may be said, that the existence of God has been denied by men, who had cultivated reason, and were dignified with the name of philosophers. It is not certain, however, that they really disbelieved it, although the love of singularity might lead them to say so; but if they really did disbelieve, we know that prejudice and sophistry sometimes pervert minds, which deem themselves completely free from their influence, and that there is no truth, not even the evidence of the senses, which some person or other, calling himself a philosopher, has not controverted. At any rate, they are but a few against many, a minority not to be considered, when opposed to the innumerable millions who have maintained the contrary doctrine. "Let it be supposed," says Bishop Wilkins, "that some men have declared a disbelief of the divine nature in general; yet as there have always been some monsters among men, in respect of their bodies, so may there be likewise in respect of their minds; and this is no prejudice to the standing laws of nature."

It may be objected farther, that mankind have not agreed in the belief of one God, but of a multiplicity of Gods, and that, with the exception of the Jews, polytheism was the system of all nations in ancient times, as it still is, where neither Christianity nor Mahometanism has been introduced. But even among such nations, the general principle was admitted, that there is a nature superior to man, by which the universe was arranged in its present form, and its affairs are still administered: besides, it should be remarked, that although the doctrine of the unity was much obscured, yet it was not altogether obliterated; for even the grossest idolaters retained the notion of a supreme deity, called Zeus and Jupiter, by the Greeks and Romans, and described by the latter, as hominum Sator atque Deorum. Some of their philosophers approached still nearer to the truth, and conceived him to be exalted far above the gods of vulgar adoration, and as requiring to be worshipped, not by images and sacrifices, but by devout meditation and virtuous conduct.

The atheists of the school of Epicurus, accounted for this general belief by the principle of fear. Primus in orbe deos fecit timor. But this seems to be reasoning quite worthy of the system which it is brought to support. It puts the effect before the cause. Other men would have supposed that fear proceeded from the previous belief of a power or powers superior to mortals, which were able to injure them. Every other affection is excited by a suitable object; but in the present case, men by some inexplicable impression began to be afraid of something, they knew not what; and thinking this very unreasonable, as it undoubtedly was, set about finding out an adequate cause of their fear, and luckily lighted upon the idea of Gods, terrible beings whom it was hazardous to offend. We need say nothing more about this theory, however ingenious it might appear to its inventors.

Another attempt was made to account for this general belief, by ascribing it to the artifice of statesmen, who contrived in this manner to give greater authority to their laws, and to retain men in subjection by the sanctions of religion. But an assertion without proof, we are at liberty to deny. By what historical facts is it supported? Who was the first legislator, who propagated the story of the existence of the Gods? And how did he succeed in persuading a whole people to give credit to a dogma, of which they had no evidence but his affirmation, and had never heard a whisper before? If one legislator was the inventor of it, how did it come to spread rapidly over the whole earth? Or did all the princes and statesmen of the world assemble in congress, and having agreed upon this expedient for maintaining their authority, return to their respective countries to put it in practice? Was there in ancient times a holy alliance? And how did it happen that they became the dupes of their own stratagem, and believed in the Gods as firmly as their subjects?

VOL. I.-22

*Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, Book i. chap. 4.
P

With a few exceptions, the belief of a superior Being, obscured indeed by polytheistic notions, has prevailed among mankind. We do not appeal to

this fact, as if the existence of God were to be decided by the number of suffrages, or rested upon the feeble basis of opinion. We would not represent it as conclusive in itself, independently of other proofs; nor is it the strongest argument in favour of the doctrine, but can be viewed only in the light of a subsidiary one. The amount of it is this, that there is something in the constitution of the human mind, which leads to this belief; or that it is the result of the due exercise of the rational powers, with which man is endowed. When we find men in distant countries, who had no intercourse with one another, born in distant ages, and differing widely in language, and manners, and modes of thinking, united in believing that there exists a great Being, who is the Maker or the Ruler of the world, what can we infer, but that the proofs of his existence are exhibited throughout all nature, and are so conspicuous as to be seen by every eye? The consent of nations corroborates the argument, which we have drawn from the marks of design in the works of creation; as it shews that the inference deduced from them is not a local prejudice, but a legitimate conclusion from the premises. "What nation is there," says Cicero, “or race of men, which does not entertain some notion of the Gods prior to instruction? When, therefore, this opinion is not established by instruction, or custom, or law, and all without exception firmly assent to it; it is necessary to understand that there are Gods, since we have implanted or rather innate knowledge of them. It is necessary that that, in which all naturally agree, should be true."

V. The existence of God may be inferred from a variety of facts in the history of human affairs. Every argument which proves a superintending Providence, proves that there is an intelligent and active Being by whom the universe is governed. When we appeal to the order and regularity which prevail, and to the beneficial results of the operations which are incessantly going on around us, the atheist tells us that these are the laws of nature. But what is nature? is it something, or nothing; a being distinct from the universe, or the universe itself? If nature means the universe, he has given us no information. We inquired how there is such order in the universe, and how such beneficial effects are produced; and he deems it sufficient to say, that such is the constitution of things. Such an answer we might receive from an ignorant man, whom we had interrogated respecting something which he did not understand. He would say, I do not know, but so it is. But surely we should never think of calling this man a philosopher. With the exception of professed atheists, all men have acknowledged a Providence; and events occur of such a character, as to lead the mind away from the mere succession of natural causes and effects, to the interposition of an almighty and intelligent Agent. When we see an undoubted instance of retributive justice and such instances are not rare even under this mixed dispensation-we unavoidably think of an invisible Judge; and when we observe tokens of wisdom more than human, directing and controlling, and over-ruling events to its own ends, we have recourse to Him who works all things according to the counsel of his will. The atheist may talk of such events in the jargon of his system, but he cannot fully satisfy his own mind, and still less the minds of others. Hence it sometimes happens that, bold when there is no danger, but a coward when calamity and death seem to be near, he is dismayed at the tokens of a present Deity, and with a voice of terror, implores the mercy of the Being whom he lately scorned as a phantom.

Under this argument supernatural facts have been adduced as proofs of the existence of God. By these, we mean facts which cannot be accounted for

* Cic. de Nat. Deorum, Lib. i. § 17.

by the known laws of nature. There may be facts of an extraordinary kind which cannot be called miraculous, because, although they show a deviation from the ordinary course, they do not imply a suspension of the laws, or the interposition of a power superior to them. They are the result of natural causes unusually combined; and in this way, we explain the production of monsters, and strange phenomena, which excite wonder. But if it can be proved, that on any occasion, a law of nature has been suspended or reversed, it is a legitimate inference that there exists somewhere a power by which nature is controlled. I allude to two kinds of facts as indicating the agency of a Being greater than nature and its laws, namely, miracles and prophecy; and in appealing to these, I tread in the steps of the most illustrious philosophers of antiquity, who considered omens, prodigies, and oracles, as proofs of the existence and providence of the gods. It would be preposterous at present to quote Scripture as authoritative, because we must first be assured that there is a God, before we can know that any book contains a revelation of his will. I refer to the sacred writings only as records, the genuineness of which has been fully established, and from which we learn that works, which may be strictly called miraculous, have been performed; and that predictions were delivered many ages ago, which have been subsequently fulfilled with the utmost exactIf a miracle is an event which could not be brought to pass by any law of nature, it cannot be denied, that to give sight to a man born blind, to restore an arm or a leg which was wanting, and to still a storm by a simple command, were miracles: and what conclusion could those who witnessed them draw, or what conclusion can be drawn by those who are assured of them by competent testimony, but that there is a Being who sways the sceptre over the universe, and is possessed of power sufficient to the production of any effect? The same conclusion follows from prophecy, which, supposing knowledge in the prophet that does not belong to man, must have proceeded from an intelligent Being, to whom the future is as manifest as the present, and who possesses such dominion over physical and moral causes, over the material tem, and the thoughts and volitions of men, as to accomplish with unerring certainty whatever he had foretold. That Being is God.

ness.

sys

Such are the arguments by which we demonstrate this fundamental doctrine of religion. Some of them are conclusive by themselves; and when taken together, they compose a mass of evidence which must give complete satisfaction to every person who fairly considers them, and which nothing can resist but prejudice and obstinate incredulity.

Before I proceed further, I shall lay before you two or three reflections upon the truth which we have established.

First, the doctrine of the existence of God diffuses light and order over the whole system of creation. The atheist can account for nothing; his creed is embarrassed with inextricable difficulties. He ascribes eternity to beings who must have had a beginning; he speaks of contrivances which had no contriver; he sees many bodies in motion which observe a constant and regular course, but denies that there is a first mover. To him the universe is a riddle, and a mystery. A Deity explains the phenomena of nature. As soon as he is recognized, we have power which could call the things which are out of nothing; wisdom capable of arranging and governing them; and goodness, the source of the beauty which charms our eyes, and of the happiness which is felt through all the ranks of animated beings. I cannot conceive an atheist to experience any pleasure from the contemplation of objects in which he perceives no marks of intelligence and benevolence, nothing on which an enlightened and feeling mind would delight to dwell. But, to the religious man, nature is a mirror which reflects the glory of its Maker. It is animated by his presence; it brightens under his smile; it speaks of him to all nations, and proclaims him to be wise and good.

Secondly, the doctrine which we have established by so many arguments shews us at the head of nature, a Being, the contemplation of whom is calculated to rouse the noblest energies of our souls, the best affections of the heart. The atheist sees no being in the universe better than himself, and hence selfishness becomes the distinguishing feature in his character. He lives to himself, and regards his own interests as of paramount importance; and nothing but the dread of reaction and retribution, restrains him from making inroads upon the happiness of others. To the moral discipline of the mind; to acts of self-denial and disinterested beneficence; to the abhorrence of crime for its own sake; to the maintenance of purity and innocence, even when there is no danger of detection, and no fear of any painful result; there is no motive in the system of the atheist. But the idea of a God holds out to view an assemblage of perfections which command our reverence and our love, and create the desire of approximating, in some faint degree, to the standard of excellence. From this idea flow all the sentiments and emotions of piety, and the various exercises of virtue, in the mortification of unhallowed appetite, the patient endurance of evil, and the practice of justice and charity. Religion is the parent of every good quality in man; the glory of his nature consists in the impress which it bears of the image of his Maker.

Lastly, this doctrine is replete with consolation amidst the vicissitudes and troubles of life. In the hour of extremity, the atheist has no resource but reluctant and sullen submission to necessity. He has nothing to reconcile him to the evils of life, which come, he knows not how, and rob him of a portion of his happiness without any compensation. His ultimate prospect is annihilation or unconsciousness, when the bubble of existence shall burst, and mingle with the elements. He lives like a beast, and like a beast he shall die. Amidst the distresses of the present scene, religion points to God, the Father of our spirits, the friend and guardian of the righteous, from whose omnipotent love there is every thing to hope. It teaches us to resign ourselves to his merciful disposal; to be thankful even for afflictions, because they are instruments of good; and to trust, in the most forlorn circumstances, amidst the decays and failure of our bodily constitution, that he will bestow upon us, in another state of being, the happiness which it has seemed meet to his wisdom to deny us in this world.

This great and glorious Being, whose existence we have proved by a variety of arguments, is ETERNAL. According to our conceptions, eternity is distinguished into anterior and posterior; or, in the language of the schools, into eternity a parte ante, and eternity a parte post; that is, we conceive of it as a duration preceding the present moment, which had no beginning, and a duration following, which will have no end. We have already seen, that since something exists now, something has existed from eternity; that that something is not matter, or the universe, but a living, intelligent Being, a designing Cause, the Author of the manifold contrivances which we observe in the creation. There was a time when he existed alone, and there never was a time when he did not exist. This existence is not contingent, but necessary. He exists in and of himself; and to suppose any anterior reason of his existence, would be to strip him at once of eternity and independence; and would prove that we had erred in conceiving him to be God, and that the name ought to be transferred to the prior cause. It is evident, that what exists by necessity of nature, must have always existed. The idea of the Epicureans, that the Gods were formed by the same chance, to which they attributed the formation of all other things, was absurd; and their sole design in allowing their existence, was to avoid the charge of atheism, by a seeming acknowledgment of the popular system. The ancients justly remarked, that they granted it in name, but denied it in fact.

As God has existed from eternity, so he will exist to eternity; to use the language of inspiration, "his years shall not fail." No conceivable reason can be assigned, why he should cease to be. There is no superior Being upon whom he is dependent for existence, and who might revoke his gift; and in his nature there is no principle of decay. From the one or the other of these causes, every other being might be annihilated or reduced to a state of unconsciousness; but the Creator is manifestly not exposed to their influence. "A principle," says Plato, "has no origin, for all things arose from a principle, but the first principle arises from nothing, neither were it a first principle, if it were originated by some other. And if it has no beginning, it can have no end.” The eternity of God has been proved from his immensity in the following manner. "The mode of existence," says Gale, "always follows the mode of essence, because existence, according to the confession of the schools, adds nothing to essence but actuality; neither is it indeed really distinct from essence. Now duration is nothing else but continued existence; whence it necessarily follows, that if God's essence be infinite, his existence and duration must be also infinite."* But as we have not yet demonstrated the infinitude of the Divine Essence, we shall not deduce an argument from it in proof of its eternity. We think, that its eternity is manifest from its necessary existence; for hence, it is equally evident that it shall never cease to be, as it is that it never began to be. Necessity operates alike at all times. It is a permanent reason; it is the same now as it formerly was; and it will be the same hereafter as it is now. Contingent beings exist at one time, and may not exist at another, because there is nothing in their own nature which secures their continuance; but a necessary Being is immutable in duration. What he at present is, he always will be.

From what has been said, we perceive an important difference between the eternity of God and that which may be predicated of some of his creatures, as angels and human spirits. Both are destined to exist for ever, but they are not necessarily immortal, and there is no contradiction in supposing them to be annihilated; nor is their existence without beginning, as it will be without end. There was a time when they were not; and all that can be said of them is, that having begun, they shall never cease, to exist. Their life is an interminable series; it will flow on without intermission, and never approach nearer to a close. It is an infinite duration, not absolutely, but as it is incommensurate, admits of no limits, and will be perpetually progressive. The eternity of God comprehends the past as well as the future, and is thus expressed by an inspired writer: "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God." And hence we may see why, although angels and the souls of men shall subsist for ever, it is said of God, that "he only hath immortality."+ To him exclusively belongs the attribute of absolute, underived, independent, and necessary eternity. The creatures to whom we have referred, shall never die, but their continuance in life is the result of the will of their Creator; and besides, to speak in our imperfect manner of so mysterious a subject, it is only half an eternity which is allotted to them as their portion, the half which is to come, while eternal ages had revolved before they were called out of nothing. But there is still a more important difference between the eternity of God, and that of creatures. Theirs is not wholly possessed at once; it is enjoyed in detail, and consists in a perpetual succession of moments. It unites stability and change; stability, as their existence is infallibly secured, and change, as it is a constant transition from one part of duration to another. But the eter nity of God has been defined to be the interminable possession of life, complete. perfect, and at once. Eternitas est interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta * Court of the Gentiles, part iv. B. ii. c. 4. § 3.

+ Ps. xc. 2.

1 Tim. vi. 16.