question of methodology does not have an important bearing upon this question of the distinction between the psychical and the physical, but this relation can not appear as long as one member of the distinction is taken as fixed.

(3) The Place of Consciousness in Evolution. The place of consciousness in evolution is the same on either the Lamarckian or Darwinian view. This is made possible by the author's theory of organic selection and social heredity. One of his reviewers, indeed, thinks that he has not wholly escaped the fallacy of supposing that consciousness produces causal changes in the physical world of muscles. But, besides the author's disavowal of such a doctrine in a reply to this review, he distinctly says in the work before us that there is a third view beside the theory of automatism and the theory that consciousness is a vera causa (p. 121).

But what is this third view? Does the author here intend a functional interpretation of the relation of the psychical to the physical? If there is one psychophysical system, and if consciousness is simply the meaning of this system when it is tensional, as contrasted with the state of the same system when in the relatively stable equilibrium of habit, then consciousness can be included in the statement of the antecedent phenomena explanatory of a voluntary movement-not indeed, as a distinct phenomenon, but as the statement of a continuous process in one of its stages. To say that the same movement could take place without this state of consciousness is to say that the fact that it was a conscious movement (i. e., had this meaning as distinct, say, from an habitual movement) does not make it a different movement from one which is not conscious. Any mark or character of the movement makes it a different movement. In truth, no two movements are ever exactly alike. Of course, you may abstract from all these differences, but then your judgment is an hypothetical and not a descriptive one, and here the aim, as the author says, is to secure a scientific in the sense of a descriptive statement of the facts.

The suggestion that heredity rather than variation is the fact to be accounted for in evolution, "that variation is normal, and that heredity is acquired through the operation of natural selection restricting the limiting variation" (p. 230), is, then, to be put alongside of this other contention of the author, that consciousness, in one form, is the growing-point of evolution from the first. Is not this tantamount to saying that what we call consciousness is the variable element in development and evolution, that consciousness represents the shifting area. of tension in adaptation, or, to put it from the other side, the moving

equilibrium, or struggle toward equilibrium, between the forces of the organism and the environment?

(4) Mind and Body. The problem of the relation of mind and matter, from this standpoint, becomes chiefly a question of the logic of scientific method. The present writer has elsewhere (Philosophical Review, May, 1903) suggested that this is the consistent interpretation of Professor BALDWIN'S chapter, in the book before us, on "Mind and Body." The psychical ceases to be an entity in any sense of the term, even in the sense of energy. Instead of the psychical being subordinated to the concept of energy, as Professor OSTWALD contends, or being regarded as interchangeable because universally parallel, as Professor BALDWIN contends, these concepts must, in time, be reconstructed in terms of each other, and take their place in a scientifically continuous series, the terminology of which remains to be worked out, but of which it is the great distinction of Professor BALDWIN to have given a hint in his otherwise paradoxical doctrine of psychophysical evolution. Another hint in the same direction is the recent attempt to define the meaning of the psychical by Professor GEORGE H. MEAD, in the University of Chicago Decennial Publications, Volume III, where the psychical is defined as the process, as contrasted with the content, of the experience, or, to use the terms of logic which he employs, the psychical is identified with the copula of the judgment.

The Psychology of Action.'

H, HEATH BAWDEN.

We have in this book what we have learned always to expect from the pen of its distinguished author, a lucid, interesting and original presentation of the principles of psychology. Its originality consists in the successful employment of terms chosen from the sphere of practical life, as the leading categories and principles of division. Instead of the traditional classification of the subject-matter under the rubrics of cognitive, affective, and conative states, we have the refreshing consciousness of feeling that we follow the meaning of the author from the beginning without being involved in a system of technicalities. He discusses mental life under the headings of Sensitiveness, Docility, and Initiative. These terms retain the content which they have in ordinary life while at the same time serving the purposes

1 Outlines of Psychology; An Elementary Treatise with Some Practical Applications. By JOSIAH ROYCE, Ph. D., LL. D. New York, Macmillan Co., 1903. (In the Teachers' Professional Library series, edited by President NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.)

of an accurate psychological analysis. The main discussion under these heads is preceded by four chapters entitled respectively: "Introductory Definitions and Explanations," "The Physical Signs of the Presence of Mind," "The Nervous Conditions of the Manifestation of Mind," "General Features of Conscious Life." The author then proceeds to discuss the three chief forms of Sensitiveness, viz: "Sensory Experience," "Mental Imagery," "The Feelings." The aim here is to "make a summary statement of the principal kinds of states of consciousness that occur within the range of our psychological experience," considered especially with relation to the sorts of physical conditions upon which they depend. Docility is treated in five chapters.. This is the study of the "relations that bind the consciousness of any moment to previous experience." The "General Law of Docility" is the law of habit which is traced through its various exemplifications in "Perception and Action," "Assimilation," "Differentiation," and "Imitation," which introduces to us "The Social Aspect of the Higher Forms of Docility." Initiative is discussed in a single chapter entitled: "The Conditions of Mental Initiative." This is followed by two concluding chapters: "Certain Varieties of Emotional and Intellectual Life," "The Will or the Direction of Conduct."

In general standpoint this book may be regarded as a contribution to what is coming to be called the functional point of view in psychology. This is seen in the insistence upon the integrity of experience, in the valuable critique of the doctrine of conscious elements as employed by the structural psychologist, and in the use throughout of the biological conception of habit, and even of consciousness, as special developments within the life of the organism for the sake of enabling it to adjust itself in its changing environment. Probably the author did not have this last point so explicitly in his aim as might be inferred from the statement just made, but it is only the more significant if such is the case. Hints of it are scattered throughout the book without any more explicit statement being made than that embodied, for example, in the following sentences: "The central processes which our images accompany form themselves a part of our reaction to our environment, and our more organized series of mental images actually form part of our conduct" (p. 160). "Thought is either action or nothing" (p. 351). Here is the gist of the functional point of view, that all the various forms of consciousness are special developments within action, and, therefore, special developments of action.

1 Italics ours.

As this, to the present reviewer, is the most significent feature of the entire treatment, it may be instructive to show in what ways action is here made fundamental.

(1) The author says, "The single facts of sense, and the single movements which we make, are always related to, or, as one may say, are differentiations of our general orientation" (p. 147). This is connected with the "tropisms of orientation." "The reactions of orientation are among the most fundamental phenomena of healthy life." "Our sensory experience at any moment will stand partly for our more general activities of orientation, and partly for our more special reactions to individual objects" (p. 143). "The special acts are always superposed upon the general acts." "All our particular sensory experience will be related, not only to our special acts, but to our general acts of orientation, and to those experiences which result from these acts." "All such sensory experiences appear to our consciousness as facts existent within a certain primitive whole, which, apart from differentiation, is our experience of the general orientation of the entire organism" (p. 146). The author, in other words is insisting that our motor or kinaesthetic experiences (sensations and images) form the very core of consciousness. The kinaesthetic sensations supply the fundamental imagery of meaning. This is equivalent to saying that action is the fundamental category of experience and the various forms of conscious experience are special developments within this. Here, by the way, was an excellent opportunity to clear away at a stroke the whole difficulty of the relation of the psychical to the physical, in so far as psychology is concerned, since consciousness here appears simply as action passing through a tensional or reconstructive stage. "Tension," he says on a previous page, "the mutual opposition and balancing of numerous tendencies, is absolutely essential to normal life." Why should consciousness any more than habit be hypostasized, if both are equally developments of action?

(2) The statement which the WEBER-FECHNER law receives is a good illustration of the tendency to interpret experience from the standpoint of the act, from the standpoint of the organic circuit, as the functional psychologists would say, rather than from the standpoint of any one of its contained minor activities. "The law is that in order that differences of sensory experience should have, in two different cases of comparison, the same value for our reacting consciousness, or should appear to be equal differences, the stimuli that are compared in the two different cases must differ from one another, not by the same absolute physical difference in their magnitude, but by the same

relative difference" (267-8). "The psycho-physic law appears now to formulate a certain limit to which the Docility of the organism in responding to finer differences in stimulation is subject" (270). That is, "the psycho-physic law is not a law directly relating to our sensations, but is rather a law of our reactions" (272).

(3) In chapter XII we have a most illuminating statement of the relations of thought to action in a discussion of the psychological and social functions of language. Thinking differs from naive action. chiefly in this, that in thinking we reflect on the details of the action, and bring the method of the action to consciousness. "One who thinks makes it part of his ideal to be conscious of how he behaves in the presence of things. And this he does because the social comparison of his acts with the acts of other people not only controls the formation of his acts, but has made, his observation of his own acts an ideal' (284). "The consciousness of how one performs the act" is the very essence of thought. The abstract idea or concept is a reduced act. Take the concept or "horse" or "man." "Whoever knows what a horse or man in general is, knows of some kind of act which it is fitting to perform in the presence of any object of the class in question." "The name 'man' or 'horse,' the word-image associated with any such subject, is itself a part of a well-known act by which one may react in the presence of an object in the class in question. For naming objects is one way of responding to their presence" (286-287). "Our general ideas

tain .. attitudes." "Our mental never to be divorced from our reactions." scious plan of action."

stand, therefore, for cerimages of outer objects are A "general idea is a con

(4) The treatment of the relation of feeling to action supports the same general conception. On page 296 we read, "Like the thinking. process in general, the reasoning process develops out of conditions which at the outset involve a very rich, and in fact predominant presence of feelings and of complex emotions. That is, reasonings have resulted from what were at first decidedly passionate contrasts of opinion." Thinking, reasoning, here would appear at the setting up of distinctions and the introduction of control within the primitive predominantly affective type of consciousness. In the chapter on the Feelings the author refers to the traditional view of the relation of feeling to thought and to action as embodying an important truth, but seems hesitant about adopting it. "Those who divide mental life, in the well known traditional way, into the life of cognition, the life of feeling, and the life of will, are accustomed to assign to the feelings a