The United Nickel Company v. Harris. tions are used, they are to be used so as to prevent the development or presence of such injurious substances. The answer to this view is, that the patentee sets forth clearly that the substances he names in his first claim are injurious, that the solutions should be prepared by such methods as not to use what may produce such substances, or to remove what is so used, and then, that care should be taken not to introduce into the solution, after it is prepared, and while it is being used, any of the injurious substances, and not to use a battery of too high intensity. The evidence shows, that what is so not to be used in preparing the solution, or, if used, is to be removed, is something which, if decomposed, will produce the injurious substances, and that the directions of the patent, if followed, will prevent such decomposition, and the consequent production of the injurious substances, in the use of the solution in the electro-deposition of the nickel. The proper construction of the fourth claim of the patent of 1869 is, that it is a claim to the product or coating named in it, having the qualities described in it, when such product or coating is produced by employing the invention covered by the first claim. Under this construction, the novelty of the fourth claim is not successfully attacked. As the defendants have infringed the first claim, they have also infringed the fourth claim. There must be the usual decree for the plaintiff on these two claims. Dickerson & Beaman, for the plaintiff. Frost & Coe and Charles F. Blake, for the defendants. In re Michael Wahl, on Habeas Corpus. IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL WAHL, ON HABEAS CORPUS. Where a Commissioner has jurisdiction of extradition proceedings, and has before him legal and competent evidence as to the criminality of the accused, he is made the judge of the weight and effect of the evidence, and this Court has no power to review his action. (Before BLATCHFORD, J., Southern District of New York, October 30th, 1878.) BLATCHFORD, J. The Commissioner in this case had jurisdiction of the extradition proceedings. He had before him legal and competent evidence as to the question whether the signature to the power of attorney was forged. If such signature was forged, the act was forgery, within the treaty. The Commissioner also had before him legal and competent evidence as to whether such forgery was committed by the accused. The Commissioner is made the judge of the weight and effect of the evidence, on those points. This Court has no power to review his action in exercising such judgment on such legal and competent evidence. The Commissioner might very properly have decided that he was satisfied that the signature to the power of attorney was forged, and forged by the accused, and have disbelieved the story of the accused that the signature was genuine, on the ground that he was not worthy of credit, because on his direct-examination he represented the paper used as a power of attorney which had been signed in blank by Levi, and stated that powers of attorney, of which this was one, were left in his custody, signed and executed by Levi in blank, to be used as required during his absence, while, on his cross-examination, he stated that the paper was not partly printed, but was a blank sheet of paper with the name of Levi written at the bottom, thus showing that it was no power of attorney, as signed by Levi. The Commissioner might well have discredited all the testimony of the accused on this subject, and probably did. At all events he had before him evidence on the weight of which it Gray v. The Town of York. was his province to pass, and it must be presumed that he did pass on it, and that he did find that the signature was a forgery and forged by the accused. Under the decisions of this Court, in In re Stupp, (12 Blatchf. C. C. R., 501,) and in In re Vandervelpen, (14 Id., 137,) this Court cannot review the judgment of the Commissioner in this case holding the accused for extradition, and the writs must be discharged, and the accused be remanded to custody under the commitment under which he was held. Salomon & Burke, for the German Government. CHARLES F. GRAY vs. THE TOWN OF YORK. Under the Act of the Legislature of New York, passed May 18th, 1869, (Laws of New York, of 1869, chap. 907, p. 2,303,) commissioners were appointed to issue the bonds of a town and invest the proceeds in the stock of a specified railroad corporation. The commissioners subscribed for the stock, but, before the bonds were issued, the corporation was merged in a new corporation, by proceedings taken under a general statute in force when the proceedings to appoint such commissioners were taken, which provided that all debts due to the old corporation, and all stock subscriptions belonging to it, should vest in the new corporation. After the stock was subscribed for, the provisions of such general statute were extended to said two corporations by a special Act. The bonds were issued to the new corporation. Afterwards, by a special Act, the issuing of the bonds to the new corporation was ratified, and the bonds were declared to be binding on the town. In a suit to recover on coupons attached to the bonds: Held, that the town was liable on the coupons. (Before WALLACE, J., Northern District of New York, November 12th, 1878.) WALLACE, J. By the order of the County Judge of Livingston county, predicated upon a petition by a majority of the tax payers of the town of York, and pursuant to the provisions of the Act of May 18th, 1869, (Laws of New York, Gray v. The Town of York. of 1869, chap. 907, p. 2,303,) the persons who signed and issued the bonds in question were appointed commissioners, with authority to create and issue the bonds of the defendant, to the amount of $100,000, and invest the same, or the proceeds thereof, in the stock of the "Northern Extension of the Rochester, Nunda and Pennsylvania Railroad Company." The commissioners duly subscribed for the stock, but, before the stock was delivered, and before any bonds were issued in payment of the subscription, the corporation became merged in the "Rochester, Nunda and Pennsylvania Railroad Company," a new corporation, created by the consolidation of several corporations. This consolidation was attempted to be effected under a general statute of the State, (Act of May 20th, 1869, Laws of New York, of 1869, chap. 917, p. 2,399,) authorizing the consolidation of railroad companies, which was in force at the time the proceedings were instituted pursuant to which the commissioners were appointed; and this statute, among other things, provided, "that all debts due, . on whatever account, to either of said (consolidating) corporations, as well as all stock subscriptions, and other things in action, belonging to either of said corporations, shall be taken and deemed to be transferred to, and vested in, such new corporation, without further act or deed." By an Act of the Legislature of the State, passed May 17th, 1872, (Laws of New York, of 1872, chap. 764, p. 1,825,) and after the commissioners had subscribed for the stock, the provisions of the general Act were extended to the Northern Extension of the Rochester, Nunda and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and to the Rochester, Nunda and Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The commissioners issued and delivered the bonds to the new corporation, and thereafter the bonds came to the possession of the Buffalo Savings Bank, with full knowledge by the officers of the bank of the origin and history of the bonds. Subsequently, on February 22d, 1873, an Act was passed by the Legislature of the State of New York, (Laws of New York, of 1873, chap. 24, p. 19,) ratifying and confirming the acts of the commissioners in issuing the bonds to Gray v. The Town of York. the new corporation, and declaring that the bonds should be valid and binding upon the defendant. The plaintiff is a purchaser of coupons originally attached to these bonds, for the payment of interest maturing September 1st, 1877, and March 1st, 1878. He purchased the coupons after those payable September 1st, 1877, became due. Upon these facts the question first arises, whether or not the acts of the commissioners in taking the stock from, and issuing the bonds to, the new corporation, were obligatory upon the town, irrespective of the operation of the validating Act of the Legislature. The commissioners were authorized to subscribe for stock in a designated and existing corporation, possessing an organization and advantages peculiar to itself. They were invested with no discretion, but were limited to the strict terms of the authority conferred by the statute, and of the order which gave effect to the statute. If they had subscribed originally for the stock of the new corporation, it could not be contended for a moment that their act would have been binding upon the town. These considerations, however, fall short of reaching the real question to be solved. The commissioners did pursue their lawful authority in subscribing for the stock of the original corporation. Could this subscription have been enforced against the town by the new corporation? If it could, the commissioners have done only that which they were in duty bound to do, and their principal cannot question the acts of its agents in this behalf. When the town, by the action of its tax payers, expressed in the mode sanctioned by the statute, concluded to become a stockholder in a railroad company, it consented to assume and occupy towards the company the same relations as those of any individual stockholder. Its contract was subject to the same implications, depended upon the same conditions, conferred upon the railroad company the same rights, and imposed upon the town the same liabilities, as that of an ordinary subscriber for stock; and, however unwise may have been the legislation which permitted it to make such a contract, and however unfortunate may be the results VOL. XV.-22 |