stage intermediate between the life of cognition and the life of will. From this point of view our cognitive consciousness first furnishes to us the facts. In terms of our feelings we estimate the values of these facts for us. In view of these values our acts are determined. That this traditional view has a real significance cannot be questioned. But in the present exposition of the structure and laws of consciousness we are not at all closely following the lines of the traditional exposition" (164). Now the reviewer ventures to suggest that this traditional view, with one modification, stands more in line with the general method of treatment pursued in this book than does the exposition actually given. On another page (226), the author says that in ordinary association "the perception is relatively instantaneous." present sense disturbance is at once associated with a consciousness due to already established motor habits" (225). This suggests the real significance of the traditional view-which holds that we first perceive something, then feel interested in it, and then act upon it-only the traditional view regards this as a conscious act of perception, whereas, in truth, this initial perceptive act is automatic, instinctive or habitual. It is a good illustration of one of those "attitudes" to which the author refers elsewhere. The traditional view is true except that the cognition which comes first is not conscious or reflective but instinctive or intuitive. And the consciousness, which the author says accompanys our acts, or takes place "side by side with the tendencies to action" (164), from this point of view is rather developed within the action at the point where and because of the fact that this instinctive perceptive habit fails to meet the exigencies of some situation. Thus is evolved first an emotional consciousness and then within this, as we have already seen, an intellectual consciousness (in this case, conscious cognition) which defines and controls this emotion. From this standpoint feeling is just unanalyzed consciousness; it is total, vague, impulsive consciousness; hence the significance of the analysis of emotion into organic, kinaesthetic and dermal sensations.

(5) Initiative, attention, apperception, self-activity, are all traced back to elemental tendencies, instincts or tropisms, operating "at times when the results are not immediately adaptive." If the adaptation were perfectly smooth and unimpeded there would be no need for the evolution of such phenomena as attention and initiative. These are the product of, and are developed to meet the necessities of disadaptation in experience. The orderly control of experience in attention and direction of experience in so-called self-activity are the result of a selection from among a great number of still unadaptive movements

in which the animal persists despite their inefficiency. This is what Professor BALDWIN has called functional selection from excess movements or over-production of variations in the individual. Important questions arise at once to some of which an answer is given in chapter XIII. Why are these tropisms not immediately adaptive, and why do animals persist in making these non-adaptive movements? Why should such conscious processes as attention develop thus at the points of disadaptation in experience? What is the psychology of this disadaptation or break in the experience? And, even more important, the psychology of the reconstruction or readjustment after the break, by means of the conscious attention thus evolved. Professor ROYCE answers the first of these questions by saying that "this factor, this peculiar persistence, belongs to the temperament of the animal" (315). He, I suppose, would hasten to add that this is no real explanation, since "temperament" is something itself to be explained rather than the explanation of anything. Would it be in line with his own argument to suggest that the approximate reason is that the ordinary inhibitory effect of the regular routine of habitual acts is removed. The animal is, so to speak, reduced to a state of psychoplasm or impulse because of the ineffectiveness of the customary modes of activity. The restlessness and persistence in unadaptive movements represent simply the releasing of tendencies which are ordinarily inhibited. Relative freedom from ordinary restraints results in a relapse into a comparatively primitive state of unmediated impulse, until new restraints can be established, new habits built up. This gives us a hint, at the same

time, as to the true nature of the break or disadaptation and a suggestion as to the law of the readjustment or reconstruction. Apart from some such interpretation, one is impelled constantly, throughout this whole discussion of initiative, to ask the old question, whether there is ever any absolutely novel element in experience, and, if not, how there can be any real progress.

(6) One's feeling, after reading this delightful book, is one of satisfaction in finding the emphasis thrown once again upon the unity and continuity of experience, after so much analysis and dissection in ret cent psychology, but with this, perhaps out of it, springs a desire that the author had carried out his organic view of experience a little further and shown us, not only that action is the natural consummation of feeling and thinking, but also how feeling and thinking first appear because of the interruption of action. It is just the full appreciation of the significance of this emergence of consciousness within action, as itself a phase of action-that consciousness not only leads over into action

but arises from and within action-that is most needed at the present time to put psychology into right relations with biology, on the one side, and with philosophy, on the other. With biology, because herein we find a category common to both sciences-the category of action, of adaptation, or adjustment and readjustment. With philosophy, for a similar reason, that in the process of the reconstruction of experience we see the true functional significance of the psychical. One of the best features of the book before us is its insistance on the social character of consciousness, and upon the psychical individual as the centre for the initiation of new and progressive phases of social life. "Certainly a general view of the place which beings with minds occupy in the physical world strongly suggests that their organisms may especially have significance as places for the initiation of more or less novel types of activity" (301). "Social inventiveness depends upon individualistic restlessness" (327).

A recent writer has said that "we ought to turn our views of human psychology upside down and study what is now casually referred to in a chapter on habit or on the development of the will, as the general psychological law, of which the commonly named processes are derivatives." This Professor ROYCE has done in a way that will prove instructive to psychologists as well as to teachers.

H. HEATH BAWDEN.

The Fore-Brain of the Bird.1

The bird presents in its brain as in other features of its organization more marked specialization than is to be found in any other class of vertebrates. The bird brain has been the subject of comparatively few researches and our knowledge of its structure and of the significance of its several parts has been meager. In the fore-brain, especially, great difficulties to a right understanding of its morphology and physiology have been presented by the unusual size of its basal ganglion and the apparent absence of a true pallium over a large part of the fore-brain. The homology of the several parts of the basal ganglion, the extent, structure, and the connections of the pallium and the functional significance of the several areas or nuclei are perplex

1 Untersuchungen über die vergleichende Anatomie des Gehirnes, von Dr. LUDWIG EDINGER in Frankfurt a. M. 5. Untersuchungen über das Vorderhirn der Vögel in Gemeinschaft mit Dr. A. WALLENBERG in Danzig und Dr. G. M. HOLMES in London. Mit sieben Tafeln und elf Textabbildungen. Sonderabd. aus d. Abhdign. d. Senckenb. naturf. Gesellschaft, Bd. XX, Heft IV.

ing questions to the solution of which Dr. EDINGER has applied himself during several years. The very satisfactory results published in this paper EDINGER attributes in large part to the coöperation of WALLenBERG and HOLMES, which made it possible to study a very wide range of material, representing all the chief types of birds, and to study the course of fiber tracts by the degeneration method. The attempt

to describe the centers and fiber tracts in so complete a manner that they may be recognized in any group of birds, may be regarded as fairly successful.

The key to the interpretation of the bird fore-brain is found in its development. The fore-brain in the early embryo presents the typical arrangement: a thick ventral wall formed by the basal ganglion and an extensive pallium forming the roof of the wide ventricle. ganglion, however, grows much more rapidly than the pallium and eventually obliterates a large part of the ventricle and fuses with the pallium over the greater part of the lateral and dorsal regions. The ventricle becomes reduced to a narrow medio-dorsal cleft connecting occipital and frontal horns, the latter extending into the olfactory lobe. The parts of the pallium thus fused with the basal ganglion have been overlooked or wrongly interpreted by previous authors. It is usually marked off from the basal ganglion by a layer of cells or by a layer of medullated fibers—the Stabkranz—and even where it is not so marked its structure and connections, as well as its developmental history, show that it is a true pallium.

In the basal ganglion the author has identified the epistriatum and the nucleus thaeniae and their fiber tracts, the relations being essentially the same as in the brain of reptiles. The remainder of the basal ganglion, which is very greatly enlarged as compared with that of any other vertebrate, consists of a ventro-median mesostriatum, a dorsal hyperstriatum, and a lateral ectostriatum. The ventro-anterior end of the mesostriatum is divided into two nuclei, a median lobus parolfactorius and a lateral nucleus basalis. Although there are great differences in the size and functional importance of these two nuclei and of other parts of the basal ganglion, the brains of all birds agree in the main features. The fibers from the pallium and the hyperstriatum form a medullated fiber layer, the lamina medullaris dorsalis, over the dorsal surface of the mesostriatum which corresponds to the capsula interna of mammals. The fibers then pass downward through the mesostriatum to form the brachia cerebri on its ventro-caudal surface. A true capsula interna is occasionally present (parrot). It is as yet

impossible to compare the parts of the basal ganglion of birds with the nuclei in the corpus striatum of mammals.

Only a few of the more important facts in the arrangement of the fiber tracts can be mentioned here. The olfactory apparatus is very poorly developed. Only a single tract of fibers connects the lobus olfactorius with the rest of the fore-brain and the destination of these fibers is not described. The nucleus thaeniae sends a bundle to the ganglion habenulae. This is joined by a bundle from the occipital cortex (tractus cortico-habenularis) and by one from the more anterior portion of the basal ganglion. This bundle, which is not commented upon by the author, suggests the anterior portion of the tractus olfactohabenularis, as it has been described in fishes. No tract which can certainly be considered as fornix has been found. The greater number of fibers, both ascending and descending, connecting the fore-brain with the thalamus are related to the striatum and not to the pallium. Especially interesting is a tract from the sensory nucleus of the V nerve to the nucleus basalis of the mesostriatum and a corresponding descending tract of the oblongata and possibly to the cervical cord.

The most of the fiber bundles connecting the pallium with other divisions of the brain are mingled with those of the striatum and are ascending fibers from the thalamus and mid-brain. Almost the only large descending tract from the pallium is the tractus septo-mesencephalicus, from the medio-dorsal portion of the pallium to the dorsal part of the thalamus and the tectum opticum. Its function is unknown. A commissura pallii connects the medio-dorsal cortex of the two sides. A tract connects the occipital cortex with the mid-brain beneath the tectum opticum. This bundle corresponds to the cortical optic tract in mammals. The various portions of pallium are interconnected by shorter and longer associational fibers. These are least developed in the medio-dorsal cortex. Other important fiber tracts connect the nuclei of the fore-brain with one another. The anterior commissure appears to be purely a commissure between the two epistriata.

The experimental works of SCHRADER, GOLTZ, and KALISCHER on the functions of the bird fore-brain are reviewed, and the results extended by means of the new anatomical facts. The fore-brain is not essential to either sensory or motor activities but exercises a directive influence on both which raises them above the plain of simple automatism. Removal of the pallium alone does not cause the bird to starve, unless the striatum also is injured. A certain degree of localization of function is present in the fore-brain of various birds. The mesostriatum has an important relation to the act of eating, probably mediated