Demurrer to an indictment of defendant, Lewis R. Martin, for forgery in the first degree. The facts appear in the opinion. Peter Mitchell, for defendant.-Co. Crim. Pro. § 718, subd. 5, is unconstitutional because it is in conflict with the provisions of amended art. 6 of the U. S. Constitution, that the accused "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." United States v. Hills, 7 Pet. 142; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 555, 556. Peter B. Olney, district attorney, for the people. RUFUS B. COWING, City Judge.-On November 20, 1883, an indictment was filed in this court, charging the defendant, Lewis R. Martin, and others, with forgery in the first degree. The defendant, Martin, demurs to the indictment, for the reason, as alleged, that the indictment does not contain sufficient facts to constitute a crime; in that it does not set forth the name of the person whom the defendants intended to have defrauded, or assign any reason for the omission. The people have joined in the demurrer; and this court is called upon to settle the question of law thus raised. On the argument, the counsel for the defendant conceded, that the indictment sufficiently charges forgery in the first degree against the defendant, if subdivision 5 of section 718, of the Penal Code, is constitutional. This subdivision reads as follows: "Where an intent to defraud constitutes a part of a crime, it is not necessary to aver or prove an intent to defraud any particular person." In my judgment, the above section of the Penal Code is constitutional; and, therefore, the indictment need not allege an intent, on the part of the defendant, to defraud any particular person, but only to defraud in general. The statutory definition recites the general intent to defraud; and the evident intent of one who commits forgery is general, for his intent undoubtedly is, to defraud any one upon whom he can put off his forged writing or instrument. The defendant who commits forgery intends to defraud any one he can, without knowing at the time who it will be. I can see no injustice to the defendant, in making his intent, by way of allegation, as general, as is his intent, in point of fact. To be sure, the defendant is entitled to know the nature of the charge made against him: first, that he may know exactly what he is called upon to defend himself against, and to be prepared to meet, upon his trial; and second, that he may be able to plead the indictment, when he is called upon a second time to defend himself against the same charge. In my opinion this indictment is sufficiently definite to meet both of these requisites. I know of nothing, either in the constitution of this state, or in that of the United States, restricting the legislature in determining what acts shall constitute a crime or in determining, by way of procedure, what the indictment should contain, to properly set it forth; so long as it contains sufficient of allegation to warn the defendant of the nature of the accusation made against him, and to enable him to prepare his defense, and to use the indictment as a bar to a second prosecution for the same offense. I consider this indictment sufficiently definite to meet all these requirements. Judgment is ordered for the people upon the demurrer, and the defendant is allowed to answer over. I Court of General Sessions-New York County. January, 1884. PEOPLE v. BOYLE. SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE. The Court of General Sessions of the City and County of New York has no jurisdiction to discharge a prisoner committed by a police magistrate in default of giving the undertaking required by section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to keep the peace. Motion to discharge the defendant Thomas Boyle, who is in custody in default of giving an order taking to keep the peace. Peter B. Olney, district attorney, for the people. RUFUS B. COWING, City Judge.-It appears from the complaint upon which the proceedings were initiated, that the defendant, on the 18th of December, 1883, threatened to kill the complainant, his wife; and by the commitment, that the magistrate, before whom the proceedings were pending, committed the defendant to the city prison in default of bail, until he should be discharged by due course of law. The counsel for the defendant claims and insists that this court is the proper forum for him to move for his discharge; while the district attorney insists that this court, under the circumstances, has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the motion. Where a person has been arrested for threatening a breach of the peace, and has given an undertaking, as required by section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there can be no doubt but that this court has jurisdiction to discharge the defendant under certain circumstances; but I fail to find any where, in sections 84 to 99 inclusive, any express authority given to this court to entertain jurisdiction of the proceeding, where the defendant has been committed by the magistrate, in default of the giving the undertaking required by section 89. Under the law of this State, as it existed before the Code, and as declared in the Revised Statutes, when a person was arrested and brought before the magistrate, charged with threatening a breach of the peace, Colby says, at pages 84 and 85 of his work, that there is no examination, or trial, of the party arrested; and that he is not permitted to be heard, either personally or by counsel; he must either enter into the undertaking or be committed. But sections 87 and 88, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, have changed the law; so that the magistrate may proceed to examine the charge, and determine upon evidence, whether it is well founded, or not; and if not, may discharge the defendant. It may be, that the legislature intended that this court should have power, to discharge the defendant, where he is committed for want of filing the undertaking, required by section 89, the same as where the undertaking is given. But if so intended, I find it nowhere so expressed, in words; and therefore, inasmuch as it appears, that the defendant stands committed in default of giving the undertaking, required by section 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, I have come to the conclusion, that this court has no power to discharge the defendant. The motion is denied. Supreme Court-General Term-Fourth Department. January, 1884. PEOPLE v. BORK. PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF PROCEEDINGS OF COURT.- The prisoner was sentenced May 3, 1883, by a Court of Oyer and Terminer, held by a justice of the Supreme Court, and also by two justices of Sessions, as appears by the caption of the minutes kept by the clerk, and by the judgment entered by him. The defendant did not object at the time to the constitution of the court, but claims for the first time on appeal that the judgment and sentence were void because the court should have been held by a Supreme Court justice alone, as required by Co. Crim. Pro. § 23. Held, that it may properly be assumed, especially in the absence of objection by defendant, that when the Court of Oyer and Terminer was held in the proper place by a justice of this court, as the law requires, that a regular court was held as the law directs, and that if the caption contains a recital not authorized by law, it may be disregarded as surplusage, or as a technical error which does not effect the rights of defendant. (BARKER, J., dissenting.) Therefore, under the provisions of Co. Crim. Pro. § 542, that the appellate court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or defects, the judgment and sentence must be affirmed. Defendant was tried and convicted under L. 1875, ch. 19 (the "Peculation Act"), of which section 3 provides, "When rendering a verdict of guilty upon the trial of any person indicted under this act, the jury may find and state with their verdict, the amount of loss resulting from the offense of the defendant." Held, that the statute is permissive only, and that a sentence upon a conviction thereunder may be lawfully imposed without any such finding in the verdict. (Per BARKER, J.) Appeal by the defendant, Joseph Bork, from a judgment of the Court of Oyer and Terminer, of Erie County, May 3, 1881, convicting defendant, on an indictment found November |