them? Had he lost his senses? was he a raving visionary, who mistook the illusions of fancy for realities? or was he in jest, and did he wish his letters to be laughed at? These suppositions are out of the question. He was in a sound mind, and expected what he wrote to be received with respect. And how were his epistles received? were they treated with the scorn, or the indignation which is due to the man who presumes to tell lies to our face? We know that they were regarded then, as they have ever since been, as the compositions of an apostle, who was authorized and qualified to instruct the church in the important truths and duties of religion. But they could not have been so regarded, if the Corinthians and the Hebrews had not seen miracles performed by Paul and by others, in confirmation of their doctrine. The claim to supernatural powers would have destroyed all their credit, if it had not been substantiated. "In matters of opinion, it is possible to impose upon others by bold asseverations, and subtle reasonings; but he who promises to cure the blind, and raise the dead, leaves himself no subterfuge, and must either perform his promise, or submit to be considered as a fool or a madman." There is another view which may be taken of the argument. While the apostles affirm that they had wrought miracles in the presence of those to whom they wrote, they farther affirm that some of those persons had received miraculous gifts. There are intimations of this kind in several of the epistles; but the subject is discussed at length in the first epistle to the Corinthians. This is the last thing which an impostor would do, or rather it is a thing which he would not do. He might appeal to the reason of others, because he had contrived previously to pervert it by sophistry; he might appeal to their senses, because he could deceive them by the arts of legerdemain ; but he would not dare to appeal to their consciousness. Paul would have been laughed at, if supernatural gifts had been unknown in the primitive church. But he was still regarded as an apostle of Christ; and the continued respect which was shown to him, is a proof that such gifts did exist in the church. By the communication of them, the revelation contained in the books of the New Testament was authenticated.

A miracle is a supernatural work. It is an effect which could not be produced according to the laws of nature, and, therefore, implies a suspension of these laws, or a deviation from them. Some have called it a transgression or violation of them: but I do not think that these terms are well chosen, because in their usual application, they suggest the idea of disobedience to authority, and an encroachment upon right; and consequently, are improper in speaking of any act done by the Creator himself, or by others according to his will. Let it be observed, that we do not give the name of miracle to every prodigy or strange event, because it is not necessary in such cases to suppose that the laws of nature are counteracted or surpassed. They may be accounted for, and many of them have been explained by an accidental concurrence of causes which rarely meet, and their number is diminished in proportion as the boundaries of science are enlarged; that is, the more thoroughly nature is understood, the more easily can such things be shown to be in harmony with its laws. Not a few of the miracles related by ancient historians are now known not to be such, but merely uncommon events. We do not call a monstrous birth, or a fall of stones from the clouds, miraculous; but we would so designate the cure of blindness by a touch, and the raising of the dead by a word.

The possibility of miracles will be called in question only by atheists. He who believes that the universe exists by eternal necessity, may consistently deny that any change can take place in its established order; but no such idea can be entertained by a person who admits that it is the work of an intelligent and an omnipotent Being. To an enlightened theist, its laws must appear

to be nothing else but the uniform exertion of his power; and surely he can alter the mode of operation when there is some end worthy of his wisdom to be accomplished. Vegetation implies a particular process, in which a seed, the earth, moisture, air, light, and heat, perform their respective parts, and a certain time is required to its completion; but there is no doubt that he, who gives efficacy to this process, could produce a perfect plant in a moment, as it must be allowed that he did at the beginning. Now, if a tree should instantly spring up before us, in full size, covered with foliage and laden with fruit, we should not hesitate to acknowledge a miracle. It is not necessary to dwell upon this point, because it will not be disputed that miracles are possible, whatever doubts may be entertained with respect to their necessity and expedience.

I proceed to observe that none but God can perform miracles.

The truth

of this observation, I should think, would be conceded, if the true idea of a miracle were kept steadily in view; for, if it be understood to be an effect which cannot be produced by the laws of nature, we are compelled to have recourse to the immediate power of God for the cause. It is acknowledged that there are some passages of Scripture, from which it has been inferred that miracles may be performed by evil spirits and their agents. After some of the miracles which Moses wrought, it is said that "the magicians of Egypt did in like manner with their enchantments."* But many learned men contend, and have endeavoured to prove, that nothing more is meant than that they imitated what Moses had done, by sleight of hand, and the assistance of those who were in concert with them. They think that this is evident from the nature of the miracles in which they pretended to rival the power of Moses, and which afforded them an opportunity to practise their dexterity; but when he proceeded to work other miracles, their skill was baffled, and they confessed that this was the finger of God. The story has much the appearance of art carried to a certain length, and then failing, because its resources were exhausted. Our Lord foretold that there should arise false Christs and false prophets, who would show great signs and wonders; but we know that these were not real miracles, from the accounts which have come down to us of the wonders which they did exhibit, and which are exactly of the same kind with the tricks employed by jugglers to excite the admiration of the multitude. It is admitted that evil spirits might do some things which would appear miraculous to us. They might, for example, raise a man from the ground, and convey him through the air to a distant place, as Satan did to our Saviour. But whatever astonishment such an event might excite, it would not, when understood, be regarded as a miracle. If we saw the spirit in a visible form lifting up the man, and carrying him in his hand, we should be surprised indeed, but still we should know that what was done was as agreeable to the laws of nature as if he had been elevated in a balloon. It would be a real miracle, if he was raised without the agency of any natural power, because the event would be referrible, in this case, to God himself, suspending or counteracting the law of gravitation. But, in speaking of miracles, we presuppose the existence and moral government of the Deity. On this ground, we believe that the different species of creatures will be restrained by his providence from going beyond their proper sphere; that wicked spirits will not be permitted to act such a part, as would lay mankind under an absolute impossibility of distinguishing between truth and falsehood, and subject them to unavoidable delusion. This would be the effect if they were permitted to work real miracles, or to do such things as could not be distinguished from real miracles; for then they could practise any imposition

* Exod. vii. 11.

upon mankind, and there would be no means of discriminating a true from a pretended revelation. But they cannot act independently of Him, in whom all creatures live, and move, and have their being: and surely, he would not give them liberty to do any thing which would defeat the purpose of those communications to mankind, which it might seem fit to his wisdom to make. It is true, that men have been employed in working miracles, but they were merely instruments in the hands of God; and the only person who ever wrought them by his own power was Jesus Christ, who, as the Lord of nature, controlled its laws at his pleasure. We are apt to fall into a mistake, when we speak of miraculous powers having been communicated to certain individuals. We are mistaken if we suppose that such powers were inherent in them, were properly their own, and were exerted by them as they exerted their natural faculties. I believe that the apostle Paul could no more work miracles than I can, and the only difference between us is, that in consequence of a commission which he had received, and I have not, divine power accompanied the signs which he gave, or the words which he pronounced, when any thing was to be done out of the ordinary course. It was not Paul who performed the miracle, but God, or Jesus Christ, who secretly directed him to rebuke diseases, for example, when it was his design to remove them. "Why look ye so earnestly on us, as though by our own power or holiness we had made this man to walk? The name of Jesus, through faith in his name, hath made this man strong, whom ye see and know." We say, then, that God alone can work miracles.

Miracles may be proved; that is, there is no reason why we should conclude against them a priori, if they are not contrary to the perfections of God, or to any previous declaration of his will. In either of these cases we might at once pronounce them to be impossible, because we should be certain that he who only could, would not perform them. I acknowledge that the expectation that the course of nature will continue has been considered by philosophers to rest on an instinctive principle of belief; and that, upon this principle, it has been said, all the operations which have a respect to futurity are conducted. No man would build a house, if he did not expect that it would stand by the law of gravitation; or sow his field, if he did not calculate upon the regular order of the seasons. But observe how far this principle goes. It assumes the constancy of the laws of nature, (the knowledge of which, however, is derived from experience,) and from their past, deduces their future continuance. But what demonstrates the connexion between the premises and the conclusion? It is not intuitively evident, that because an event has regularly taken place for a long period, it will take place for a period equally long. If the course of nature is the order in which divine power is exerted to uphold the system of creation, we can have no certainty that it will be always exerted in the same order, without an express declaration from the Creator himself. By those who believe revelation, the conclusion that it will be perpetual must be pronounced to be false, and a time will come, when the expectation, founded on this instinctive principle of belief, will fail, because it foretells a mighty revolution, which will be followed by a new order of things. It is certain, that God has not obliged himself by any thing which he has said or done, by any thing which we can collect from reason or experience, to a uniformity in the exercise of his power, without a single deviation. To suppose that he has would be a mere assumption; and if any person should on this ground affirm that miracles are improbable, he would not deserve a serious answer. If the universe is governed by Omnipotence, for aught that we could tell, its movements might stop to-morrow, or some

Acts iii. 12. 16.

alteration might be made which would give it a new constitution; and the utmost which we are warranted to presume, is, that if it is the will of the Most High that the present race should still people the earth, the present order, which is so admirably adapted to their nature and necessities, will be upheld. It should be observed, at the same time, that miracles no more disturb that order than the sudden movement of the index the fiftieth part of an inch backward or forward would disturb the order of a watch. The effect upon the system is, if possible, still less; for a miracle is a suspension or counteraction of the laws of nature only in one point of infinite space. The cure of a disease, or the resurrection of a dead body, does not affect the general laws of the universe.

These remarks have prepared our way for estimating the force of the celebrated argument against miracles which Hume has founded on experience.* He maintains that the proof against them is complete, being established upon the constant experience of the immutability of the order of nature. After the view which we have taken of the subject, this will appear to be no proof at all. Assuming that for four thousand years the course of nature had not been disturbed, we have yet no certain data upon which we could conclude that it would never be disturbed. If it is subject to the control of an intelligent Being of infinite power, it is presumptuous in any man to say that no case could arise which would render it proper for him to interpose in a sensible manner. The argument from the stability of nature is a mere sophism, an inference which is not contained in the premises. But we must say something more of it. The premises are neither self-evident nor demonstrable, but assumed. The advocates of miracles affirm that the course of nature has not been immutable; and this philosopher deems it sufficient to say that it has. How did he know what has been the course of nature in past ages? He did not exist from the beginning of time; he was but of yesterday, and was indebted for his knowledge of what had happened before him, to testimony. Now this testimony told him, as it tells us, that the course of nature had not been uniform, but had been subjected to repeated interruptions; and how could he say with candour and truth that it had never been altered? It was the business of a philosopher, not to take the uniformity of nature for granted in opposition to the only evidence which he could have on the subject, but to prove, if he was able in some, other way, that its course had never undergone the interruptions which history alleged. Had this plan been adopted, we should have never heard of his boasted argument," which, with the wise and learned, would be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, would be useful as long as the world endures," namely, that as our experience of the uniformity of nature is firm and unalterable, but our experience of the truth of human testimony is variable, the evidence against miracles from the former, overwhelms and annihilates any evidence in their favour which is supposed to be afforded by the latter. He first falsifies testimony by representing it as establishing the immutability of the laws of nature, which it does not, and then opposes testimony, under the name of experience, to testimony affirming the change of those laws. We know that variable as is our experience of testimony, that is, although we find it sometimes to be true, and at other times to be false, the declaration of a single witness will often induce us to believe an event totally different from any which had fallen under our own observation. Credit is given every day to a traveller of acknowledged capacity and integrity, when he relates strange phenomena, and equally strange occurrences in the countries which he has visited. Were he indeed to affirm that he had seen a miracle, we should not be so ready to believe him: but if his report were cor

* Hume's Essays, vol. ii. Of Miracles.

† Vol. ii. p. 124.

roborated by other witnesses alike possessed of mental and moral qualifications; if they agreed, not only when brought together, but when separately examined; if they had no interest to serve by their statement, but the maintaining of it would tend to their prejudice; if they should persist in averring its truth in the midst of sufferings and in the article of death; if they would not retract, although, upon condition of doing so, they were promised their lives; there is not a man in the world who would not admit that the evidence was irresistible. This is undoubtedly a case in which, to use the language of Hume, the falsehood of their testimony would be more miraculous than the event which they relate; and then, as he admits, they might pretend to command our belief or opinion. But these are the circumstances in which the testimony to the miracles of Christianity was delivered; and consequently, we must set aside, as irrelevant, all reasoning from the uniformity of the course of

nature.

My next observation is, that a case may be conceived in which there would be a reason for the working of miracles, and it is the case in which they are alleged to have been actually wrought. If God should be pleased to make any communication to mankind for their benefit, and his own glory, there would be a necessity that he should interpose in a sensible manner. I do not say that we could have expected miracles beforehand, because we could not have known beforehand that he would make any communication of his will. But we see that amidst many things in the course of events which must be viewed as indications of severity, there are also tokens of his goodness. Notwithstanding the criminal conduct of his creatures, he makes the sun shine, and the rain fall upon them, gives them food and raiment, and innumerable blessings, and exercises mercy in relieving them from the evils which fall to their lot, and in providing the means, by the use of which their sufferings are alleviated. We could not, from these things, infer that he would proceed farther in our behalf; but if he should extend his care to our souls as well as to our bodies, it would be an extension of the benevolence already displayed in his works. It would be in conformity to the plan which he has hitherto pursued, and a farther development of it, if he should interpose to rescue fallen men from ignorance, guilt, and perdition. It would not be unworthy of him, or rather it would reflect great glory upon his character, if he should impart to them more correct views of his nature and attributes, deliver to them a plain rule of duty, point out the means of regaining his favour, and make such discoveries of the future state as would animate their obedience, console them in affliction, and raise them above the fear of death. It is certain that they have no claim to such a revelation; but the granting of it would be in accordance with the kind and compassionate nature of the providential dispensation under which they are placed. It does not follow that a revelation was strictly probable; but the reasoning shows that it was not improbable; that there was no presumption against it; nay, that there was some presumption in its favour; that is, that although nothing exactly similar had taken place, there was something so like it as to render it by no means incredible. Now, if God should be pleased to make a revelation for the instruction and happiness of his creatures, miracles were evidently necessary, because it was only by them that it could be attested. It was not to be a revelation to every individual, conveyed into his own mind with such marks of its origin as should take away all doubt; but a revelation communicated to a few, to be by them published to the world. Here, then, is a case in which miracles were called for to confirm the testimony of the ministers of heaven, to convince others that they spoke by higher autho rity than their own, and, consequently, the probability of miracles is in proportion to the probability that a revelation would be made. They are insepa rably connected; the one could not be without the other,