2 Ves. Jun. 106. But where a person, after having made his Kenyon v. will, executed a conveyance in trust for payment of Sutton, debts in a schedule, and instead of declaring the uses 600. to himself in fee, after payment of the debts, he declared that the trustees should convey to such uses and purposes as he by deed or will should appoint; and for default of appointment, to himself in fee. This was held to be a revocation. Charman, 107. It was decreed by Sir W. Grant in a late Charman v. case, that a devise was not revoked by a bankruptcy; 14 Ves. 580. because the bankrupt laws take the property out of the bankrupt only for the purpose of paying his creditors; and from the moment that the debts are paid, the assignees are mere trustees for the bankrupt, and can be called upon to convey to him. ofLeaseholds. 108. With respect to leasehold estates, it has been Revocations long settled, that a surrender of a lease for lives, and the taking a new lease, will operate as a revocation of a former devise; for the testator, by the surrender, divests himself of his whole estate in the old lease, and acquires a new estate by the renewal. Turner, 109. Sir H. Marwood being seised of an estate for Marwood v. three lives, held of the Archbishop of York, made his will, by which he devised this lease. He afterwards 163. surrendered it and took a new lease. It was resolved that this surrender and renewal operated as a revocation of the devise of the lease; for by the surrender the testator had put all out of him, had divested himself of the whole interest; so that there being nothing left for the devise to work upon, the will must fall and the new purchase being of a freehold descendible, could not pass by a will made before 2 Atk. 597. such purchase. 110. Where a person has an estate pur auter vie, at the time of making his will, and afterwards pur Galton v. Hancock, ante, c. 3. $36. Abney v. 2 Atk. 593. Rudstone v. 1 Bro. Rep. 261. chases the inheritance; it is a revocation of any devise of the estate pur auter vie. 111. Although a term for years, acquired after the making of a will, passes by it; yet if a testator bequeaths a term for years, of which he is then possessed, and afterwards surrenders it, and takes a new term; this will operate as a revocation, or ademption of the bequest; and the new term will be considered as part of the personal estate. 112. A person devised two college leases for years to his mother, upon certain trusts. The testator afterwards surrendered the two college leases, and accepted two new leases of the same premises; but the last was not sealed with the college seal till after the death of the testator. Lord Hardwicke decreed that the bequest of the first lease was revoked; but that of the second lease was not. 113. If, however, the words of the will show the testator's intention to dispose of all terms for years, whereof he may die possessed, a renewed term will pass; for a term for years being only a chattel, there is no necessity for a possession at the time when a 3 Atk. 174. will of it is made, or of a continuance of such pos Carte v.Carte Stirling v. 3 Atk. 199. session till the testator's death. 114. A person devised in the following words: "As to all and singular my leasehold estate, goods, chattels, and personal estate whatsoever, I give the same to my daughter." The testator, after making his will, renewed a lease for years with the Dean and Chapter of Windsor. Lord Hardwicke said, that what the testator had done in this case was not a revocation. Suppose the testator had purchased a new lease, would not that have passed? why then should not a new term in a lease equally pass ? 16 Ves. 197. 115. A person devised to S. S. her leasehold Slatter v. Noton, garden, &c. for the term of his life, and after his decease to his children. After the publication of the will, the testatrix surrendered the lease, and took a new one. The question was, whether the bequest was revoked. a Sir W. Grant, M. R. said the question was, whether a specific devise of a leasehold estate was affected by a renewal of the lease, subsequent to the will. The ground upon which in many cases it had been held that renewed leases did not pass to the specific devisee was, that the thing given no longer existed. But as testator might undoubtedly dispose of the future, as well as his present interest in a chattel real, it was a question of intention, what the subject of disposition was; whether only the interest which he had at the time of executing the will, or all the interest, though subsequently acquired, which he might have at his death, in the leasehold premises. That intention was to be collected from the words used by the testator to express it; there were no words prospective or future to take in any interest which the testatrix might subsequently acquire in the leasehold; and therefore the renewal operated as a revocation of the bequest: and decreed accordingly. 116. In the case of Darley v. Langworthy, the testator devised a term for years, in trust that the same might go unto and be enjoyed by the owner and possessor of his freehold estate thereby devised. The Court of Chancery decreed, that the bequest 3 Bro. Parl. of the leasehold was revoked by the revocation of Ca. 365. the devise of the freehold. But this was reversed by the House of Lords. 10. Unless confined to Lands de- 17. A Surrender of a Copyhold Nature and SECTION 1. S a will of lands is ambulatory during the life of the testator, and may be revoked by him at any time before his death, so it may be republished: and a republication of a will has a twofold effect; first to give it all the effect of a will made at the time of its republication, and secondly to set up and re-establish a will that has been revoked. Re-execution 2. The first mode of republishing a will is by a is a Republi- re-execution of it; and although it was held before the statute of frauds, that any words importing an cation. Martin v. intention to republish a will, amounted to a republication; yet it is now settled, that an express republication of a will must be attended with the same circumstances that are necessary to its first publication; for otherwise the statute of frauds would be evaded. Litton v. Cha. 90. 3. It was formerly held, that since the statute of And also a frauds there could be no devise of lands by an Codicil. implied republication, for the paper in which the Fakland, devise was contained ought to be re-executed. But 3 Rep. in it was afterwards determined, that a codicil duly Lansdowne's attested, and annexed to a will, or referring to a will, case, 10 Mod. should operate as a republication of such will, so as to make it take effect from the execution of the codicil; by which means lands purchased after the execution of the will, and before the execution of the codicil, pass by the will. 9 96. 4. A person by a codicil executed according to the statute of frauds, reciting that he had made his will, added,—“I hereby ratify and confirm my said will, except in the alterations after mentioned." It was decreed, that the testator's signing and publishing this codicil, in the presence of three witnesses, was a republication of his will, and both together made but one will; and therefore that lands purchased after the execution of the will, and before that of the codicil, passed by the will. And upon an appeal to the House of Lords, the decree was affirmed. 1 Ves. 437. 5. A testator by a codicil, written on the back of Potter v. his will, gave additional legacies and annuities, rati- Potter, fying and confirming his will; this was attested by three witnesses in these words :-"This will, with the several additions and alterations above, was signed, sealed, and republished by the testator, as his last will and testament, in the presence of us the subseribing witnesses." He afterwards made another codicil, which, though not dated, was agreed to have been made about four or five days before his death, in the presence of three witnesses, reciting that having in his will appointed several limitations and |