66 Congress passed an act authorizing the President to take possession of Louisiana, and providing "that "until the expiration of the present session of Congress, unless provision for the temporary govern"ment of the said Territories be sooner made by Congress, all the military, civil, and judicial powers "exercised by the officers of the existing government of the same shall be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as "the President of the United States shall direct for "maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of "Louisiana in the free enjoyment of their liberty, "property, and religion." The Louisiana Act was followed substantially in the case of Florida2 and may have inspired a part of the act annexing Hawaii, but it is not a precedent for the Philippine bill. The government of Louisiana, such as it was, was established definitely. The Philippine government is to be called into being by the President upon the happening of an event of which he is to be the sole judge-the suppression of insurrection. And, in this relation, the bill is open to the serious objection that it recognizes, tacitly, the mere will of the executive as being the foundation of all governmental powers in the islands. The Louisiana Act continued the old government of Louisiana and merely authorized the President to fill its offices. The Philippine bill enables the President to erect a government at will, manned by "such person and per 3 12 Statutes at Large 246. 23 Statutes at Large 523. See also Mitchel v. U. S., 9 Peters 711, 736. 66 sons as he may direct." The Louisiana Act did not purport to confer legislative powers upon the President, and Governor Claiborne's first proclamation expressly recognized the obligation of the old laws and municipal regulations. The Philippine bill seems to concede to the President full legislative powers. The Louisiana government was to last no longer than the then session of Congress, though the new government ordained by Congress on March 24, 1804, was not actually installed until October 1, 1804. The Philippine government is without term. Viewing the bill as an Administration measure, and recalling the opinion of the Administration that the Constitution is not law in the Philippines, it seems that it purposes to invest the President with the right, or perhaps I should say to recognize that he has the right, to hold all legislative powers in the islands and exercise them at his pleasure. If this be the purpose of the bill it approves the powers of the British Crown over dependencies not regulated by Parliament, without imposing the checks upon their abuse which obtain in the British system, where the Crown is forbidden to act "contrary to the fundamental law,"1 and where relief from injustice may be had through an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.2 The Philippine bill is a halting measure of doubtful legality. It merely conveys an impression that some day, in some way, something ought to be done for the Philippines, whereas it is the duty of Congress and well within its power to act at once. 1 See supra, p. 31. Each day of unrest in the Philippines makes our presence more hateful and postpones our opportunity for helpfulness; indeed, if resistance be greatly prolonged we may learn one day that we have demoralized a people we promised to benefit. The republic itself may be menaced by persistent disaffection, for if it shall be involved presently in a new and greater war the enemy will find allies in the Philippine territory. The Administration is blameworthy for having belittled the extent of the disaffection. If the President shall now call for troops to garrison the islands thoroughly he will not be blamed for exaggerating it. But whatever may be the state of the insurrection, the peace we want is contentment — not merely the end of strife; and we cannot hope that one will follow the other whilst we treat disaffection as wanton opposition to a benign sovereign, and armed resistance to our authority as unnatural rebellion. The attitude of regretful surprise that Filipinos should resist our benevolence is a disingenuous pose. When we recall that a few months ago we knew nothing of the Philippines (know little now in fact), we may comprehend how ignorant must be the islanders of the institutions and spirit of our republic. In these circumstances conciliation is not an improper overture to rebels. It is a generous effort to allay the mistrust of a strange people, and to assure mutual comprehension between parties brought unexpectedly into a difficult relation. In pursuance of these ends let Congress cause proclamation to be made that the Philippines are not a dependency, but are part of the republic and within the protection of the Constitution; and especially that citizenship and civil rights are bestowed in the Philippines as in all other United States territory, and that trade between all parts of the republic is free. This proclamation should not be withheld because proclamations of the President and his agents have proved futile, for, as a message from Congress declaring the law of the Constitution, it will be of higher dignity and promise. Nor should it be issued with an exaggerated hope of its influence, since the sending of a message is, after all, but a one-sided dealing at arm's length with a situation that requires intimate discussion. Representative Filipinos should be invited to attend a conference to be held at Washington, and they should be received neither as traitors nor as heroes, but as people of new territory come to discuss the vital question of its government. If it be objected that any intercourse with insurgents is beneath our dignity, let us remember that President Lincoln left his capital to talk with Confederate leaders at Hampton Roads, set in his own opinions, with no expectation of changing theirs, but determined that no chance for peace should be lost through lack of consideration on his part. OUR RELATION TO THE OLD ORDER The Old Laws One of the first questions suggested by the coming of a new sovereign to a country has regard to the fate of that old order which is evidenced by the local law. In this event, "the law which may be de "nominated political," says Chief Justice Marshall, "is necessarily changed."' This is true in the broad sense that the peculiar attributes and powers of the old sovereign are not transmitted to the new one; nor do the laws through which such powers have been exercised become its laws. "It cannot be ad"mitted," said the Supreme Court, "that the King "of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to "the United States any of his royal prerogatives; "and much less can it be admitted that they have "capacity to receive or power to exercise them. "Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or other"wise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and "laws of its own government, and not according "to those of the government ceding it." By the light of this decision we perceive that when President Jefferson commissioned a governor of Louisiana with the powers of the former governor-general and the intendant he could not lawfully invest the republican official with any attributes of those representatives of royal power inconsistent with our Constitution." While the new sovereign has a right to change all the political institutions of the annexed district, Chief Justice Marshall did not mean that the act of annexation necessarily effects this sweeping result; and governmental agencies consistent with the new order may be utilized without confirmatory legislation. The vitality of municipal agencies, for example, is illustrated in the case of California, where the State 1 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters 511, 542. 2 Pollard v. Hagan, 3 Howard 212, 225. See also New Orleans v. U. S., 10 Peters 662, 736. See Picton's Case, 30 State Trials 225. 3 See supra, p. 37. |