CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Admiralty jurisdiction of state courts, see "Ad-
miralty."

Annexation by cities of other towns, see "Mu-
nicipal Corporations," 3.

Imposition of license tax, see "Licenses."
Obligation of contracts, power congress to
forfeit land grant, see "Public Lands," 6.
Qualification of voters, see "Elections and Vot-
ers," 1.

Regulations as to public lands, see, also, "Public
Lands," 1, 2.

Right of accused to confront witnesses, see
"Criminal Law," 33.

Submission of questions to courts by governor
and legislature, see "Courts," 1.
Titles of acts, see "Statutes," 5, 6.
Construction.

1. To warrant a state court in declaring
void a provision of the state constitution as in
conflict with the federal constitution, the con-
flict must be very clear. - Romine v. State,
(Wash.) 34 P. 924.

2. Const. art. 1, § 16, authorizing the tak-
ing of lands for private ways of necessity, is not
self-executing, and before a person can main-
tain a proceeding to have land of a person, not
his grantor, condemned for a private way of ne-
cessity, the legislature must define what are to
be private ways of necessity, authorize persons
to apply for them, and prescribe the method by
which the necessary land is to be taken.-Long
v. Billings, (Wash.) 34 P. 936.

Delegation of legislative power.

3. The legislature has power to provide,
in an act establishing law libraries, (Act March
31, 1891.) that counties shall come within or
remain without the provision of the act, as the
boards of supervisors of the respective counties
may determine.-Board of Law Library Trus-
tees v. Board Sup'rs Orange County, (Cal.) 34
P. 244.

To tribunals transacting county
business.

Iers on the road commissioners, who were not a
"tribunal transacting_county business." John-
ston, J., dissenting.-Board Com'rs Wyandotte
County v. Abbott, (Kan.) 34 P. 416.
Judicial powers.

vacation, to take bail, and fix its amount, is
5. A law permitting the clerk of court, in
clerk judicial power.-State v. Sureties of
not unconstitutional, as conferring on said
Krohne, (Wyo.) 34 P. 3.

Control by courts of executive depart-
ment.

6. The execution of orders given by the
president of the United States for the removal

of intruders from government land will not be
interfered with by injunction, the courts having
no jurisdiction over the executive department
of the government.-Guthrie v. Hall, 34 P. 380,
1 Okl. 406.

Local and special laws.

an

7. The term "township" in Const. art. 5,
§ 25, forbidding special laws regulating county
or "township" affairs, refers to an involuntary
corporation, or quasi corporation, and not to a
voluntary municipal corporation, such as
incorporated town; and special legislation is
not forbidden in respect to incorporated towns
or cities, except in cases where a general law
can be made applicable.-Town of Valverde v.
Shattuck, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 947.

S. Act March 27, 1890, (Laws 1889-90, p.
131,) giving certain communities, which had pre-
viously undertaken to incorporate as municipal
corporations under an invalid law, the right to
reincorporate under the statute without refer-
ence to population, but solely by reason of their
peculiar condition, is a special law, and void,
under Const. art. 2, § 28, which prohibits the
legislature from passing special laws "for grant-
ing corporate powers and privileges," and ar-
ticle 11, § 10, which provides that "corporations
for municipal purposes shall not be created by
special laws." -Town of Denver v. City of
Spokane Falls, (W: 34 P. 926.

-

9. The provision of the act of 1889 which
makes a street assessment prima facie evidence
of the regularity of the proceeding is not a spe-
cial or local law, within the constitutional pro-
vision that the legislature shall not pass special
or local laws regulating the practice of courts
of justice.--McDonald v. Conniff, (Cal.) 34 P.
71.

10. The bank commissioners' act of March
30, 1878, providing for the examination, and, in
certain cases, the winding up, of banks by com-
missioners appointed for the purpose, is not a
contravention of Const. art. 4, § 25, providing
that the legislature shall not pass local or spe-
cial laws granting to any corporation any spe-
cial or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity.
-People v. Superior Court, (Cal.) 34 P. 492.
Retrospective laws.

11. Laws 1893, c. 109, concerning the sale
and redemption of real estate, does not change
or nullify any of the terms of a judgment duly
rendered before the passage of the act directing
the sale of an interest in land for the purpose
stated in said judgment.-Greenwood v. But-
ler, (Kan.) 34 P. 967; Moore v. Barstow, Id.
969.

Vested rights.

12. It is within the power of the legislature
to prescribe the mode of assessing property for
taxation in a city of the third class, as neither
the city nor the citizen has a vested right to
Heilig v. City Council of Puyallup, (Wash.) 34
have property assessed in a particular way.--

4. Const. art. 2, § 21, provides that the
legislature may confer upon tribunals transact-
ing the county business of the several counties
such powers of local legislation and adminis-
tration as it shall deem expedient. Sess. Laws
1887, c. 214, requires the county commissioners,
on petition of certain land owners, to order the
improvement of any county road, and to ap-
point road commissioners who shall superin- 13. Act N. M. T. 1889, §§ 1, 2. authoriz
tend such improvement, and shall apportion the ing special verdicts, and declaring that when
cost among the landowners within half a mile the special verdicts are inconsistent with the
of the improvement. Held, that this act was general verdict the former shall control, is not
unconstitutional in conferring legislative pow-in conflict with Const. Amend. U. S. art. 7.

P. 164.
Jury trial.

which provides that the right of trial by jury police power of the legislature.-Woodward v.
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., (Cal.) 34 P. 239.
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of Taxation-Exemption.
the United States than according to the rules
of the common law, since such provision applies
to powers exercised by the government of the
United States, and not to those of states and
territories.-Walker v. New Mexico & S. P. R.
Co., (N. M.) 34 P. 43.

14. Const. U. S. Amend. 7, providing that in
suits at common law involving more than $20
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, ap
plies to territorial courts.-Bradford v. Terri-
tory, (Okl.) 34 P. 66.

15. A proceeding by information in the na-
ture of quo warranto is a suit at common law,
within the meaning of Const. U. S. Amend. 7,
providing for the right of trial by jury in such
suits.-Bradford v. Territory, (Okl.) 34 P. 66.

16. St. Okl. c. 70, art. 18. § 22, providing
that nine jurors may return a verdict, is in-
valid, as in violation of Const. U. S. Amend. 7,
providing for the preservation of the right of
trial by jury.-Bradford v. Territory, (Okl.) 34

P. 66.

Due process of law.

17. Act March 11, 1893, § 11, (Sess. Laws
1893, p. 284.) prohibiting the recording of a deed
unless accompanied by a certificate of the treas-
urer that all taxes levied, and which have be-
come a charge on the property according to the
books and records of his office, have been paid,
is unconstitutional, as interfering with the
right to acquire and dispose of property, and as
taking property without due process or compen-
sation.-State v. Moore, (Wash.) 34 P. 461.

Wash. 1883, p. 64,) known as the "Gross Ear
23. Act Wash. T. Nov. 28, 1883, (Lami
ings Law," which provided (section 1) for the
taxation of the gross earnings of railroad er
porations, and exempted them from all other
taxes, was not in conflict with Organie Act
vided that "all taxes shall be equal and m
Wash. T., (Rev. St. U. S. § 1924,) which pro-
form, and no distinction shall be made in the
assessments between different kinds of prop
erty, but the assessments shall be according to
did not prohibit the legislature from exempting
the value of the property," since such provision
the property of any person or corporation from
taxation.-Columbia & P. S. R. Co. v. Chilberg,
(Wash.) 34 P. 163.

Assessments

ments.

for local improve-

Constructive Trusts.

18. A city charter giving power to improve
streets at the expense of adjoining property is
not unconstitutional, as depriving persons of
property without due process of law, because See "Trusts," 7, 8.
it does not expressly provide for notice to the
property owners at any stage of the proceed-
ings. Wilson v. City of Salem, (Or.) 34 P. 9;
Id. 691.

19. Gen. St. c. 93, §§ 13, 14, as amended by
Sess. Laws 1885, p. 304, and Sess. Laws 1891,
p. 281, (known as "Railroad Stock-Killing
Acts,") making railroad companies absolutely
liable for stock killed, and arbitrarily fixing the
amount to be paid, contravene the constitutional
provisions for equal protection and due process
of law. Railway Co. v. Vaughn, (Colo. App.)
34 P. 264, followed.-Rio Grande W. Ry. Co.
v. Chamberlin, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 1113.

20. Gen. St. c. 93, §8 13, 14, as amended by
Sess. Laws 1885, p. 304, and Sess. Laws 1891,
p. 281, (known as "Railroad Stock-Killing
Acts.") which fix the amount to be paid for
certain kinds of animals by an arbitrary sched-
ule of prices, and provide for the fixing of the
value of other animals by appraisers without
allowing proof of actual value, and which
make the company absolutely liable, are un-
constitutional, in that under them a railroad
company may be denied the equal protection of
the laws, and deprived of its property without
due process of law. Wadsworth v. Railway
Co.. (Colo. Sup.) 33 P. 515, and Railway Co. v.
Outcalt, 31 P. 177, 2 Colo. App. 395, followed.
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Vaughn,
(Colo. App.) 34 P. 264.

Deprivation of liberty.

21. A statute permitting informations to be
filed without preliminary examination, when-
ever the prosecuting attorney is satisfied that
a crime or offense has been committed in his
county, is not invalid as an infringement of
"due process of law."-State v. Sureties of
Krohne, (Wyo.) 34 P. 3.

Police power.

CONTEMPT.

Violation of injunction, see "Injunction,” 10.
See, also, "Certiorari," 3, 4.
Procedure.

in disobeying an order requiring the person
1. A commitment for contempt of court
committed to restore to the administrator of an
estate in process of settlement money which be
had obtained as attorney for such administra
tor by false pretenses, is void, where the judg

show that he was in fact such attorney.-Ex
ment on which the commitment issued fails to
parte Carroll, (Cal.) 34 P. 518.
Review on certiorari.

2. The finding that a publication was 82
unlawful interference with the proceedings of
the court, within Code Civil Proc. § 1209, de
fining contempts, is not conclusive on cer
tiorari, where it appears that the publication
could not possibly have had that effect.-In re
Shortridge, (Cal.) 34 P. 227.
Power to punish.

3. A judge of the circuit court has power
to punish for contempt. Laws 1891, c. 83, § 5.
In re Wolf, (Kan.) 34 P. 1048.

4. Where defendant was adjudged to have
certain property of plaintiff. and was ordered
to appear on a certain day in the same term
and restore it, but failed to do so, and after
a further continuance was found guilty of co
tempt, the court still had jurisdiction over the
case, for the purpose of punishing defendant-
In re Wolf, (Kan.) 34 P. 1048.

Contest.

Of election, see "Elections and Voters," &
Of wills, see "Wills," 6-9.

22. Act March 31, 1891, (St. 1891, p. 223,)
authorizing the organization and creation of
sanitary districts throughout the state, and em-
powering such districts to issue bonds for the
construction of sewers and drains, is within the Discretion of trial court, see "Appeal," 71

Continuance.

that, if extensions of plaintiff's pipes were nec- | funds in such bank as would agree to pay the
essay, the lessee could require plaintiff to put highest rate of interest, appointed defend
them in, plaintiff to be allowed for the amount bank the city depository for the ensuing er 1
so expended 6 per cent. interest, and 3 per and deposited the city funds therewith. Bef
cent. per annum on the cost for deterioration the expiration of the year, the state sacer
of the extension,-and, plaintiff insisting on its court decided that said section of the clame
rights under this lease, defendant could refuse was void, and thereupon plaintif with
to furnish water.-San Diego Water Co. v. from defendant the amount deposited by z
San Diego Flume Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 656.
Held, in an action for the interest accrued a
such deposit, that since, under the preras
Performance.
cision, the contract for the payment of Le
11. Plaintiff agreed to sell defendants certain est was void, and the making of it constitzet
stock, and defendants agreed to take it, and pay a felony, plaintiff could not recover there
plaintiff a specified amount therefor; such pay--City of Los Angeles v. City Bank, (Call) &
ments to be made "as soon and fast as they
were able, financially, to do so, without sacrifi-
cing their interests in, or the property of," such
company. Held, that defendants were bound
to perform such contract within such time as
was reasonable for the disposition of their prop
erty.-Fisher v. Chadwick, (Wyo.) 34 P. 899;
Chadwick v. Hopkins, Id.

12. One who contracts to build a house, the
last installment of the cost to be paid him "on
completion of the work," cannot claim such
installment if the house was destroyed by fire
before the second coat of paint was on the
house, all the doors hung, the fastenings put on
the front doors and windows, or the build-
ing delivered to the owner.-Clark v. Collier,
(Cal.) 34 P. 677.

13. Defendant, the proprietor of an inn and
theater, employed plaintiff to work in the the-
ater, and advanced her traveling expenses. She
boarded at his inn and remained in his employ
until his wife, who had charge of the girls at
the theater, assaulted her, and threatened her
life, so that she was afraid to remain. When
she left there was more due her as salary than
she owed for board, but defendant attempted
to apply her salary on the debt for the money
advanced her, and for her board seized her
trunk, so that she was unable to accept another
position offered her. Held that, under the agree
ment, it was intended that plaintiff should re-
pay the money advanced by work, and as de-
fendant failed to furnish her proper protection
from her coemployes, and by seizing her trunk
rendered her unable to obtain other employ-
ment, he cannot deny that the debt was fully
paid.-Hanlin v. Walters, (Colo. App.) 34 P.

686.

P. 510.

Actions on contracts-Pleading.

18. The act of God rendering performan
impossible, if relied on as a defense, RYS
pleaded.-Pengra v. Wheeler, (Or.) 34 P. 354
19. As Civil Code, § 1614, provides that a
written instrument is presumptive evidence f
a consideration, a special averment of a ec
sideration is not necessary, where the ec-
plaint in an action on a contract states that it
is in writing; and it is immaterial that the
contract is set out according to its legal e
fect only, and not in haec verba. — Henke r
Eureka Endowment Ass'n of California, (Ca!
34 P. 1089.

20. Defendant agreed to transfer to pla
tiffs certain mining stock in exchange for stars
of another company and $25,000 in cash, 15.
guarantied an annual dividend of 3 per cent
the mining stock. The cash payment was to le
deposited with a trust company until the the
to certain property was perfected in the ch
company. Defendant failed to pay the In
dends, and, in an action therefor, plaintifs a
leged the exchange of stock, and the depest of
allege that defendant received the cash fr
the cash with the trust company, but did not
such company. Held, that the complaint fai
(Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 728.
to show a cause of action. -Jones v. Pet

Action to rescind-Judgment for dam-
ages.

rescind the contract it appeared that defendant
21. In an action by the vendees of land to
agreed to pipe water to the land, which f
failed to do; that plaintiffs agreed to clear and
14. Where a lease of water power provided seven months, and the balance within a year
plant to fruit trees one-half the land with
that, in case the dam and race controlling the thereafter; and that they carried out uch
power were injured by high water, the lessor agreement. Held, that if such action was tre
should repair them within 10 days after the wa-
as an action to rescind, and not as an get
ter had fallen to its average winter stage, the for damages, a judgment in plaintiff's favor
lessor would be excused from the making of re- for the cost of such improvements, and rescind
pairs within the required 10 days after the waing the sale, could not stand.-Fountain v. Sea
ter had fallen to the average winter stage, if itropic Land & Water Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 497.
it rose again so as to make impossible the com-
pletion of the work in the time agreed.-Pengra
v. Wheeler, (Or.) 34 P. 354.

15. Where plaintiff, in an action for breach

Contributory Negligence.

Conversion.

of contract, must show performance on his part See "Negligence,” 4–7.
before he can recover, nonperformance by him
cannot be excused on the ground that it was
caused by the act of God; and Civil Code, §
1511, providing that want of performance is See "Trover and Conversion."
excused "when it is prevented or delayed by ir-
resistible superhuman cause," does not apply
to such cases.-Remy v. Olds, (Cal.) 34 P. 216.

16. Where, under a contract with defendant,
plaintiffs were to commence the work therein
provided for on a specified date, and failed to do
so, it was competent for them to show that,
though defendant notified them at that date
that it had arranged for them to commence,
it failed to make the arrangements; such evi-
dence being offered, not to change the terms of
the contract, but to show the reason of their
Loncompliance therewith.-Texas, S. F. & N.
Ry. Co. v. Saxton, (N. M.) 34 P. 532.

Part performance.

17. Plaintiff, the city of Los Angeles, in pur-
suance of section 44 of its charter, (Act Jan.
31, 1889,) authorizing the deposit of the city

Conveyances.

See "Chattel Mortgages;" "Deed;" "Fraudulent
Conveyances;" "Mortgages;" "Sale;" "Ter
dor and Purchaser."

CORPORATIONS.

See, also, "Banks and Banking;" "Carriers:"
"Insurance;" "Irrigation;" "Municipal Cor
porations;" "Railroad Companies."
Action against stockholder, see "Limitation of
Actions," 2.

Special laws, see "Constitutional Law," 7–10.
Usurpation of corporate franchise. see "Que
Warranto."

Amending articles or certificate of in
corporation.

its business, will be held responsible for his
acts in its name, unless it affirmatively shows
that such acts were unauthorized.-Carrigan v.
Port Crescent Imp. Co., (Wash.) 34 P. 148.

1. A change of the laws of a mutual ben-
efit association in regard to the payment of ben-
efit certificates is not an amendment of its cer-
tificate of incorporation or articles of associa-
tion, within the meaning of Civil Code, § 362,
providing the method for making such amendment,
ments.-Bowie v. Grand Lodge of Legion of the
West, (Cal.) 34 P. 103.

Who may question corporate powers.
2. Even though a corporation claiming title
to land may not have had the right to acquire
and hold the same, the question cannot be
raised by a stranger asserting an unwarranted
claim of ownership. Per Harwood, J.-Butte
Hardware Co. v. Schwab, (Mont.) 34 P. 24.
Corporations de facto.

3. The mere fact that the owners of a
mine use a corporate name does not make a
corporation de facto, where no corporate act is
performed, and no steps have been taken to
incorporate. Bash v. Culver Gold-Min. Co.,
(Wash.) 34 P. 462.

-

Corporate existence.

4. Proof of a defendant's incorporation is
unnecessary where it has appeared to a suit,
and therefore the admission of parol evidence
of its incorporation, though incompetent, is
harmless error.-A. Gauthier Decorating Co. v.
Ham, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 484.

5. Under Code Proc. § 194, subd. 1, which
requires the answer to contain a general or spe-
cific denial of each material allegation of the
complaint controverted by defendant, such de-
nials put plaintiff to his proof as to every alle
gation material to his cause of action; and
hence a general denial in an answer is sufficient
to require plaintiff to prove its corporate char-
acter alleged in the complaint.-Town of Den-
ver v. City of Spokane Falls, (Wash.) 34 P.

926.

Estoppel to deny.

6. The fact that the owners of a mine used
the name C. Gold-Mining Co. before any legal
steps were taken by them to form a corpora-
tion does not estop the corporation, when legal-
ly organized, from denying its prior existence.
-Bash v. Culver Gold-Min. Co., (Wash.) 34 P.
462.

7. The maker of a note is estopped from
denying that the payee is or was a corporation,
by his having dealt with it as such, and re-
ceived the consideration of the note.-Bank of
Shasta v. Boyd, (Cal.) 34 P. 337.

Contracts.

the fulfillment of contracts between its pro-
12. A mining corporation is not liable for
moters, or for money expended by them in the
original purchase of the mine and its develop.
unless a contract to be responsible is
clearly proved.-Bash v. Culver Gold-Min. Co.,
(Wash.) 34 P. 462.

13. A president of a corporation went to
one holding a note against it, and, after telling
him that he had the money to pay the note,
and after the creditor had produced the note,
he told the creditor that he needed the money,
and he would give his stock in the corporation
as security if he could keep it. The creditor
decided that he did not want the stock, but
said that it could stand as it was, and the
president could pay it to him in a few months.
The president used the money for his own pur-
poses. Held, that the indebtedness of the cor-
poration was thereby liquidated, so that an un-
authorized note, given in renewal, was without
consideration, and the corporation was not es-
topped to deny its validity.-Edwards v. Carson
Water Co., (Ñev.) 34 P. 381.

14. Where the power to authorize the exe-
cution of notes for a corporation rests in the
board of trustees, a note executed by the presi-
dent and secretary without a resolution of the
board is not authorized, though they constitute
a majority of the board.-Edwards v. Carson
Water Co., (Nev.) 34 P. 381.

15. A railroad company employing an attor-
ney to perform services connected with the
construction of a connecting line, which it con-
templates operating as an extension of its road,
is liable for his services, and cannot defeat an
action for the value thereof on the ground that
its general officers had no power to bind the
corporation for such services.-St. Louis & S.
F. R. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, (Kan.) 34 P. 400.

16. So long as a corporation is a "going cor-
poration," engaged in the conduct of the busi-
ness for which it was organized, and not known
or believed to be insolvent by its officers and
managers, with assets exceeding its liabilities
by many thousand dollars, it is not in such a
state of insolvency as will preclude its execut-
ing a mortgage on its property in good faith to
secure a debt of the corporation, though its
directors are security for the debt.-Sabin v. Co-
lumbia River Lumber & Fuel Co., (Or.) 34 P.

692.

With officers and stockholders—
Ratification.

17. A corporation authorized its president
8. In an action on a note purporting to to execute a mortgage to secure a loan, at a
have been made by defendant corporation, rate of interest and for a length of time speci-
where it appears that all the business of de-fied. The mortgage executed by him was for
fendant, including the making of numerous a shorter period than authorized, and provided
similar notes, had for a long time been trans-
acted by its president and secretary, who exe-
cuted the note, and that their actions had al
ways been informally ratified by paying the
notes, and otherwise, defendant is estopped to
deny the authority of such officers to execute
the note.-Duggan v. Pacific Boom Co., (Wash.)
34 F. 157.

9. Where a creditor of a corporation per-
mits the president to retain for his own use
the money he has brought with which to pay
ff the note, the note being allowed to stand,
the president, in giving a note of the corpora-
tion in renewal, acts for himself, and not for
the corporation.-Edwards v. Carson Water Co.,
(Nev.) 34 P. 381.

10. The grantee of grantees of a corpora-
tion, in a suit by the latter to quiet title, can-
not claim that it had no power to acquire and
hold land, as any title he may have is derived
from it. Fer De Witt, J.-Butte Hardware Co.
v. Schwab, (Mont.) 34 P. 24.

11. A corporation which names one as man-
ager, and allows him as such to largely control

that the interest should be paid monthly, that
a failure to pay interest when due rendered the
principal due, and that the mortgagees should
recover attorney's fees in case of foreclosure.
These conditions were not authorized, but the
company accepted the money and used it for
the purposes intended, and paid the interest on
the mortgage monthly for four months. Held
that, in an action to foreclose the mortgage for
default in interest, the corporation and its as-
signee were estopped from denying the author-
ity of the president to execute it.-Gribble v.
Columbus Brewing Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 527.

18. Where the power to authorize the exe
cution of notes for a corporation rests in the
board of trustees, the trustees cannot be heid
to have ratified the act of the president and
secretary, who had executed a note for the
corporation, by reason of the knowledge of a
majority thereof, acquired while acting as pres-
ident and secretary.-Edwards v. Carson Water
Co., (Nev.) 34 P. 381.

19. The fact that the secretary made out
a statement of the debts of the corporation in