, I might say, stormed Congressmen with petitions, memorials, letters, and telegrams, earnestly praying for the passage of the various measures that have been before Congress from time to time, They plead for this legislation for so long and it did not come that they came to the conclusion that a more effective plan should be adopted to impress upon Congressmen the necessity for such legislation, and on March 20, 1898, a large union meeting of members of these organizations in the State of Pennsylvania was held at Pittsburg, Pa, for the sole purpose of urging the passage of the bills then pending before Congress, and to prepare plans to put the various candidates for the next Congress on record in regard to such legislation, and a committee was appointed to carry out the work of the meeting. I hand you a copy of the circular prepared by that committee, which was sent to each candidate for the United States Senate and House:

Mr.

Candidate for Congress.

BEAVER FALLS, PA.,

1898.

DEAR SIR: At a union meeting of 500 delegates from various parts of Pennsylvania, representing the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, Order of Railway Conductors, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and Order of Railroad Telegraphers, held in Pittsburg, Pa., March 20, 1898, for the purpose of taking action regarding injunctions and other questions which vitally affect labor, the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

Whereas our experience of the past few years with some of our courts in their actions in cases of injunctions and contempts has convinced us of the wisdom of the expressions and actions of our forefathers when they said, "The liberties of the people were endangered by the aggressions of the courts," and when they declared to the world that "one of their reasons for severing their allegiance to the British throne was because they were deprived of the benefit of trial by jury," and when they placed a clause in our Constitution which says that "trials of all crimes shall be by jury," and as there was a bill introduced in the first session of the Fifty-fifth Congress which provides for trial by jury in certain cases of contempt: Therefore, be it Resolved, That we believe the right of trial by jury is just as sacred to-day as it ever has been, and that we view with alarm the aggressive tendency of some of our judges in their attempts to serve corporate interests through the guise of equity proceedings whereby both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution are violated, and we denounce such actions as judicial tyranny; and we urge our two United States Senators and Congressmen to use their influence and vote in behalf of the bill referred to; and be it further

Resolved, That a committee composed of one member from each organization here represented be appointed by the chairman of this meeting, and if the above bill or a similar one is not passed at this session of Congress, said committee shall interview, or cause to be interviewed, each candidate for United States Senator and Congressman and ascertain their views, and whether or not, if elected, they will use their efforts in behalf of such legislation, and said committee shall publish the result of such interviews in all labor and industrial journals in Pennsylvania, and also in the public press; that a copy of this resolution be sent to the President, the United States Senate, and the House of Representatives.

As the bill referred to in this resolution was not enacted into law at the last session of Congress, therefore, we, the committee appointed by that meeting to interview each candidate for Congress and United States Senator, do respectfully submit to you the following questions:

What are your views on the power and practice of courts in issuing injunctions in labor disputes?

How is such power derived, and is it misused?

Do injunctions interfere with the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury? Should Congress specifically define and limit the power of courts in issuing injunctions?

If you are elected, will you vote for a law which will define and limit the power of courts in issuing injunctions?

A copy of this letter has also been given to the press.

Respectfully, yours,

Kindly address your answer to H. R. Fuller, secretary, 213 Tenth street, Beaver Falls, Pa.

Several of the candidates made no answer to this circular, ignoring it entirely. Thirty made replies, and not one of them upheld injunctions, and twenty-seven of them agreed if elected to vote for a bill which would limit and define the power of the courts in issuing injunctions. Thirteen of those who were pledged were elected. In one district one candidate refused to make reply to the questions, while his opponent made a favorable reply, and we were successful in electing the man who was favorable by a majority of 34 votes. The circular and answers were all made public at the time; I have the answers with me, and if the committee desires to see them, I am at liberty to furnish them.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to be thoroughly understood in this part of my remarks. I simply do this to show you that we have endeavored to carry out our resolutions. We do not pass resolutions and then sit down. We have appealed to this means at different times, and in the State of Pennsylvania used it against candidates who would not agree that there should be something done. It was for that purpose that that committee was appointed. These answers which I have here were publicly given to the press-the circulars and the answers—and there are some very valuable arguments in these answers which were made public, as I have said.

I have here also the opinions of two firms of attorneys of these organizations on this bill, and I would be glad to submit them to you also.

The CHAIRMAN. They will all be printed together.

The opinions of the attorneys referred to are as follows:

P. M. ARTHUR, Esq.,

CLEVELAND, OHIO, March 2, 1900.

G. C. E. B. of L. E., Society for Savings Building, City.

DEAR SIR: I have examined the draft of a proposed bill entitled "An act to limit the meaning of the word 'conspiracy' and also the 'use of restraining orders and injunctions' as applied to disputes between employers and employees in the District of Columbia, etc.," which you handed me on the 28th ultimo, and, in connection therewith, I have carefully read the opinion of Messrs. Ralston & Siddons regarding the same. I have also carefully compared the proposed act with the act of Parliament of 1875 and the act of the Maryland legislature of 1884, referred to in said opinion, and I find that the proposed act is a substantial copy of those two acts in so far as it relates to what conspiracy shall be considered a crime.

The law passed by Parliament in 1875 was one that received very careful consideration not only by members of both Houses of Parliament, but also by employers of labor in Great Britain and the representatives of labor organizations, and also by leading lawyers, judges, and public-spirited citizens of the realm. That law was the result of their combined wisdom, and fairly represents their united judgment on the subject. So far as I have been able to examine, it has been given a fair and liberal construction by English judges when cases have arisen to which it was applicable.

It was regarded in England, and certainly was, a substantial step in the direction of making the crime of conspiracy one that did not bear down unequally upon workmen engaged in a struggle for that which they deemed to be due them. It is somewhat remarkable, with this example of Great Britain in existence for a quarter of a century, that Maryland is the only one of the United States which should take the same forward step. I will say, in passing, however, that we do not need such a law in Ohio, because there is no such crime in Ohio as conspiracy. But in all States which have a common-law jurisdiction of crimes and offenses the definition given by Messrs. Ralston & Siddons is substantially correct, and the crime is recognized and commissions of it punished in those States.

I am of opinion, therefore, that this part of the measure is entitled to support and that its adoption into a law shall be of service to all concerned.

The proposed law, however, outlines a very radical departure from ordinary proceedings when it undertakes to apply the same definition of the word "conspiracy to any case in which an injunction or a restraining order is issued. Neither the English act nor that of Maryland undertook to enter this field. Consequently, there are no decisions which will serve as a guide as to how this part of the law would operate in practice. I can see no possible harm to come from it, however, although I am somewhat apprehensive that some of our Federal courts might undertake to strangle that part of the law by construction. This, however, is only my guess, and I may be entirely wrong about it. I regard the measure, as a whole, as a step in the right direction and one which I believe if enacted into a law will be beneficial in its operation. I have not seen any of the other bills which have been proposed and which are referred to in the opinion of Messrs. Ralston & Siddons, and therefore do not undertake to compare this measure with any of those. I concur with those gentlemen in that part of their opinion in which they express the necessity for caution in proposing measures and in their disinclination to attack beneficial existing remedies in the hope of getting the relief to which workingmen believe themselves entitled.

Respectfully submitted.

ALEX. HADDEN.

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN,

CLEVELAND, OHIO, March 21, 1900.

P. H. Morrissey, Grand Master, City.

DEAR SIR: We are in receipt of several bills introduced into the United States Senate and House of Representatives, the purport of which is to restrict the power of the courts to grant promiscuous injunctions and restraining orders. An examination of the bills shows us that they are all of the same purport, and many of them almost identical in wording. Senate bill No. 326 we consider a very good one of this kind; perhaps the best of the set. Upon a careful reading, however, of the bill submitted by Ralston & Siddons, we consider the latter the best bill because of the fact that it gets at the root of the whole matter. Before entering upon a discussion of its merits, we desire to call the attention of the originators of the bill to the fact that the word "and," in the fifth line of the heading, should be changed to "or" in order to make the meaning and sense of the bill complete.

The bills which have been introduced by the Senators and Representatives do not define what shall constitute conspiracy or contempt of court, but only deal with the subject after the contempt has been committed, and leave the court perfectly free to determine what is contempt. The other bill, however, defines the term conspiracy and clearly sets out the fact that it is not contempt of court for the members of an organization to do or not to do a certain thing, provided the same would be lawful for one member to do. Most of these injunctions and restraining orders have been issued upon the theory that the doing or refraining to do a certain act by labor organizations amounted to conspiracy. If, however, the court can be shorn of this enlarged meaning of the word which they have assumed to themselves, it seems to us that it will very much curtail the powers of the courts in this direction.

After a careful study of the matter we would prefer to recommend the Ralston & Siddons bill as affording more and better relief to the labor organizations throughout the entire country. It would not leave the courts such a wide discretionary power if the interpretation of the word conspiracy is defined, that the object of all the other bills would be already achieved, and there would be only a few contempt proceedings.

The question, however, presents itself to our minds whether or not the introduction of the Ralston & Siddons bill might not defeat the passage of any of the others. It occurs to us that the best thing to be done is to unite all forces on one bill, and