Page images
PDF
EPUB

Nonsuit.

Notes.

on the minutes of the court, and errors of law
are relied on, the notice of motion must specify
the errors relied on, and "if the notice do not See "Practice in Civil Cases," L
contain the specifications* * * the motion
must be denied." Held that, where the notice
does not contain the required specification, it is
radically defective, and cannot be amended by See "Negotiable Instruments."
adding new specifications after the time for fil-
ing it has expired; and if it is so amended, by
leave of the trial court, after such time has
expired, the specifications will not be consider-
ed on appeal.-Packer v. Doray, (Cal.) 34 P.
628.

8. A notice of motion for a new trial, directed against the "findings" rather than against the "decision" of the court, is sufficient, as under Code Civil Proc. §§ 632, 633, the findings constitute the decision.-Haight v. Tryon, (Cal.) 34 P. 712.

Abandonment of application.

4. The presentation of a formal motion for a new trial in writing, and the withdrawal thereof, and substitution of another, does not constitute a withdrawal of the notice of intention to move for new trial, nor an abandonment of the proceeding.-Wastl v. Montana Union Ry. Co., (Mont.) 34 P. 844. Misconduct of jury.

5. Code Civil Proc. § 296, subd. 2, provides for a new trial whenever one or more of the jurors shall have been induced to assent to a verdict by a resort to the determination of chance, and that such misconduct may be shown by affidavits of the jurors. Held, that a verdict will be set aside on an affidavit of a juror that an agreement was entered into by the jury to arrive at the result by a "quotient verdict," and that he was induced to assent to the verdict because of the agreement so made and carried out, though the affidavits of other jurors are that the quotient so arrived at was used as a basis of discussion as to the amount of the verdict.-Gordon v. Trevarthan, (Mont.) 34 P. 185.

Accident and surprise.

Notice.

Notice to sureties before entering judgment on bond, see "Appeal," 108.

before reviving judgment, see "Judgment"
29.
Of appeal, see "Appeal," 9-14.

Of election, see "Elections and Voters." 2.
Of motion for new trial, see "New Trial." 2. 3
When notice to agent imputed to principal, see
"Insurance," 8.

NOVATION.

What constitutes.

1. A lumber firm agreed with two of its members to sell them sawed lumber at a certain price. The two members formed a new firm, and one of them sold his interest in the contract to the other, and the latter sold interests therein to two strangers. The old firm continued to sell to the purchasing concern utder the agreement, and to receive payment therefrom, without regard to its personnel, the bills being in all instances made out in the name of the purchasing concern. There was no evidence of any agreement to release the original contractors. Held, that there was no novation, and the lumber firm could sue or of the purchasing members for an accounting without joining his new associates in the p chasing contract.-Chapin v. Brown, (Cal) 34 P. 525.

tract of sale, on which some payments re 2. A purchaser of land assigned the conmained due, to a third person, whom he then introduced to his vendor as the man to whom he had resold the land. Such assignee then 6. "Accident or surprise which ordinary told the vendor to look to him for the rest of prudence could not have guarded against," as the payments, to which the vendor replied that a ground for new trial, does not include ig- it made no difference to him; that he work norance, mistakes, nor misapprehension of an make the deed to whoever made the last payattorney, not occasioned by the adverse party, ment. Held, that there was no novation by nor mismanagement of the defense by the at- which the assignee of the contract became torney, through design, ignorance, or negli- bound for the purchase money yet to be paid. gence.-Holderman v. Jones, (Kan.) 34 P. 352.-Osburn v. Dolan, (Wash.) 34 P. 433. Newly-discovered evidence.

7. A new trial should not be granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence unless such evidence is very clear and satisfactory, and likely to affect the result.-Baumgarten v. Hoffman, (Utah.) 34 P. 294.

8. In an action to foreclose a mortgage, defendants claimed that alterations had been made after execution, and plaintiff testified that he went, immediately after the acknowledgment, from the notary's office to the re

corder's office. Defendants, after judgment for plaintiff, moved for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence that the mortgage was acknowledged at least an hour before it was recorded, and that one P., who occupied a part of the office of defendant, saw plaintiff make alterations after acknowledgment. Held, that where, from the issue, defendants had reason to believe that plaintiff would deny that the alterations were made after execution, they failed to use due diligence in getting such evidence, and the motion for new trial was properly overruled.-Harralson v. Barrett, (Cal.) 34 P. 342.

9. An affidavit of counsel, on information and belief, for new trial for newly-discovered evidence, is insufficient. - Cole v. Thornburg, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 1013.

Nomination.

See "Elections and Voters," 3-6.

NUISANCE.

Liquor nuisance, see "Intoxicating Liquors," 5.
Prescriptive right to maintain obstruction of
street, see "Municipal Corporations," 20.
Livery stable.

per se a nuisance, though it may become such
1. A livery stable in a town or city is not
if not constructed, kept, and used in a proper
Sup.) 34 P. 902.
manner. Phillips v. City of Denver, (Colo

Rights of individual with respect to
public nuisance.

2. The erection of a dam across a naviga ble stream, though a nuisance, will not be enjoined on application of one sustaining no spe cial or personal injury thereby.-Esson v. Wattier, (Or.) 34 P. 756.

Oath.

Administration to witness, see "Witness," 1

OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE.

Information.

1. An information for resisting an officer charged that defendant did "knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully resist him, one J., a dep uty sheriff, duly appointed, qualified

and acting as such." Held, that the informa-
tion would not, after verdict, be adjudged in-
sufficient on the ground that it did not allege
that defendant knew J. to be a deputy sheriff,
that objection not having been taken before
rial by demurrer.-State v. Brown, (Wash.) 34
P. 133.

2. An information for resisting an officer
while serving a warrant of arrest on defendant
alleged that the warrant charged defendant
"with a crime against the laws of the state,"
and that it "was duly and regularly issued
from a justice of the peace court" of a certain
precinct. Held, that the averments as to the
egality of the warrant were sufficient.-State
. Brown, (Wash.) 34 P. 133.

Obstruction.

Of highway, see "Highways," 4, 5.

OFFICE AND OFFICER.

See, also, "Clerk of Court;" "Judge:" "Justices
of the Peace;" "Receivers;" "Sheriffs and
Constables;" "States and State Officers."
Authority of bank officers, see "Banks and
Banking," 1.

County officers, see "Counties," 1-3.

Liability on treasurer's bond because of moneys
lost by failure of bank, election of remedies,
see "Principal and Surety," 3.

Presumption as to performance of duty by offi-
cers, see "Corporations," 23.
Eligibility-Aliens.

1. Where one, without the qualification of
being a citizen of the United States, has been

elected to the office of chief of police of a
city, the election will be annulled, and his cer-
tificate canceled.-Drew v. Rogers, (Cal.) 34 P.
1081.

Resignation and removal.

point the police commissioner of the city, by
and with the advice and consent of the sen-
ate; that the governor may, in vacation, fill
vacancies by appointment, and that all ap-
pointments by the governor shall be made with
the power of suspension or removal at any time
for cause stated in writing, but not for polit
ical reasons. Held, the governor's power of
removal extends to officers appointed by and
with the consent of the senate, as well as to
those appointed in vacation of the senate to
fill vacancies.-Trimble v. People, (Colo. Sup.)
34 P. 981.

Change of compensation during term.
6. Gen. St. § 628, relating to compensation
of city councilmen while acting as a board of
equalization, does not provide that they shall
be entitled to compensation, but merely ex-
cepts them from the prohibition against receiv-
ing compensation at all, and leaves the matter
to be determined by the council. Held, that
an act taking away the power of a city coun-
cil does not deprive them of compensation,
within Const. art. 2, § 25, forbidding an in-
crease or diminution of the compensation of
a public officer during his term of office.-Heilig
v. City Council of Puyallup, (Wash.) 34 P. 164.
Officers de facto.

7. The fact that the persons duly elected
as the officers of a sanitary district met, quali-
fied, and organized before the votes were can-
vassed by the board of supervisors, and before
they were officially declared elected, is
ground for questioning in a collateral proceed-
ing their official acts done after such canvass.
-Woodward v. Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., (Cal.)
34 P. 239.

no

Liability for moneys lost by failure of

bank-Effect of bond.

8. Where the clerk of court, as such, de-
posited, with a bank in good standing, moneys
paid into court pending litigation, he is not lia-
ble on his official bond for the amount so de-
posited on failure of the bank.-Wilson v. Peo-
ple, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 944.

2. Under Denver City Charter, § 45, the
governor is not required to institute an inves-
tigation of a judicial nature before removing a
police commissioner; and the determination of
the governor of the sufficiency of the cause stat-
ed is conclusive, though the cause may not im-
port wrongdoing to the officer removed, since See "Evidence," 9-21.
the only restrictions on the power of removal
are that it must not be for political reasons,

Opinion Testimony.

Orders.

and that the cause must be stated in writing. See "Practice in Civil Cases," 3.
Trimble v. People, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 981.

Removal by governor.

3. Const. art. 4, § 6, which provides that

Ordinance.

the governor "may remove such officer for in- Of cities, see "Municipal Corporations," 10-15.
competency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in

office," applies only to officers whose offices are

Ouster.

whose offices are created by law, but whose Of cotenant, see "Tenancy in Common," 1

established by the constitution, and to officers

appointment or election is not otherwise provid-

ed for; and does not apply to an officer whose

office is created by a statute which provides for
the appointment of the officer, and also for his

Parol Evidence.

suspension and removal, by the governor, for See "Evidence," 25-32.
cause stated in writing, but not for political
reasons.-Trimble v. People, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P.

981.

4. Const. art. 12, § 1, provides that "every
person holding any civil office under the state
or any municipality therein, shall, unless remov-
ed according to law, exercise the duties of such
office;" and article 13, § 3, provides that cer-
tain officers shall be liable to removal for mis-
conduct or malfeasance in office "in such man-
ner as may be provided by law." Held, that
such provisions do not require the legislature
to prescribe the procedure leading to removal
before an officer not liable to impeachment can
be removed, and that an officer is removed
"according to law" if removed in accordance
with a constitutional statute.-Trimble v. Peo-
ple, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 981.

PARTIES.

See, also, "Ejectment," 8.

Action to enforce lien, see "Mechanics' Liens,"
35, 36.

In action to determine water rights, see "Irri-
gation," 9, 10.
In equity, see "Equity," 13.
On appeal, see "Appeal," 22.
To foreclosure of mortgage on homestead, heirs
of parties, see "Homestead," 4.
Proper parties.

1. Where a mortgage made in the form of
a trust deed conveys real estate to a trustee for
the benefit of a third party, to secure the pay-
ment of an indebtedness to such third party,
5. Denver City Charter, § 45, (Laws 1893, the latter may maintain an action in his own
p. 172,) provides that the governor shall ap- name to recover the debt, and to foreclose the

mortgage given to secure the same.-Hutchison | Evidence of.
r. Myers, (Kan.) 34 P. 742.
Joinder of defendants.

2. Rev. St. § 2395, providing that any per-
son may be made a defendant who has or claims
an interest in the controversy adverse to plain-
tiff, or who is a necessary party to a complete
determination of a question involved, does away
with the common-law rule that the administra-
tor of a deceased joint obligor cannot be joined
as defendant with the surviving obligor, in an
action on the contract, unless such survivor is
insolvent.-Fisher v. Chadwick, (Wyo.) 34 P.
899; Chadwick v. Hopkins, Id.
Misjoinder.

8. A complaint is not necessarily defective in which there is united with some defendants another against whom no liability is shown, and an order overruling a demurrer for misjoinder of parties is not reversible error if the rights of the parties have not been prejudiced. -Asevado v. Örr, (Cal.) 34 P. 777.

Waiver of objections.

4. An objection as to misjoinder of parties plaintiff cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.-Moore v. Vickers, (Colo. App.) 34 P.

257.

[blocks in formation]

6. Under Code Proc. § 156, providing that any person may before the trial intervene in any action or proceeding who has an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either party, or an interest against both, a creditor who has attached certain property of his debtor cannot intervene in opposition to the appointment of a receiver in an action by other creditors against the same debtor.-State v. Superior Court of Snohomish County, (Wash.) 34 P. 430. Substitution.

1. The declarations of one person that a other is his partner are incompetent against the latter to charge him as a partner. Johnston t Clements. 25 Kan. 376, followed.-Howard 1 Woodward, (Kan.) 34 P. 348. Dissolution, settlement, and accounting of an alleged partnership between plaintiff an: 2. Where, in an action for the dissolutive defendant and for an accounting, it appeas sale of all the merchandise for which plain-f that plaintiff gave defendant a complete biof asks an accounting, and delivered possessic thereof to defendant, who sold it with plaint. concurrence, and that an agreement for an counting was had, and the receipt of all dus admitted by plaintiff, the complaint was pre erly dismissed.-Gibson v. Glover, (Colo. Ap 34 P. 687. Actions against.

3. Garnishment to secure a claim against a partnership cannot be maintained against a partner individually.-Jones v. Langhorne, (Crida Sup.) 34 P. 997.

4. In an action against two persons as partners for services in packing goods, proof mere? that defendants were joint owners of the goods does not entitle plaintiff to recover.-Miller v. Vermurie, (Wash.) 34 P. 1108.

5. Where a petition alleges in general terma that two persons are liable for the price of goods purchased by them, and the answer of one is a general denial, without any attack upon the petition that the facts as to the joint liability were not fully and definitely stated, the admission of proof showing that the joint liability arose through a partnership of the par ties is not material error.-Howard v. Woodward, (Kan.) 34 P. 348.

Action at law between partners.

6. Where two persons agree to each f nish one-half the money to purchase real e tate, each to have a half interest in the des and the title is taken in the name of one, who afterwards sells the land at an increased price, a recovery in an action for money had and received against the person holding the tide cannot be defeated on the ground that the transaction related to a partnership which is unsettled, and not the subject of an action at aw.-Coffin v. McIntosh, (Utah,) 34 P. 247. Passengers.

7. Where two suitors seek to recover from a general debtor,-the one upon express contract, and the other upon garnishment,-there is no such identity of claims as is contemplated by Rev. St. § 4109, in order to authorize a sub- See "Carriers." stitution of defendants.-McCauley v. Sears, (Idaho,) 34 P. 814.

PARTITION.

When allowed.

1. Under Code Proc. § 583, relating to partition, and providing that "the rights of the several parties plaintiffs as well as defendants may be put in issue, tried and determined in such suit." a suit in equity for partition should not be dismissed, as at common law, because defendant is in possession, claiming adversely, but the court should determine the title.-Hill v. Young, (Wash.) 34 P. 144. Pleading.

2. It is not necessary that a complaint for partition allege necessity for a sale in lieu of partition, or that partition cannot be made, as Code Proc. § 584, provides that if such facts appear from the evidence, without allegations in the pleadings, a sale may be ordered.-Hill v. Young, (Wash.) 34 P. 144.

PARTNERSHIP.

Notice to partner, effect on firm, see "Negotiable Instruments," 3.

Right of partner to homestead, see "Homestead," 1.

PAYMENT.

See, also, "Compromise;" "Release and Dis
charge.

Of mortgage, see "Mortgages," 5, 6.
Of negotiable instruments, see "Negotiable In-
struments," 7.

Voluntary payment.

1 Though payment of interest on a note secured by a mortgage could not be recovered because of a void provision therein, yet, where defendants voluntarily paid such interest under a mistaken belief that they were bound to do it be credited on the principal of the loan.—Har so, they cannot recover it back, or demand that ralson v. Barrett, (Cal.) 34 P. 342. Application.

2. Where an attorney renders services in various matters, and the client makes a partial payment "on account of fees for legal serv ices." the attorney cannot credit the money on certain items of his account, so as to place them beyond controversy.-Hinckley v. Krug, (Cal) 34 P. 118.

3. A claim for materials furnished a cotractor for a building cannot be defeated by proof that the contractor, from money received

on his contract, paid the material man more
than the value of his materials, for which pay-
ment the material man gave him credit on his
general account against such contractor, the
material man not knowing whence the money
came, and neither the owner nor the contractor
giving any directions as to the application of
the payment.-First Presbyterian Church of
Hutchinson v. Santy, (Kan.) 34 P. 974.
Debt contracted in foreign country.

4. A debt contracted in a foreign country
is payable in the currency of that country, and
therefore, where the creditor sues in the United
States, he is entitled to recover such sum in
money of the United States as equals the debt
in the foreign_country where it was payable.—
Grunwald v. Freese, (Cal.) 34 P. 73.

Penalties.

For usury, see "Usury."

Personal Injuries.

See "Damages;" "Negligence."

Petition.

See "Pleading," 4-6.

enjoin defendant from collecting tolls thereon,
an averment in the complaint that "for more
than six months last past defendant has had
no franchise or right to demand or take toll,"
is not an admission of the existence of such
franchise or right previous to that period.-
People v. Volcano Canyon Toll-Road Co., (Cal.)
34 P. 522.
Petition or complaint.

4. Under Rev. St. § 2447, providing that a
petition must contain a statement of the facts
constituting a cause of action in ordinary lan-
guage, an exhibit attached to a petition, and
therein referred to as a part thereof, is not a
part of the petition, and cannot be referred to
to determine the sufficiency, or to supply alle
gations omitted therefrom.-Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. Kahn, (Wyo.) 34 P. 895.

5. Where a complaint alleges that defend-
ant is a corporation organized for the purpose
of paying its members periodical installment en-
dowments; that plaintiff became a member, and
received a certificate entitling her to rights of
membership, and participation in the endow-
ment fund to the extent of $6,000, to be paid
at 10 stated periods, etc.; that defendant there-
upon executed a certain contract in writing,
whereby it promised and agreed to pay plain-
tiff, on a certain date, $600, and that no part

For formation of sanitary district, see "Munic- of said sum has been paid, a demurrer on the
ipal Corporations," 1, 2.

Physicians and Surgeons.

Appeal from board of medical examiners, see
"Appeal," 6.

Contest of will, testimony of physician, see
"Witness," 3.

PLEADING.

See, also, "Damages," 9, 10; "Fraudulent Con;
veyances, " 16-18; "Limitation of Actions,"
17, 18; "Master and Servant," 9; "Negotiable
Instruments," 12; "Set-Off and Counter-
claim," 2.

Action against sureties, see "Principal and
Surety," 8.

for libel, see "Libel and Slander," 6.
on contract, see "Contracts," 18-20.
on policy, see "Insurance," 10.

Alleging estoppel, see "Estoppel." 14, 15.

release, see "Release and Discharge," 4.
Averment as to city's corporate existence, see
"Municipal Corporations,' 48.

Demurrer, see "Municipal Corporations," 33.
Effect of demurrer as admission, review on
appeal, see "Appeal," 56.

Joinder of causes, see "Action."
Pleading and proof, see "Insurance," 13.

of corporate existence, see "Corpora-
tions," 4, 5.

General principle of construction.

1. Under Rev. St. § 4207, providing that in
the construction of a pleading its allegations
must be liberally construed with a view to sub-
stantial justice, a pleading is not to be con-
strued most strongly against the pleader.
Cantwell v. McPherson, (Idaho) 34 P. 1095.
Alleging conclusions of law.

2. A complaint in an action on an ac-
count, which alleges, generally, "unreasonable
and vexatious delay" in making payment, and
asks interest thereon, is sufficient, in the ab-
sence of any objection thereto, to admit proof
of the facts constituting such delay;
where judgment is rendered by default against
defendant, for the interest claimed, it will be
presumed that such proof was offered.-Keys v.
Morrison, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 259.

Negative pregnant.

and

3. In an action in the nature of a quo
warranto, brought by the attorney general, to
have a certain road declared a highway, and to

ground of ambiguity is properly overruled, as
it is clear that the cause of action is based on
the written contract to pay, and the previous
allegations are but inducements to the contract.
-Henke v. Eureka Endowment Ass'n of Cal-
ifornia, (Cal.) 34 P. 1089.

6. In an action by an execution debtor.
against a sheriff to recover damages for selling
land without notice, the complaint need not
allege that the sheriff's return, that he has
given notice, is false.-Raker v. Bucher, (Cal.)
34 P. 849.

Demurrer.

7. A joint demurrer by several defendants
must be overruled if the complaint is good as
to either of them.-Asevado v. Orr, (Cal.) 34 P.
777.

8. Under Civil Code, § 222, providing that
the judgment may, when justice requires it, de-
termine the ultimate rights of the parties on
each side, as between themselves, where the
answer shows that one of the plaintiffs had be-
come jointly liable with defendant on the con-
tract in suit, a general demurrer to such an-
swer should be overruled. -Jones v. Perot,
(Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 728.

two counts cannot be sustained if either count
9. A demurrer to a complaint containing
is good.-Asevado v. Orr, (Cal.) 34 P. 777.
Answer.

10. An answer wherein defendants "say"
that they deny each and every allegation in the
complaint, while not commendable, is a denial,
and will be sustained, unless objected to at the
proper time.-Town of Denver v. City of Spo-
kane Falls, (Wash.) 34 P. 926.

11. In an action on a note, an allegation in
the complaint that it has not been paid is ma-
terial, and, when the complaint is unverified,
the issue of nonpayment is raised by a general
denial, so that the answer cannot be stricken
out as sham.-Bank of Shasta v. Boyd, (Cal.)
34 P. 337.

12. Where it appears from the copies of a
note and mortgage sued on, and which are set
out in the complaint, that the action is not
barred, an unverified answer setting up the
statute of limitations, since it admits the due
execution of the note and mortgage, is properly
stricken out as sham.-Bank of Shasta v. Boyd,
(Cal.) 34 P. 337.

13. In an action to foreclose a mortgage
made by a corporation on its brewery plant, a
denial in his answer, by its assignee for the
benefit of creditors, on information and belief,
that certain appliances connected with property

described in the mortgage were attached to the realty and were fixtures, was insufficient, since he must be presumed to be in possession and to have knowledge as to such fact.-Gribble v. Columbus Brewing Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 527.

14. Plaintiff's motion for judgment because the answer is evasive is properly denied, where plaintiff's objection to the answer may be overcome by the correction of an evident clerical error which the context shows to be the use of "when" for "where."-Raker v. Bucher, (Cal.) 34 P. 654.

[ocr errors]

amendment will not be allowed, after trial o as to count on plaintiffs' rights, as heirs of B whose estate had not been administered on or distributed, to sue for conversion of property of which they had never been in possess. and which defendant had received under a cotract to which plaintiffs were not parties, as such amendment would raise new issues, wh would probably require a new trial.—Bradley 1, Parker, (Cal.) 34 P. 234. Pleading and proof.

24. Where an action on a contract for com 15. An answer alleging that defendant "destructing a building foundation, less an allow nies any knowledge or information sufficient to ance for deviation from the requirements of the form a belief" as to the allegations of the com- contract, is tried on the theory that a know plaint is defective, as it does not show that he edge by defendant at the time of defective costruction, without objection, might preclude her from insisting on plaintiffs' failure to perform their contract, it is error to exclude evidence the work, was her agent, on the ground that that defendant's husband, who was overseeing such agency was not alleged by plaintiffs-Me Dermott v. Grimm, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 99.

could not have obtained such information. · Jones v. Perot, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 728. Answer-Inconsistent defenses.

16. In an action for breach of contract, the answer denied the breach alleged, and affirmatively alleged that defendants continued to perform the work provided for by the contract until directed by plaintiffs to desist from so doing. Held, that such defenses were not necessarily inconsistent, and that the court properly refused to strike out the answer for alleged inconsistency in the defense.-Brown v. Porter, (Wash.) 34 P. 1105.

Failure to answer cross complaint.

17. In an action for partnership accounting, defendant filed a "cross complaint" which related to the partnership transaction set forth in the complaint, alleged the partnership contract in somewhat different terms, and contained only matters in avoidance, or constituting a defense or counterclaim. Held, the averments of the cross complaint were not admitted by failure of plaintiff to answer, as the cross complaint was really an answer to the complaint, and therefore its averments were deemed controverted, under Code Civil Proc. § 462.Haight v. Tryon, (Cal.) 34 P. 712.

Motion to compel election.

18. A cause of action may be stated in different counts in order to meet any possible phase of the evidence, and the pleader will not be required to elect on which count he will proceed.-Remy v. Olds, (Cal.) 34 P. 216. Amendment.

19. Where a defendant, under leave of court, filed a supplemental answer, another judge could not order it stricken from the files be cause not filed in apt time, nor because the case was set for trial before the leave was granted and the answer filed. - Godding v. Colorado Springs Live-Stock Co., (Colo. App.) 34 P. 942, 20. In an action by a mortgagee for conversion of the mortgaged chattels, there is no abuse of discretion in allowing defendant, at the trial, to amend his answer, and to aver that the mortgage was released before defendant took the property.-Irwin v. McDowell, (Cal.) 34 P. 70S.

21. Under Sess. Laws 1889, p. 73, providing that, when facts occurring subsequent to the commencement of an action render it proper, they may, by leave of court, be presented by supplemental pleadings, and issue taken thereon as in case of original pleadings, it was not error for the court to refuse to allow facts occurring subsequent to the commencement of the action to be pleaded as an amendment to the original answer, but to require them to be set out in a supplemental pleading.-Sylvester v. Jerome, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 760.

22. It is in the discretion of the trial court to refuse to allow an amendment of the complaint by striking out certain admissions therein, after the report of the referee in the case has been made.-Buno v. Gomer, (Colo. App.)

34 P. 256.

23. Where the complaint in an action for conversion describes plaintiffs as heirs of one

25. Under an answer denying that plantif show that a deed to plaintiff absolute in form ever owned the land in dispute, defendant my P. 696. was a mortgage.-Wenzel v. Schultz, (Cal) 34

26. Evidence only tending to establish pan of an answer which has been stricken out s properly excluded.-City of Santa Ana v. Har lin, (Cal.) 34 P. 224.

27. In an action to condemn land for a street, evidence of irregularities in the preceedings to open the street is properly excal ed where irregularities are not alleged in the answer. City of Santa Ana v. Harlin, (Cal 34 P. 224.

Variance.

28. Where a complaint alleges an express contract between plaintiff and defendant, there can be no recovery on proof of a contract be tween defendant and a third person for ph tiff's benefit.-Haynes v. Tacoma, 0. & G. H R. Co., (Wash.) 34 P. 922.

of land sold by plaintiff to defendant, plaintif 29. In an action on notes given for the pries cannot escape the effect of having failed to per form by tendering a deed, on the ground tha: it would have been useless, where he has not alleged such excuse. - Underwood v. Tew, (Wash.) 34 P. 1100.

30. Nor, in the absence of proper allegations. can plaintiff show that he has always been ready, willing, and able to perform.-Underwood v. Tew, (Wash.) 34 P. 1100.

31. In an action by real-estate agents to re cover commissions, where the original contract which was set out in the petition recited that a part of the consideration for the land was to be paid in cash, the admission of evidence that the owner subsequently agreed to see as cash a secured note offered by the proposed purchaser does not constitute a material vanance.-Davis v. Lawrence, (Kan.) 34 P. 1051. 32. An action on contract will be dismissed where defendant shows illegality of the m tract by proper cross-examination of plaintifs witnesses, though defendant did not special TM plead such illegality.-Ah Doon v. Smith, Ore 34 P. 1093.

33. In an action to restrain a chattel mort gagee from foreclosing his mortgage, where the complaint proceeds on the theory that the gagee had accepted a deed of the mortgages land in full satisfaction of his debt, and hi promised to discharge the mortgage, the mortg gor is not entitled to an accounting by the rur gagee as to the value of the land, or the pe ceeds realized by him from its sale, since th is not within the issues presented by his e plaint.-Davis v. Hinchliffe, (Wash.) 34 P. 9 Failure to deny execution of instru ment under oath.

34. In an action for money had and received. B., which is merely matter of inducement, an the complaint alleged that defendant had us

« PreviousContinue »