umes (1793-96). Leach made many improvements in the text; he corrected the headings, inserted the names of the judges at the beginning of each term, and modernized the references. In former editions a variety of cases without any names were often crowded together in such a confused mass as to be practically undistinguishable. Leach separated these cases under the title "Anonymous." Beside contributing many notes and references he added a large number of cases. As thus corrected the work was much improved; but the volumes are still wanting in accuracy and completeness, and, moreover, vary greatly in value. The second, sixth, and twelfth, for instance, have often been cited with commendation, while the reputation of the fourth, eighth, and eleventh is particularly bad. The arrangement of the contents of the work is disorderly and confusing in the extreme. The first two volumes, containing both law and equity cases, deal with the reign of Charles II.; the third mainly with the reign of James II.; the fourth and fifth, during William III.'s reign, and the sixth, during Anne's, are made up of decisions by Chief Justice Holt; volume seven completes Anne's reign and contains decisions of Chief Justices Hardwicke and Lee in the King's Bench from the sixth to the eighteenth years of George II.; volume eight contains King's Bench decisions. from the eighth to the twelfth years of George I., during the service of Chief Justice Pratt; the ninth volume is made up entirely of chancery cases, containing Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's decrees from the eighth to the eleventh years of George I., and Hardwicke's from the tenth to the twenty-eighth years of George II. ; the tenth, extending from the eighth year of Anne to the eleventh year of George I., is made up of decisions by Macclesfield in law and in chancery; the eleventh gives Holt's decisions during the first eight years of Anne's reign, and Chief Justice Pratt's from the fourth year of George I. to the fourth year of George II.; and the last volume is given to Holt's cases in the reign of William III. This collection of reports, notwithstanding its deficiencies, has perhaps been cited oftener in modern times than any other seventeenth century report. Many of the best known early cases are scattered through these volumes.

The inaccuracies of Shower (1678-94), who gives some good cases, have been somewhat remedied in subsequent editions. Some of Sir Orlando Bridgman's excellent opinions in the Common Pleas are preserved in the reports bearing his name (1660-67). Vaughan's reports (1665-74) from the same court deal principally with the labors of the judge of this name; Lutwyche (1683-1702)

also records some Common Pleas cases from the latter part of the seventeenth century. Among the minor reports of this time, beside J. Kelyng's brief collection of criminal cases (1662–69), are several of little if any value: Carter (1664-85), Comberbach (1685– 99), and Carthew (1686-1701). Since almost all the cases printed by Skinner (1681-98) had appeared in prior reports this work is seldom cited.

Some of the ante-Revolutionary reports exhibit technical learning of a high order; but it must be admitted that they are not easy reading. The cumbersome system of feudal tenure, with which the vast proportion of the cases prior to the Restoration are concerned, was at best unpromising material.1 After the Restora

1 Coke's work affords abundant examples of the verbose and pedantic judicial utterances of early times. On the other hand, Chief Justice Crewe's remarks on the honors of De Vere (W. Jones, 101) is one of the rare specimens of stately eloquence: "I have labored to make a covenant with myself that affection may not press upon judgment; for I suppose that there is no man that hath any apprehension of gentry and nobleness but his affection stands to the continuance of so noble a name and house, and would take hold of a twig or a twine thread to uphold it. And yet Time has his revolutions; there must be an end of all temporal things, — finis rerum; an end of names and dignities and whatsoever is terrene; and why not of De Vere? For where is Bohun? Where is Mowbray? Where is Mortimer? Nay, which is more and most of all, where is Plantagenet? They are entombed in the urns and sepulchres of mortality. And yet let the name and dignity of De Vere stand so long as it pleaseth God." The judges were particularly sententious in their use of analogy, as where Hobart contrasts the common and statute law by saying that "the statute is like a tyrant: where he comes he makes all things void; but the common law is like a nursing father, and makes void only that part where the fault is and leaves the rest." Biblical citations and analogies abound. One of the most curious instances of scriptural allusion is Lord Ellesmere's reference to the dissenting opinion of his two dissenting brethren in the case of the Post-nati: "The apostle Thomas doubted of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ when all the rest of the apostles did firmly believe it; but this his doubting confirmed in the whole church the faith of the resurrection. The two learned and worthy judges who have doubted in this case, as they bear his name, so I doubt not but their doubting hath given occasion to cleare the doubt in others, and so to confirme in both the kingdomes, both for the present and the future, the truth of the judgment in this case." There is every evidence that these legal luminaries were devoid of a sense of humor. It has been suggested that Shakespeare derived part of the humorous colloquy between the grave-diggers in Hamlet from Chief Justice Dyer's serious discourse in Hales v. Petit, Plowden 262. Sir Thomas Bromley's diverting argument in Sharington v. Stratton, Plowden 303, upon the distinction between brotherly love and mere acquaintance as a sufficient consideration to raise a use in land, is a good specimen of the exhaustive ingenuity with which discussions were pursued at the bar. See, also, in the same volume, the report of the agreement between counsel, in the case of Clere v. Brook, 442, as to the basis of the preference of males to females in the law of descent. On rare occasions a reporter is moved to display his wit. "One Mr. Guye Faux, of the parish of Leathley, a cavalier, had a cause heard about a plunder upon Monday this week after dinner, and was well

tion the reports increase in interest. The radical reforms in the law of real property, and the slow but steady amelioration during the latter half of the seventeenth century of common law doctrines and procedure, in consequence of the interference of the chancellor, gradually brought within the purview of the common law remedial measures which had theretofore been recognized only in equity. For instance, the introduction in the reign of Charles II. of new trials with reference to the evidence, obviated recourse to equity in cases like that which had brought about the conflict between Coke and Ellesmere.

Although these early reports, with few exceptions, are now seldom cited in practical work, their historical value can hardly be overestimated. Reports that are almost worthless as judicial records often throw valuable side-lights upon early practice and procedure;1 not infrequently they supply interesting illustrations of the social life of the time.2

The Revolution forms almost as distinctive an epoch in legal as

in court, and damages a hundred pounds awarded, and he was found dead next morning, upon the conceit of it, as was supposed." (Clayton's Assize Cases 116.)

1 One is struck by the interminable arguments. Plowden speaks of cases having "hung in argument eight, ten, and twelve terms." Considering the wide range of the arguments, the consumption of time must have been enormous. For instance, the case of Stowell v. Zouche, in Plowden, was argued twice in the Common Bench and then twice in the Exchequer Chamber before all the judges. Calvin's case, in Coke, was argued first at the King's Bench bar by counsel and then in the Exchequer Chamber, first by counsel and then by all the judges; it was afterward twice argued by counsel and then upon four successive days at the next term by all the judges, and thereafter, at another term, by all the judges on four successive days. It was not until Mansfield's time that this habit of reargument was suppressed.

Jury service in early times was plainly no sinecure. "And for that a certain box of preserved barbaries, and sugar called sugar candy, and sweet roots called liquorish" was found on one of the jurors in the consultation room he was fined twenty shillings (Plowden 518). "The judge did put back the jury twice because they offered their verdict contrary to their evidence, as he held, and set a hundred pounds fine upon one of the jury who had departed from his companions; but after, upon examination, it was taken off again, for that it did appear it was only by reason of the crowd and some of his fellows were always with him." (Clayton's Assize Cases 31.) The case of King v. Buckenham, Keble, 751, illustrates the severity with which early courts protected their dignity.

It is apparent from an entry in Birks v. Tippetts, 1 Saunders, 33 b, that certain professional characteristics do not change materially from century to century: "Twisden, Justice, interrupted Saunders, and said to him, ' What makes you labor so? The court is of your opinion and the matter is clear.'"

2 For instance, pages 266 to 298 of W. Jones's reports contain "notes taken at a justice seat in the forest at Windsor," forming a quaint record of litigation between Lord Lovelace, Sir Charles Howard, and others, in the time of Charles I., concerning their "deeres and dogges."

in political history. In the passing of the despotism of the Stuarts, and the consequent acknowledgment and definition of civil and political liberty, the judiciary acquired a stability which has never been shaken. The judges have ever since held their office during good behavior instead of at the sovereign's pleasure, and their removal could only be effected by the crown upon the address of both houses of Parliament. The turning point in judicial affairs at the Revolution is clearly marked. Of the notorious instruments of usurpation and violence, the dethroned king's chancellor was in the Tower and his chief justice in Newgate. On the other hand, the new era was opened by the appointment of one of the ablest and best of chief justices, Sir John Holt, to succeed Wright, one of the worst; and from this time no address has ever been voted by either house of Parliament with a view to the displacement of an English judge.

From the Revolution the reports increase in value and importance; they deal more with modern conditions. The development of commerce, and the consequent variety and importance of personal property and of contracts, the growth of maritime jurisprudence, the development of equity, and the general introduction of more liberal and enlightened views of justice and public policy, all combined to give a new tone and impulse to the common law.

It is a great misfortune that the labors of the distinguished jurist whose character and career exemplified the best features of the new era should have been so inadequately preserved. Reference has already been made to the reports of Chief Justice Holt's cases in Modern. Holt's term is covered, in addition, by Salkeld (16891712), Lord Raymond (1694-1734), and Comyns (1695-1741). The first two volumes of Salkeld (the third volume being a mere collection of detached notes of cases from other reports) were published under the supervision of Lord Hardwicke, and enjoy a good reputation; yet the reports are too brief to be clear, and many of the cases are taken at second hand. Lord Raymond's reports of Holt's decisions are of excellent authority. After Holt's death Raymond seems to have relaxed his efforts. His third volume contains the pleadings at large. Comyn's reports are posthumous, and are not as reputable as his digest. In addition to the volumes above mentioned, some of Holt's cases may be found in Carthew (1686-1700), and Levinz (1660-97), both of poor reputation, and in the appendix to Kelyng's criminal cases. The volume entitled Temp. Holt (1688-1710) is mainly an abridgment of Holt's decisions by Giles Jacob, Pope's "blunderbus of the law."

During the first dozen years of George II.'s reign we have several new reports: Barnardiston (1726-35), Fitzgibbon (1727-32), W. Kelynge (1731-36), Barnes (1732-60), Ridgeway (1733-37), Lee (1733-38), Cunningham (1734-36), Andrews (1737-39), and Willes (1737-60), —most of them, unfortunately, of inferior workmanship. Most of the cases in Cunningham, Ridgeway, 7th Modern, and Lee's Cases Temp. Hardwicke, are apparently all taken from the same manuscript; yet they are our main reliance for Hardwicke's services in the King's Bench.

Fortescue (1695-1738) and Strange (1715-48) are of fair repute. Fortescue is partial to his own opinions, which are characterized by more solicitude of taste than power of thought. Strange was master of the rolls and the colleague of Hardwicke, some of whose arguments at the bar and common law decisions he reports. His reports are quite modern in form. Cooke's Common Pleas reports, which are frequently cited, are mostly practice cases. Gilbert's Cases in Common Law and Equity (containing, however, no equity cases) cover the term of Chief Justice Parker. Bunbury (1713-42) and Parker (1743-67) together form a consecutive chronicle of the Exchequer under George I., George II., and the first seven years of George III. Bunbury's reports are mere notes, but they were taken in court by Bunbury himself, and were afterward edited by his son-in-law, Sergeant Wilson.

Willes's reports of his own opinions as chief justice of the Common Pleas are highly authoritative. Although published after Willes's death, they appear to have been carefully prepared by this learned judge, and they were afterward revised and edited by Durnford, the editor of the Term Reports. This volume also contains some cases in the House of Lords. Willes's excellent reports are little if at all superior to those prepared by Wilson (1743-74). This very accurate work records the labors of such distinguished judges as Wilmot, Willes, and De Grey, and is of great value. Sir William Blackstone's miscellaneous collection of cases (1746-79), extending over a period of thirty-three years, do not display the care that we should expect from the celebrated commentator. Wilmot's opinions (1757-70) contain decisions by this learned judge not reported elsewhere. Foster's small collection of criminal cases (1743-61), the work of a very eminent authority in criminal law, is of the highest authority as far as it goes. The collection of notes published in Kenyon's name (1753-60) came from a genuine manuscript, but was probably not designed for publication.