creditor on the dismissal of his action, and
gave to the second attaching creditor the su-
perior right to the funds in the hands of the
clerk.-Tootle v. Miner, (Kan.) 34 P. 401.
Bond for release of property.
6. In an action on a bond given to secure
release of attached property, conditioned for
liability in case judgment was rendered against
defendant in attachment, a finding that a judg-
ment was not rendered is not warranted where,
in the record of the attachment suit subsequent
to a judgment of nonsuit, appears a judgment
for plaintiff therein, as to the legality of which
there is no evidence, there being a presumption
in its favor.-Moore v. Mott, (Cal.) 34 P. 345.
7. The lien of an attachment is not de-
stroyed by the delivery of the property to the
owner on his furnishing a delivery bond, and
if the officer, after surrendering it, seizes it un-
der other attachments, it is subject to disposi-
tion under the lien of the first attachment, and
the sureties on the delivery bond are relieved
from liability thereon by such resumption of
possession by the officer.-Schneider v. Walling-
ford, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 1109.
Judgment and findings.
8. As Code 1887, c. 6, authorizing an ac-
tion aided by attachment on a debt not due in
certain cases, permits defendant to traverse the
affidavit, and provides that, if plaintiff fails to
substantiate the cause alleged, the attachment
shall be dissolved, and the action dismissed, a
judgment for plaintiff on a trial by the court,
where the affidavit has been traversed, cannot
be sustained unless there is a finding on the
facts alleged as ground for the attachment.-
Woods v. Tanquary, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 737.
Claim of preferred lien by laborers
Dismissal by plaintiff.
9. An attaching creditor may dismiss his
action and release the attachment before sale
without being liable to laborers who have served
labor claim notices therein, under 1 Hill's Code,
§ 3124, allowing laborers, in all cases of attach-
ment, execution, and similar writs, having
claims against defendant, to give notice thereof
at any time before actual sale of the property,
declaring them preferred claims, and providing
that the officer shall pay them out of the pro-
ceeds of the sale, and providing, further, in
case the claims are disputed, for actions, in
which case the officer is required to retain suffi-
cient of the proceeds to await their determina-
tion. Wells v. Columbia Nat. Bank, (Wash.)
34 P. 160.
as to the terms under which he will surrende
his interest in the land to the railroad company
for its right of way.-Haynes v. Tacoma, é.
& G. H. R. Co., (Wash.) 34 P. 922.
Liability for negligence.
2. In an action by an attorney to recre
for professional services, defendant citize
damages for incompetency and negligence, a
there was evidence that he employed plata
to prosecute certain actions to judgment for a
fixed sum in each case, and that plaintiff w
discharged before judgment for negligence and
incompetency, in failing to file lis pendens
two foreclosure suits. Held, that evidence the
plaintiff explained to defendant the effect of
filing and failure to file such notices, and the
probable expense, and that defendant said be
did not want to spend the money for fin
them, was admissible.-Hinckley v. Krug, Cuk
34 P. 118.
3. In such case it is not error to exelnde er-
idence that part of the property covered by me
of the mortgages plaintiff was employed to fere
close was conveyed by the mortgagor before.
but the deeds were not recorded until after, the
foreclosure suit was commenced, where it
pears that the remaining property sold for
enough to satisfy defendant's judgment.-Hits-
ley v. Krug, (Cal.) 34 P. 118.
4. A client cannot recover of his attorney
damages on account of negligence, in the ab-
sence of any injury to the client caused by
such negligence.-Hinckley v. Krug, (Cal)
5. It is not unprofessional conduct for
attorney to sue a just claim against a nonresi
dent, and serve summons by publication, when
employed to do so, with the hope that posely
the defendant therein will pay the judgment
obtained, on its being sent to the place wher
he resides, though such attorney knows such
action cannot be maintained, for want of jers
diction.-Hinckley v. Krug, (Cal.) 34 P. 118.
Compensation of attorney.
6. Where an attorney advised his client
in an action against a nonresident, that service
by publication was good, and a valid judgment
could be obtained, such attorney cannot recover
for services rendered therein. - Hinckley
Krug, (Cal.) 34 P. 118.
7. In an action by an attorney to recover
for professional services, where part of the
services for which plaintiff seeks to recover mo
sisted in examining the title to a lot, it is er
ror to exclude evidence that, through the ad-
fendant purchased the lot, and was afterwards
vice of plaintiff that the title was clear, de
compelled to redeem it from a prior tax lien.—
Hinckley v. Krug, (Cal.) 34 P. 118.
10. Code 1881, c. 33, directs that, when
property attached on a writ issued in another
county is claimed by a third person, he shall
file his affidavit and bond with the sheriff, who
shall return them to the clerk of the county
where the property was seized, and said clerk
shall docket the claim as a cause for trial.
Held, that the sheriff's failure to return the af-
fidavit could not deprive the proper court of
jurisdiction, nor the attaching creditors of their
right to an adjudication. - State v. Superior See "Arbitration and Award.”
Court of Mason County, (Wash.) 34 P. 151.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
Argument of counsel, see "Criminal Law," 22-
24; "Trial," 8, 9.
Attorney's fees, liability of state, see "States
and State Officers," 3, 4.
on foreclosure, see "Mortgages." 8.
provision in note, see "Negotiable Instru-
ments," 1.
Authority of attorney.
1. An attorney, employed by a railroad
company to represent it on the trial of a partic-
ular cause for the condemnation of a right of
way, has no authority to enter into any contract
with a third person, not a party to the action,
Autrefois Acquit and Convict.
See "Criminal Law," 9-11.
In criminal cases-Bond on appeal.
1. The supreme court has no authority to
reduce as excessive the amount of the appeal
bond fixed by the trial court in a prosecution
for manslaughter.-State v. Gile, (Wash.) 34 P.
151.
2. It is no defense for the sureties on a
bail bond that the information was insufficient-
ly verified, or that the arrest of the principal
on a warrant issued on such information was
illegal.-State v. Sureties of Krohne, (Wyo.) 34
P. 3.
3. The sureties on a criminal recognizance
for the appearance of a defendant, and to
abide the judgment of the court, and not depart
without leave, are discharged from further lia-
bility when the defendant has duly appeared,
and received sentence, and thereafter has of-
fered and submitted himself to the sheriff, to
be taken into custody under the sentence im-
posed by the court.-Jackson v. State, (Kan.) 34
P. 744.
See "Banks and Banking" "Carriers;" "De-
posit in Court;" "Innkeepers;" "Pledge."
Liability for moneys lost by failure of bank,
see "Office and Officer," 8.
See "Elections and Voters," 7.
Bankruptcy.
National banks-Contracts.
5. A national bank has power to take an
assignment of a mortgage on land to secure a
loan made at the time of the assignment.-
First Nat. Bank v. Andrews, (Wash.) 34 P.
913; Young v. Same, Id.
Best and Secondary Evidence.
See "Evidence," 3, 4.
Bills and Notes.
See "Negotiable Instruments."
In bond, filling, see "Bonds."
In deeds, filling, see "Deed."
Board.
See "Assignment for Benefit of Creditors;" "In- Of county commissioners, see "Counties," 4.
solvency."
BANKS AND BANKING.
Authority of president and cashier.
Of trade, see "Inspection."
Bona Fide Purchasers.
Of negotiable paper, see "Negotiable Instru-
ments," 3-5.
1. The president and cashier of a bank
have no authority, by virtue of their office, to
sell property belonging to the bank.-Greena-
walt v. Wilson, (Kan.) 34 P. 403.
Special remedy provided for winding
up affairs-Bank commissioners.
2. Bank Commissioners' Act March 30,
1878, provides for the examination of all banks
by commissioners appointed therefor. Section
11 of such act, as amended by St. 1887, p. 90,
provides that if the bank commissioners find
that any such corporation has violated its char-
ter, or is conducting business in an unsafe
manner, and refuses to discontinue its illegal
practices, the attorney general may bring suit
in the proper court to prohibit the transaction
of further business, and to wind up its affairs.
Section 21 provides that all acts are repealed
in so far as they are inconsistent with the act.
Insolvent Act 1880, § 8, provides that an ad-
judication of insolvency may be made for
causes enumerated therein on the petition of
five or more creditors whose demands amount
in the aggregate to not less than $500; and
section 25 requires the assignee, "as speedily
as possible, to convert the estate, real and per-
sonal, into money." Held, that the insolvent
act is superseded by the bank commissioners'
act as far as banking corporations are concern-
ed, and that an adjudication of insolvency
against a banking corporation, and the appoint-
ment of a receiver therefor, would not lie on
the petition of creditors therefor.-People v.
Superior Court, (Cal.) 34 P. 492,
3. A contention that the sole object of the
bank commissioners' act is visitation and a re-
port to the attorney general by the commission-
ers, and that there is no suggestion therein for
the sequestration of assets, is untenable; sec-
tion 11 of such act further providing that if the
court shall consider it unsafe for the corpora-
tion to continue to transact business, and that
it is insolvent, an injunction shall be issued,
and thereupon such proceedings shall be taken
against the corporation "as may be decided up
on by its creditors," and sections 18 and 19
authorizing the commissioners to maintain ac-
tions in the name of the people, under the
court's direction. - People v. Superior Court,
(Cal.) 34 P. 492.
4. The remedies provided by the two acts
are not cumulative, nor the powers conferred
by the bank commissioners' act auxiliary to
those conferred by the insolvent act, the object
of the bank commissioners' act being to provide
an entirely different scheme for winding up the
business of a banking corporation.-People v.
Superior Court, (Cal.) 34 P. 492.
See, also, "Principal and Surety."
For release of property attached, see "Attach-
Injunction bond, see "Injunction," 11, 12.
Of contractor, see "Mechanics' Liens," 30.
On appeal, see "Appeal," 15-17, 107, 108.
- in criminal cases, see "Bail."
Authority of obligee to fill in blanks.
1. The attorney for an attachment debtor
presented to defendants for signature as sure-
ties a redelivery bond, blank as to the specific
description of the property attached and its
value. Defendants signed the bond and justi-
fication annexed, and gave the paper to the at-
torney, who signed the jurat as notary. He
thereafter filled in the blanks, and delivered
the bond. Held, that defendants had made
him their agent to fill the blanks, and were
estopped to deny his authority. - Palacios v.
Brasher, (Colo. Šup.) 34 P. 251.
2. When sureties sign an official bond,
which is blank as to the penalty, and permit it
to pass from their hands in that condition, they
are estopped to claim that it was afterwards
filled up without their authority. - Rose v.
Douglass Tp., (Kan.) 34 P. 1046.
Conflict between field notes and monu-
1. While the corners of a survey as actual-
ly established and marked on the ground by the
United States government surveyors control the
designation of such corners in the plats or field
notes, yet the presumption is that the corners
have been established at the places indicated by
such field notes; and the proof that the actual
establishment was different must be clear and
convincing, where the actual location as claimed
does not accord with the section lines in ad-
joining sections, and will establish the claim in
an irregular shape.-Cadeau v. Elliott, (Wash.)
34 P. 916.
Location of corner
veyor's footsteps.
2. In order to locate an intermediate post
in a survey of land, which was run also by
courses and distances, the footsteps of the sur-
veyor should be followed, instead of taking a
reverse course.-Blackburn v. Nelson, (Cal.) 34
P. 775.
The pipe was put in evidence, but there wun
testimony as to where it was found. Had the
the evidence did not justify an instruction a
to the effect of possession of property recently
stolen.-People v. Abbott, (Cal.) 34 P. 500.
4. It is error to charge that the possessin
of stolen property soon after the taking, w
not sufficient to justify a conviction, is a
ty circumstance," and that defendant w
bound to explain the possession in order to re
move its effect, as this invades the province d
the jury.-People v. Abbott, (Cal.) 34 P. 500
3. In an action to recover possession of
land it appeared that plaintiffs owned land
bounded by the meander line of a lake as first
surveyed by the government in 1855; that the
waters of the lake receded, and left the land
in dispute lying between the present and orig-
inal meander line of the lake; and that de-
fendant took possession of and built a house
on the land in 1879, and has ever since resided
there. Defendant claimed, and witnesses tes-
tified, that the land first settled on by him was
an island, separated from plaintiffs' land by
water several feet deep, and was part of the
public domain. Several witnesses supported
plaintiffs' claim that no such island ever ex-
isted, and the plat of the original survey of the Of contracts, see "Equity," 5–9.
township showed none. Held, that the evidence
was sufficient to justify a verdict for defend-
ant as to the facts in issue.-Moore v. Brown-
field, (Wash.) 34 P. 199.
4. Under a deed purporting to convey a
certain number of feet along a street commen-
cing at a certain point, only that number of
feet passed by the deed, and therefore evidence
that the grantor, in measuring off the land
granted, measured more than that number of
feet, is incompetent to show that more than
the number of feet stated passed by the deed.
-Hogins v. Boggs, (Cal.) 34 P. 653.
5. On the question of the location of a
point called for in a patent and survey, the
court may consider the field notes and descrip-
tion in the patent of an adjoining tract, the
boundaries of the two tracts being coincident
for a distance of several miles, and both hav-
ing been surveyed by the same surveyor at
about the same time.-Adair v. White, (Cal.)
34 P. 338.
See "Factors and Brokers."
BURGLARY.
What constitutes offense.
1. A buggy house "in which goods, wares,
merchandise, and other valuable things are kept
and deposited" is a "building" in which burglary
may be committed, within the meaning of Gen.
St. 1889, c. 31, § 68.-State v. Garrison, (Kan.)
34 P. 751.
Proof of corpus delicti.
2. In a burglary case it appeared that one
evening a storekeeper had in his safe in the
store certain money; that when he and his
clerks left for the night, no one was there, and
the doors were locked and windows closed;
that neither of them returned until the next
morning; that the storekeeper had not author-
ized any one to enter the store during the night,
and it could not be entered except through the
doors or windows; and that in the morning the
money was gone from the safe, and apparently
a window had been raised during the night.
Held, that the corpus delicti was established.-
State v. Munson, (Wash.) 34 P. 932.
Instructions.
3. In a burglary case it appeared that a
Chinaman's trunk and pipe were stolen from
the burglarized building. There was evidence
that two persons carried a "China trunk" from
the lot on which the building was situated
about the time the crime was committed; that
defendant and others were seen with such a
trunk about that time; and that such China-
man's trunk was found open two days after
wards, a considerable distance from the build-
ing. There was no evidence that a "China
trunk" is any different from any other trunk.
CARRIERS.
See, also, "Railroad Companies."
Limiting liability.
1 A railroad cannot, in consideration of
reduced rate, exempt itself from all liabus
of a carrier of live stock, not resulting fre
defective trucks, wheels, or axles.-Union Pac
Ry. Co. v. Rainey, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 986.
Live-stock shipments
shipper.
2. The defect in a car furnished to trans
port horses, that the side slats are so far aper
as to allow horses to get their feet thro
them, is not so apparent to the shipper he
ing his horses on the car as to convict him of
negligence. - Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rainey.
(Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 986.
Carriage of passengers
sengers.
3. Where a person, believing he has a
right to do so, rides on a freight train with the
consent of the conductor in charge, and, whe
so riding, is injured through the negligence of
the trainmen, the company is liable to him as
a passenger, though such train be one whic
by the rules of the company, was not allowed
to carry passengers.-Everett v. Oregon S. L.
& U. N. Ry. Co., (Utah,) 34 P. 289.
Injuries to passengers.
4. In an action by a passenger against a
stage company for personal injuries received
from the upsetting of a stage in coming dow
a mountain road, it appeared that one of the
horses had been inclined to run away; that the
road was muddy and slippery; that the horses
were going at "a slow jog," when they were
yards before the driver regained control: tha:
frightened by a landslide; that they ran 10
flying mud and slush made it hard for the driv
and that the horses were going in a trot, whe
er to see, and tended to frighten the horses:
they were so frightened by another slide that
the driver lost control, and they ran away, 11
Held, that there was evidens
for the jury as to whether defendant failed to
upset the stage.
Pacific Coast Stage Co., (Cal.) 34 P. S&S.
provide suitable horses and driver.-Knight t
5. In an action against a cable-car en
car alleged to have been prematurely started.
pany for injuries received in alighting from a
after instructing the jury that common carriers
of passengers must use such vigilance and fore-
sight as they can, under the circumstances, in
view of the character and mode of conveyance
adopted, to prevent accidents, it was not in-
proper to instruct that "it was the defendant's
business to know, before starting up the car.
whether passengers getting off or on the ear
were in a position to be injured, and it weeld
be negligence to start the car suddenly, under
such circumstances, without exercising every
precaution for the safety of those who might
be getting off or on."-Tobin v. Omnibus Cable
Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 124.
lie to review the action of the court in commit-
arriage of passengers Contributory | perior court has no jurisdiction to review such
negligence of passengers.
proceedings on certiorari, though the time lim-
ited for appeal has expired before certiorari is
6. In an action against a street-car com- brought.-Gregory v. Dixon, (Wash.) 34 P. 212.
any for personal injuries, plaintiff claimed,
nd the evidence tended to prove, that a car view contempt proceedings on certiorari.-State
3. The supreme court of Montana can re-
as started while she was alighting therefrom, v. Fourth Judicial District Court, (Mont.) 34
hile defendant claimed, and gave evidence P. 39.
> show, that the car was started before plain- 4. An order for payment of temporary ali-
ff left her seat, and that she tried to get off
hile the car was in motion. Held, that an in-mony being appealable, and such appeal, with
truction making the defense of contributory the enforcement of the order, certiorari will not
stay bond, furnishing a complete remedy against
egligence dependent on whether defendant
uld have guarded against such negligence was
endered harmless by subsequent instructions
at the verdict must be for the defendant if
he injuries were caused either solely by plain-
ff's negligence, or, jointly and concurrently, by
e negligence of plaintiff and defendant or its
ervants, and that if plaintiff, knowing the car
'as in motion, chose to run her chances, and
et off by stepping directly out from the car,
le must abide the risks she took.-Tobin v.
mnibus Cable Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 124.
iability for passengers' effects.
ting defendant for contempt in disobeying the
order; the provision of Const. art. 8, § 3, that
writs of certiorari in proceedings for contempt
the justices of the supreme court may issue
in the district court, not being intended to ap-
ply where there is remedy by appeal.-In re
Finkelstein, (Mont.) 34 P. 847.
7. In an action against a sleeping-car com-
any for loss by a passenger of his coat while See "Fraudulent Conveyances;" "Sale," 1
his berth at night, the presumption of neg-
gence on the part of defendant arising from
uch loss is rebutted by the uncontradicted evi-
ence of the car porter that he was on duty, See "Venue in Civil Cases," 3.
nd engaged in watching the car, through the
ight, till after the loss.-Pullman Palace Car
o. v. Freudenstein, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 578.
8. A railroad company is not bound, as a Evidence of, see "Criminal Law," 41.
art of its contract to transport a passenger,
ho is employed as a traveling salesman, to
arry as his personal baggage a case of sam-
le merchandise belonging to his employers; and
here it receives and checks such case without
nowledge of its ownership or contents, a part
f which is afterwards stolen from its baggage
oom without negligence on its part, it is not
able to the owners.-Southern Kan. Ry. Co.
F. Clark, (Kan.) 34 P. 1054.
Sheriffs and constables have not the ab-
olute right, because of their office, to carry
weapons at all times, since Act 1887, c. 30,
10. provides that sheriffs, constables, and oth-
r officers "may carry weapons in the legal dis-
harge of the duties of their respective offices,
hen the same may be necessary, but it shall
e for the court or jury to decide from the evi-
ence whether such carrying of weapons was
ecessary or not, and for an improper carrying
r using deadly weapons by an officer, he shall
be punished as other persons are punished."-
Guyse v. Territory, (N. M.) 34 P. 295.
CERTIORARI
Review on, see "Contempt," 2.
1. Code Civil Proc. § 323, provides for a
vrit of certiorari when an inferior court has
exceeded its jurisdiction, and there is no ap-
beal, nor any adequate remedy. Const. art. 5,
23, provides that a writ of error shall lie
From the supreme court to every final judgment
of the county court. Held, that a writ of cer-
iorari should not issue for the review by a dis-
rict court of a judgment rendered by a county
ourt within its jurisdiction, and from which
here was no appeal to the district court, un-
Her Gen. St. §§ 500, 501, since there was an
adequate remedy by writ of error from the su-
preme court.-Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bowler,
Colo. App.) 34 P. 940.
2. Since Gen. St. § 784, provides that the
proceedings of the county superintendent of
schools organizing school districts may be ap-
pealed to the county commissioners, the su-
See, also, "Fraudulent Conveyances."
Liability of sheriff, see "Sheriffs and Consta-
bles," 8.
1. A mortgage of a stock of goods was
filed as soon as made, and the mortgagees'
agents, who occupied the other side of the same
building as the mortgagor, took possession, and
put in charge a man who hired the mortgagor
to help him, as clerk. New books were opened,
and all moneys received, after payment of run-
ning expenses, were applied on the mortgage
debt. The mortgagor's name on the window
was not erased. Held, that there was a change
of possession, as against subsequently attach-
ing creditors.-In re Fisher, (Or.) 34 P. 1024;
Koehler v. McCamant, Id.
2. Under Code, § 776, subd. 40, providing
that every mortgage of personal property capa-
ble of immediate delivery which is not filed or
recorded shall be presumptively fraudulent as to
the mortgagor's creditors unless accompanied by
immediate delivery and followed by an imme-
diate change of possession of the mortgaged
property, the possession of the mortgagee, where
his mortgage is not recorded, must be exclusive,
and accompanied with such outward acts of
ownership as to apprise the public that the
property has changed hands; and a joint pos-
Peirce v. Kelly, (Or.) 34 P. 963.
session with the mortgagor is not sufficient.-
3. A mortgage of merchandise, permitting
the mortgagor to remain in possession and sell
in the usual course of business, paying the pro-
ceeds to the mortgagee till the debt is extin-
guished, is rendered void against creditors by
a parol' agreement that the mortgagor may re-
tain from the proceeds a small allowance for
the support of his family. - Wile v. Butler,
(Colo. App.) 34 P. 1110.
Description of property.
4. The return of the mortgagor's assignee,
to whom the stock of mortgaged goods was turn-
ed over by consent, showing that he sold more
articles of some kinds than were described in
the mortgage, does not show that the descrip-
tion in the mortgage was inadequate as against
subsequently attaching creditors, there being
no averment or proof that the mortgagor had
any goods other than those described in the See "Pledge."
mortgage. In re Fisher, (Or.) 34 P. 1024;
Koehler v. McCamant, Id.
Release--Substitution of other security. Of taxes, see "Taxation," 9-14.
5. Though a contract for a pledge, by recit-
ing that it is given in lieu of a certain chattel
mortgage, shows an intention that it shall take
the place of the chattel mortgage, it does not,
in the absence of the delivery of the articles
thereby agreed to be pledged, release the chat-
tel mortgage; Civil Code, § 2988, providing that
no pledge is valid till the property is delivered
to the pledgee.-Irwin v. McDowell, (Cal.) 34
P. 708.
Seizure by mortgagee
6. Where the holder of a chattel mortgage,
under his mortgage, takes possession of a part
of the personal property mortgaged, but makes
no sale or disposition thereof, as prescribed by
the statute, he is liable to the mortgagor for
the actual value of the same, at the time and
place of taking possession thereof.-Miller v.
McElwain, (Kan.) 34 P. 396.
Title of mortgagee after default.
7. Possession by a chattel mortgagee after
the maturity of his debt does not vest in him a
legal title which is subject to attachment.-
Voorhies v. Hennessy, (Wash.) 34 P. 931.
See "Municipal Corporations."
Verbal land contract, see "Vendor and Pur-
chaser," 1.
Against decedent's estate, see "Executors and
Administrators," 7-9.
CLERK OF COURT.
Certificate by deputy to affidavit, see "Affida-
vit."
Judicial power, see "Constitutional Law," 5.
Liability for money lost by failure of bank, see
"Office and Officer," 8.
Powers-To adjourn court.
When the judge is not present at the
time fixed by law for the holding of a term of
court, the clerk of the court cannot, in the ab-
sence of statutory authority, adjourn the court
to a future day. In re Terrill, (Kan.) 34 P.
457; In re McClaskey, Id. 459.
Collateral Attack.
See "Judgment," 25-27.
Effect of decision of secretary of interior, see
"Public Lands," 18.
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSI-
TIES.
State university-Board of regents.
Const. art. 11, § 7, requires the members
of board of regents of the state university to be
"elected," and Act March 19, 1891, provids
that "the board shall consist of three elective
members, as now provided by law, and of the
governor and attorney general, who shall be
officio members of the board." Held, that the
act does not inaugurate a new system of go
ernment for the university, but merely incresse
the number of regents, and that the attorney
general in office at the time of the passage of
the act is not entitled to act as a member of
the board ex officio, since the act does not show
the existence of an emergency at the time of 3
passage which requires the induction of the is
creased number into office prior to their election
by the people. State v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 121. and
State v. Arrington, 4 P. 735, 18 Nev. 412, for
lowed.-State v. Torreyson, (Nev.) 34 P. 870
In obtaining decree of divorce, see "Divorce,"
3-5.
Color of Title.
See "Adverse Possession," 4; "Public Lands,"
15.
Bank commissioners, see "Banks and Bank-
ing," 2-4.
Common Carrier.
Community Property.
See "Husband and Wife," 6-9.
Compensation.
Of attorney, see "Attorney and Client," 6, 7.
Complaint.
See, also, "Payment;" "Release and Dis-
charge."
Effect of offer as admissions, see "Evidence," &
Compromise as consideration.
The compromise by a wife of a suit for
divorce against her husband, and her abandon
ment of her alleged right of homestead in his
property, is a valid consideration for a mor
gage executed by the husband in her favor te
secure a note.-McClure v. McClure, (Cal.) 34
P. 822.
Conclusion of Law.
Condemnation Proceedings.
See "Eminent Domain."
In policy, see "Insurance," 1, 2.
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