Supreme Court, New York Special Term. Reported N. Y. L. J., THE PEOPLE ex rel. WILLIAM S. GRAY v. GEORGE HILLIARD as Special Deputy Commissioner of Excise. BEEKMAN, J. The relator is the duly appointed receiver of a judgment debtor who is the holder of a liquor tax certificate having still some time to run. The receiver is not in possessio!: of the certificate, and as the judgment debtor cannot be found he is not able to obtain such possession. Proof of these facts has been submitted to the commissioner of excise, coupled by a formal statement by the receiver that he surrendered the certificate and demanded the surrender value, under section 25 of chapter 112 of the Laws of 1896, known as Liquor Tax Law. The commi sioner has refused to recognize the validity of this demand, on the ground that, under the law, the party making the demand must physically surrender the certificate in order to entitle him to receive the rebate. The question is brought up for consideration upon a demurrer to the return made by the commissioner to a writ of alternative mandamus which has been sued out by the relator to compel such payment. A liquor tax certificate under the liquor law has a double significance. It not only evidences the fact of the payment of the tax, but it also operates to make a traffic in liquors lawful for the person to whom it is issued. Furthermore, the physical possession of the certificate is also essential to authorize such traffic and its continuance during the term for which the tax has been paid. Section 21 of the law provides that before commencing or doing any business for the time for which a liquor tax is paid and a certificate is given, such certificate shall be posted up and at all times displayed in a conspicuous place where such traffic is carried on. Section 27 permits the sale and assignment of such certificate and authorizes the purchaser to continue the traffic thereunder on certain conditions among others, the presentation of such cer tificate to the officer who issued the same, or to his successor in office, "who shall write or stamp across the face of the certificate, over his signature, the words 'consent is hereby given for the transfer of this liquor tax certificate to' (and here insert the name of the corporation, association, copartnership or person to whom the same is transferred)." Section 25 provides that the holder of such certificate may surrender it to the officer who issued the same, "who shall thereupon cancel the same and refund the pro rata amount of the tax paid for the unexpired term of such tax certificate." The same section also provides that a receiver of the property of a person holding such certificate may in like manner, surrender the same, or may continue to carry on the business, in which latter event the certificate shall have written or stamped across its face, over the signature of the officer who issued the same, a permission to continue the traffic for the unexpired term. Sufficient has been shown to indicate the importance attached to the physical possession of the certificate, and the dependence of the rights of the person to whom it has been issued, or to whom it has been transferred, upon such possession. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that when the statute provides for the surrender and cancellation of the certificate, it means not only a surrender of the rights to traffic in liquor under the law, but also, where it is in existence an actual surrender of the paper itself and its physical cancellation. The importance of this to a proper administration of the law by those appointed to supervise its operation is apparent. Taking the present case as an illustration, it may be that before the receiver was appointed the judgment debtor has assigned the certificate, and transferred its possession to such assignee. Should such purchaser present it to the commissioner, with the written application and bond required by the law, the latter would be compelled to give his consent to such transfer and thereupon the assignee would be entitled to traffic under the certificate in like manner as if it had been originally issued to him. In that event, if the refund asked for in his application should have been made, the situation would be either one where the commissioner would become personally responsible for the amount of the tax so refunded, or the business would be carried on under the certificate for the balance of the term without the payment of the tax, which conditions the lawfulness of the traffic. The statute should not receive a construction which would result in such inconsistency and confusion. I am, therefore, of the opinion that upon the facts before me the relief asked for should not be granted. In stating this conclusion, I also wish it to be understood that I do not decide that appropriate relief may not be obtained where the certificate has been destroyed through some casualty, and that fact plainly appears. That would present a different case, to be determined upon a different principle. All that I undertake to hold here is that where it appears that the certificate is in existence, the commissioner of excise cannot be called upon to accept a surrender of the same without its physical production for cancellation. For the reasons which I have stated, it follows that the demurrer must be overruled and judg ment awarded to the respondent, dismissing the writ. County Court, Broome County, December, 1896. Unreported. PEOPLE V. SAMUEL J. WEIR. APPEAL from a judgment of the Recorder's Court of the City of Binghamton convicting the defendant of having violated section 1 of article 1 of title 7 of the Ordinances of the City of Binghamton in keeping his saloon open for the transaction of business, between the hours of twelve o'clock midnight and one o'clock in the morning. Charles F. O'Brien and R. B. Richards, for appellant. James T. Rogers, for respondent. ARMS, Co. J.: Section 1 of article 1 of title 7 of the Ordinances of the City of Binghamton provides that "every saloon, restaurant, bar or other place, where any distilled or fermented liquor is kept for sale (except drug stores) and every billiard room, bowling alley, or place where games of chance or skill are carried on or permitted, as a business, or in connection with any business, shall be closed on Sundays and every night on or before twelve o'clock and shall remain closed until five o'clock the following morning. "Any person owning or having charge of any place above men tioned, who shall violate any provisions of this section shall be subject to a fine not to exceed $100." This ordinance was in force when chapter 112 of the Laws of 1896, known as the Liquor Tax Law, took effect. There is no dispute over the facts, and the only question pre sented here is whether the ordinance above quoted is still in force notwithstanding the passage of chapter 112 of the Laws of 1896. By section 44 of that act it is provided that "the pro visions of any special or local law, grant or charter in conflict with this act are hereby repealed and annulled" and it is con tended by the appellant that this provision repealed the pro visions of the local ordinance, while on the other hand it is con tended by the respondent that the legislature and the ordinance in question do not conflict; that the ordinance does not assume to regulate the traffic in liquors but is a part of the police power conferred upon the local authority to regulate the times, and the places, where such traffic shall be conducted. It was said in People v. Murray, 4 App. Div. 193, that the result of the new liquor law was "the total extinction of an entire excise system and the creation of another and different one, including the whole State and embracing in a single scheme everything necessary to the establishment and operation of a complete system, even to the very details required by different conditions in different localities." This case was affirmed in the Court of Appeals, it being the case in which the constitutionality of the law was assailed. It is a well-settled rule that a later statute covering the same subject-matter and embracing new provisions operates to repeal the prior act, although the two acts are not in express terms repugnant. Another well-settled rule is, that where a later statute not pur porting to amend a former one upon the same subject, covers the whole subject and was plainly intended to furnish the whole law thereon, the former statute will be held to be repealed by necessary implication. Chapter 112 of the Laws of 1896, is named "Liquor Tax Law," but it was said in People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, 149 N. Y. 39: "It is radically different in some respects from the excise laws which it superseded. But the changes are in the administration of the excise system and not in its essential character. The most notable changes are (1) State supervision in place of supervision through Boards of Excise, and (2) the opening of traffic to all citizens (with certain exceptions) who shall pay the license tax and give the bond required." A careful examination of the Liquor Tax Laws leads one almost irresistibly to the conclusion that it was intended as a general and uniform law, and as the only law, to govern and control the business of trafficking in liquors on the points to which its provisions relate and for which they provide. To hold otherwise might lead to serious complications and difficulties. Under its provisions a person holding a tax certificate has the unquestionable right to sell up to one o'clock in the morning Urtil that time, he is not required to expose to view from the street the inside of his place of business. Now if the ordinance in question is still in force, while he would be obliged to close and lock his outside door at twelve o'clock, he might have any number of people inside between the hours of twelve and one to whom he could sell whatever they wanted for the period of one hour, during which time their acts and conduct would not be subject to the observation of or interference by any officers of the law, as neither a special agent or a police officer would have any authority to break in and enter the place. It seems quite apparent that the two provisions are both inconsistent and repugnant. The license tax imposed by this act is uniform and equal in its several grades in all the counties of the State and, if it were to be subject to either abridgment or partial nullification by local authorities it would no longer be a uniform scheme under the direction of the State, but might be made subordinate to the varied and different ideas of the different towns, villages and cities throughout the State. Such legislation would be absurd in theory and might easily lead to inequality and injustice. Moreover, I am of the opinion that the ordinance in question was expressly repealed by section 44 of the Liquor Tax Law. From these views, it follows that the judgment of conviction should be reversed and the defendant discharged. Supreme Court, Washington Special Term, December, 1896. Unreported. In the Matter of the Application of JOSEPH C. RUSSELL to revoke the Liquor Tax Certificate of MICHAEL NOONAN. STOVER, J. This is an application under section 28 of the Liquor Tax Law, for the revocation of a certificate. The only issue raised by the proof is as to the allegation that the consent |