EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT. THE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE NEUROLOGY, as originally announced, was open to contributions in the field of comparative neurology, physiology and psychology. The founder, feeling that the time was ripe for a more thorough correlation of the facts in these different fields, planned to devote the Journal as much to the functional as to the structural study of the nervous system. During the thirteen years of the existence of the Journal of Comparative Neurology, the functional side of neurological work, although not wholly neglected, has received far less attention than was originally contemplated, chiefly on account of the continued ill-health of the Editor-inChief, who had intended to devote himself primarily to comparative psychology. Now, however, we are able to announce an enlargement of the editorial staff which will insure a more satisfactory representation of the functional as well as the structural aspects of neurology. The Journal will hereafter be known as the "Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology." The organization of the editorial staff remains in general as before save that Dr. ROBERT M. YERKES of the Department of Psychology, Harvard University, will be the responsible editor for the department of Animal Behavior. He will be supported on the editorial board by representative students of Comparative Psychology and other departments will be strengthened by the addition of collaborators. The attention of psychologists, physiologists and medical practitioners is called to the fact that this is the only journal in any language especially devoted to this large and important field of research. It is our aim to make the Journal indispensable to all interested in the structure and functions of the ner vous system from whatever point of view. They will find much of value in the materials published, for in addition to the recognized fact that the human nervous system can be best understood structurally by a study of its phylogeny, it is now clear that an understanding of the reactions of lower organisms and especially of the evolution of action, is necessary for an appreciation of the functional significance of the human nervous system. For morphologists the Journal will continue to be, as in the past, the vade mecum in its department. And we again call attention to the fact that by comparative neurology we mean. not the study of the nervous system of lower organisms alone, but all neurological researches carried on in the comparative spirit and by the comparative method. In addition to technical articles of a special nature, there will be presented critical digests, synthetic reviews and editorial summaries of particular topics designed to give in a non-techical way the most important results of research in each of the specialties in our field. Hereafter the Journal will appear bi-montly, and each annual volume will contain about five hundred pages. The first number of the new volume we hope to have ready in February. Every effort will be made to secure as prompt publication of acceptable contributions as is consistent with the high standard of scientific and mechanical excellence which we propose to maintain. should The subscription price will be $4.00, strictly net (foreign subscriptions $4.30, 18 s., M. 28, 22 fr., L. 22). All MSS. and matter for review be sent to the responsible editors. Those dealing with the structure of the nervous system and all business correspondence should be sent to the Managing Editor, C. JUDSON HERRICK, at Denison University, Granville, Ohio; those dealing with the functions of the nervous system and comparative psychology may be sent directly to Dr. ROBERT M. YERKES, Psychological Laboratory, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. LITERARY NOTICES. The Relations of Biology and Psychology.' The book before us has already been reviewed by a number of writers and needs no introduction to the readers of this journal. The purpose here is simply to touch upon certain points (not dwelt upon at length by any of these reviewers) which are of interest at once to the psychologist and to the biologist. (1) Psychophysical Evolution. The papers which are here gathered together may be treated, says the author, "as each dealing with a narrower question, yet as having reference to the larger problem which may be called psychophysical evolution—the evolution of mind and body together" (p. 2). This conception of psychophysical evolution is one to which the author returns again and again throughout the book in a way which is stimulating or exasperating according to where the reader stops in in the perusal of the book. One at first feels that the author has struck out the true solution of a perplexing question, and he turns the pages expectantly until he shall come to the convincing presentation of this great thought. But as he proceeds all that he finds is the cheerful assumption that this has already been made as clear as is necessary-and this is the source of the feeling of exasperation. The clearest brief statement of the principle of psychophysical evolution is that in which the author says that "the brain not a brain when consciousness is not there," and "consciousness does not, on the other hand, produce movement without a brain" (p. 130). This most promising suggestion leads the reader to the natural conclusion that the author has in the background a point of view which justifies what appears upon the surface as a rather paradoxical juxtaposition of concepts usually kept quite distinct. What is this point of view? We all, doubtless, today, feel that brain and consciousness are equally genuine and valid phases of the reality of experience; and 1 BALDWIN, J. MARK. Development and Evolution: physical Evolution, Evolution by Orthoplasy, and the Modes. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1902. Including PsychoTheory of Genetic this has been stated in many metaphors and similes. We are all either asking the question "why the mind has a body” or why the body ever came to have a mind. But what we still lack is an analysis of the origin and meaning of the distinction-its genesis and its function. Why do we distinguish between brain and consciousness at all, if ultimately they are so intimately one? Just how is their difference related to their identity? How did the distinction originally come to be set up, and what modifications has it undergone in the history of scientific thought? (2) The Psychological and the Biological. The author's discussion of the terms "psychic" and "psychological" (Chap. I, §2) is a hint of such an analysis. In this section Professor BALDWIN distinguishes between the "pyschological" and the "psychic" as follows: "By the psychological I mean the mental of any grade, viewed from the outside; that is, viewed as a definite set or series of phenomena in a consciousness, recognized as facts and as 'worth while' as any other facts in nature." "This occurrence of a psychological change in an animal is a fact in the same sense that the animal's process of digestion is" (p. 4). "The discussion of the respective spheres of these two sciences turns upon a distinction of points of view. On the one hand the psychologist as such, and for his science, must aim at the recognition only of the facts which are psychic or mental; that is, of such as are facts to the consciousness in which they occur. These alone are psychic, and these belong to individual psychology" (p. 5). "Psychology, when considered as the science of mind, that is, looked at from the objective point of view,-takes cognizance of the 'psychonomic'; but when considered as a subjective science, as interpreting its own data, it does not; but, on the contrary, it confines itself to the psychic" (p. 8). By way of criticism of this, the question at once arises whether there is any such thing as psychology "considered as a subjective science"? Many other writers have been insisting that there is no "individual psychology" in this sense; there is no science of the individual. From this point of view, the "psychologist as such" is no scientist at all; the attempt to draw a distinction between two kinds of psychology in this sense proves suicidal. If the difference "turns upon a distinction of points of view," then it does not turn upon a distinction of contents; if it is a distinction of method only, then it is not a distinction of subject-matter. When we take up "the standpoint of the observer, that of the scientific man who essays to investigate some one else's consciousness, or that of an animal, the procedure is now subject to different rules and limitations" (p. 5) it is true, but this is essential to any science of psychology; this is not another kind of psychology over and above so-called "individual psychology." Individual psychology is not scientific psychology apart from this. There is no science of psychology which deals with the strictly psychic. Moreover, this view gets the author into difficulties when he comes to apply it to his doctrine of psychophysical evolution. "But now, and this is the essential point to remark in our present connection, so soon as we ask the psychophysical question of genesis,-that of the development and evolution of mind and body taken together,pursuing the biogenetic method, this limitation no longer rises to trouble us. We include all psychophysical facts as such in the definition of our science. Changes in mind and body go on together, and together they constitute the phenomena. Both organic and mental states and functions may be appealed to in our endeavor to trace the psychophysical series of events of such, since both are objective to the spectator, the scientific observer" (p. 8). Accordingly, "with the general understanding now arrived at, we may take a preliminary survey of the field in the light of certain current hypotheses. Among these is what is known as 'psychophysical parallelism" (p. 10). "The principle of parallelism assumed, we claim once for all the right to neglect the relation of the two terms, mental' and physical, in all circumstances whatsoever" (p. 15). But how can we interchange the psychical and the physical if, by definition, the psychic facts are facts only "to the consciousness in which they occur?" The law that "for science all facts are equal” does not mean that the physical and the psychical can be interchanged without changing the "point of view." And if the author here does not mean the psychical by his term "mental," then how does the discussion become relevant to the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism? What Professor BALDWIN seems to mean is that the same process of psychophysical evolution may be stated either as psychological or as biological, i. e., it may be interpreted from either of these equally objective points of view. But this has nothing in common with the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism. The latter, as he says elsewhere, is a question of ultimate philosophical interpretation, while the former is a question of division of labor in scientific method. Not that the Note that the ambiguous term "mental," so important at this juncture, is not defined. |