CHAPTER 113. Order on John Websters Petition in Regard to an action of Trespass. UPON READING a Petition of John Webster of Hampton, Setting forth That in an Action of Trespass brought against him by Cpt. John Wadleigh of Salisbury for Cutting Thatch or Sedge in a certain Piece of Marish Ground belonging to the Petitioner, lying in the Township of Hampton within the Province of New-Hampshire, three Miles & a Quarter distant from Merimack River in any Part thereof, depending in the Inf Court within the County of Essex, under Advisemt upon the Petitioners Plea to the Jurisdiction ; Praying the Cause may be superseded, The Line betwixt the two Provinces not being adjusted & settled; Ordered that the said Cause be superseded for six Months next Coming, And that the Justices of the Court govern them selves accordingly. CHAPTER 120. Ord" on Joshua Seeknouts Petition in Regard to a Judgment by Default against him. UPON READING a Petition of Joshua Suckenot Indian Sachem of the Island of Chepaquidock in Dukes County, Praying that a Cause lately given against him by Default in the Inferiour Court of Common Pleas holden at Edgar Town in the said County in an Action of Trespass brought against Nicholas & Phinehas Norton by John Norton before Benjamin Skiffe Esq' one of her Majesties Justices on the eighteenth of August 1712, Where the Petitioner at his Request was admitted Defendt & obtained Judgemt for Costs From wch the said John Norton appealed to the Inf Court afore said & there obtained the Judgemt by Default; Praying that the said Cause may be brought to the next Sup' Court of Judicature to be holden at Plimouth & that the said John Norton be obliged there to appear, that the Issue between him & the Petitioner may be there tryed; Ordered that the Prayer of the Petition be granted, That the Cause be brought to the next Superiour Court of Judicature to be holden at Plimouth & that an Ord1 be drawn accordingly.1 1 In the following January Seeknout petitioned the legislature for the order which was to be drawn in his favor, and received it in these terms :— "Ordered that the Prayer of the Petition be granted, & That the Court receive & hear the Cause accordingly the Petitioner Causing the adverse Party to be served with a copy of this Order by the Sheriff or his Deputy fifteen Days at the least before the Sitting of the said Court." Legislative Records of the Council, ix. 255 CHAPTER 150. Resolve allowing Banisters Petition for an appeal from a Judgment. UPON READING a Petition of Thomas Banister of Boston Mercht Praying Relief for that at a late Inferiour Court of Common Pleas held at Boston for & within the County of Suffolk a Judgement was entered up by Default against the Goods & Effects of Jeremiah Garvan Merchant in Fayal in the Hands of the Petitioner as Factor for the said Garvan at the Suit of Moses Bow, the Petitioner being summoned to appear & answer to the said Suit, agreable to the Act entituled An Act to enable Creditors to receive their just Debts out of the Effects of their absent or absconding Debtors, From which Judgement the Petitioner asked an Appeal, but was denied the same, And at an After-Inferiour Court upon a Writt of Scire facias, Judgement was entered up against the Petitioner to satisfy the Sum recovered by the Principal Judgement as of his own proper Debt, Wch will be to his Loss as he alledgeth several Hundred Pounds : The Law allowing an Appeal generally in all Cases upon Judgements given in the Inferiour Court, And it appearing that the Petitioner demanded an Appeal sitting the Court within the Time limited by Law ; Resolved that the Challenge of the Appeal ought to have been received, And that he be now admitted thereto & have the Benefit of the Law in that Respect to be heard before the next Superiour Court of Judicature to sit in Boston: And that the Judgement of the Inferiour Court upon the Scire facias and the Appeal depending thereon are hereby suspended. 1719-20. CHAPTER 130. Order on Gyles Dyers Petition. A PETITION of Gyles Dyer Merch Shewing that at an Inferiour Court held at Boston for the County of Suffolk on the first Tuesday of October last past, he recovered Judgment against John Barnard late of Boston Merch for the sum of two hundred eighty four Pounds twelve shillings & nine pence; That at the same Court The Secretary's record of this second petition sets out more fully the nature of the suit in question. It is here stated that Seeknout complained “of undue Proceedings in a Suit brought by John Norton against Nicholas & Phineas Norton for Trespass for Driving a Mare of the said John Nortons off the said Island by Direction of the Petitioner, And in which Suit he was admitted Defendant." Ibid. the said John Barnard recovered Judgment against the Petitioner in three Actions for the sum of two hundred and ninety pounds; but so it is, that the said Barnard is absconded, so that the Petitioner can receive no Benefit from his Judgment against Barnard, althô he has taken out Execution thereupon; but the Petitioner will be liable to the Execution of the said Barnard upon his three Actions, when Judgment should be made thereon, the same being respited by the Judges of the Superiour Court till the Court shall meet upon their adjournmt upon the Petitioners humble Petition. to the Judges; that the said Barnard will have an Attorney to receive the Money recovered against the Petioner, on purpose to defraud him; who will be left without Remedy unless relieved by this Honble Court, and therefore humbly praying that An Act may be made for his Relief; which may order the said Money levied by the said Barnard's Execution, to be lodged in the Superiour Court, that so it may be subjected to the Petitioners Execution, or otherwise, as to the Justice & Wisdom of this Honble Court may seem most proper & fitting. Ordered that the further Consideration of this Petition be refer'd to the next Session of this Court, & that in the mean time Executions be stayed on both Sides. 1 An order of hearing and notice to Barnard, passed November 26, having failed for want of Barnard's appearance. HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Published monthly, during the Academic Year, by Harvard Law Students. THE uniform purpose of the REVIEW has been to present a periodical useful to lawyers in active practice as well as to those interested in law as a scientific study. Much remains to be accomplished; yet it is believed that the results justify the continued effort to meet the need for such a legal magazine. Beginning with the next number, it is proposed to increase the scope of the editorial work. A new department will be established, containing, in addition to the present book reviews, an index of articles in other legal periodicals, with a criticism of those particularly important. The purpose of this undertaking is not only to afford a complete and easily accessible reference to current legal articles, but also to present a critical discussion of important problems which may not happen to arise in cur rent cases. The demand for volumes already issued is such that it has become necessary to begin to reprint extensively. Although the work of reprinting is proceeding as rapidly as possible, at present only a limited number of orders for early volumes can receive attention; ultimately, however, it is expected that all orders will be filled. An exhaustive analytical index of the articles and editorials is also being prepared, and will be issued at a small charge with the last number of the current volBy thus making readily accessible the valuable material in the fifteen volumes, it is hoped that the REVIEW will become still more useful as a reference book for student and practitioner. THE LAW SCHOOL. The school opens with several changes in the curriculum made necessary chiefly on account of the assumption of Pro fessor Langdell's work by Professor Ames. Two courses in Equity Jurisdiction will hereafter be given by Professor Ames, one open to second and the other to third year students; but for this year these courses will be identical. Professor Strobel takes the place of Professor Ames in the half course on Admiralty, while Mr. Wyman, LL. B. 1900, will conduct the course on Suretyship and Mortgages. Roman Law, the Interpretation of Statutes, and Administrative Law are omitted; as usual in alternate years, the course on the New York Code is replaced by lectures on Massachusetts Practice, given by Mr. E. R. Thayer. Professor Gray and Assistant Professor Westengard again divide the work of Property I. and Property II. Mr. Peabody will continue to assist Professor Beale in Criminal Law, while Professor Williston will be without an assistant in first year Contracts. Professor Strobel will repeat the course, introduced last year, on the Civil Law of Spain and the Spanish Colonies. The lectures on Patent Law, omitted for several years, will be resumed this year by Mr. J. L. Stackpole, LL. B. 1898. The size of the entering class and the total number of students thus far enrolled are both practically the same as last year; the exact figures will be given in the December number. THE ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL PRECISION. Whether the decisions in the Insular Cases are considered correct or incorrect, it seems generally admitted that the opinions rendered are deficient in clearness and in precision, elements most essential in cases of such importance. Elaborate discussions and irreconcilable differences upon general principles, and upon fascinating and fundamental problems suggested by equally indiscriminating dicta in other cases, complicate, where they do not hide, the points at issue. It is extremely difficult to determine exactly what has been decided; the position of the court in similar cases arising in the future, or still pending, is entirely a matter of conjecture. Perhaps the most striking instance of a decision which, apparently, entirely overlooks a question necessarily involved, is to be found in the case of Dooley v. United States, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 762. Duties had been collected from the plaintiff on goods imported into Porto Rico from the United States, first, by order of the military authorities before the cession of the island to this country; second, under orders issued by the President after the cession; and third, under an act of Congress passed still later. In deciding the first point the court properly held that the plaintiff could not recover for duties collected by the military authorities; the question of the validity of the duties imposed by act of Congress, raised under the third head, remains to be decided in the suit still pending. As regards the duties collected under the second head, the court, intimating that the orders of the President might be valid in so far as they imposed duties on imports from foreign countries, nevertheless decided that the President had no power to impose duties on goods imported from the United States. It may be difficult to support the distinction drawn ; but conceding the correctness of this decision, does it follow that such imports were entitled to entry free of all duty? It must be remembered that the court had just decided, under the first head stated above, that up to the time of the cession imports from the United States were subject to duties under the existing laws as established by the military authorities. Heretofore the rule has been uni |