which led to them passed so rapidly and lightly through our mind as to leave no impression behind them. By chance, we went to a particular place; by chance, we met with a particular person. But there was no chance in the case; for, if we could recal the previous train of thought which is irrecoverably gone, we should find, that our going to the place was as natural as the motion of a ship in a given direction, by the force of the tide or of the wind, and that all the consequences are so many links in a chain of causes and effects. Chance, indeed, is impossible under the government of God; unless we should suppose his government to be partial or imperfect, and that there are some events to which its power does not extend. Nothing seems to be more a matter of chance than the decision of a lot; yet the Scripture says, "the lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord."* An arrow shot at random may fall to the ground, or may kill one man as well as another; but in the case of Ahab, it had received a commission, and pierced the bosom of the impious and devoted monarch. If then, we will speak of chance, let us affix to the term an idea consonant to reason and religion, and let it express solely our ignorance of the causes of events.

With regard to the particulars now mentioned, every person will readily assent to them, as soon as they are accurately and clearly stated. A part of the subject which remains, namely, the divine government of the actions of men, is more difficult, because it involves the question respecting the consistency of the agency of the Creator with the liberty of his creatures. The general fact, that he is concerned in their actions, is manifest from their absolute dependence upon him, in whom they live, and move, and have their being: and from many declarations of Scripture. The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whithersoever he will;"‡ and the same thing may surely be said of the subject of kings.

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That his Providence is concerned in the good actions of men, will not be denied. Their goodness may seem to justify his interference; and the assistance which he gives will be deemed worthy of the purity and benevolence of his character. It will be readily acknowledged that he excites men to good actions; that he presents to them proper objects and proper motives; that he strengthens their faculties; that he imparts an agreeable feeling to their minds, while they are engaged in them; that he encourages them to persevere amidst difficulties and obstacles; and that he enables them, in many instances at least, to accomplish what they intend. The Scripture asserts, "that God works in us, both to will and to do of his good pleasure," § and on this ground calls upon us to be thankful and humble. Against the doctrine of efficacious grace, which is plainly taught in this, and many other passages of Scripture, the common objection is, that it leaves nothing to the human will but a simple concurrence with the motions of grace; and consequently, takes away its power of choosing or refusing, according to its own determination. Without entering into this controversy at present, I observe, that the influence which God is conceived to exert in good actions, is, in some respects, analogous to that which one man exerts upon another, without being suspected of at all intrenching upon his liberty. If one man excite another to a good action; if he lay before him strong inducements to engage in the performance of it; if he strengthen his faculties by culture and exhortation; if he give him every possible assistance, and endeavour to make his duty agreeable to him, we never doubt, when the latter complies, that the action is his own, and that all its merit is imputable to him, although strictly it did not originate with himself, and he perhaps would not have thought of it, unless the former had been his monitor and counsellor. We never dream that he is less free in this, than in any other action which he spontaneously performed, because in whatever way his consent • Prov. xvi. 33. † 1 Kings xxii. 2 Chron. xviii. + Prov. xxi. 1. § Phil. ii. 13.

was obtained, he did consent, and the action was perfectly voluntary. There is no difference between the Divine agency upon men, and the agency of one man upon another, except that God is conceived to exert immediately some power upon the minds of his creatures, which one creature cannot exert upon another. Whether this power is any infringement of their liberty, we cannot determine by abstract reasoning, because we are ignorant of its nature and operation. The question must be decided by experience, which assures those who are the subjects of this influence, that they retain perfect freedom of choice, and by Scripture, which declares that God makes them willing in the day of his power. It is certain, that its operation is in strict accordance with the nature of man; that it does not compel, but inclines him; that it takes away nothing which is essential to moral responsibility, because, whenever choice is exercised, a man is accountable. The concern of Providence in good actions will be admitted by all, but those who, carrying their notions of liberty to an extravagant height, would exempt the human mind from the government of God, and constitute man an independent sovereign, who sways the sceptre of his will without control.

The concern of Providence in the sinful actions of creatures cannot be so satisfactorily explained, because it is difficult to ascertain how far the Divine agency may proceed, without having any part in the sinfulness of the action. The followers of Manes or Manicheus solved the difficulty by maintaining, after the ancient Persians, two principles, the one good and the other evil; and some individuals and sects have not hesitated to affirm, that God is the Author of sin. These impious errors we indignantly reject; but while we speak of them with abhorrence, let us beware lest, in attempting to explain the subject before us, we unwittingly fall into them, or say any thing which may imply, that our sins are chargeable upon God.

First, God permits sinful actions: "My people would not hearken to my voice, and Israel would none of me. So I gave them up to their own hearts' lusts and they walked in their own counsels." "In times past, he suffered all nations to walk in their own ways; that is, to practise idolatry, and to live in those sins with which the heathens were polluted. The permission of sinful actions does not import that he approves of them; for, as he is infinitely holy, sin must always be the object of his abhorrence; and accordingly, we find him testifying against the sins into which he permits men to fall, denouncing his threatenings against them, and actually punishing the sinners. Nor is permission to be considered as an inactive sufferance of events to take place, without knowing them beforehand, or without being able to hinder them. Either of these suppositions is unworthy of God; the one impeaches his omniscience, and the other his omnipotence. As things future are known to him, as well as things present, and as he declares the end from the beginning, so he is able, in many ways, to prevent creatures from acting. He can influence their thoughts and volitions; he can withhold opportunities; he can deprive them of ability; he can place obstacles before them, which it is not possible to surmount. Hence we may perceive what is implied in the permission of sinful actions. God does nothing to prevent them, except that he testifies against them by conscience, and by his word, which is full of dissuasions from sin and of considerations which have a moral tendency to restrain men from committing it. He does not keep them out of the way of temptation; he does not take away the means of effecting their purposes; he does not, by any influ ence upon their minds, repress their desires and inclinations; he does not represent to them, in a strong and efficacious manner, the wickedness of their conduct, or terrify them with an apprehension of the consequences; he does not employ other men to oppose them; he does not, as he could do, change their * Ps. lxxxi. 11, 12. † Acts xiv. 16.

hearts, and turn them to the love and practice of holiness. It follows that, as they are left to themselves, in circumstances which afford full scope for the exercise of their natural dispositions, the sinful actions which God has permitted do not fail to take place. They are not in the number of contingencies, or of things which may, or may not happen: there is a certainty of the event, without which it could not be the object of the Divine foreknowledge. It has been said, that the permission of sinful actions is so far from being merely an inactive sufferance of them, that it implies a positive act of his will, in as much as he wills to permit sin for ends worthy of himself. And here this distinction is made, that God does not will sin considered in itself, but the permission of sin, because evil itself cannot be the object of his will, but he must always will what is good. If sin is said to be the means of manifesting the Divine glory, it does not follow that God, who wills the end, must also will the mean considered in itself. Sin is in this case called a mean, not causally or effectively, but materially and objectively, as it furnishes an occasion of glorifying God. It is a mean, not in itself, for its natural tendency is to dishonour him, but by accident, or in consequence of his wisdom, which brings good out of evil. He who wills the end, wills also the means, but not always with the same kind of will; for, if the means are of a different nature from the end, he may will the latter effectively because it is good, but the former only permissively because they are evil; the object of his will being not properly the means themselves, but the use of them. I know not whether you have clearly apprehended this distinction, nor am I sure that it will throw much light upon the subject; but I have mentioned it, because it has been considered as important by some theological writers.

Secondly, He limits sinful actions; for, we are not to suppose that, when he permits men to sin, or leaves them to themselves, he exempts them entirely from his control. Such a supposition would be inconsistent with the dependent condition of creatures, and with the character of God as the Governor of the world. They are at all times under his superintendence, and subject to such restraints as it may seem proper to his wisdom to impose. Were the elements let loose, and suffered to exert all their fury, to mingle and conflict with unbridled rage, the earth would exhibit a scene of confusion and devastation, and the whole human race would be swept away in one general ruin. Similar would be the effect, if the appetites and passions, emancipated from physical and moral restraints, should display all their violence and malignity. If ambition, and avarice, and lust, and cruelty, and oppression, knew no bounds, the earth, where so much peace and comfort are enjoyed, would be transformed into the image of hell; with this difference, that its inhabitants, being mortal, would gradually melt away by the calamities which they mutually inflicted, and the race would become finally extinct. The designs of the Almighty could not be carried on without the application of checks and restraints; they would be embarrassed and defeated by the wayward movements of the wicked, driven hither and thither by the wild and tumultuary fluctuations of their passions. If the revengeful man had always an opportunity to gratify his resentment, how many lives would be lost, the preservation of which is necessary, not only for the comfort and prosperity of families, but for the continuation of the succession in a particular line, and for other important purposes, which the individuals thus preserved are appointed to accomplish! If despotic power were suffered to gather strength, and to extend its sway according to its lawless wish, the most flourishing regions of the earth would, in the progress of time, be characterized by the same stagnation of the human mind, the same decline of agriculture and the arts, the same degradation and consumption of the human species, which are seen in the fine countries that groan under the iron yoke of the Turkish dominion. Had persecutors been able to carry into

full effect their plans of destruction, the church of Christ must have long since existed only on the bloody page which recorded the fate of its martyrs. But Providence opposed various obstacles to the rage of the Heathen emperors in the early ages, and to the still more diabolical procedure of Antichrist and his followers; so that, although thousands and tens of thousands were the victims of their unhallowed power, a reninant was always saved; the succession of the friends of truth was secured; and the prediction of our Saviour was fulfilled, that "the gates of hell should not prevail" against his church.* "The remainder of the wrath of men thou restrainest." God says to the wicked, as to the waves of the sea, "Hitherto shall ye come, and no further." Their strength or courage fails; difficulties arise which deter them; or their passions are kept at bay by the opposing passions of others; or they change their intentions, and of their own accord abandon their work before it is finished. Such means are always at the command of Providence; and there is still another way in which it can set bounds to the wickedness of men, by depriving them, through disease or a sudden stroke, of bodily or mental ability, so that they can sin no more; or by cutting them off in the midst of their projects, like Herod the persecutor, who was smitten by an angel, and perished in a miserable manner.

Thirdly, He over-rules sinful actions, so as to accomplish great and good designs by them; and thus he makes the wrath of man praise him. The envy of the sons of Jacob against their brother Joseph, which prompted them to sell him into Egypt, was the occasion of his elevation to the highest authority in that kingdom; in consequence of which he saved alive his father and his family, in a famine which afterwards took place. "As for you," he said to them, "ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good, to bring it to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive." The reproach and persecution of the ungodly, which cause much disquiet and distress to the people of God, are made the means of exercising and strengthening their graces, and of fitting them more and more for a state of perfection. God" chastens them" in this and in other ways, "that they may be partakers of his holiness ;" and "their afflictions work for them a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory.Ӥ The introduction of sin into the world, which was followed by the fall and all its dreadful consequences, has given rise to the brightest manifestation of the glory of God, and the highest exercise of his benevolence, in the mediation of Christ, and the salvation of the guilty through his blood. But although God turns evil to good, it by no means follows that men may do evil that good may come. His procedure is like that of a skilful physician, who, finding poison in existence, so proportions and mixes it with other ingredients, that it proves medicinal; while they are like the man, who should first make a poison, and then administer it with a rash and presumptuous hand. The natural tendency of sin is only to evil; and under the management of creatures, nothing but evil will result from it. No man, therefore, should commit sin with a view to good, not only because the mean which he employs is absolutely forbidden, but because it is calculated to produce exactly the reverse of what he professes to aim at. The end is beyond his reach; the process by which good is deduced from evil, can be carried on only by infinite wisdom and almighty power. God finding sin in the world, renders it subservient to the purposes of his moral administration; but this does not justify our first parents, who introduced it, or those who continue to practise it, any more than it would excuse a man who had violated the laws of society, that his crime had somehow contributed, through dextrous management, to promote the public good.

Thus we have seen, that God permits the sinful actions of his creatures; that he limits them; and that he over-rules them. But we are not yet done Matt. xvi. 18. † Gen. i. 20. Heb. xii. 10.

§ 2 Cor. iv. 17.

with this important and mysterious subject. The most difficult part remains, -the physical agency of God in sinful actions. We have endeavoured to shew, that creatures are absolutely dependent upon God, and that, as he upholds them in existence, so it is by his secret influence that they are enabled to exert the faculties with which they are endowed. It seems to follow from this position, that he is the first cause of all their operations; and, consequently, that whether they do good or evil, they cannot act till they are first acted upon by him. Some give this explanation of the matter, that, although God preserves his creatures and their faculties, by the same power which was exerted in creating them, yet he leaves to them the right or wrong use of those faculties, that they may be the proper subjects of praise and blame, reward and punishment; and that thus their sins are imputable to themselves alone. It is owing to Providence that men exist, and are possessed of certain powers; but, that they use them improperly is owing to themselves, since God gave them liberty of will; and therefore their sins are not chargeable upon him. This view of the subject, which is adopted by many modern Divines, is as ancient at least as the days of Origen. God, he says, has made us living creatures, and furnished us with the power of moving our members, our hands and our feet. We ought not however, to say, that we have from God the specific motion to strike or kill another, or to take away his property; but only that we have received the general principle of motion, which we use to good or bad purposes, as we please. In like manner, we have received from God the general power of willing and acting, as we are living creatures; but it depends upon ourselves alone to will and to do good or evil.

It is an objection against this opinion, that it is inconsistent with what has been already proved respecting the absolute dependence of all creatures upon the Creator. It asserts, indeed, their dependence upon him for their being and faculties; but it plainly exempts their actions from his control. The matter is explained in a different manner by Calvinistic Divines, who maintain, in common with many of the Schoolmen, a Divine concourse, by which they mean, not only that God assists his creatures, but also that he excites as well as enables them to act. It is distinguished into prævius vel prædeterminens, previous or predetermining, and simultaneus vel concomitans concursus, simultaneous or concomitant concourse. The former is that act of God, by which he influences causes and principles; excites his rational creatures, of whom we are now speaking, moves them to act, and to do one thing rather than another. It is sometimes called præcursus, which seems to be a more proper term for expressing the idea than concursus. The latter is the continued influence of the Deity upon them, by which they are enabled to perform the action to which they have been excited; and this continued influence is main tained, to preserve the dependence of creatures upon the First Cause. If, like a ball which, being impelled in a particular direction, moves without receiving any new impulse from the hand, they proceed to perform the action without his continued agency upon them, the effect could be attributed to God only in part, and remotely, and consequently he would not be its immediate and principal cause. The chief difficulty is in relation to the former concursus prædeterminens; and accordingly, even Calvinists have been divided in their sentiments, some admitting previous concourse only to good works, and simultaneous concourse in reference to works of a different character; while others admit previous concourse in works of every kind, that the doctrine of Providence may be properly explained.

The difficulty which must here present itself to every person of reflection, is, that this previous concourse seems to make God the author of sin; for if a rational creature performs a sinful action, and performs it in consequence of a divine influence upon him, by which he was excited to it, the action may be VOL. I.-55 2 M