wheresoever, after payment of debts, legacies, and funeral expences, he gave to his wife for her own use and benefit, for ever, and appointed her his sole executrix. The wife enjoyed under the will for her life, and after her death the son enjoyed for his life, and died without having had issue. Upon a suit in Chancery to establish the will, one of the questions was, whether Richard Russell the son took an estate tail, or for life only, under the will. Lord Thurlow said, it was clear to him that the testator intended, and he thought had pretty plainly expressed, a contingency with a double aspect: in one case, to the children of the son; in the other, to the other persons pointed out to the children of the son in one way, to the other parties in another, viz. by settling it so as to distribute it among the great number of persons who might come within that description. The limitation to the son and his issue would be an estate tail, and perhaps the aptest way of describing an estate tail according to the statute; but it was clear he did not intend it to go to them as heirs in tail, for he meant they should take distributively, and according to proportions to be fixed by the son. It had often been decided, in other cases beside those mentioned at the bar, that where there was a gift in that way, the parties must take as purchasers, for there was no other way for them to take. The immediate consequence of this was, that Richard Russell could only take for life; and the consequence of that was, that this was a gift to the wife for life, then to the son for life, and after to his issue, in such distributive shares as he should appoint. It was then said that this might be interpreted to be a gift to the son in tail, with a power annexed to raise a future use upon it, of the description mentioned. As to that, he apprehended that in case there had been children of the son, it was not intended to be left in his power to determine whether he should or should not consider it as his own, and raise a future use if he pleased; but the disposition gave an interest to his children, and a title to insist upon an estate in the premises so given, at all events; and then the son had no authority, but as to the proportions in which they were to take; but not to choose whether any thing should be given to them or not. Then the effect was like all other gifts to persons in remainder capable of being divided, but if not, equally; and that was the necessary consequence of the supposition he mentioned before, that he intended to vest an interest in the children of his son, independently of the son, except as to the proportions; and that even so as that they should not be illusory. It was observed that the word issue would extend to grand-children or any other degree of kindred, however remote ; he thought it would be so, but only in this point of view, as a description of the objects among whom the power of the son was to obtain, to make such partition as he should think fit; and whosoever they were, they must be in existence during the life of the son, and he must have made it during his life; if so, it was of no consequence how they were described, for if it vested in him, it was of no consequence to say they were not the immediate descendants of the son. It was an estate devised upon two alternative contingencies; one, that there were objects capable of taking under the first limitation; another, that there were none such, but that there were objects capable of taking under the second. As to its being an estate tail by implication, it was contrary to reason and to common sense to impute that intention Reid v. A Devise Words of to him, if only arising from his not having made a special devise of the estate in that form. The estate he was directing to be sold, and the estate supposed to be given to the son in tail, were the same; and if so given, it could not be sold by this power, and did not come within the range of what he had before directed: it was plain, therefore, he did not intend an estate tail; and he was himself clear upon that point. Decreed an estate for life. 9. Where no words of limitation are added to a without any devise, and there are no other words from which an intention to give an estate of inheritance can be collected, the devisee will take only an estate for life. Limitation. 1 Roll. Ab. 844. 1 Roll. Rep. 369. 1 Mod. 100. Price v. Archb. of Canterbury, 14 Ves. 364. 10. If a man devise in this manner; "I devise Blackacre to my daughter F. and the heirs of her body begotten. Item, I devise unto my said daughter Whiteacre." The daughter shall have but an estate for life in Whiteacre: for the word item is not so much as in the same manner. But if a person devise Blackacre to one in tail, and also Whiteacre, the devisee shall have an estate tail in Whiteacre also; for this is all one sentence, and so the words which make the limitation of the estate go to both. A person devised in these words: "I give and bequeath to H. my farm and lands at R., to him, his heirs and assigns for ever. And I also give and bequeath to the said H. my farm and manor of E.” Lord Eldon said, the only question upon this devise was, whether the word also had precisely the same operation as the addition of the words, his heirs and assigns for ever, in the devise of the other estate immediately preceding; and it seemed to him that all the old rules against disinheriting an heir, except by plain words or necessary implication were gone, if such a construction was to prevail. Decreed an estate for life. v. Cook, 11. One Hawkins being seised in fee of three Pettywood houses, devised them to his wife for life, the re- Cro. Eliz. 52. mainder of one to Robert his son and his heirs, the 2 Leon. 129. remainder of another to Christian his daughter and her heirs, and of the third to Joan his daughter and her heirs; and did further will, that if any of them died without issue, then the survivors should enjoy totam illam partem, equally divided between them." It was resolved, that the survivor only took an estate for life in the share of the others. Bence, Cro. Car.368. 12. A person having three sons, B. C. and D., Spirt v. devised lands to B. in tail, remainder to C. in fee, and other lands to C. in tail, remainder to D. in tail; and then other lands to D. in fee. He afterwards said, "Item, I give Blackacre to my said son D.; item, I give to my said son D. Whiteacre. Also I will that all bargains, grants, &c. which I have from J. S., my son D. shall enjoy, and his heirs for ever; and for lack of heirs of his body, to my son C. for ever." It was agreed by all the Judges that the bargains and grants, &c. only were entailed; and that D. had but an estate for life in Blackacre and Whiteacre. 13. A person devised a house to his sons James and Thomas, and the heirs of their bodies, in equal moieties; and then added, but my will and mind is, that if any of my said children shall die before 21, or unmarried, the part or share of him or her so dying shall go over to the survivors. Lord Holt was of opinion that Thomas dying unmarried, his moiety went over to the survivor, and that by the devise over, only an estate for life passed. Woodward v. 2 Vern. 388. Roe v.Holms, 14. In the case of Cook v. Cook, which has been stated in Ch. 10. § 44, Lord Cowper held, that the issue of J. S. only took an estate for life. 15. A person devised a copyhold estate to his 2 Wils. R. 80. daughter Jane, her heirs and assigns for ever; but in case his said daughter died before she attained the age of 21 years, and had no issue, then his will was, that his nephew J. Hardisty should have his said copyhold lands and tenements. Right v. Russell, cited Doug. 761. Roe v. The Court was clearly of opinion that J. Hardisty took only an estate for life: that the testator by his devise to Jane plainly understood the force of words of limitation; and if he had intended to give his nephew more than an estate for life, he knew how to have done it that there were no express words in the will that gave the nephew a fee, nor any manifest intention to do so, or to disinherit the heir at law. 16. A will began with these words, "As touching the disposition of such temporal estate as it has pleased God to bestow on me." And then the testator proceeded to give his house to his son S. Russell, and after his death then to the two sons of Samuel, named Thomas and William; and gave a legacy of one shilling to the husband of his heir at law. It was resolved by the Court of Exchequer, that Thomas and William took only estates for life. 17. B. C. being seised and possessed of freehold and leasehold property, lying contiguous, and demised together, devised to his wife all his freehold and leasehold messuages, &c. and all his estate and interest therein, for and during her natural life; and after her decease he devised the said messuages to his sisters in law, M. S. and M. B., as tenants in common; but in case his mother should give any disturbance to |