chanan had before him a clearly defined duty, namely, to enforce the authority of the United States, but his blood was thin and ran slowly. He dared not, but contented himself with mumbling dreary platitudes, and prating about "coercion."

The telegraph gave the announcement at Springfield, the home of Mr. Lincoln, giving him an intimation of the unwonted cares and momentous difficulties likely to environ his administration. He had gauged the probabilities long before, and manifested neither surprise nor alarm. The Journal, of that city, supposed to reflect his views, said:

"If South Carolina does not obstruct the collection of the revenue, at her ports, or violate another Federal law, there will be no trouble, and she will not be out of the Union. If she violates the law, then comes the tug of war. The President of the United States, in such an emergency, has an imperative duty to perform. Mr. Buchanan may shirk it, or the emergency may not exist during his administration. If not, then the Union will last through his term of office. If the overt act, on the part of South Carolina, takes place on or after the fourth day of March, then the duty of executing the law will devolve upon Mr. Lincoln."

The influence of the above paragraph can scarcely be estimated. It appeared in a newspaper printed in a little Western city, but it was understood to represent the faith and purpose of the coming Chief Magistrate. It was widely copied, and loyal men, as they read it, took heart and hope. The Union, loved with unutterable love, should not be lost! It would soon have a President who would defend it to the last extremity! "Oh, that the fourth of March were come!" was said by many, both men and women. They felt they had done the South no wrong. They would offer no apologies. The threat of disunion should wring no new abandonment of honor, no new concession to wrong! After the manner prescribed by law, a President had been chosen. If for that, secession was attempted, it should not be permitted. For the present, they would wait and hope that, at the end of the many months of senile incapacity, if nothing worse, the sinewy hand of the Western President should be laid heavily upon treason.

On the 26th Major Anderson evacuated Fort Moultrie and occupied Fort Sumter. His little force was in the greatest peril, but reinforcements were withheld. Two days previously he wrote to Washington, "When I inform you that my garrison consists of only sixty

OCCUPATION OF FORT SUMTER.

43

effective men, and we are in a very indifferent work, the walls of which are only fourteen feet high, and that we have, within one hundred and sixty yards of our walls, sand hills which command our works, and which afford admirable sites for batteries, and the finest covers for sharpshooters, and that, besides this, there are numerous houses, some of them within pistol shot, you will at once see that if attacked in force, headed by any one but a simpleton, there is scarcely a possibility of our being able to hold out long enough for our friends to come to our succor."

Fort Sumter was the key to the Charleston harbor; once occupied, from it Moultrie could be knocked to pieces, and reinforcements from the sea prevented. He knew the keen eyes of the Charleston authorities were upon it. He plead for reinforcements-General Scott seconded the appeal. No-the act would be construed as unfriendly, as a menace, and exasperate the South Carolina rebels: must be avoided; and was! Major Anderson went on improving Moultrie, as though he proposed to stay permanently; at the same time he ordered the work being done on Sumter to be pressed to early completion. When notified by Captain Foster that all was ready, he took a responsibility, the announcement of which electrified the nation. Without specific instructions from the President or Secretary of War, on the 26th, he gave orders to prepare for the evacuation of Fort Moultrie. Night came; vessels were loaded with women, children and personal effects. The boats stood off, as if for Fort Johnson, but landed at Fort Sumter. At dawn, all had found the new shelter, except a few who remained to put Fort Moultrie on a peace footing. This was effected by Captain Johnson and eight men, who coolly proceeded to dismount the heavy guns, and burn the gun carriages. Governor Pinckney and the Convention took alarm from the smoke. Drums beat, the militia flew to arms, and soon the wildest rumors were afloat, corrected, however, by the appearance of Captain Johnson, in the streets of Charleston, who, on behalf of Major Anderson, communicated his action to the authorities. It gave great offense and was construed into a threat of "coercion." A communication was sent to Washington, through commissioners, who were instructed to demand of President Buchanan an order remanding Major Anderson to Moultrie, but that was too much, even for him. The State authorities took steps for the imme

diate occupancy of Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie, which Major Anderson was not authorized to prevent. They also seized the various United States and telegraph buildings. Then, had the word been spoken by the President, Major Anderson could have crushed secession in its nest. His guns could have prevented the erection of those elaborate works which subsequently compelled his surrender, and the dishonor of the flag. It is not the province of the historian to speculate, but it is impossible to resist saying "Ah! what might have been !"

Major Anderson was suddenly the most famous man in the country, and his strategic movement met with hearty approval throughout the loyal States.

Before leaving the record of this first stage of war, for such it was, it is proper to recur to the statement that Lieut.-General Scott urged upon Mr. Buchanan the importance of reinforcing Major Anderson, and of strongly manning the seaboard defenses. Since the above the autobiography of the Lieut.-General has come to hand, and the statements of the venerable hero are overwhelmingly conclusive. On the 29th of October, 1860, he addressed Mr. Buchanan a letter, in which, after alluding to the probable nearness of outbreak to follow Mr. Lincoln's election, he said:

"From a knowledge of our Southern population, it is my solemn conviction that there is some danger of an early act of rashness preliminary to secession; viz., the seizure of some or all of the following forts: Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi, below New Orleans, both without garrisons; Fort Morgan, below Mobile, without a garrison; Forts Pickens and McRae, Pensacola harbor, with an insufficient garrison for one; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, without a garrison; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison, the latter without any, and Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, without a sufficient garrison. In my opinion, all these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup de main, ridiculous."

Again, he says:

"OCTOBER 31.—I suggested to the Secretary of War that a circular should be sent at once to such of those forts as had garrisons to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults."

A significant foot-note says, "Permission not granted." On the 12th of December he left the bed to which he had been long con

GENERAL SCOTT AND THE GARRISON.

45 fined, and repaired to Washington. The next day he called upon the Secretary of War and urged upon him

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“The same views; viz., strong garrisons in the Southern forts-those of Charleston and Pensacola harbors at once; those on Mobile Bay and the Mississippi below New Orleans next, etc. * * * The Secretary did not concur in my views, and I begged him to procure me an early interview with the President, that I might make one more effort to save the forts and the Union. By appointment the Secretary accompanied me to the President, Dec. 15th, when the same topics were discussed. * The President, in reply to my arguments for immediately reinforcing Fort Moultrie and sending a garrison to Fort Sumter, said, in substance, the time had not arrived for doing so; that he would wait the action of the convention of South Carolina, in the expectation that a commission would be appointed and sent to negotiate with him and Congress respecting the secession of the State and the property of the United States held within its limits; and that if Congress should decide against the secession then he would send a reinforcement and telegraph the commander (Major Anderson) of Fort Moultrie to hold the forts (Moultrie, and Sumter) against attack. And the Secretary, with animation, added, 'We have a vessel of war (the Brooklyn) held in readiness at Norfolk, and he would then send three hundred men in her from Fort Monroe to Charleston.' To which I replied, first, that so many men could not be withdrawn from that garrison but could be taken from New York; next, that it would then be too late, as the South Carolina commissioners would have the game in their hands, by first using and then cutting the wires; that as there was not a soldier in Fort Sumter any handful of armed secessionists might seize and occupy it.

“Here the remark may be permitted, that if the Secretary's three hundred men had then, or some time later, been sent to Forts Moultrie and Sumter, both would now have been in the possession of the United States, and not a battery below could have been erected by the secessionists; consequently the access to these forts from the sea would now (the end of March, 1861,) be unobstructed and free.

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"DEC. 30.-Will the President permit Gen. Scott, without reference to the War Department [foot-note-'The Secretary was already suspected'] and otherwise, as secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York harbor, to reinforce Fort Sumter? etc. It would have been easy to reinforce this fort down to about the 12th of February. In this long delay, Fort Moultrie had been rearmed and greatly strengthened, etc. * * The difficulty of reinforc ing had thus been increased ten or twelvefold. First, the late President (Buchanan) refused to allow any attempt to be made because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina commissioners,” etc.—Aut. Vol. II.

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There is another quotation from the same authority, which is highly significant:

"Before any resolution was taken, the late Secretary of the Navy making diffi. culties about the want of suitable war vessels, another commissioner from South

Carolina arrived, causing further delay. When all this had passed away, Secretaries Holt and Toucey, Capt. Ward of the navy, and myself, with the knowledge of the President (Buchanan), settled upon the employment, under the Captain (who was eager for the expedition) of three or four small steamers belonging to the coast survey. At that time (late in January) I have no doubt Capt. Ward would have reached Fort Sumter with all his vessels. But he was kept back by something like a truce or armistice made [here] embracing Charleston and Pensacola harbors, agreed upon between the late President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, etc., and that truce lasted to the end of that adminis tration."

Alas! that the evidence should be so conclusive! Alas! that such a record must be written! Yet we may even now see the finger of Providence. Great events were shaping. By the Calvaries, and through the Gethsemanes of sorrow and purification was the nation to march reverently and penitently to the Bethany of its ascension!

Of course events so momentous caused great anxiety and produced exciting discussions, which cannot be reproduced in a work so specific in its character as this one. How did the Representatives and Senators of Illinois meet the crisis? In the Senate were Mr. Douglas and Mr. Trumbull. The former was disposed to go as far as possible towards conciliation, farther than his colleague would have deemed proper, but they united in condemning secession. Mr.. Douglas, on Tuesday, Dec. 18th, promptly moved to "lay over" a scheme proposed by Senator Joseph Lane of Oregon, which declared the government unfitted for the exigences of the times, and proposing the appointment of commissioners to suggest remedies! January 7th, in reviewing the speech of Senator Baker, after criticising the views of the Republican party, he said: "I feel bound, however, and take pleasure in saying, that I don't believe the Southern States are in any danger, or ought to have any apprehension, that Mr. Lincoln, or his party can do any harm or render insecure their rights to persons or property anywhere in this country." In that speech he used the words subsequently so often quoted-"War is disunion, certain, inevitable, final and irreversible." He made a point of keen, telling, illustrated logic, in these words: "The President in his message first said we could not coerce a state to remain in the Union, but in a few sentences he advised the acquisition of Cuba. As if we should pay $300,000,000 for Cuba, and the next day she might secede and re-annex herself to Spain, and