trine which Lord Hardwicke wished to establish, was this; that any alteration of the estate, or conveyance to uses, after making the will, though the old use remained, which was the case here, was in law a revocation of the will. That supposing in this case Sir T. C. had merely made a conveyance to the use of himself and his heirs for ever, that would undoubtedly have operated as a revocation of his will; then could the other uses to which he conveyed the estate make any alteration. He said it had been supposed in the course of the argument, that the case of Brydges v. Chandos proceeded on equitable principles; but he knew that the Lord Chancellor meant by that decision to confirm the doctrine established by Lord Hardwicke. He concluded by saying, "I do not enter into the reasons upon which all the cases have been determined; because the best rule is stare decisis. But my opinion is formed upon the authority of all the cases from the time of Lord Rolle. Such were the opinions of Lord Trevor, Lord Hardwicke, and Lord Mansfield; the latter of whom, though finding fault with former decisions, thought himself fettered by the authorities. I take it therefore that the law of the land is now clearly and indisputably fixed, if at any time it can be fixed; that where the whole estate is conveyed away to uses, though the ultimate reversion of it comes back again to the grantor by the same instrument, it operates as a revocation of a prior will. That being the law, I am bound, how unfortunate soever it may be in this case, to give my opinion in favour of the defendant ; and consequently the judgment of the Court of C. B. must be affirmed." The cause coming on again in the Court of Chan- 3 Ves Jun. cery upon the equity reserved, the Court was 682. Vawser v. 16 Ves. 519. Vide 7 Bro. Parl. Ca. 593. Att. General v. Vigor, 8 Ves. 256. Rawlins v. 382. Parol Evi dence not admissible. 2 Ves. Jun. 606. 2 H. Black. 516. clearly of opinion, that the will was revoked in equity, as well as at law, and decreed accordingly. And on an appeal to the House of Lords, the decree was affirmed. 80. It was resolved in a modern case, that a devise was revoked by an exchange; though the. land, after the death of the devisor, was restored to his heir, under an arrangement, in consequence of a defect discovered in the title of the other party to the exchange. 81. In the case of a revocation, by the execution of a conveyance of lands, subsequent to a devise of them, parol evidence is not admissible to prove that the testator meant his will should remain in force, and unrevoked by the subsequent conveyance. 82. In Goodtile v. Otway, the plaintiff went into evidence, in the Court of Chancery, of the testator's conversations with his lady and the attorney who prepared all the instruments, to show the motives for making the will; and that the testator had no intention to revoke it; and after the marriage referred to it as his will. But the Lord Chancellor was clearly of opinion, that the parol evidence, being evidence of a republication, if any thing, could not be received. That if the deed did not affect the will at law, it was out of the question; if it did, he could not set up the will again by parol evidence. 83. Upon the trial at bar of the above case, in the Court of Common Pleas, the same evidence was offered; bnt the Court refused to admit it. Lord Chief Justice Eyre said, it was manifest from the opening, that it was intended to be insisted on, that by the necessary operation of the conveyances used, Sir T. C. lost his old estate, upon which the will operated, and took a new one. If so, the con sequence was, that though there were the clearest démonstration that it was his intent, that the will: should operate upon it, the law said it should not; and by that law they were bound. If this was a case of that kind, it was a case that would disappoint the will, even admitting the clearest intention that it should not. All evidence therefore of intent seemed to him entirely foreign to the question; all such evidence therefore must be rejected; and the question tried upon its true legal grounds. Mr. J. Buller observed, that in order to determine whether the evidence was or was not admissible, the Court was to consider to whom it was to be applied. If the question was, whether the testator was incapacitated, or the instructions given were duly followed, the evidence would be admissible. But here the end proposed by it was, to show that the deeds should have a different construction from that which the words imported. That there was a great difference between cases which depended on circumstances, and those which depended on the solemn acts done by the party himself; and that distinction supported the case of Brady v. Cubitt. ante. There was no act in that case done by the testator, importing that he meant to revoke his will, or change it any respect; but changes having happened in his family by marriage, and the birth of a child, there was a presumption of revocation; and therefore it was to answer that presumption, that the Court received parol evidence. But he could not find, from any one case quoted at the bar, that the Court had received parol evidence in the case of a deed executed by the party himself, with a view of altering the construction of the instrument. A Fraudulent Conveyance vocation. 84. A conveyance obtained by fraud will not is not a Re- operate as a revocation of a prior devise; because, when such a conveyance is set aside, it is considered as a mere nullity. Hawes v. Wyatt, vide 6 Ves. 215. 8 Ves. 283. 85. Francis Hawes being seised of a reversion in 3 Bro.R. 156. fee, subject to the life interest of his father, made his will, and thereby disposed of it. The testator's father afterwards obtained from him a conveyance of 2Cox R. 263. his reversion by fraud. The Court of Chancery havWright v. ing directed the deed to be delivered up, to be canLittler, Burr. 1244. celled, said it was no deed; and therefore could not operate as a revocation of the will. Nor an Alteration of the Quality of the Estate. 1 Roll. Ab. 616. pl. 3. 86. A mere alteration of the quality of an estate, without any intention of varying the quantity of the interest, or the disposing power of the owner, will not operate as a revocation. 87. Thus where a man having feoffees to his use, before the statute 27 Hen. VIII., devised the lands to another, and afterwards the feoffees made a feoffment of the land to the devisor; it was agreed that this feoffment did not operate as a revocation of the devise for after the feoffment, the devisor had the same use as before. 88. It follows from this case, that the acquisition of the legal estate alone, will not operate as a revo 3 Atk. 749. cation of a devise. Thus Lord Hardwicke has said, that where a man has an equitable interest in fee in an estate, and afterwards takes a conveyance of the legal estate, to the same uses; this is no revocation. Williams v. 2 Ves. Jun. 89. G. Jones by articles, in consideration of marriage, covenanted to convey all his real estates to trustees, to the use of himself for life, remainder in trust to secure an annuity to his intended wife for life, remainder to the first and other sons of the marriage in tail, re mainder to the daughters in the same manner, remainder to his own right heirs. Some time after, G. Jones devised all his real estates, upon condition that he should have no issue, to his wife for life, with several remainders over. Afterwards, by indentures of lease and release, G. Jones, in pursuance of the said articles, and in consideration of the said marriage, bargained, sold, and confirmed to trustees and their heirs, all his said real estates, to hold to certain uses and trusts, which were exactly the same as those expressed in the articles. Sir R. P. Arden, M. R. said, the simple question was, whether a man having an equitable estate, devising it, and taking to himself afterwards nothing more than the legal interest in that, in which he before had the equitable, has by that simple act, going no farther, not modifying it, nor passing to the devisee any thing more than what was before given, revoked his will. He did think that had been decided, both in principle and in precedent; but he was not sure one of the counsel was not right in saying, it had not been exactly decided. But cases seemed to have been taken for granted at least, which completely proved it. It was stated by Lord Hardwicke in ante. Parsons v. Freeman, and repeated by him in Sparrow 3 Atk. 798. v. Hardcastle, in which this question, as to the effect a subsequent deed would have upon a will, was much discussed; that taking the legal estate, after a devise of the equitable interest, was no revocation; and it was admitted by Lord Loughborough in Brydges v. Chandos. Lord Hardwicke not only admitted, but seemed to consider it as decided and acted upon if so, the case was determined, for this was nothing more than taking the legal estate exactly in the same manner as he was before seised of the |