for determination by him. Neither should he introduce into an argument, suitably addressed to the court, remarks or statements intended to influence the jury or by-standers.

These and all kindred practices, appropriately termed "pettifoggery," are unprofessional and unworthy of an officer of the law charged, as is the lawyer with the duty of aiding in the administration of justice.

23. Attitude Toward Jury. All attempts to curry favor with juries by fawning, flattery or pretended solicitude for their personal comfort are unprofessional. Suggestions of counsel, looking to the comfort or convenience of jurors, and propositions to dispense with argument, should be made to the court out of the jury's hearing. A lawyer must never converse privately with jurors about the case; and both before and during the trial he should avoid communicating with them, even as to matters foreign to the cause.

24. Right of Lawyer to Control the Incidents of the Trial. As to incidental matters pending the trial, not affecting the merits of the cause, or working substantial prejudice to the rights of the client, such as forcing the opposite lawyer to trial when he is under affliction or bereavement; forcing the trial on a particular day to the injury of the opposite lawyer when no harm will result from a trial at a different time; agreeing to an extension of time for signing a bill of exceptions, cross interrogatories and the like, the lawyer must be allowed to judge. In such matters no client has a right to demand that his counsel shall be illiberal, or that he do anything therein repugnant to his own sense of honor and propriety.

25. Taking Technical Advantage of Opposite Counsel; Agreements with Him. A lawyer should not ignore known customs or practice of the bar or of a particular court, even when the law permits, without giving timely notice to the opposing counsel. As far as possible, important agreements, affecting the rights of clients, should be reduced to writing; but it is dishonorable to avoid performance of an agreement fairly made because it is not reduced to writing, as required by rules of court.

26. Professional Advocacy Other Than Before Courts. A lawyer openly, and in his true character may render professional services before legislative or other bodies, regarding proposed legislation and in advocacy of claims before departments of the government, upon the same principles of ethics which justify his appearance before the courts; but it is unprofessional for a lawyer so engaged to conceal his attorneyship, or to employ secret personal solicitations, or to use means other than those addressed to the reason and understanding to influence action.

27. Advertising, Direct or Indirect. The most

worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews, not war. ranted by personal relations is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange fɔr executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for dusi. ness by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged, or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's positions, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.

28. Stirring Up Litigation, Directly or through Agents. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a law suit, except in rare cases where ties of blood relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Not only is stirring up strife and litigation unprofessional, but it is disreputable in morals, contrary to public policy and indictable at common law. No one should be permitted to remain in the profession who hunts up defects in titles or other causes of action and informs thereof in order to be employed to bring suit, or who breed, litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries, or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or who employs agents or runners for like purposes, or who pays or rewards, directly or indi rectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or who remunerates policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar, having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner, immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.

29. Upholding the Honor of the Profession. Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, and should accept

without hesitation employment against a member of the bar who has wronged his client. The counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has been committed owe it to the profession and to the public to bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities. A lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession, and to improve not only the law, but the administration of justice. 30. Justifiable and Unjustifiable Litigations. A lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when convinced that the purpose is merely to harass or injure the opposite party, or to work oppression and wrong.

He may counsel and maintain only such actions and proceedings as appear to him just. His appearance in court should be deemed equivalent to an assertion, on his honor, that in his opinion his client is justly entitled to some measure of relief refused by his adversary. Upon that measure he may insist, though he disapprove his client's character.

31. Responsibility for Litigation. No lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for any person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to refuse retainers. Every lawyer must decide what business he will accept as counsellor, what causes he will bring into court for plaintiffs, what cases he will contest in court for defendants. The responsibility for advising questionable transactions, for bringing questionable suits, for urging questionable defenses, is the lawyer's responsibility. He cannot escape it by urging as an excuse that he is only following his client's instructions.

32. The Lawyer's Duty in Its Last Analysis. No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive, nor should any lawyer render, any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of the public. When rendering any such improper service or advice the lawyer lays aside his robe of office, and in his own person invites and merits stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, he advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law. He must also observe and advise his client to observe the statute law, though until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent adjudiIcation he is free and is entitled to advise as to

"I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of

"I will maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers;

"I will counsel and maintain only such actions, proceedings and defenses as appear to me legally debatable and just, except the defense of a person charged with a public offense;

"I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;

"I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client, and will accept no compensation in connection with his business except from him or with his knowledge and ap proval;

"I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged;

"I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for lucre or malice. So help me God."

We commend this form of oath for adoption by the proper authorities in all the states and territories.

In submitting the above draft of a Code of

(2) Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. The oaths administered on admission to the Bar in all the other States require the observance of the highest moral principle in the practice of the profession, but the duties of the lawyer are not as specifically defined by law as in the states named.

Ethics, the special committee in charge of the work makes the following explanation:

1. As directed by the Association at the 1907 meeting (vide A. B. A. Reports XXXI, 64), we have prepared and herewith transmit to you a draft for the proposed canons of professional ethics, and we very earnestly request your suggestions and criticisms. We ask, however, that if opposed to any of the canons you aid us by accompanying your remarks by a draft of the precise form in which you recommend wording the canons upon which you may comment. Our final report, based upon the suggestions and criticisms received, will be submitted to the Association in August, at Seattle, Washington, in accordance with our instructions.

2. We summarize briefly the movement which has culminated in this draft:

At the 1905 meeting of the Association held in Rhode Island, the chairman of the executive committee presented a resolution, which was adopted unanimously, providing for a special committee to report upon the "advisability and practicability" of the adoption of a code of professional ethics by the Association (Reports XXVIII, 132). At the Association's 1906 meeting, held in Minnesota, the committee reported favorably upon both points (id. XXIX, 600-604; reprinted as Appendix A of the committee's 1907 report id. XXXI, 681-684), and its recommendation, providing for a a committee from Bench and Bar to draft a series of canons of professional ethics "suitable for adoption and promulgation" by the Association, was adopted unanimously (id. XXIX, 35). In 1907, at the meeting in Maine, your committee submitted a report (id. XXXI, 676-736), containing a compilation of the codes of ethics adopted in different States of the Union, and much other information, including a reprint of the Hoffman Resolutions in regard to professional deportment. The committee in its 1907 report inter alia recommended that Chief Justice Sharswood's book on Professional Ethics be reprinted as a volume of the A. B. A. Reports, and it has already been issued as volume XXXII. The committee in 1907 also reported:

"We believe that such canons (i. e., of professional ethics), to become practically effective, should be adopted only after mature and careful deliberation, and much fuller consideration on the part of our membership than is possible at one of our annual meetings.

"We believe that your committee in drafting the code should have the active assistance of every member of the Association with thoughts upon the subject, and that the recommendations which your committee may see fit to make should be considered, not only in connection with what has already been done in those States having codes of ethics, but also in the light of what has been said by individuals who have di

The 1907 report of the committee was approved by the Association (Reports XXXI, p. 64), and the committee was directed to transmit a copy of the Sharswood reprint and of the committee's 1907 report to each member of the Association and to request a careful examination of the documents set forth in the appendix thereto, and the submission of opinions and suggestions in the matter of the proposed canons of ethics; your committee was also directed to send the reprint and report to the secretary of each State Bar Association in the United States with similar requests, and to suggest that the same be referred to such committee as may be appropriate (id., p. 64). These directions were followed by your committee in its printed letter of 20 November, 1907, to each member of the American Bar Association, and by its typewritten letter of 19 December, 1907, to the secretary of each State Bar Association in the United States. We received in reply many suggestions of value, which, with excerpts from able articles on the subject in some of the professional journals, American and English, were printed in a "Red Book" of 131 pages for the use of your committee and as an aid to it in its deliberations.

3. In the following States there are codes of ethics, more or less complete, which exist as the result either of codification by statutory enactments of some of the "duties" of lawyers, or of the action of Bar Associations therein in adopting canons of professional ethics: Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. In addition to these States there are in the following Bar Association Committees, which have been charged within the last year with the duty either of reporting upon or aiding in the work your committee has in hand, to-wit: Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Vermont. There are also committees co-operating in a number of the States which already have codes, and your committee is at frequent intervals being advised that State Bar Association committecs are being named to help the movement-a movement which should culminate in an authoritatively declared standard of professional conduct, which will not only serve as a guide to the youthful practitioner, but will place the profession, qua profession, before the public in its true light, and thereby free it from the unmerited public criticism and censure which have at times been bestowed upon it by the unthinking, as a result of the misconduct of the small percentage of unworthy men who steal into its ranks, yet who in no way represent its spirit or morale.

4. The foundation of the draft for canons of ethics, herewith submitted, is the code adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association in 1887, and which, with but slight modifications, has been adopted in eleven other States. The committee in this connection desire to record their appreciation of the help they have received in this work from their fellow member, Honorable Thomas G. Jones, of Alabama, who was the draftsman of the Alabama code of ethics, and who attended the three days' session of your committee in Washington, 30 March to 1 April, 1908, and moved the adoption of a number of your committee's modifications of the Alabama code drafted by him more than a score of years ago.

The committee approved the suggestions of Mr. Justice Brewer (reported A. B. A. Reports, Vol. XXXI, pp. 62-63). The first of his two proposals, "the preparation of a body of rules," "few in number, clear and precise in their provisions, so that there can be no excuse for their violation," "to be given operative and binding force by legislation or the action of the highest courts of the states, assuming that those courts have, as doubtless they have in some states, the power to make and enforce such rules," has resulted in the recommended form for Gath of Admission. The second is embodied in subdivision II.

The annexed draft for the canons represents our best present judgment after a most careful consideration of the subject; but we hope that the committecs of the respective State Bar Associations will aid us with their advice, and that every member of the American Bar, whether a member of the American Bar Association or not. will freely and frankly criticise the canons and advise the committee of any point, whether of substance or phraseology, with which he is not in accord, and will also submit draft for any additional canons which he believes should be inserted.

(3) Judge Jones desires to be recorded as not concurring in the personal reference to himself.

MASTER AND SERVANT-DUTY OF MASTER TO FURNISH SAFE APPLIANCES.

RUSH v. OREGON POWER CO.

Supreme Court of Oregon. April 28, 1908.

An employer must exercise diligence to furnish to its employees reasonably safe appliances, and, in the absence of any notice thereof, the employees may assume that the duty has been discharged.

Where, in an action for injuries to a brakeman while uncoupling cars, the jury could have found that a chain attached to a coupler was too short and insufficient; that, if the railroad

had exercised reasonable care in inspecting the chain after it had been repaired, the defect would have been discovered; that the injuries could reasonably have been foreseen or guarded against; and that the brakeman had no knowledge of the imperfection-it was error to grant a nonsuit.

This is a suit by Mark Rush against the Oregon Power Company, a corporation, to recover damages for a personal injury suffered by the plaintiff while engaged as a brakeman in the employ of the defendant. The negli gence stated in the complaint is the failure of the defendant to inspect two freight cars, the brakes of which, it is alleged, were out of order and so defective that they would not hold when the cars were loaded, and also the heedless putting into a train, without examination, other cars on which were defective couplings with short and inadequate chain connections, which imperfections were known to the defendant, or, by the exercise of reasonable care on its part, might have been known by it, but to the plaintiff were unknown, who, in attempting to uncouple the latter cars January 29, 1906, lost his right arm, particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances whereby the injury was sustained. The answer denies the negligence alleged, and avers that the hurt of which the plaintiff complains resulted from his own negligence and that of a fellow workman, and also that the plaintiff assumed the risk. The reply put in issue the allegations of new matter in the answer, and, the cause coming on for trial, a non-suit was given on motion of the defendant when the plaintiff had introduced his evidence and rested. From this judgment, he appeals.

MOORE, J. (after stating the facts as above): It is contended by plaintiff's counsel that an error was committed in granting the non suit. The consideration of this question necessitates an examination of the testimony relating to the place, cause, and circumstances attending the injury. It appears that the defendant owns a standard-gauge railroad which is built from Portland to other places, and operates on its lines by electricity cars for transporting passengers and freight, and maintains in such city a power house, to which extends from its main line a spur, and that other side tracks form at that place a yard where motors and cars are inspected. The plaintiff is an experienced brakeman, and at the time of his injury was employed as such by the defendant. The head brakeman, or conductor, as he is sometimes called, who was employed to switch cars in the Portland yard, did not report for duty January 29, 1906, whereupon the yardmaster ordered the plaintiff to perform that service, and directed him to go with a motor to the power house and remove there

from some empty cars, and to place therein two cars loaded with cordwood. At the place indicated the main track of the railroad extends nearly south, and a side track branches to the west. The loaded cars were "kicked" back on the main line south of the switch, where they were left in charge of a person who set the brakes to hold them in position. The plaintiff, having removed from the power house five empty flat cars forming a train which was coupled at the north end to the motor, was passing over the switch that connects the main line and the side track, when the loaded cars, notwithstanding the friction of their brakes, rolled north, and the corner of the forward car struck the third empty car from the motor at a point about four feet south of its coupling, causing the latter to be slightly litted from the track on the side where the collision occurred. The plaintiff, desiring to clear the track for a passenger car that was about due, went to the west side of the second car from the motor to uncouple that car, intending to move the disengaged part of the train to the north, so as to place a pole against it and the corner of the loaded car, which he expected to force back on the main line, and hold with the brakes until he could recouple the train, move it out of the way, and then return with the motor for the loaded cars; but he was unable to uncouple this car from the west side. He then attempted to separate the train from the opposite side, and went, for that purpose, to the corner of the empty car north of the point where it had been struck. This car had a Tower automatic coupler with a knuckle, which, when closed, was held in place by a pawl to which was attached a short iron rod with an eye at each end, connected at the top with a chain that extended upward and was fastened to an iron arm. This arm reached back to the center of the car's end, to which it was attached, and at this point was bent at a right angle horizontally, so as to extend along the framework of the car to a point near the corner, where it was again bent and turned downward, making a lever, the lifting of which raised the pawl and released the knuckle, thus avoiding the necessity of a person going between the cars to couple or uncouple them. The Tower coupler has a spring in the drawhead that keeps the pawl in position, and prevents it from being raised until the cars are forced together, releasing the tension, when the lever can be raised and the knuckle opened. The plaintiff, standing on the east side of the track, grasped with his right hand the lever at the corner of the third car, and gave with his left hand a signal to force the train slowly to the south, so as to slacken the strain, and the motorman, obeying the token, pushed the cars in that direction, but the plaintiff, being

unable to raise the lever or to release his hand therefrom, was pulled the intervening distance of about four feet until his body struck the corner of the loaded car, behind which his arm was drawn and injured, necessitating amputation at the shoulder. A small model of the Tower coupler was introduced in evidence, and has been sent up as an exhibit. An examination of this model shows that the upper eye of the iron rod or pin which is fastened to the pawl has connected therewith two links of a miniature chain and a tiny clevis that complete the connection with the iron arm which forms a part of the lever. A chain containing three constituent parts above the draw-head, namely, two links and a clevis, of relative proportions to that of the pattern before us, is of such length that, when the iron arm commences to raise the pawl, the lower end of the lever by which it is operated stands out at a sufficient angle from the corner of the car as to prevent one's hand from being caught by any counter pressure on the lever. As the chain is shortened, however, the lower end of the lever is necessarily brought down closer to the car, and, if sufficiently reduced, will strike the framework.

The plaintiff, as a witness in his own behalf, testified that it was necessary to force the cars back from six inches to two feet, so that the train could be uncoupled; that the chain on the Tower coupler at the north end of the third car, as it then stood on the track, had been repaired and consisted of only two constituent parts, one of which was a short, round, cold-shut link; that when he took hold of the lever, and gave the signal slowly to slacken the tension, the movement of the train caused the lever to tighten and caught his hand so so that he could not withdraw it, and that such retention could not have occurred if the chain had been of the regulation length; that, when the train was started, he partially stumbled, and was unable, with his left hand, to give a signal to check the motion, but when his arm was struck he hollowed and the motorman halted; and that in the few seconds after his hand was caught, and before his arm was injured, he for the first time noticed the defect in the chain. The plaintiff further testified that the empty cars which he tried to uncouple must have been brought into the yard the day before he was injured; that, upon the arrival of a train at such place, the cars are supposed to be inspected, and, when no "Bad order" tag appears on them, they are supposed to be in good condition, and that no mark of that kind was displayed on the car mentioned; that the distance of about four feet between the corner of such car and the corner of the car causing the collision afforded ample space for uncoupling, and if his hand had not been caught