June 28, 1889.

PETER MCCARTHY, Respondent, v. THOMAS H. THORN, et al., Appellants.

Decided June 28, 1889. Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff entered on the verdict of a jury and from an order denying a motion made upon the minutes "to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial upon the exceptions taken on the trial, and because the verdict is for excessive damages and is contrary to the evidence, and is contrary to law." Robert A. B. Dayton, for appellants. George G. Tabell, for respondent. Before Sedgwick, Ch. J., and Truax, J. The Court held (Truax, J., writing, Sedgwick, Ch. J., concurring) that the only question in the case was the one presented by the defendant's exception to the refusal of the court to dismiss the complaint, and that there was sufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury, and affirmed the judgment and order with costs.

BESSIE C. PFEIFFER, as Administratrix, etc., Respondent, v. THE AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY, Impleaded, etc., Appellant.

Decided June 28, 1889. Appeal by defendant from judgment entered on verdict of jury. Stickney & Shepard, for appellant. F. F. Nugent and William H. Arnoux, for respondent. Before Sedgwick, Ch. J., and Freedman, J. Per Curiam.-Judgment affirmed with costs.

THE HOLMES AND GRIGGS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Respondent, v. G. LIVINGSTON MORSE, Appellant. Decided June 28, 1889. Appeal by defendant from judgment entered on report of referee. A. C. Ellis, for appellant. Sidney H. Harris, for respondent. Before Sedgwick, Ch. J., Truax and Dugro, JJ. Per Curiam. The decisions of the supreme court

November 21, 1889-January 6, 1890.

on the subject involved in this action, are to be followed. Judgment reversed, order of reference set aside and new trial ordered, with costs to abide event.

JOSEPH ATKINSON, et al., Respondents, v. TITUS B. TRUESDELL, Appellant.

Decided November 21, 1889. Appeal from an order re-settling an order granted at special term denying defendants' motion for a new trial on a case, etc., by striking out from that order the words "ten dollars" leaving in lieu thereof a blank space for the insertion after taxation by the clerk of the amount of statutory costs allowed by the code on a motion for a new trial on a case. Edward P. Wilder, for appellant. Samuel W. Weiss, for respondents. Before Truax and Ingraham, JJ. The Court held (Ingraham, J., writing, Truax, J., concurring), that as the records before the general term showed that the motion was made on a case, and was argued and decided on the merits, the objection that under § 1002 it could not have been made on a case, inasmuch as it was not made at the term at which the case was tried, or before the time in which the defendant could take an appeal from the judgment had expired, was untenable. The case of Forstman v. Schutling, 38 Hun, 485, distinguished.

GARRET FITZGERALD, as Administrator, Appellant, v. CHARLES FACH, Respondent.

Decided January 6, 1890. Appeal from judgment entered upon verdict for plaintiff, and from order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial made upon, the minutes. George C. Coffin, for appellant. Thomas F. Grady and Theodore Connolly, for respondent. Before Sedgwick, Ch. J., Freedman and Ingraham, JJ. Per Curiam.-Judgment and order affirmed with costs.

Jan. 6, 1890.

SOPHIE E. MINTON, Respondent, v. THE NEW YORK ELEVATED RAILROAD COMPANY, et al., Appellants. Decided January 6, 1890. Appeal by defendants from judgment entered upon the decision of a judge at special term. George V. N. Baldwin, for respondent. Davies & Rapallo, for appellants. Before Freedman and Ingraham, JJ. Per Curiam.-The judgment should be affirmed with costs.

S. CHARLES WELSH, V. THE METROPOLITAN ELEVATED RAILROAD COMPANY, (action No. 2.)

Decided January 6, 1890. Before Freedman and Ingraham, JJ. Per Curiam.-The questions presented on this appeal are all determined by the decision in Welsh v. The Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., action No. 1. See ante, page 408. See ante, page 408. For the reasons. there stated the judgment should be affirmed with costs.

INDEX.

The adverse possession to render a
deed made by one not in possession
void under the statute, must be
under claim of a specific title which
is hostile to the title made by the
deed claimed to be void. A claim
under a deed which by its proper
construction is not in conflict with
the deed claimed to be void will not
constitute such adverse possession
within the statute. Casey v. Dunn,
381.