being in vain or not in vain, consists in those means being connected or not connected with the effect in such a manner as this, viz., that the effect is with the means and not without them, or that the being of the effect is, on the one hand, connected with the means, and the want of the effect, on the other hand, is connected with the want of the means. If there be such a connection as this between means and end, the means are not in vain. The more there is of such a connection, the further they are from being in vain; and the less of such a connection, the more they are in vain. Now, therefore, the question to be answered (in order to determine whether it follows from this doctrine of the necessary connection between foregoing things, and consequent ones, that means used in order to any effect are more in vain than they would be otherwise) is, whether it follows from it that there is less of the forementioned connection between means and effect, that is, whether, on the supposition of there being a real and true connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, there must be less of a connection between means and effect than on the supposition of there being no fixed connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, and the very stating of this question is sufficient to answer it. It must appear to every one that will open his eyes that this question cannot be affirmed without the grossest absurdity and inconsistence. Means are foregoing things, and effects are following things; and if there were no connection between foregoing things and following ones, there could be no connection between means and end; and so all means would be wholly vain and fruitless. For it is by virtue of some connection only that they become successful: it is some connection observed, or revealed, or otherwise known, between antecedent things and following ones, that is what directs in the choice of means. And if there were no such thing as an established connection, there could be no choice as to means: one thing would have no more tendency to an effect than another; there would be no such thing as tendency in the case. All those things which are successful means of other things do therein prove connected. antecedents of them; and therefore to assert that a fixed connection between antecedents and consequents makes means vain and useless, or stands in the way to hinder the connection between means and end, is just as ridiculous as to say that a connection between antecedents and consequents stands in the way to hinder a connection between antecedents and consequents. Nor can any supposed connection of the succession or train of antecedents and consequents, from the very beginning of all things, the connection being made already sure and necessary, either by established laws of nature, or by these together with a decree of sovereign immediate interpositions of divine power, on such and such occasions, or any other way (if any other there be)-I say no such necessary connection of a series of antecedents and consequents can in the least tend to hinder, but that the means we use may belong to the series and so may be some of those antecedents which are connected with the consequents we aim at in the established course of things. Endeavors which we use are things that exist, and, therefore, they belong to the general chain of events: all the parts of which chain are supposed to be connected; and so endeavors are supposed to be connected with some effects or some consequent things or other. And certainly this does not hinder but that the events they are connected with may be those which we aim at and which we choose, because we judge them most likely to have a connection with those events from the established order and course of things which we observe, or from something in divine revelation. Let us suppose a real and sure connection between a man's having his eyes open in the clear daylight, with good organs of sight and seeing, so that seeing is connected with his opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not opening his eyes; and also the like connection between such a man's attempting to open his eyes and his actually doing it. The supposed established connection between these antecedents and consequents, let the connection be ever so sure and necessary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain for a man in such circumstances to attempt to open his eyes in order to seeing; his aiming at that event, and the use of the means, being the effect of his Will, does not break the connection or hinder the success. So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of connection and consequence: on the contrary, it is truly forcible against the doctrine of contingence and self-determination, which is inconsistent with such a connection. If there be no connection between those events wherein virtue and vice consist, and anything antecedent, then there is no connection between these |