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within twelve months after the survey thereof, years from the date of the act, contemplates bi by the United States, file with the register of one appraisement within the fire years: ged the land office for the district where such land where the county commissioners bare also a is located a profile of its road," it is not neces- praised the value of improvements made tbs sary for a company which has filed its articles on by an occupant, as required by section 1, 3 of incorporation and proofs of organization, and occupant is not entitled to another appraiser constructed a

road

unsurveyed public on the sale of the land within the five years, lands, to file a map of definite location, in or- though the proviso to section 7 requires the per der to entitle it to the benefit of the act.-Den- chaser to pay the owner of the improvei ver & R. G. R. Co. v. Hanoum, (Colo. Sup.) | the appraised value thereof "at the time 34 P. 838.

sale," within 30 days from the date tberec 4. Act Cong. July 27, 1866, incorporating Holm v. Prater, (Wash.) 34 P. 919. the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company, and 8. Defects in an application to purchase granting lands in aid of the construction of the state school lieu lands, made September road, granted such railroad power, inter alia, to 1868, cured by the curative act sue and be sned, and all “the powers, privileges, March 24, 1870, (St. 1870, p. 352;) and de and immunities necessary to carry into effect the March 27, 1872, limiting the effect of s2: purposes of this act as herein set forth.” Act curative act in the matter of school lao's Cong. April 20, 1871, authorized such corpora- the amount of 320 acres for any one parti tion to mortgage its road: “provided, that if er did not apply, the application hariag be the company shall hereafter suffer any breach made before the passage of the curative art of the conditions of the act above referred to, -People v. Noyo Lumber Co., (Cal.) 34 P. C. under which it was organized, the rights of 9. The act of 1872 was superseded by Pai those claiming under any mortgage made by Code, $ 3573, which is substantially the sa the company to the lands granted to it by said as Act March 24, 1870.–People v. Noro Le act, shall extend only to so much thereof as ber Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 96. shall be coterminous with or appertain to that 10. Act Cong. March 1, 1877, (19 Stat. 26 part of the said road which shall have been known as the "Booth Act," "relating to constructed at the time of the foreclosure of demnity school selections in the state of Csi. said mortgage." Held, that Act April 20, 1871, fornia,” and confirming to the state the title was not intended to extend the time within to these lands selected by the state, s which the company should complete the road to equivalent to a grant of the lands to the sea the date of foreclosure of such mortgage. Lee as of the date of listing, and the title thos and Seeds, JJ., dissenting.-Atlantic & P. R. ratified was within the effect of the curacie Co. v. Mingus, (N. M.) 34 P. 592.

act of March 24, 1870, and was then by

validated, as though the lands belonged to t Grants in aid of railroad When title

state at the time of the passage of the 2* passes.

People v. Yoyo Lumber Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 5. Act Cong. March 3, 1875, granting rights

11. The provision of Act April 17, 181 of way to railroads over the public lands, pro- for facilitating the construction of a state cass vides in section 4 that a company desiring the by the sale of alternate sections of the scboi benefits of the act shall file a profile of its road, land lying under the canal, violates Coast & which, after approval by the secretary, shall be 0, $ 3, inhibiting the use of the public sch noted on the plats, "and thereafter 'all lands fund for any purpose other than the mainte crossed by said right of way shall be disposed nance of the schools.--In re Canal Certificate of subject thereto. Held, that the grant passes (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 274. title to the company on the filing of the profile, Indian titles. not on the filing of the articles and proof of 12. United States treaties with the Cheroke organization. Enoch v. Railway Co., (Wash.) Nation of May 6, 1828, and February 14, 18. 33 P. 966, followed.-Reidt v. Spokane Falls & granted it 7,000,000 acres for a permace N. Ry. Co., (Wash.) 34 P. 150; Flutsch v. home, and further provided that, "in addition Same, Id.

to the 7,000,000 acres of land thus pror det Power to declare forfeiture.

for and bounded, the United States further 6. Act Cong: July 27, 1866, incorporating guaranty to the Cherokee Nation a perpetual the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company, and outlet west, and a free and unmolested use of granting lands in aid of the construction of the of said seven millions of acres, as far pets

all the country west, of the western boundary road, declares the purpose of the grant to be the sovereignty of the United States and the to secure the safe and speedy transportation of rights of soil extend." Treaty of Dersi mails, troops, munitions of war, and public 29, 1835, provided for the setting apart of stores to the Pacific coast. Sections 8 and 9 800,000 acres as a part of the permanent bom provide that the grant is made and accepted on of the Cherokee Nation, "it being apprehender condition that work shall be commenced with that the seven million acres set apart for tha: in two years: that a certain number of miles of road shall be constructed annually: that the Cherokee Nation could use the lands set apart

purpose were not sufficient." Hed. that the whole shall be completed by July 4, 1878; and, for an outlet for that purpose only, and a seiin case of breach thereof, the United States tlement by them or others under license frog may do all things needful to secure a speedy them on the outlet, and the operation of s'00 completion of thie road. Section 20 provides quarries thereon, was an unwarranted este that to better accomplish the object of the act, sion of the guaranty made by the treaties Jor "namely; to promote the public interest and dan v. Goldman, 34 P. 371, 1 Okl. 459. welfare," and secure to the government at all 13. Nor are the rights of the Cherokee Va times

the use and benefit of the rail- tion in such outlet enlarged by the treaty of road and telegraph lines, congress may at any 1866, which provides that the United States time, having regard for the rights of such com may settle friendly Indians in any part of the pany, “add to, alter, amend, or repeal this act. Cherokee outlet, the lands to be paid for to the ileld, that congress had the power to pass Act Cherokee Nation, and that the Cherokee Na July 6, 1886, declaring a forfeiture of the un- tion may retain the right of possession and ; earned lands because of failure to construct risdiction orer all of the outlet until thus i the road within the time prescribed in the and occupied, after which their jurisdiction and grant.--Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Mingus, (N. rights of possession to cease forever and I?. M.) 34 P. 592.

land so sold and occupied.--Jordan v. Gold

34 P. 371, 1 Okl. 459. School lands. 7. Act March 28, 1890, (Laws 1889-90, p.

Application for patent - Filing adverse 438,) & 3, which makes it the duty of the county

claim. commissioners to inspect and appraise all school 14. Plaintiff, by a void deed, conviT 13 lands which may be sold or leased within five' undivided interest in a mining claim to its or

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tenants, who applied for and obtained a pat-1 cover costs.”—Packer v. Doray, (Cal.) 34 P.
ent. In a suit against them and their gran-628.
tee to quiet title it was not pleaded or shown
that plaintiff was an owner or claimant when

QUO WARRANTO.

.
the patent was applied for. Held, that plaintiff Right to jury trial, see “Constitutional Law,”
was not estopped, under Rev. St. U. S. $
2326, because it did not file an adverse claim

15.
to the application. Per De Witt, J. – Butte Usurpation of corporate franchise-Bur-
Hardware Co. v. Schwab, (Mont.) 34 P. 24 den of proof.
Inclosure under color of title.

In an action in the nature of a quo
15. A judicial decree, followed by posses- warranto, brought by the attorney general, to
sion under a bona fide claim, is color of title, have a certain road declared a highway, and to
within the meaning of Act Cong. Feb. 25, enjoin defendant from collecting tolls thereon,
1885, prohibiting inclosures of public lands un- defendant's claim and exercise of the fran-
less under "claim or color of title made or ac chise being admitted, the burden is on defend-
quired in good faith,” and, such possession hav- ant to show by what warrant or authority such
ing lasted for 25 years, the holder can main- claim is made. - People v. Volcano Canyon
tain ejectment against persons assuming to en- Toll-Road Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 522.
ter on the premises as being "public lands of
the United States." Cameron v. U. S., 13
S. Ct. 595, 148 U, S. 301, followed.-Los An RAILROAD COMPANIES.
geles Farming & Milling Co. v. Hoff, (Cal.) 34
P. 518.

See, also, “Carriers;" "Master and Servant;"

"Negligence.”
Conveyance by pre-emptioner-Title of
grantee.

Authority of contractor, see “Principal and

Agent," 4.
16, A conveyance of land by the pre-emp-
tioner gives the grantee title thereto, as against Frightening horses, see "Negligence," 2.

of officer, see "Principal and Agent,” 3.
an attaching creditor of the grantor, though the Grants in aid of, see "Public Lands," 3-6.
conveyance be void, as against the government. Imposing absolute liability for stock killed, see
under Rev. St. U. S. $ 2263, relating to pre "Constitutional Law," 19, 20.
emption of public lands, and providing that all Liability for obstructing surface water,
"transfers of the right hereby secured, prior to "Surface Water."
the issuing of the patent, shall be" void.-MC- Taxation, see “Constitutional Law," 23.
Millen v. Leonard, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 681.
Cancellation of entry – Allowance for Construction across public lands.

1. Gen. St. & 1572, by expressly conferring
improvements.

on railroad companies the right to construct
17. Where one makes improvements on land their lines across, along, or on any river, stream
entered as a homestead, after being notified of water, or water course which their routes
that the entry, having been allowed by inad, intersect' or touch, excludes the right to con-
vertence, would be returned to the general land

struct lines across tide lands belonging to the
office for cancellation, he cannot claim an al-
lowance for such improvements on final de state. -Seattle & M. Ry. Co. v. State, (Wash.)

31 P. 551.
cision against him.-Smith v. Arthur, (Wash.)
34 P. 433.

Highway across track.
Conclusiveness of decision of secretary

2. Where a highway is established across

a railroad company's right of way, the com-
of the interior.

pany is entitled to compensation for all neces.
18. The decision of the secretary of the in- sary expenditures in constructing cattle guards
terior, on appeal from the land department, and such other things as the statute requires
that certain land was not included in a grant it to construct on account of the highway.-
to defendant, is conclusive so long as it stands, Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Board Com’rs John-
and cannot be collaterally attacked in an action son County, (Kan.) 34 P. 396.
to recover purchase money by one to whom de.
fendant agreed to convey title. Colburn v. Occupation of streets and highways.
Northern Pac. R. Co., (Mont.) 34 P. 1017.

3. Under 1 Hill's Code, $$ 1569, 1570, pro-

viding that, if a railway company locate the bed
Public Policy.

of its road on any portion of the track occupied

by an established territorial or county road, it
See “Contracts,” 6.

shall be responsible to the county "for all ex-
penses incurred" in relocating and opening the

portion of said road so appropriated, a com-
Quantum Meruit.

plaint, in an action by a county against a rail-

road company, alleging that the expense of re-
See "Assumpsit.”

locating and opening a road so destroyed and

appropriated by defendant "is and will be" a
QUIETING TITLE

certain sum, without averring that any such

expense has been incurred, does not state a
Possession by plaintift.

cause of action.- Weymouth v. Port Townsend
1. In an action to quiet title to an undi- & S. R. Co., (Wash.) 34 P. 151.
vided interest in land, a finding that defend- Crossing other railroads.
ant had built a foundation for a house partly 4. Gen. St. & 1571, provides that any rail-
upon a portion of the premises is not a finding
that plaintiff was not in possession when the unite its railway with any other railway before

way company may cross, intersect, join, and
action was brought. Per De Witt, J.-Butte constructed "at any point" in its route, and,
Hardware Co. v. Schwab, (Mont.) 34 P. 24.

if the two companies cannot agree on the com-
Disclaimer by defendant-Judgment. pensation or the points and manner of the

2. Where defendant in an action to quiet crossings and connections, the same shall be de
title disclaims as to part of the land, it is not termined as provided for the taking of land
error for the court to dismiss the action as to necessary for the constructing of a railroad.
such part, instead of giving plaintiff judgment Code Proc. $ 651, provides that if the court
therefor, as such judgment would be merely shall be satisfied by competent proof that the
formal, under Code Civil Proc. $ 739, which property sought to be appropriated is necessary
provides that “if the defendant in such action for the purposes of the enterprise, he shall
disclaims in bis answer any interest or estate make an order for a jury. Held, that where
in he property * the plaintiff cannot re the points of crossing could not be determined

by the companies the court was to determine accident at a crossing, unless that be the pror them, and that it did not have to declare a imate cause of the injury, and there te B necessity for a crossing at a particular point such negligence on the part of the person desired by the new road where it would greatly jured as to prevent bis recovery: - Chicago, injure the senior road, and near by which the I. & P. R. Co. v. Crisman, (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. new road could pass without such injury, and 286. with merely an additional expense to the new Contributory negligence. road.-Seattle & M. Ry. Co. v. State, (Wash.)

12. Where the view of the track from the 34 P. 551.

highway is obstructed, or the crossing is in Taxation Exemption on paying per- other respects especially dangerous, it is the centage of gross earnings.

duty of a traveler, aware of such facts, to a 5. Act Wash. T. Nov. 28, 1883, (Laws view is unobstructed; and if he cannot other

ercise a higher degree of care than when the Wash. 1883, p. 64,) known as the “Gross Earnings Law," which provided for the taxation of wise satisfy himself that it is prudent to create the gross 'earnings in lieu of any and all other track.-Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Crisman,

he must stop and listen before driving on the taxes upon any railroad equipment, appurtenances, or appendages there (Colo. Sup.) 34 P. 286. of, or upon any other property situated in this road company does not excuse negligence in

13. Gross negligence on the part of the raa territory, belonging to the corporation owning the part of one injured at a railroad crossis or operating such railroad," did not limit the

-Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Nunes, (Cola exemption from taxation to property actually Sup.) 34 P. 288. used in the operation of railroads, but exempt

14. Failure to give the statutory siztas ed all property of such corporations.-Columbia & P. S. R. Co. v. Chilberg, (Wash.) 34 P. 163. speed, does not excuse negligence on the rant

or running the train at a too rapid rate fi Liability for negligence Of consoli- of one injured on a railroad crossing.-Chi ari dated company.

R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Crisman, (Colo. Sup/ 34

P. 286. 6. Where two or more railroad companies are consolidated under the statutes of the state, Injuries to persons on track-Contribthe new or consolidated company is answerable utory negligence. for the obligations of the old companies, includ 15. In an action for injuries from being ing torts, in the absence of any evidence or struck by a train while walking along a n} stipulations to the contrary.-Berry v. Kansas road track in a cut in a street with an embart. City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co., (Kan.) 31 P. 805. ment on each side, an instruction that it is the Injury to trespasser on cars.

duty of men walking on the track, on discuter 7. Where plaintiff was injured through the ing the approach of a train, to leave the track gross negligence of defendant's trainmen, who if possible, and it is negligence if they fai 10 had knowledge that he was on the train. de- do so;. that, if plaintiff knew the train was ap fendant is liable for the injury, even if the proaching, and could have gotten away from i plaintiff was a trespasser. -Everett v. Oregon even by throwing himself prostrate on the s S. L. & U. N. Ry. Co., (Utah,) 34 P. 289.

bankment, and failed to use such means of se

preservation as were obvious and were at hao Statutory provisions--Rate of speed. he was negligent,-is not erroneous, where iber

8. The mere fact that a train which caused is evidence to warrant it -Beck v. Portland & an injury to a person on the track was running V. Ry. Co., (Or.) 34 P. 753. at a speed prohibited by an ordinance, which 16. Nor is it error, in such case, after etimerely prescribed a penalty for its violation, is dence that there was another road which plain not, per se, conclusive proof of negligence, ren- tiff could have chosen, to charge that a dering the railroad company liable, but such vio- cannot go deliberately, and with his eyes op=1

. lation must have been the proximate cause of into danger, and then complain of another this: the injury; and whether the company is liable he is injured; that it is his duty to use all of is for the jury, and not the court, to say.--Beck dinary means for self-preservation, and if be v. Portland & V. Ry. Co., (Or.) 34 P. 753. fails to do that,-if there is a choice of ways fa Accidents at crossings.

him to pass, one safe and the o:her dangeroos

and, with knowledge of the situation, be takes 9. Defendant, having a contract to build a the latter,-he must abide the consequeneslength of sea walí, was hauling sand for filling, Beck v. Portland & V. Ry. Co., (Or.) 34 P. K in a train of cars on a temporary track along the water front, said train making about 20 Stock-killing cases. trips a day. Subcontractors were hauling stone

17. Plaintiff's son testified that he was of and other material in large quantities by tea in foot, driving the stock killed on the road cross on a road crossing over said track. Heid, that ing defendant's railroad; that when the store a charge that said crossing was not a highway were struck he was behind them. 30) paris crossing was irrelevant on the question of de from the crossing. It appeared that the tra's fendant's liability for injuries to one of the was going fast. Held, that the evidence did teamsters.---Carraher v. San Francisco Bridge not support a finding that the engineer's failCo., (Cal.) 34 P. 828.

ure to whistle 80 rods from the crossing parts 10. The complaint in an action against a caused the accident. -Atchison, T. & Š. F. R railroad company alleged that the driver of a Co. v. Bell, (Kan.) 34 P. 350. horse car in which plaintiff was a passenger, Fires. on approaching a crossing of defendant's track, 18. Act Jan. 8, 1891, requiring railroad con observed an engine standing on the track with panies, between September 1st and November in 25 feet of the crossing, whereupon he stop- 1st in every year, to burn the vegetation 09 ped the car; that, after ascertaining that the their right of way as a guard against fire, and engine was not in motion, he started to cross making them liable for damage resulting froa the track; that when he was very near it the failure to do so, does not authorize a recorery engineer of defendant's engine negligently com- for fire occurring, October 20, 1891. -- Iria menced to back it towards the car, whereupon Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gilland; (Wyo.) 34 P. 953. the passengers, including plaintiff, observing 19. It is not per se negligence for a riit that a collision was imminent, jumped from way company to permit combustible material the car, and that in so doing plaintiff, though such as "stalks, grass, grain, or stubble." to using due care, was injured. Held, that the grow or remain on its right of way in court complaint stated a cause of action.-Stephenson erable quantities.-Union Pac. Ry. Co. 1. Giiv. Southern Pac. Co., (Cal.) 34 P. 618.

land, (Wyo.) 34 P. 953. 11. Failure to ring the bell or blow the 20. Under Act March 31, 1887, making rail. whistle at a crossing, as required by law, does road companies liable for loss from fire started not render a railroad company liable for an by their engines, no negligence on the part of

one whose property is destroyed is to be consid- | trict attorney, unknown," and the evidence for
ered unless he knowingly or purposely placed the prosecution showed that before the in-
luis property where sparks wouid be likely to formation was prepared the district attorney
ignite it, or, being present, suffered it to re was informed as to who stole the property,
main in proximity to a fire in actual progress, and from whom it was received by defendant,
without effort to protect it; and, in the ab- the variance is fatal.-Sault v. People, (Colo.
sence of evidence of such neglect, an instruc- App.) 34 P. 263.
tion on contributory negligence is properly re-
fused.-Union Pac., D. & G. Ry. Co. v. Wil-

Recognizance.
liams, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 731.

See “Bail."
Ratification.

Records.
See "Principal and Agent," 5–7.

Correcting journal entry of conviction, see

"Criminal Law," 70.
Real Estate Agents.

Estoppel by, see "Estoppel,” 3, 4.

On appeal, see “Appeal," 27-47.
See "Factors and Brokers."

Right to have deed recorded, see “Constitu-

tional Law," 17.
RECEIVERS.

Redemption.
Estoppel to object to appointment, see “Estop From execution sale, see “Execution," &

pel," 13.
Removal of receiver and appointment of an-

Sale of equity, see “Mortgages," 14.
other, right of appeal, see "Appeal,” 5.

Reformation.
Appointment.

1. Although, under the statute, the pur- of contracts, see “Equity,” 3, 4.
chaser of mortgaged premises on foreclosure
sale is entitled to rents of the premises or the

Regents, Board of.
value of the use and occupation from the time
of the sale until redemption, a receiver will See “Colleges and Universities.”
not be appointed for the premises before the
expiration of the period allowed for redemption,
eren though the judgment debtor is insolvent,

RELEASE AND DISCHARGE.
as the latter, until then, is entitled to the pos. See, also, “Compromise;" “Payment.”
session.-West v. Conant, (Cal.) 34 P. 705.
2. A complaint in an action to recover pos-

Of insolvent, see “Insolvency," 5.
session of land, with damages for witholding it of mortgage, see “Chattel Mortgages,” 5.
and rents, alleged plaintiff's ownership of prem- of surety, see “Principal and Surety," 3-7.
ises withheld by defendant; that defendant What constitutes.
was renting the premises and collecting the
rents; that the premises were mortgaged; and

1. A subcontractor assigned to a creditor
that plaintiff needed the rents

to pay interest all money due or to become due under his con-

tract.
falling due on the mortgage. Held not to show

When the creditor presented his claim
grounds sufficient for the appointment of a re-

at the request of the contractor, who ques-
ceiver pending the action.-State v. Secondo Ju- tioned the amount due, he gave å receipt ex-
dicial District Court, (Mont.) 34 P. 609.

pressed to be in full of all claims under the

subcontract, the contractor stating that, if any
Rights of attaching creditors.

was due, it should be paid irrespective
3. Where one has attached property the of the receipt. The creditor reassigned his in-
court has no authority to direct a receiver ap-

terest to the subcontractor. Held, in an ac-
pointed in an action other than the attachment tion against the original contractor to recover
suit to take charge of the attached property, a balance alleged to be due, that the unau-
as the attachment creditor has not only a

thorized receipt given by the creditor was not
right to have his debt satisfied out of such conclusive.-Moore v. Vickers, (Colo. App.) 34
property, but to have the sheriff retain it in P. 257.
Ehe mean time.-State v. Superior Court of Fraud or mistake.
Snohomish County, (Wash.) 34 P. 430.

2. In an action against a stea mship com-
Liability for losses.

pany for personal injuries sustained by falling
4. Where goods, under an order of the through the hatchway of defendant's vessel,
court procured by the parties in interest, are defendant pleaded a release by plaintiff, but
sold at auction at a loss, the receiver is not it did not appear that anything was
-hargeable therewith. – Rush worth v. Smith, said to him concerning a release by any one on
Coio. App.) 34 P. 482; Appeal of Eskridge, Id. behalf of defendant, and he testified he could

not and did not read it when he signed it. An
Power to make contracts.

employe of defendant read it to plaintiff's wife,
5. A consent order for the appointment of who could not read it, and she testified that
receiver of a mercantile partnership provided from what he read, and from his explanation of
hat he might continue the business of the it, she was led to believe it was simply a re-
sa Jara store, and replenish the stock therein ceipt, and that on her request plaintiff signed it.
rom the moneys received, until said stock can Such employe was a witness, but did not testify
e sold at a good and reasonable price.Held, about reading the paper to plaintiff's wife.
hat the receiver was justified in buying goods Hold, that the court properly charged that plain-
necessary to replenish the stock at 30 days' tiff was not bound by the release unless he had
ime, as customary, liquidating the bills out knowledge of its contents or purport, or had
of the proceeds of the sales.-Rushworth v. the means of such knowledge.-Smith v. Occi-

mith, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 482; Appeal of Esk- dental & Oriental Steamship Co., (Cal.) 34 P.
dige, Id.

84.

Scope of releasə.
RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS.

3. A receipt for money, recited to be "in

full settlement of account as follows: 40 cubic
Information- Variance.

yards stone @ $4,50 per yard,” is not a re-
Where the information on which deceipt in full for anything further than the stone
endant was tried charged that he received specified.-Union Pac., D. & G. Ry. Co. v. Mc-
tolen property "from some person to the dis- | Carty, (Colo. App.) 34 P. 767.

V.34P.-76

more

ever

Pleading release-Necessity.

Retrospective Laws.
4. A release of a cause of action is not
available unless it is specially pleaded.--Grun- See “Constitutional Law,” il
wald v. Freese, (Cal.) 34 P. 73.

Return.
Religious Societies.
Disposition of property, res judicata, see "Judg-

Of writ, see "Writs," 24.
ment," 19.
Escheat of property, see “Escheat."

Revenue.

See "Taxation."
Remedy at Law.
See “Equity," 1; "Injunction," 1, 2; "Specific

Review.
Performance," 1.

On appeal, see “Appeal,” 53-88; "Criminal Remittitur.

Law," 77-79.
See “Appeal," 98.

REVIEW, WRIT OF.
Removal.

Extent of review.
Of officers, see "Office and Officer," 2-6

1. A finding by the board of equalizacja

that a person has omitted taxable propery Repeal.

from his list to a certain amount is coocias

on the courts on writ of review, since Code Of statutes, see "Statutes," 14.

Civil Proc. $ 1074, provides that the reriem such writ cannot be extended further than

determine whether the inferior tribuna! REPLEVIN.

board has regularly pursued its authority.S Demand-When necessary.

curity Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Boan Sans

Los Angeles County, (Cal.) 34 P. 437; Voic 1. Where the defense in replevin is found. Street Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Same, id. ed on title in a defendant, and the right of Los Angeles Sav. Bank v. Same, Id. possession incident thereto, it is not necessary 2. Even if the fact that property has bei to prove demand and refusal.-Greenawalt v. so omitted is necessary to give the board jet Wilson, (Kan.) 34 P. 403.

diction, the court cannot review the eric Damages.

to determine whether there was evideo

show such fact, since the fact is one to be 2. In an action by a farmer to recover termined by the board. --Security Sav. Bank possession of horses, wagon, and harness, and Trust Co. v. Board Sup’rs Los Angeles Canety for damages for their wrongful detention, a(Cal.) 34 P. 437; Main Street Sav. Bach charge that the measure of damages is "the Trust Co. v. Same, Id.; Los Angeles Sar. Bert value of the use or hire of the property while v. Same, Id. in possession of defendant from the time of demand" is prejudicial to defendant when un

Revival. accompanied by considerations of whether the property could have been constantly employed Of judgment after satisfaction, see "Judgment" by plaintiff at a given rate of earnings, either 29. by letting for hire or by employment at home, and whether the gross earnings would have

Reward. been dininished by expense for, feeding, and Funds applicable to payment, see “States and care.-Brunell v. Cook, (Mont.) 34 P. 1015.

State Officers," 6.
Representations.

Riparian Rights.
Estoppel by, see "Estoppel," 9.

See “Irrigation;” “Waters and Water Courses Rescission.

Risks of Employment.
Of contract, see "Contracts," 21; "Equity,"
5-9.

See “Master and Servant," 20–26.
Of land contract, see "Vendor and Purchaser,"
9-11.
Reservoir.

Rivers.
Right to maintain, see "Waters and Water See "Waters and Water Courses."
Courses," 2.
Resignation.

ROBBERY.
Of officers, see "Office and Officer," 2-5.

Description of money stolen, see "Larceny," 1

Possession of stolen property, instructions, se Res Judicata.

"Burglary," 3, 4. See "Judgment," 12-23.

Instructions-Possession of stolen prop

erty. Resolutions.

On a prosecution for robbery, and

struction that defendants' possession of the Of cities, see "Municipal Corporations," 10–15. stolen property shortly after the crime, and

their failure to account for such possessos, Resulting Trusts.

are circumstances to show their guilt, and the

they were bound to explain the possession 9 See "Trusts,” 4-6.

remove its effect, is not error where the cours

has also charged that such possession is not a Retraxit.

itself sufficient to warrant a conviction, but

merely a circumstance to show guilt.-People F. See "Judgment," 16.

Etting, (Cal.) 34 P. 237.

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