gressed. And we remark, that he alone is the competent Judge of our actions, because he alone is acquainted with our circumstances and motives, and can distinguish between the form and the substance, the specious pretence and the upright intention. There are many considerations to be taken into account in a moral estimate of conduct, which he only can combine, to whom the proceedings of the mind are as manifest as external actions are to us. And hence we are led to remark, that God knows the hearts of men, and claims this knowledge as a prerogative in which no mortal shares with him. "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked; who can know it? I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings." "Although we easily believe such knowledge to be the attribute of a Being who is as intimately present with our spirits as with our bodies, yet we can form no adequate conception of it, because it is so different from our own knowledge of each other's hearts, which is founded upon outward signs, often of doubtful interpretation, upon analogy or a presumed resemblance between them and ourselves, and in some cases merely upon conjecture; whereas the knowledge of God is immediate and intuitive. How awful the reflection, that he is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart, that its inmost recesses are naked and opened to the eyes of Him with whom we have to do! Thoughts which are only half-formed, which are suppressed as soon as they arise, which fly across the mind and are forgotten, do not escape his observation. He traces the windings and labyrinths of the soul, and discovers latent principles and motives, of which we are ourselves hardly conscious. "His eyes are upon the ways of man, and he seeth all his goings. There is no darkness, nor shadow of death, where the workers of iniquity may hide themselves."†

God knows things to come. In this respect there is no resemblance of his knowledge in man, nor we presume in any creature. We perceive what is present, and remember what is past; but the future can be approached only by imagination, unless we deem it an exception, that we are necessarily led to believe that the laws of nature will always be as they have hitherto been, and that succeeding generations will be like the present in form, and in general habits and pursuits. But these vague notions leave us in perfect ignorance of the actual state of things which will afterwards take place. We know not a single individual who will be born, or a single event which will befall him. Something indeed is revealed to us concerning the future history of the world; but the light of prophecy has emanated from him, who says, "Behold the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare; before they spring forth I tell you of them." This subject came under review, when we were speaking of the immutability of his knowledge. A proof, that he sees the future as well as the present, is furnished by the predictions of Scripture. God announced Cyrus by name long before his parents were born, and foretold his war against Babylon, and the means by which he should obtain possession of the city. He foretold the rise and fall of the four ancient monarchies, and portrayed before hand the characters and achievements of Alexander the Great and his successors, with such particularity and truth, that Porphyry, the learned adversary of Christianity in the third century, affirmed that the prophecies must have been written after the events. He foretold the birth of Jesus Christ, the place of his nativity, and the family from which he should spring, with the principal events of his life, and his death, although it was effected not by an immediate interposition of providence, but by the unexpected combination of Jews and Gentiles. It is unnecessary to multiply instances. We formerly adverted to the difficulty which has perplexed the thoughts, and exercised the ingenuity, of the studious in every age, with re+ Job xxxiv. 21, 22.

Jer. xvii. 9, 10.

Is. xlii. 9.

gard to the means of reconciling the foreknowledge of God with the free agency of man. What is certainly foreseen, will certainly happen; but the infallibility of the event seems to preclude liberty of action, which consists in the power of acting or not acting, and of acting in this way or in that, as at the moment the mind of the person shall determine. The discussion of this point would lead us into a digression from the present subject. It has been often remarked, and justly, that the simple foreknowledge of actions has no influence upon their existence; of which we may satisfy ourselves by reflecting, that when we have at any time ground for confident expectation that a neighbour will take a particular course, our foresight is not the cause of his conduct, which would have been the same if it had not been foreseen: but this observation only removes the difficulty a step farther back. As there can be no certain foreknowledge of things in themselves uncertain, it still remains to inquire, what is the ground of certainty in human actions which renders them the object of infallible foreknowledge? If it be said to be the Divine decree, the difficulty unquestionably is not diminished. Amidst all the perplexity in which we are involved, one thing is beyond dispute, namely, that God does foreknow future events, and prophecy is a proof of it. The truth of both these principles is incontrovertible: that known to God are all his works from the beginning of the world, and that man is accountable. He is free, while he is acting the part which his Maker has assigned to him; and may be justly punished for doing what constitutes a necessary link in the chain of events. The Jews fulfilled the Divine purpose in crucifying our Saviour, and yet brought wrath upon themselves to the uttermost. It ought not to weaken our belief, that we cannot reconcile liberty and foreknowledge. Such is the condition of man and of all finite beings, that they must assent to many things, for which they cannot account. We need not wonder, that when our thoughts are directed to God, we are on all sides encompassed with mysteries.

God knows all possible things. No person can suppose, that those alone are possible, which have been, now are, or shall hereafter be; that Divine wisdom is exhausted by the plans which it has already concerted, and Divine power by the effects which it has already produced, or has determined to produce. God could have called into existence many other worlds, and many other orders of creatures. He could have arranged systems totally different from any of those which have been established, governed them by different laws, and peopled them with inhabitants of different natures and faculties. He could have made our own world the scene of a different train of events, by replenishing it with a race of holy beings, who should have never been induced by temptation to swerve from their duty, and among whom pain, and sorrow, and mortality, would have been unknown. His infinite understanding knows not only what he has done, and has purposed to do, but all that his wisdom could have devised, and all that his power could have accomplished. If any man should be so curious as to ask, why he chose the present system in preference to so many possible systems? he should be reminded, that the question is presumptuous, and that we can return no answer to it, because God has not informed us of the reasons; but that if he shall ever be pleased to disclose his counsels to us, they will undoubtedly be found worthy of eternal admiration and praise.

The knowledge of God may be distinguished into two kinds, which have been called by Scholastic Divines, scientia simplicis intelligentiæ, and scientia visionis. Scientia visionis has for its object all things past, present, and to come; it is said to be founded on will, because the measure of it is the will of God, as expressed in his eternal purpose. He foresees as future those things alone which he has determined to bring to pass. They were only possible, till he decreed their futurition. It is called also scientia libera, free knowledge,

because it depends upon his will, which is the only reason of all the events of time. As nothing could take place independently of him, so he was under no necessity to act at all, or to act in any particular manner; but all his operations, ad extra, are the result of free choice. Scientia simplicis intelligentiæ has for its object possible things, things which might have been done, but never will be done. The measure of it is omnipotence; that is, while the former knowledge is limited by his decree, this is extensive as his power. He knows all that he could do; and because this knowledge is not founded on his will but on his power, it has been called scientia necessaria. His infinite understanding necessarily knows every thing which his infinite power can effect. A third kind of knowledge has been ascribed to God, and called scientia media, as being something between the two kinds already mentioned. It is the knowledge of what will happen in certain given circumstances, the knowledge of what creatures will do, if endowed with certain qualities and placed in certain situations. But there is no occasion for this distinction, as all the objects of this new kind of knowledge are comprehended under the head of scientia simplicis intelligentiæ. If God by his infinite understanding, knows all possible causes and all their possible effects, he knows what would be the result in any supposable case. He knew that the men of Kielah would deliver up David to Saul, because he knew the state of their hearts, and the influence which the authority and solicitations of that monarch would have upon their conduct. It is objected farther against the media scientia, that it is unworthy of God, as it makes him dependent upon creatures for a part of his knowledge; for the distinction has been invented with a design to prove, that his knowledge of the future actions of men is not founded on his own purpose to permit them, or to bring them to pass, but in a prospective view of the manner in which they will conduct themselves. It was introduced in opposition to the doctrine of free and sovereign grace, and it proposes to account for his purpose to give grace to one and not to another, by his foresight of the use which they would make of means and opportunities.

Concerning the knowledge of God, we assert, in opposition to this opinion, that it is independent. It is not obtained through the medium of his creatures, but, so far as it respects future things, is founded on his own will. No effect can be viewed as future, or in human language, can be the object of certain expectation, but when considered in relation to its efficient cause; and the cause of all things that ever shall exist is the purpose of God, "who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." As the knowledge of God does not depend upon the actual existence of objects,-for this would limit it to the present and the past,—so it does not depend upon any conditions attached to their existence. He does not know that such things will happen, if such other things shall go before; but the whole series of events was planned by his infinite understanding, the ends as well as the means; and he foresees the ends, not through the medium of the means, but through the medium of his own decree, in which they have a certain future existence. They will not take place without the means; but the proper cause of them is not the means, but his almighty will.

It follows, in the second place, that the knowledge of God is eternal. If it be independent upon creatures, and founded in his own purpose, then it is as ancient as his purpose. Were it impossible to foresee the free actions of men, much of his knowledge would be acquired in time. It would be daily receiving accessions, like our own, to which something is added every day by our observation of the conduct of those with whom we are surrounded. It has been said, "that as it implies not any reflection on the Divine power, to say that it cannot perform impossibilities, so neither does it imply any reflection on his knowledge, to say that he cannot foresee as certain what is really not certain,

but only contingent." This is true; but it remains to be proved that the actions of men are contingent in such a sense as to be uncertain. Reason will ascribe all possible knowledge to God; and that it is possible certainly to foresee the free actions of men, cannot be a matter of doubt to a believer in Divine revelation, which abounds in predictions of such actions. The knowledge of God is eternal. The doctrine of temporal decrees, of decrees made in time, as men show themselves to be worthy or unworthy, is chargeable with the impiety of setting limits to the Divine understanding, and making the Most High fickle and mutable as man, who is of one mind to-day, and of another to

morrow.

In the next place, The knowledge of God is simultaneous, or as it has been differently expressed, not discursive but intuitive. Some parts of human knowledge are intuitive; that is, the things are perceived at once, and no process of reasoning is necessary to discover them. There are certain axioms or first principles, to which the mind gives its assent as soon as they are proposed, and the terms are understood. There are also some truths, which, although not intuitive, are nearly such, because the mind arrives almost instantly at the conclusion. But the general character of human knowledge is, that it is successive. The riches of the mind, like external wealth, are acquired by accumulation. New objects and new relations of objects, daily present themselves to our senses; and from truths which we know, we infer other truths by a longer or a shorter train of reasoning. Thus our knowledge is discursive. But the infinite understanding of God receives no accession of ideas. The term infinite, which we apply to it, proves an accession to be impossible. He sees all things, as we see axioms by intuition. Eyes are ascribed to him to denote his knowledge, and to signify that it comprehends the whole system of things, as the human eye surveys at a glance the whole visible horizon. It follows, that what is called media scientia, or the knowledge of events through their causes, cannot be properly attributed to him, because it is a discursive process, or implies the inference of one thing from another, and consequently a succession of ideas. There is no progression from ignorance to knowledge in the Divine mind, which was from all eternity omniscient.

Hence it is evident, that the knowledge of God is immutable, as I shewed in a former lecture; and I proceed, therefore, to remark, that it is distinct This is true also of human knowledge, to a certain extent. We have a distinct knowledge of mathematical truths, of facts which we have witnessed, and of the existence of objects which we perceive by our senses. On the other hand, we are ignorant of the essences of all things; we have no conception of the relation between their properties and their essences, or how the former inhere in the latter; and our ideas of many things are general and obBut all things are naked and opened to the eyes of God, Tazykoμsvæ as an apostle says, as manifest to him as the interior of an animal is to us, when it has been fairly divided and spread out for inspection. An infinite understanding is incapable of oversight, of misapprehension, or of taking a hasty and inaccurate survey. Every object, every quality of every object, every relation which it bears, every thing which may be predicated of it, whether it be animate or inanimate, all is before God, and is as thoroughly known as if his attention were fixed upon it alone. Among the many millions of the human race, every individual may truly say, "Thou, God, seest me."

scure.

In the last place, The knowledge of God is infallible. There is no mistake in his apprehension of things, and there is nothing like conjecture. Future events are as certainly known as present, because, although they may be contingent in respect of the agents, or may be produced by the free volition of

men, they are future, not contingently but necessarily, to him who has purposed to bring them to pass. But as this is manifest from what has been already said, any farther illustration is unnecessary.

Any passages of Scripture which may seem to be inconsistent with the Divine omniscience, will perplex only the ignorant, and are easily disposed of. When God is said to have come down to see the city and tower which were building on the plain of Babylon,* that person would be justly laughed at who should suppose, either that he could literally descend, or that it was necessary to change his place, in order to know what was going on upon earth. When, again, he represents himself as looking that his vineyard should bring forth good grapes, whereas it brought forth wild grapes,† it would be the height of absurdity to take the words in their literal meaning, and imagine that he was really disappointed. Every body knows that God is speaking of himself after the manner of men, who in order to see an object more distinctly, draw near to it, and when they have arranged the means, expect the usual result. The two passages teach us, that God was perfectly acquainted with the transaction at Babel; and that, after the pains which he had bestowed upon his ancient people, it was solely owing to their own perverseness, that they were not made wiser and better.

The consideration of the Divine omniscience is calculated to check the lofty thoughts which we are too apt to entertain of ourselves. We often see men proud of their talents, and sometimes so much elated as presumptuously to pronounce judgment upon God himself; to censure his dispensations, as if a different procedure would have been wiser; to criticise his word, and refuse to give credit to its plain declarations, because reason cannot comprehend them. Thus finite measures that which is infinite. Such is the impious arrogance of an insignificant creature, who only yesterday began to know any thing, is puzzled by the most common occurrences, and finds mysteries in a grain of sand. Let him reflect upon an infinite understanding, and shrink within himself, saying, "I neither learned wisdom, nor have the knowledge of the Holy."‡

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There are many important lessons which are taught by this attribute of our Creator. It admonishes us to beware of sin, since he is the constant witness of our actions; and to study sincerity in all things, and particularly in our religious profession, because our motives are distinctly seen by him. It encourages good men to put their trust in him, and to commit all their affairs to his disposal; for a particular providence, which is the source of so much consolation, is founded on his infinite knowledge. The very hairs of our heads are numbered; and as nothing can befal us without his knowledge, so every event is under the direction of his wisdom and goodness. The eyes of the Lord run to and fro throughout the whole earth, to shew himself strong in the behalf of them whose heart is perfect toward him."§

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The omniscience of God encourages humble supplication in every season of need. There is no cause of fear that the prayers of the righteous will not be heard, or that their sighs and tears will escape his notice, since he knows the thoughts and desires of the heart. There is no danger of being overlooked amidst the multitude of supplicants who daily and hourly present their various petitions, for an infinite mind is capable of paying the same attention to millions as if only one individual were soliciting its notice. The want of appropriate language, the impossibility of giving expression to the deep feelings of the soul, will not hinder their success; because before they attempt to speak, he knows what they would say. "It shall come to pass, that before they call, I will answer; and while they are yet speaking, I will hear."||

In a word, what a powerful excitement is it to our duty, that He is looking on who approves of every honest endeavour to please him, and will abundantly * Gen. xi. 5. + Isa. v. 2. ‡ Prov. xxx. 3. 2 Chron. xvi. 9. || Isa. Ixv. 24.